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ABSTRACT 
Two s a l ient features of  late nineteenth centu ry American economic 
development we re the appearance of a multitude of large , horizont a l ly or 
vert ica l ly integrated manufactur ing corporation s ,  and t he eme rgence of  a 
sophist icated market for industria l securities . Acco rding t o  most 
economists and economic historians , both of  t hese developments can be 
att r ibuted prima rily to increased def icit f inancing requi rement s among 
late nineteenth century American manufacturers . This was presumed t o  
have resulted largely f rom technologica l  innovations in manufacturing 
that increa sed both total capital requi rements and the minimum s i ze of  
t he requ i red init i a l  investment in many indust ries . These developments 
we re t hought to have necessitated t he c reat ion and sale of new 
securities to a large , expe rientially and geographica l ly diverse pool of 
investors , and t he establishment of  new , more e ffic ient ma rket 
mechanisms to fac i l it ate the f low of funds between surplus and de ficit 
spending unit s . Ana lys is of the f inancial histories of  t he meat packing 
and suga r refining indust ries during 1 8 7 5 - 1 9 0 5  casts consi de rable doubt 
on this account of t he relat ionship between American f inancial  and 
bus iness development . P ractically a l l  phys ical capital expenditures o f  
the large vert ica l ly o r  horizontally integrated corporat ions which came 
t o  dominate each industry were funded in t he same manner a s  t he 
pa rtnerships and proprietorships out of which such corporat ions emerged­
-through short-term bank borrowings and retained earn ings . The 
innova tion of new bus iness devices , f inanc ia l ins t itut ions , and 
financ i a l  pract ice s ,  as my interpretat ion of  t he f inanci a l  histories of 
both industries suggest s ,  can be largely attributed t o  t he emergence of 
a new phenomenon , "st rategic f inance . "  "S trategic f inance" involved t he 
use o f  securitie s ,  corporat ions and holding companies t o  facilit ate t he 
reorganizat ion and combination of independently organized, a l ready 
exist ing product ive capacity . The reconf igurat ion o f  i ndependent , 
vi 
though functionally related business units e liminated the diffi culties 
c reated by the cha racteristics of "sunkeness"  and indivisib il ity o f  
invested capita l i n  manufacturing enterprises organized along 
pa rtnership ,  proprietorship or primitive corporate l ines . 
The institutions that facilitated the proces s  o f  "strategic f inance" had 
l ittle to do with funding the establishment o f  new productive capacity 
or the f inancing of ongoing operations . 
v i i  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTI ON : THE EVOLUTION OF F INANC IAL P RACTICES AND 
FINANCIAL STRUCTURES AMONG AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS , 
1 8 7 5-1 9 0 5  
Introduction 
According t o  Raymond w. Goldsmith,  a rise in the ratio o f  
f inancia l  a sset s ,  o r  securities , relative t o  t angible wea lt h  h a s  been a 
nearly universal cha racteristic of the economic development o f  t he 
indus t ria l i zed nat ions of the we stern world during t he nineteenth and 
t wentieth centuries . • The tendency for financial inst ruments to grow in 
importance as an i tem of national wea lth has usually been accompanied by 
the evolution of new types of securities,  and the eme rgence of new 
financia l inst itut ions and techn iques to a id in t he i r  creat ion and 
distr ibut ion . I t  is commonly assumed that mos t  of  tht secur i t ies 
created during the course of  industrial development are issued by 
manufact uring f i rms seeking to increa se their command over economic 
resources in advance of t he i r  having obtained the revenues f rom t he sale 
o f  t he outputs that such a n  increase in inputs is  expected t o  yield . 
The increase in the number and variety o f  securities is  t hen as sumed to 
be a consequence of  increased fixed o r  working capit a l  requirements 
among manufact u rers . 
This appa rently sensible assumpt ion has undoubtedly con t ributed t o  
t h e  paucit y  of answers t o  a numbe r of interest ing quest ions . How did 
f i rms f inance their act ivit ies before widespread use of t he mul t it ude of 
negotiable securit ies , f inancial markets and inst itut i�ns t hat t hey use 
today? How did t he i r  f inancia l practices change after t he p roliferation 
of new types of securities? What provided the impetus for t he 
1Raymond w. Goldsmith,  Financial St ruct u re and Development ( New 
Haven : Yale Univers ity Press,  1 9 6 9) .  
1 
innovation of new securities and financia l  techniques ?  A number of 
questions a ls o  a rise about the inte rrelat ionship bet ween the changing 
composit ion of s upply of part icular types of securit ies , the b roader 
financia l s tructu re and the economy as a whole . For instance , what is 
t he nature of t he interdependence between f inanci a l  and industrial 
development? How did commercial  banks and o ther f inancial inst itut ions 
contribute to the format ion of rea l  capital?2 
A Summary of Expl ana t i ons of Financial Developmen t In American 
Man u fa c t uring During the La t e  Nineteen th Cent u ry 
Most historica l and t heoretica l attempt s t o  answer these quest ions 
as t hey apply to nineteenth century American manufacturing take one o f  
two approaches .  The first i s  logica l and inte rnal l y  con sistent , and 
makes f requent use of the p ractice of recas ting h i st ory in terms that 
economic and financial theorists use t o  comprehend the modern world. 
The second approach is less axiomatic and logica l ly consistent , and 
eschews t he sweeping genera l i zations commonly made by proponents of t he 
first approach , focuss ing instead on the histor ica l development o f  a 
part icul a r  inst itut ion or aspect of a part icular per iod . The latter 
approach , a lt hough f rustrat ingly f ragmented, is far  richer in historical 
deta i l  than the former . In o rder t o  cons ider the merits o f  each 
approach , I have selected t wo industries and have attempted to recount 
the f inancial history of  each du ring t he development of America ' s  modern 
f inanci a l  st ruct u re . The f inancial histo ries which appear in the 
fol low ing four chapters suggest t hat the Procrustean Bed into which the 
history of  Ame rican financia l development has been frequently and 
convenient ly placed has yie lded an account of  the relat ionship between 
f inancia l  and industrial development that is severel y  l acking in 
2For more on the specification of some of t he ma j or issues related 
to the role of  f inancial development in ove ra l l  economic deve lopment ,  
see Rondo Came ron , ed . ,  Banking in the Ea rly Stages of Industria l i za tion 
( Cambridge : Oxford University P ress , 1 9 67) , pp . 1 - 1 1 and Goldsmith,  
Financi a l  St ructure and Deve lopment , Ch . 1 .  
2 
descript ive accuracy and interpret ive usefulness . The s a l ient featu res 
of  what economic inst itut ions and busines ses were act u a l ly doing during 
the late nineteenth cent u ry have been overlooked by historians and 
t heorists who have used the f i rst of t hese approaches in the formulation 
of  t he " textbook explanat ion" of  t he relationship between financial ,  
business and industrial development i n  Amer ica during the late 
n ineteenth cent u ry . This has yie lded a received wisdom which i s  in need 
of ca reful reexaminat ion . 
The "Textbook Explanation" 
Major Fea t ures 
According to the received wisdom o f  ou r  economic principles , 
economic history ,  and finance textbooks , t he most important feature o f  
financia l deve lopment is the emergence and perfect ion o f  institut ions 
and inst rument s that facilitate the flow of  rea l  savings between s u rplus 
and def icit spending units . Def icit spende rs a re presumed t o  seek to 
acqui re f inancial capi t a l  in excess of cu r rent revenues f rom savers  in 
o rder to expand t he i r  control ove r inputs in t he p rocess  of  product ion . 
The prima ry impetus for t he development of new f inancial institut ion s ,  
inst ruments and p ract ices has , t he story cont inue s ,  de rived f rom 
changing de f icit f inancing requirement s ,  which a re t he primary facto r  
behind a l l  bo r rowing and security issues . 3 The pro l i ferat ion of  the 
corpo rate form of bus ines s organi zat ion, f inanci a l  ma rket deve lopment ,  
and t he dramatic increa se i n  t he numbe r o f  consolidat ions in 
manufactu ring indust ries during 1 8 8 8- 1 9 0 3  a re all  expla ined by this 
hypothe s i s  i n  many of t he mos t  highly respected and widely read accounts 
of nineteenth century economic and financia l  development . 
3Goldsmith,  Financial St ruct ure and Development , pp . 4 0 0 - 4 0 5 . 
3 
The Rise of Incorpora t ed Businesses and the Use of Corpora t e  S tock 
Paul S amuelson has asse rted that t he p rima ry reason t hat 
businesses chose t o  adopt the co rporate form o f  business o rganization 
and issue corporate stock is that " la rge corporations can raise large 
sums of money to engage in e fficient large scale production . "' The 
economic rationa le for the innovation of the corporate f o rm of business 
organization and t he p roliferation of  corporate securities is presumed 
by Samue lson to be as fol lows: 
Without limited liability and the corporation, a mar ket 
economy simply could not reap t he benefit that comes when 
l a rge supplies of capital need to be att racted to e fficient­
sized corporations t hat produce a va riety o f  complement a ry 
products,  that poo l risks,  and that best utilize t he 
economies o f  sizable resea rch unit s and managerial know-how 
( Samuel son and Nordhau s ,  Economics ,  12th ed . ,  p .  4 4 0) .  
Lance Davis , who is perhaps the most wide ly cited authority on t he 
development of  America' s capital market s ,  echoes Samuelson ' s a rgument . 
He asserts that the ma j o r  features of t he corpo rate form o f  business 
organization ,  such as limited liability ,  perpetual life,  and t he 
divisibility of  equity a re t hose that made it easie r  for corporations to 
secure ext e rnal finance . Incorporated businesses had a decisive 
a dvant age ove r more primitive business organiza tions in t hat t hey could 
finance t heir expansion t hrough the issue o f  corporate stock to a large , 
dive rse pool of investors . ; 
Ma rga ret Myer s ,  in her authoritative 1 9 3 1  hist ory of  t he emergence 
of the New York money market , noted that t he growth of the securities 
market in New York during t he last quarter of t he nineteenth century 
received it s prima ry impetus f rom inc reases in the volume of  stock 
issues by indust ria l corporations . This s he att ributes l a rgely t o  a 
re laxation of the laws governing incorpo ration,  which made it easier for 
4Paul A.  Samuel son and William D .  Nordhaus , Economic s ,  12th edition 
( New York : McGraw-Hil l Book Company, 1 9 8 5 ) , p .  vii, p .  4 4 0 . 
�Lance Davis et a l . ,  American Economic Growth: An Economists 
History o f  the United States ( New York: Ha rper & Row ,  1 972 ) , p .  3 3 2 . 
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bus inesses t o  raise money-capital by issu ing stock . 6 According t o  
Myers , the ea rly f inancial ma rket i n  Ame rica w a s  an  amorphous s t ructure 
out o f  which emerged va rious inst itut ions , each o f  which appeared i n  
response t o  an i ncreased demand for a pa rticular t ype of  f i nance . To 
meet the needs of t rade a nd comme rce, the commerci a l  paper and fore ign 
exchange ma rke t s  eme rged ;  in response to the demand for speculat ive 
borrowing from t raders in New York ' s va rious securit ies exchanges ,  the 
cal l  loan ma rket came into being ; a nd in response t o  t he increased fixed 
capital requ i rements of manufacturing bus i nesses , the industrial  
securit ies ma rket appea red . ' 
I n  a more recent account , Michael Baskin asserts t ha t  the 
devel opment o f  new financial inst rument s ,  techn iques , and mar kets can be 
a t t r ibuted t o  efforts to minimi ze the problems created by w idespread 
informa t ion asymmetries between company ins iders and potential 
investors . 8 Although Bas kin bemoans the fact that l it t le i n  t he way of 
financial history has been based on historica l evidence rathe r  than a 
priori reasoning, he h imse lf resorts t o  the latter techn ique when he 
assumes that the changing financial pract ices and new t ypes of 
secu r it ies he observes ( wh ich he hypothesizes a re intended to address  
agency problems , adve rse select ion and prohibitive uncertainty 
discount s )  o r iginated in " t he requi rements for ever increasing amounts 
of capit a l  t o  fuel la rge -sca le enterprise . . .  [wh ich requi red that ] 
capital  . . .  be sol icited from investors located ove r  a w ide a rea . "9 
Although Baskin ma kes pa instaking use of t he historical reco rd t o  
account for t he changing relat ive importance of  different t ypes o f  
6Ma rga ret G .  Mye rs , The New York Money Ma rket: Origins and 
Deve lopment ( New Yo rk : Co lumbia University P re s s ,  1 9 3 1 ) , pp . 2 9 5 -2 9 7 . 
7Myers , p .  1 0 . 
8Michael Ba skin,  "The Deve lopment of  Corpo rate F inancial  Mar kets i n  
Britain and the United State s ,  1 6 0 0 - 1 9 1 4 :  Overcoming Asymmet r ic 
Informat i on , "  Bus iness History Review 62 ( Summe r ,  1 9 8 8 ) : 1 9 9-2 3 7 . 
9Baskin,  p .  2 0 0 . 
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stocks and bonds within different indus t ries , l i ke mos t  other p roponents 
of  the many variants of the " textbook explanat ion , "  presumes t ha t  the 
issuance o f  perpetua l obligat ions like corporate s tock i s  prima facie 
evidence of  a demand for external finance to fund the creat ion o f  
t angible f ixed asset s . 
Consol i da t ions and Financial Developmen t 
Several  other account s have st res sed t he importance of  the 
relat ionship bet ween consolidat ions , f inanci a l  develop1nent , and t he 
emergence of a ma rket for industrial securities . 10 P roliferat ion of  
consol idat ions in t he late nineteenth century is also,  t hough s omewhat 
more cont rove r s i a l ly,  perceived as having p roceeded f rom t he same set of  
conside rat ions t hat gave rise to most othe r  f inancia l  developments 
during the nineteenth century : an unsatisfied demand for money-capital 
t o  f inance capital investment in consolida t ing indust ries . According t o  
this view, the process of  consol idat ion was ident ical t o  t h a t  o f  s imple 
inco rpo ration,  a l though on a larger sca le , and was underta ken in most 
instances so that securities cou ld be created, sold for cash i n  t he 
deve loping securit ies ma rket , and the proceeds used t o  f i nance new 
investment among t he consolidated f i rms . 
This account , which again derives f rom the work of  Lance Davis , 
asserts that the peculiarly Amer ican system of unit banking, consisti ng 
of t housand� o f  re lat ively small  commercial bank s ,  wa s incapable o f  
meet ing t he financial needs of  America ' s  increas ingly la rge indust rial 
1 0Thomas R .  Navin and Ma rian v. Sea rs , " The Rise o f  a Market for 
Indust rial  Securit ies , 1 8 87- 1 9 02 , " Business History Review 2 9  ( 1 95 5 ) : 
2 55-272 , asse rted that the la rge number o f  conso l idat ion-backed 
secu r i t ies which we re is sued during 1 8 8 8 - 1 8 9 3  and 1 8 97-1 9 0 2  gave r ise t o  
the indust r i a l  securities ma rket and i t s  attendant inst itution s . Ralph 
Ne lson , Me rge r Movements in Ame rican Indust ry, 1 8 9 5- 1 9 5 6  ( P rinceton,  
N . J . : P rince t on University P ress , 1 9 5 9 )  pos ited that a buoyant 
securit ies ma rket caused the sha rp increa se in the number o f  
conso l idat ions that occu rred during 1 8 97-1 9 0 2 . I n  Navin and Sear s  
causat ion runs f rom consolidat ions t o  the development of  t h e  indust rial 
securit ies ma rket , whereas in Nel son the development c� t he market a nd 
i t s  ancil la ry inst i tut ions caused the consolidat ions . 
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corporations . ll Individual indust rial firms in countries l i ke Britain,  
with the i r  wel l  developed branch banking systems , could ca l l  upon t he 
local branch o f  one o f  t he system' s giant commerc ial banks for  a l l  t he i r  
financial needs , both l a rge and sma l l . Growing Americ�n indus trial  
f i rms , howeve r ,  increas ingly found the i r  financi a l  needs unmet by  t he 
commercia l banking system, and were forced t o  cons o lidate in o rder t o  
gain access t o  t he long-te rm capital markets , s uch a s  the New Y o r k  Stock 
Exchange , in which mos t  of the growing number of indust ri a l  securit ies 
t hat we re t raded were issued by newly me rged o r  consol ida t ing f i rms . 12 
Davis ' s  account of the relationship between consolidat ions and t he 
demand for external f inance appears in one of t he more widely read 
Ame rican economic history textbooks as follows: 
The American industrial f i rm in similar c ircumstances [to 
its  Brit ish counterpart ) had no such local capital  source . 
To rai se [expansion capit a l ) , t he Ame rican f i rm had t o  
create an intangible asset that cou ld be t raded e lsewhere , 
in  a ma j o r  center,  for capital funds . It c reated such 
int angible asset s ,  stocks and bonds ,  by merger with its  
compet itors ( Jonathan Hughes , Ame rican Economic Histo ry, 3 rd 
edit ion . New York : Scot t ,  Foresman and Company, 1 9 9 0 ) . 
Hughes ' s  notes that "history seems to support"  Davis i n  h i s  
a ssert ion that t h e  " fragmentat ion of American commercial banking , " by 
making it impos s ible for many industrial f i rms to secure s u f f icient 
capital t o  f inance t he i r  fixed and wo rking capital needs , "produced both 
h igh finance and big bus iness . " 1 3  A shortage of money capit a l  to 
f inance expans ion among a s ignif icant number of c redit-sta rved 
manufactu rers , acco rding to Davis and his interp rete r s ,  was t hus 
respons ible for  the g rowt h of  the New York investment banking community 
at the turn o f  the cent ury, the proliferat ion o f  the consol idation 
1 1Lance Davis , "The Capit a l  Markets and Indust rial Concent rat ion : 
The U . S .  and U . K . , a Compa rat ive Study , " Economic History Review 1 9  
(Augus t ,  1 9 6 6 ) : 2 55-2 7 2 . 
12Lance Davi s ,  " The Capital Ma rkets and Industrial  Concent rati on , " 
pp . 2 6 6-2 6 8 . 
1 3Hughe s ,  pp . 3 6 9-37 0 . 
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backed securities that comprised most o f  the inst ruments that were 
t raded in t he deve loping investment ma rket , and indeed, the 
consolidat ions themse lves . 
The Developmen t of the Industrial Securi t i es Marke t  
The development o f  new f inancial inst it ut ions t o  facilitate t he 
exchange o f  the new securities , such as  investment banks , comme rcial 
paper b rokers , t he commercial paper ma rket , and the ma rket for 
indu s t r ial securities , receives a s imilar t reatment in the economic 
history l iterature . Lance Davis repeatedly re fers to what is presumed 
to be the i r  common funct ion : the t ransfer of real savings between 
surplus and de f icit spending unit s . 1 4  The prima ry feature for Davis in 
t he development o f  capital markets is t he i r  e ffecti venes s in mobili zing 
money-capital between savers and inves tors . Davis t reats the emergence 
of nat iona l ma rket s for long- and short-term capital as a movement 
towa rds t he i r  greater e f f ic iency as price sett ing mechanisms , in  which a 
homogeneous "commodit y, " money-capital , is exchanged f o r  p romises to 
pay o f  va rious du ration . 
The crit ica l problem, for Davis , is to explain t he persistence of  
inter-indu s t ry o r  inter- regiona l rate o f  return d i fferent i a ls ( which he 
believes were endemic t o  America ' s f inancial markets prior t o  1 9 0 0 )  
across f inancial inst ruments o f  ident ica l du rat ion . 1 5  ln his view,  the 
capital ma rket "di sequ il ibrium" man i fested in such rate o f  retu rn 
dif fe rent ials  wa s a t t r ibutable to rapid increases in the dema nd for 
external f inance as  the locat ion of  many indust ries shi fted f rom east t o  
14See , f o r  inst ance , Lance Davis et a l . ,  Ame rican Economic Growt h : 
An Economis t s  History o f  the United States , p .  4 4; Lance Davis and 
Dougla s s  Nort h ,  I nst itut ional Change and American Economic G rowth 
(Cambridge : Cambr idge Un iversity P res s ,  1 9 7 1 ) , pp . 1 0 6- 1 1 7 ;  and Lance 
Davis , " The I nvestment Market , 1 8 7 0 -1 9 1 4 : The Evolution of a Nat i on a l  
Market , " Jou rnal o f  Economic History 2 5  ( September ,  1 9 6 5 ) : 3 5 5 - 4 0 0 . 
1 5Lance Davis et a l . ,  American Economic Growt h : An Economists 
History o f  the Un ited States,  pp . 3 2 4 -327 : Lance Davi s ,  "The Investment 
Market , 1 8 7 0 - 1 9 1 4 : The Evolut ion of a Na t iona l Ma rket . "  
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wes t ,  and a series of technological innovat ions in manu facturing 
increased both total capital requ i rement s and the minimum s i ze o f  the 
requi red init ial investment in many indust ries . 1 6  The new inst itut ions 
and ma rkets that emerged in response t o  this increased demand for 
externa l f inance resulted in a more efficient t ransfe r of  money capital 
between savers and investors , and a decrease in t he cost t o  American 
manufacturers o f  f inancing t he accumulation o f  newly c reated t a ngible 
asset s .  Davis ' s  story of American f inancial development , at least 
insof a r  a s  it relates to the late nineteenth and early t went ieth 
cent urie s ,  ends with the disappearance of  rate of  ret urn different ials 
in t he money and investment ma rkets . 
Davis ' s account of the development of America ' s f inancial  
infrast ructure ,  which posits a "capital  mar ket " i n  which savings a re 
bought and s old a s  the dominant f inancial inst itut ion , and financial 
development as  cons ist ing primarily o f  the c apital ma rket ' s  movement 
towa rd a state nearer to the theoretical idea l of " pe rfection , " ha s 
rece ived wide currency in the economic h istory l iterat•.tre . 17 The 
dominance of this approach is i l lust rated by its  appea rance in t he 
Encyclopedia of Ame rican Economic History, wherein,  t oget he r  with a 
brief historical account of the deve lopment o f  t he New York f inancia l 
ma rkets  and investment banking community by Robert S obe l ,  i t  comprises 
1 6Lance Davis , "Capital Immobil it ies and Finance Capi t a l i sm, " in 
Late Nineteenth Century Amer ican Development , ed . Jef f rey G .  Wil l iamson 
(Cambridge : Cambridge University P res s ,  1 9 7 4 ) ,  pp . 5 8 2 -5 8 3 . 
1 7See, for instance , a representative text : Rober t  C .  Puth,  
Ame rican Economic History ( New York : The Dryden P ress , 1 9 8 7 ) . By 
"pe rfect ion" I mean a hypothe t ical genera l equil ibrium in financia l  
ma rket s ,  i n  which a l l  oppo rtunities for economic p rofits  f rom the 
t rans fer of  savings between surplus and def i c it t rading units have been 
e l iminated and a l l  gains f rom t he intertemporal exchange of purchasing 
powe r exhaus ted . 
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the gener a l ly accepted view of the relat ionship betwee� f inanci a l  and 
industria l  development . 18 
The Alternative Explanation 
Adolph Berl e and Gardiner Means on the Corpora t e  Revolu t i on 
There a re a numbe r of accounts of  the rise o f  incorporated big 
busi ness and the development of  America ' s  f inanci a l  s t ructure dur ing the 
late n ineteenth cent u ry that a re at odds with the w idely accepted 
"textbook explanat ion" ou t l ined above . Acco rding to Adolph Berle and 
Ga rdiner Means ,  i n  the i r  classic wo rk on the mode rn corpo rat ion , the 
p ro l i fera t ion of the corporate fo rm of  business o rgan i zat ion , first in 
the text ile i ndustry,  then in ra i l roads and min ing, and f in a l ly i n  a 
number o f  other indust ries within the manu facturing sector,  wa s 
a t t r ibutable t o  a des i re on the part of bus iness owners to " f ree 
themselve s "  f rom fixed investments t hat had a l ready been unde rt a ken,  o r  
to enable the consol idat ion o f  smaller,  exist ing business propert ies 
within a s ingle incorpo rated bus iness unit . 1 9 The prima ry ways by which 
most corporat ions inc rea sed their wea lth,  according to Berle and Means , 
were t hrough the re inves tment of ea rnings or by acqu i r ing con t rol o f  
other exist ing companies through the purchase or exchange o f  securit ies; 
they asserted that ra i s ing capital through the s a le o f  corporate stock 
was o f  minor impo rtance in f inanc ing corpo rate investment i n  capit a l  
goods . 20 There fore , the connection between t he spread o f  t h e  corporate 
form of  business o rganizat ion and a des i re on t he part of  bus inesses to 
18Lance Davis , " Saving and Investment , "  in Encycl oPedi a  of  Ame rican 
Economic History :  Studies o f  the Princ iple Movement s and Ideas , ed . Glen 
Porter (New York : Charles Scribner' s Sons , 1 9 8 0 ) . 
19Adolph D .  Be r le and Gardiner C .  Means , The Mode rn Corporation and 
P rivate P rope rty ( New York : Commerce Clearing House , 1 9 3 2 ) , pp . 1 2 -1 3 .  
20Ber le and Means , p .  4 2  
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gain access to a new form o f  external f inance to f und the accumulation 
of newly c reated tangible a ssets was ins ignif icant . 
Gerald Gunderson ' s account , in his economic history textbook ,  i s  
s imilar,  though not identical,  to that of  Ser le and Means . According to 
him, the incorporation o f  many manufactu res during the late n ineteenth 
cent ury had little to do with the indivisibility of investment projects 
and the c r itical  " a l l  at once " t iming of investment which was common 
among railroads and canal companies prior to 1 87 0 . 2 1 Most 
incorporations occurred a fter companies had a l ready become l a rge , 
profitable enterprises . Gunderson asse rts that these corporat ions were 
not go ing public merely to raise capita l ;  to a large extent they had 
a l ready solved tha t problem . 22 Rathe r,  he states , " it appears as if the 
greatest attract ion to t a k i ng t he incorporat ion step . . .  lay in the 
advantage it offered to existing bus iness owners of  retaining the wea lth 
they had a l ready c reated . " 23 The corporate device facil itated this  by 
enabl ing formerly unsa lable business equ ity to become highly l iquid, 
result ing in a great ly inc rea sed market value for an incorporated 
bus iness ove r  its pract ically non-existent ma rket value a s  a 
pa rtne rship . 24 
21Gera ld Gunderson , A New Economic History of Amer ica (New York : 
McG raw-Hi l l  Book Company,  1 9 7 6 ) , p .  3 5 5 . According to Gunders on ,  the 
s i ze and t iming o f  investment projects within much o f  the t ranspo rtation 
secto r  necessitated the use o f  va rious types of  negot iable securities to 
secure l ong term finance form outs ide sources . This wa s�. he 
asserts,  the case with most incorporated manu fact u rers  ( see below)  . 
22Gunde rson ,  p .  3 5 5 . 
23Gunderson,  p .  3 5 5 . 
24Be rle a nd Mean s  ( pp .  xv-xvi ) also emphasize the role of  
securities exchanges a s  a "mechanism for l iquidity" rathe r than a s  a 
"place of  investment . "  According to them, most stock issues that a re 
t raded on the securit ies exchanges have a l ready been issued and sold by 
s ome other means , and a re f requent ly backed by other f inanci a l  assets o r  
physica l p roperties a lready i n  existence , rather than a n  expected 
revenue st ream f rom s ome yet to be consummated investn • •  mt project . 
Therefore ,  it is extremely unlikely that money and c redit that is  
involved in the ci rculation o f  stock ever enters the st ream o f  "direct 
commercial or product ive use . "  
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The Rol e of Short Term Credi t in Financing Fixed Capi t a l  Investment 
Among Man u fa c t urers 
The view that the search for  external f inance to fund f ixed 
capital inve stment was the catalyst for profound st ructura l changes 
within the capita l ma rkets has been cons ide red and di smis sed by S idney 
Pollard . Alt hough his  thes is pe rtains to nineteenth century Brit ish  
development , it cont ains a numbe r o f  assert ion s  that  may wel l  f it the 
experiences of the Amer ican manufacturing and f inancial  sectors a s  
wel l . 25 P o ll a rd asserts that the amount o f  f ixed capit a l  emp loyed in 
most manufacturing indust ries has been g reatly exaggerated; most f i rms 
achieved inc reases in output by improvements in " o rder and 
o rganizat ion , " and inc rementa l ,  interna lly f inanced technological 
improvements and addit ions to productive capacity,  rather than through 
the a l l  at once incorpo ration of costly mechanical devices i nto the i r  
p roduct ion proces ses . 26 Most important in reducing t h e  burden o f  f ixed 
capital  expenditures among most manu facturers was the fact that : 
New i ndust rialists took over f rom the older t ypes o f  
i ndustry and commerce , with little change , the methods o f  
providing capital and of  ma king payments . These methods 
we re based on an e labo rate ly ba lanced and del icate system o f  
[ short term) c redit ( Pol lard,  p .  3 0 3 ) . 
According to Pollard, the use of  commercial bank c redit coupled 
with the complex t rade c redit a rrangements that existed among many 
man uf acturers , the i r  distributors and suppliers a llowed growing f i rms to 
enter new l ines or expand their c i rcle of  product ion with only a sma l l  
amount o f  equity capital provided b y  the owners . In this way many 
manufacturers we re able to increase the i r  volume o f  bus iness through the 
increased provi s ion of  work ing capital enabled by borrowing on open 
2�S idney Pollard,  " Fixed Capital in the Indus t r i a l  Revolution in 
Britain , " Journal o f  Economic History 2 4  ( September ,  1 9 6 4 ) : 2 9 9-3 1 4 . 
26Pollard,  pp . 3 0 1-30 3 . According t o  Pollard,  i ron manufacturers 
had the h ighest ratios o f  f ixed to working capital a s  va lued on the i r  
books in pounds sterling,  ave raging . 72 / 1  dur ing the early-middle part 
of t he n i neteenth centu ry;  other manufacturers had much lower f ixed 
capit a l  requi rement s .  
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account f rom supp l ie rs or through the use of  c redits extended by 
commerc ial banks , and to accumu late out of  earnings enough to enlarge 
the base o f  their operat ions . Whi le the banking system in the U . S .  may 
not have been as respons ive to the short term c redit needs of bus i ness  
as the branch banking system of  Britain, Amer ican manu factu re rs had an 
important sou rce of  short-term c redit that provided an excel lent 
complement to short-term bank c redit , the is suance of s ingle name 
commercial pape r . 27 
Informat ion gathered by Navin and Sears on la rge Ame r ican 
manufacturers dur ing the late n ineteenth cent u ry supports the 
appl icabi l ity of Pollard' s inte rpretation to the f inanc i a l  deve lopment 
o f  Amer ican manufacturers . Th roughout the 1 8 8 0s and early 1 8 9 0 s  most 
f i rms , even those which were very la rge and fixed-capita l intens ive by 
contempora ry standa rds ( such as the S inge r Sewing Machine Company,  the 
McCormick Ha rvest ing Machine ry Company and the Ca rnegie Steel Company) 
were e ither partnerships or very closely held corpo rat ions . Each had 
apparent l y  f inanced the i r  f ixed capital accumu lat ions through the 
init i a l  investment o f  a sma l l  c i rcle of  owners , extens i ve use of short 
term c redit , and the reinvestment of earn ings . 28 
Consol i da t i ons, The Emergence of Big Busi ness and the Devel opmen t of the 
Indus t r i a l  Secu ri t ies Marke t  
There i s  a l so an a lternat ive explanat ion for  the concurrent 
increases in consolidat ion activity, and the pro l i fe rat ion of corporate 
secur i t ies that occurred dur ing 1 8 90-1 9 0 5 . Ralph Nelson , in his  study 
of  Ame r ican merge r movement s ,  noted that most o f  the secu rities that 
were issued during the me rger wave of  1 8 9 7 - 1 9 0 2  we re exchanged for  
27Pollard,  p .  3 0 9 . For more on  the increased use  o f  s ingle name 
commercial paper among Amer ican manufacturers during 1 8 50 - 1 9 0 0 ,  see 
Myers , pp . 3 1 4 - 32 5 . 
21Navin a nd Sea r s ,  pp . 1 0 9- 1 1 0 .  Each of the compan ies named above 
had a s sets with book va lues in excess of $ 1 0  mi l lion 1� 1 8 8 8 . 
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assets a l ready in existence or the securit ies o f  other companies , rather 
than for cash . During 1 8 9 7 , 94 percent of a l l  recorded issues o f  
industrial  preferred and common stock were exchanged for t angible assets 
a l ready in existence and the securit ies of other compan ies ( inc luding 
the assets and equity of partnersh ips that we re conve rting to 
incorporated businesses ) .  During the next f ive yea rs , when the annual 
number of conso l idat i ons reached a pea k  that has yet to be surpassed, 
the numbe r of  securit ies issued for cash to the gene ral publ ic increased 
to an annual  ave rage of  only 1 0 . 6  pe rcent of  a l l  secur i t ies is s ued . 29 
Although no s imi lar  f igures are ava i lable for the period before 1 8 9 7 ,  it 
is a lmost certain that the proport ion of  securities issued direct ly for 
cash was even lowe r ,  as the ma rket and its anc i llary inst itut ions had 
yet to become fully accustomed to the dist ribut ion of industrial  
secu rities . 
These figures cast doubt on Lance Davi s ' s hypot hes i s  that mergers 
were bei ng undertaken by capital starved f i rms so that consolidation 
backed securi t ies could be exchanged for cash i n  the devel oping 
secur i t ies ma rket to fund the expansion of product ive capacity and 
increases in working capital among the newly consolidated f i rms . Of  
course , the increa sed profitabil ity of hori zont a l ly consolidated f i rms 
may s ubsequent ly have cont ributed to addit ional capital acc umulat ion 
through the reinvestment of  ea rnings in the consol idated bus inesses . 30 
Other accounts cast further doubt f rom another qua rter on Davis ' s  
29Nel son , pp . 8 8 -8 9 .  
30 It i s  poss ible that the consolidat ions which most o f  the security 
is sues during this pe riod we re meant to fac i litate ena�led the 
subsequent generation of funds to finance increased fixed capital 
acc umulat ions . For instance, a newly formed consol idat ion might real ize 
h ighe r ea rnings on invested capital than had been rea l i zed by its  
formerly independent const it uent pa rt s ,  with  such ea rnings s ubsequently 
being reinvested in expanding the product ive capacity o f  the 
consolidat ion . I n  this case the issue of securities may be t hought of 
as indi rectly having contributed to the format ion o f  new f ixed capita l ,  
even though such securities were not i ssued direct ly in response to the 
need to f inance increased f ixed capita l  expenditu res . 
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hypothesis on consol idat ions and inves tment market activity dur ing the 
late nineteenth century . According to Naomi Lamo reaux, f i rms t hat were 
most l ikely to engage in consolidat ion shared a numbe r of s imil a r  
tendenc ie s ,  including h igh ratios of  f ixed cha rges t o  t o t a l  revenue ( due 
in l a rge part to " excessive borrowing" relat ive to the use of other 
methods of interna l and exte rna l f inance ) , la rge establishments and 
numbers o f  workers,  pers istent overproduction and e xcess capacity,  and 
h igh rat ios of  total invested capital to output . 3 1  None of these 
s uggest a shortage of  f inance to fund the accumu lat ion of newly 
produced, tangible , f i xed a ssets . Rather they sugges t  the reverse : that 
the amount of capital that f i rms were able to obtain t hrough 
"t radit ional "  channels (whateve r  they we re ) was more than s u f f ic ient to 
fund a high rate of  investment within the manufacturing sector . 
R .  C .  Michie, in a high ly deta iled, compa rat i ve study of  the 
London and New York inves tment ma rkets , describes the typical n ineteenth 
century consol idat ion as involving " no more than the convers ion of ( an ]  
estab l ished company into ( a ]  larger grouping, involving l it t le 
fundamental  change o r  any need to obtain f inance for  ma j o r  new 
developments . " 32 Michie ' s findings cast further doubt on the hypothesis 
that merger s  were mot ivated by the need to obta in new forms of external 
f inance . 33 
A number of early twentieth cent ury account s of the f i rst great 
merger wave a ls o  f a i l  to ment ion the st imulat ive role that a scarcity o f  
external f inance was thought to have played in consolidat ion by Davis 
and Hughes . According to Carl Parrini and Martin Sklar,  who surveyed 
the works o f  a number of a number of late nineteenth and early t wentieth 
31Naomi Lamo reaux, The Great Merge r Movement i n  Amer ican Bus iness , 
1 8 9 5-1 9 0 4  (Cambridge: Cambridge Univers ity P re s s ,  1 9 8 5 ) , pp . 3 3 -3 4 ,  p .  
5 5 ,  pp . 9 0 - 9 2 . 
32R .  C .  Michie,  The London and New York Stock Exchanges,  1 8 5 0 - 1 9 1 4  
( London : Allen & Unwin,  1 9 8 7 ) , pp . xii-xii i .  
33Michie, p .  2 2 5 . 
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century Ame rican economi s t s ,  the convent ional wisdom on the primary 
impetus t o  consol ida t ion at the t ime when t hey were actual ly taking 
place held that mergers came about as a result  of a " congestion of 
capita l , "  or i nves tment in redundant plant and i tems in p roces s ,  a 
phenomenon t hat was t hought t o  have resulted f rom chronic ove rs aving 
( and underconsumpt ion) . Much of such excess savings o riginated i n  
h ighly prof itable enterprises that , prior to the i r  conso l idat ion,  had 
f inanced most of their  f ixed investment out of reta ined earnings 
generated on a h igh volume of throughput . Such chronic oversaving and 
ove rinvestment drove down o r  dest royed rates of retu rn on invested 
capit a l ,  a nd according t o  t he economists whose wo rk was surveyed by the 
authors , gave r ise t o  an u rgent need for the coordinat ion of investment 
and product ion in indust ries t hat we re so s t ricken . 34 
Towa rd a New Al t erna t i ve Expl ana t i on 
I n  t he work of Be rle and Means , Michie, Pollard,  and Lamo reaux , 
the increased use of indust rial securities,  incorporat ion and 
conso l idat ion in the late n ineteenth century did not play the same 
central  role in the r ise of big bus ines s  that they did i n  t he "textbook 
explana t ion . "  The increased use of secur it ies and the corporate device 
was not , in t he a lternat ive view, an essential o r  even important t oo l  
f o r  obta in ing t h e  funds requi red f o r  t h e  growth of  l a rge , f i xed-capital 
intens ive f i rms . This cont radict ion between t he rece ived wisdom among 
economists  a nd the event s  of the late nineteenth centu ry as interp reted 
by proponents of  the a lternat ive explanat ion has been l arge ly 
unexplored . Not only is it  unclear precisely how f i rms f inanced t he i r  
act ivit ies once industrial  securities and incorpo rat ion came into common 
use ( and how t he f inanc ial pract ices of such f i rms di f fered f rom the 
34Carl J .  Parrini and Ma rtin J .  Sklar,  "New Thinking About the 
Ma rke t ,  1 8 9 6- 1 9 0 4 : Some Ame rican Economists  on I nvestment and the Theory 
o f  S u rplus Capita l , " Jou rnal of Economic History 4 3  ( September ,  1 9 8 3 ) : 
5 5 9-57 8 . 
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earlier period) if those devices did not play the role in f inancial  
devel opment t hat has  typica l ly been att ributed to them . It  i s  a l so 
uncertain what funct ion corporate securit ies , the i s sue o f  which most 
certa inly prolife rated during the late n ineteenth centu ry ,  se rved t o  the 
is suing f i rm .  It  i s  to these two questions that this dissertat ion is 
addressed . 
My approach i s  to desc ribe and interpret the f inanci a l  development 
of two indust ries : meat packing and suga r ref ining . Each g rew rapidly 
during the pe riod 1 8 7 5- 1 9 0 5 ,  each came to be dominat ed by one or more 
ve ry la rge incorporated businesses , each underwent profound 
o rganizat ional or technological change during 1 8 7 5 - 1 9 0 5 ,  and each 
experienced dramatic increases in the leve l  of invested capita l  emp loyed 
in its  l a rgest firms . Yet ,  as the evidence that w i l l  0e p resented below 
shows , each continued to re ly almost completely on t he financial 
techniques and inst itut ions that were a l ready we l l  establis hed dur ing 
the earliest pe riod of thei r development . The new, increas ingly 
sophist icated financia l techniques and financial institut ions t hat went 
hand in hand with t he widespread adopt ion of the corporate form of 
business organizat ion in both the suga r refining and meat packing 
indust ries did not derive f rom an unsatis f ied demand for externa l 
f inance to fund the accumulation of  rea l capita l .  The proliferat ion o f  
new types of secu rities and the techniques that accompanied their 
creation and dist ribut ion a rose in response to an ent i re ly diffe rent set 
of  circumst ances and were di rected toward an entirely diffe rent end than 
the funding of the accumulation of addit iona l p roduct ive capac ity in 
f inance-sta rved, increas ingly f ixed-capital intensive indus t ries . 
This study is based on the works of  a number of individuals who 
have des c ribed t he deve lopment of each industry in rich historical 
det a il . To t he i r  wo rk,  I have added a det a i led f inanc ial history o f  
each indu s t ry,  as a spect of  their overall deve lopment that h a s  only been 
t reated indirect l y in the works upon which t he case studies a re based . 
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The f inancial hist ories presented below thus include a synthesis  o f  a 
number of diverse contempo rary accounts of  the f inanci a l  development o f  
t he meat pack ing and sugar refining industries. These include t he 
records of  R .  G .  Dun & Co . ,  a nineteenth centu ry c redjt reporting 
agency , the Comme rcial  and Financial Ch ronic le , perhaps the mos t  
reputable of  late nineteenth century business publ ica t ions ,  and a 
mul t itude of  State and Fede ra l gove rnment documents and records of  lega l 
proceedings that detail  the many invest igat ions int o t he a ffairs of  
t hese indust ries that we re unde rtaken during the late nineteenth 
century . 3� 
Financial Development of Mass Production Industries 
Financial Consequences of Mass Production Technologies Among American 
Man u fa c t urers 
The indust r ies that comprise my case st udies were chosen in the 
hope that the i r  f inanc ial hi stories would yield genera l izat ions t hat 
woul d  be appl icable to a wide range of  different manufact u ring 
indust ries . The dominant f i rms in s uga r ref ining grew by way o f  
horizont a l  consol idat ion ,  whe reas the largest f i rms in meat packing grew 
by way of  vert ica l integrat ion . One indust ry underwent a drama t ic 
t echnological revo lut ion ( the advent of re f rige ra t ion ) which greatly 
increased t he l i kelihood that its financ i a l  faci l i t ies would be st ressed 
by the need of most produce rs to invest "all  at  once" in new, capital 
intens ive product ion and dist ribut ion fac i l i t ies . The other underwent 
more gradual  technological change . But each shared one important 
characteristic that makes their f inancial histories m�re relevant to a 
wider range o f  indus t r ies than I originally thought pos s ible . 
Acco rding t o  Al fred Chandle r,  t he mos t  fundament a l  t rans format ion 
that occurrP.d in Amer ican manu facturing du ring the last qua rter  of  the 
3�For more on t he ma jor featu res of  t he sources used in comp i l ing 
t hese f inanc i a l  hist ories , see Appendix A .  
1 8  
nineteenth century involved a profound, interrelated o rgani zat ional and 
technologica l revolut ion . The revolut ion in product ion involved the 
appl icati on of new mas s  product ion technologies to the manufacture of a 
wide range o f  items , f rom f lour to machine tool s . Contemporaneous with 
the incorporat ion o f  new , mas s  production technologies into a rapidly 
increas ing numbe r of manu facturing faci l it ies was an o rganizat ional 
revo lution , by which output was expanded by imp roved des ign of  
manufactur ing o r  process ing plant s ,  and by improvements in manage rial 
pract ices des igned to synchronize product f lows and supervise the wo rk­
force . 36 The deve lopment s of new types of machinery and the intens i f ied 
applicati on of ene rgy to production made poss ible by the new technology, 
coupled with new ways of organizing input s and items in the p rocess o f  
product ion helped to increase the speed and volume of  the f low o f  
materials within a s ingle manu facturing firm . 37 Wh i le most such 
indust ries became " capital intens ive "  in the sense that t he new 
technologies enabled a sharp decrea se in the number o f  workers requi red 
to p roduce a s ingle unit of output , the economies enabled by the new 
technologies resulted more from the volume and speed of throughput than 
the s ize of a given manu facturing facil ity o r  the value of i t s  
p roductive equ ipment . 38 Savings resulted primarily f rom greatly 
increasing the intensity with which machinery and personnel were used, 
and by keeping men and ma chines fully employed a round �he cloc k . 39 
S ince such indust r ies grew inc reas ingly volume inten s ive ,  t hey a lso g rew 
increas ingly investment -intens ive in t hat t he working capital  needs of 
the typical manufactu ring facility increa sed more rapidly than did their 
36Alfred D .  Chandle r ,  The Vis ible Hand : The Manage r i a l  Revolut ion 
in Ame rican Bus iness (Cambridge : Harvard University P ress ,  1 9 7 7 ) , pp . 
2 4 0 -2 4 1 . 
37Chandler,  The Vis ible Hand, p .  2 4 1 . 
38Chandler,  The Vis ible Hand, p .  2 4 4 . 
39Chandle r ,  The Visible Hand, p .  2 4 4 . 
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f ixed capit a l  requi rement s . Increased capital intensity among late 
nineteenth century manufacturers,  insofar as it  occur red, s hould t hus 
not necess a r i ly be const rued t o  mean f ixed-investment intensive . 
Perhaps " items-in-process i ntens ive" would be a more accurate , t hough 
more cumbersome , term .  
The most import ant aspect of  t he new ma ss product ion techno logies 
for  f inanci a l  h istory wa s not the di f f iculty faced by manufacturers in 
f inancing t he i r  incorpo rat ion into a part icular manufacturing f a c i l ity, 
but rather �n the types of behavior such new techno logies made poss ible 
or des i rable . qo Many indust ries that embraced the new mass production 
technologies were engaged in high volume product ion and s ales o f  a 
homogeneous p roduct . The savings thus real ized by such manufacture rs as 
a result of  t he economies of  high-volume throughput induced many to " run 
f u l l "  at  a l l  t imes ,  rega rdless of the e f fect such a course o f  act ion had 
on the price of  their product . Fo r such manu facturers collusion,  and 
later horizonta l  combinat ion of one sort or anothe r ,  eventua l ly became 
highly des i rable, i f  not absolutely necessary for surviva l . 41 I n  other 
indu s t r ies , inc reased throughpu t ,  coupled with t he nove l characterist ics 
of  such dive rse new products as western dressed bee f and sewing 
machines , increased the need for the close coordinat ion of f lows of  raw 
mater i a l s ,  i tems in proces s ,  and outpu t ,  with final ma rket demand, and 
f o r  the prov i s ion of service and educat ion to pu rchasers of such novel 
o r  technological ly soph ist icated product s .  Many such manufacturers 
40Lamoreaux, pp . 1 5- 1 6 . 
q 1 Lamo reaux , pp . 1 5- 1 6 .  It  is beyond the scope o f  t h i s  work to 
engage in a det a i led analysis of the reasons why such f i rms may have 
chosen t o  engage in " running ful l "  when the inevitable e ffect o f  such a 
course o f  act ion wa s to dec rease total earnings . The fact i s  t hat t hey 
did, and that the deleterious effect s of  such "cutthroat compet i tion" 
led in many cases t o  horizontal consolidat ion . For a t horough analysis 
of the poss ible dete rminants of  such behavior, see Lamoreaux, pp . 5 8 - 6 1 . 
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undertook integration into dist ribut ion o r  the provis ion o f  raw 
materials . 4 2  
Both the sugar refining and meat-packing indu s t r ies made extens ive 
use o f  the mas s  p roduction techniques described above . Each relied on a 
s trategy that stressed a h igh rate of  tu rnover o f  items i n  p roces s  and 
volume s a les ; their  earnings resulted f rom low per-uni t  e a rn ings on h igh 
volume sales of a homogeneous output rather than h igh per-unit prof it s .  
Furthe rmore,  each pu rsued one of the courses o f  integ ra t ion out l ined 
above in response to the ope rat ional problems and oppc �t unities c reated 
by the new ma ss product ion technologies . The f inanc i a l  histories of  
both a re thus p robably representat ive of a broad cross sect ion o f  
indust r ies i n  which mas s  product ion and ma ss dist ribution t echniques 
became the norm du ring the last quarter of the n ineteenth century . 
Financial Histories : An Overview of the Meat Packing and 
Sugar Refining Industries 
The Role of Short -Term Credi t in Financing Fixed Capi t a l  Expendi t ures 
During the early pe riod of the i r  growth ,  most f i rms in both 
indu s t r ies were highly reliant on va rious types of short t e rm c redi t . 
Such short t e rm c redit cons isted primarily o f  comme rc i a l  bank 
borrowings , s ingle name commercial pape r ,  and borrowing on open account 
f rom suppliers . None o f  t he fi rms in either indust ry made appreciable 
use of double or t riple name t rade accept ances . F i rms gene ra l ly seek 
short-term c redits  f rom suppliers,  commercial banks,  and other f inanci a l  
institut ions i n  o rde r to increase the i r  wo rking capit a l . Therefore i t  
i s  commonly s upposed that the contribut ion o f  short term c redit to t he 
42Lamo reaux,  pp . 1 5-1 8 . For a deta i led account of the t ypes of 
indust r ies in which ve rt ica l integration was l ikely to occur ,  and the 
form such integra tion commonly took , see Chandler ,  The Vis ible Hand, pp . 
2 8 5-2 8 9 .  - ·  
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formation of f ixed capital in industry is negligible . 43 Apa rt f rom 
instances in which commercial banks have depa rted f rom the rule o f  
res t rict ing t hemse lves to the grant ing of  short t e rm c redit , the view 
that short term c redits aid solely in the accumulat ion of  quick assets 
fails t o  cons ider the way in which short term c redits a re used t o  f ree 
resources for f ixed investment . As Rondo Came ron has asserted in his 
analysis of  the role of banks in the process of  industrializat ion : in 
indust ries with h igh rates of profit and reinvestment , this cont r ibut ion 
can be conside rable . 44 
Cameron i llust rates his point us ing an example similar  t o  t he 
following . Cons ider a firm with total as sets o f  $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  one-half  of 
which cons ists  of  f ixed capital,  the othe r  one-half working capital . 
Assume the f i rm has no debt whatever . On average , t he f i rm turns over 
i t s  working capital every three months ; its annua l  sales a re therefore 
$ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 . I f  t he ave rage rate of  profit we re f ive percent , the annual 
gross p rofit o f  t he bu siness would equa l $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 ,  equi va lent t o  a ten 
percent ret u rn on total equity i f  the business was ent i rely self­
financed . I f  such a firm, however,  shi fted its  own capital t o  f ixed 
investment and re l ied on bank c redit for an ident ical p roport ion of  
working to f ixed capit a l ,  its rate of profit on equity would c l imb t o  
t wenty percent . As suming an appropriately low annua l  rate of  int e rest 
on the borrowed funds , the inc reased rate of retu rn on equity generated 
by t he use o f  borrowed funds to f inance the expansion of working capita l 
( and the corresponding shift of owne rs capit a l  into fixed i nvestment ) 
would a l low for approximately double the rate of  f ixed capital expans ion 
( a ssuming t hat a l l  earn ings we re reinvested in the business ) t han would 
43This � rgument fol lows Cameron, pp . 1 0- 1 2 . Also,  see Thorstein 
Veblen , The Theo ry of Bu s iness Enterprise (New York : Cha r les Scribne r ' s 
Sons , 1 9 0 4 ) , pp . 92- 1 1 9 . 
44Came ron , p .  1 1 . 
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obtain i f  the f i rm relied ent i rely on its own resources t o  f inance its 
operat ions . 
The records o f  firms within the suga r ref ining and meat packing 
industry suggest that they rel ied on the persona l res ou rces of a l imited 
c i rcle of owners t o  f inance the i r  early fixed capital expenditures , 
s upplemented by various short term credits for the f unding o f  t he i r  
work ing capit a l  needs . 45 The new mass production ,  ma rket ing and 
distribut ion techniques employed by most la rge sugar refining and meat 
packing fi rms facilitated a greatly inc reased t hroughput and a quick 
t u rnover o f  working capit al . The earnings t hat we re generated on t he 
rapid tu rnove r o f  a prima r ily borrowed working capital were o f  
sufficient quant ity to aid i n  the funding of  a h igh rate of expansion o f  
p roductive capacity,  and to supplement bank borrowings and other forms 
o f  short term c redit in funding a s imilarly expanding base o f  working 
capit a l . None o f  t he f i rms which comprise these case s t udies , with the 
except ion o f  Swift & Co . ,  re l ied to any s igni f icant extent on the issue 
or s a le of stock and bonds to fund any aspect of t he i r  operat ions prior 
to 1 8 9 0 . 46 
The me thods used in financing invent orie s ,  items i n  t he process o f  
p roduction,  pay ro l l s ,  t h e  ma intenance o f  product ive capacity,  o r  the 
cons t ruc t ion o f  new p roductive capacity did not change appreciably 
during 1 8 90 - 1 9 0 5 ,  even after fi rms in each industry had g rown t o  la rge 
s i ze , and the deve loping industrial secu rities ma rket had begun to t a ke 
45See P o l l a rd ,  pp . 3 0 9-3 1 4 ,  for a deta i led descript ion o f  the 
sophist icated way in which early manufacturers in Britain ( and perhaps 
in America)  st ructured their short term obl igat ions in o rder to use such 
obl igat ions to generate a suff ic ient volume of earnings to finance the i r  
new f i xed capita l and depreciat ion expenditures . 
46Alt hough Swift & Co . appea rs t o  have been an early exception t o  
t he gene rali zat ion made above , i t  wi l l  be shown below t h a t  its  stock 
issues were pa id for in an unusual fashion, which made their issuance 
and sale not unl ike bo rrowing in h igh volume f rom a short term lende r . 
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s hape . 47 Pa radoxica lly,  by 1 9 02  nea rly a l l  had inco rporated, issued 
s tock and/or undergone consolidat ion into la rge vert ica lly or 
horizontally integrated f i rms . I f  such f i rms were making extensive use 
of  t he new f inanc ial techniques enabled by t he adopt ion of t he corporate 
form of bus iness o rganizat ion and t he developing investment ma rket , yet 
had not undergone any s igni ficant change in t he way ir. which they 
financed t he i r  operations,  t hen the quest ion remains : what role did t he 
corporate device , corporate securit ies and the securities ma rket play in 
t he development o f  the financial pract ices of American manufactu res and 
in the process of the accumulat ion of newly created t angible assets in 
gene ral? 
The Use o f  Corpora t e  St ock 
Navin and Sea rs have described four stages in t he development of 
t he securities ma rket du ring 1 8 87-1 902 . 4 8 During the f irst stage the 
mar ket for indust rial securities was quite "thin " ,  with a few t rust 
cert if icates and even fewer corporate secu rities changing hands . The 
second stage spans the f i rst merge r wave of 1 8 8 8 - 1 8 9 3  in Ame r ican 
47Some of  the longe r established f i rms in the meat packing indu s t ry 
subst ituted interna l ly accumulated equity o r  funds obta ined f rom t he 
sale of  st ocks o r  bonds for short term borrowings on t he i r  ba lance 
sheets  a fter  1 9 0 0 . For more on this tendency in othe r industrie s ,  see 
Lamoreaux, pp . 5 5- 5 9 . 
48Navin and Sea rs , pp . 1 37 . This shou ld not be t a ken t o  be a 
def in it ive account of the development of the industrial  securit ies 
ma rket , its institut ions or  the various functiona ries , such a s  t he stock 
specialist and promote r,  who emerged as the ma rket " deepened . "  For a 
det a i led account of  the deve lopment of the New York S tock Exchange , see 
Michie ,  pp . 1 6 7 -2 1 9 ,  Edwa rd J .  Meeker,  The Wo rk of the Stock Exchange 
(New York : The Ronald P ress Company , 1 92 2 )  o r  Robe rt S obe l ,  The Big 
Boa rd : A History of the New York Stock Ma rket ( New York : Free P re s s ,  
1 9 6 5 ) . See Ma rgaret Mye r s ,  The New York Money Ma rket : Origins and 
Devel opment and Sereno P rat t ,  The Work of Wa l l  S t reet : An Account of the 
Funct ion, Methods and History of t he New York Money and Stock Market s ,  
3 rd ed . ( New York : Applet on , 1 92 1 )  for a des cr ipt ion of  the relationship 
between the devel oping indust rial securit ies ma rkets in New York and the 
cit ies other f inancial  inst itut ions . Also , see Robe rt Sobe l ,  The 
Curbst one Brokers : The Origins of the American Stock Exchange (New York : 
Free P re s s ,  1 97 0 )  for a good descript ion of t he more " informa l "  ways in 
which some securit ies we re exchanged before being admitted t o  " fo rma l "  
t rading o n  the New York Stock Exchange . 
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manufacturing . During this period a lmost a l l  new i ssues were c reated 
within indust ries undergoing horizont a l  cons o l idat ion : either t rust s 
conve rt ing to holding compan ies or holding companies formed in imit a tion 
of t he t rus t s . Almost a l l  such consol idat ions we re init i ated by t he 
part ies to the mergers themselves ; promoters and investment banke rs 
p layed an ins ignificant role in t he market ing and issue of indust rial 
secu r i t ies during this period . Only very ra rely did f i rms i ssue shares 
as a means of raising addit ional money-capital  t hrough 1 8 9 3 . 49 
The t h i rd and fourth stages overlap ;  t he former occurred at  the 
beginning of the great merger wave of 1 8 97 - 1 9 0 2 ,  with the latter 
occupying the last few yea rs of  the period . During the great merger 
wave of 1 8 97-1 902  t he ma rket for industrial secu rit ies reached a state 
o f  sophist icat ion and scope that would rema in largely unchanged du ring 
the next thirty years . Throughout the period, secur i t ies issued during 
consolidat ions , reorgani zat ions and recapita l i zat ions great ly 
outnumbered t hose i ssued t o  ra i se addit ional capit a l  t o  f inance 
expans i on . During the third period independent promoters played a more 
prominent role in orches t rat ing consolidations and ma rket ing 
conso l ida t ion-ba cked securit ies . �0 Du ring the fourth per iod, as the 
use of  la rge quant it ies of cash in putt ing together consolidat ions 
became more common , investment bankers and investment s yndicate s ,  with 
their abil ity t o  underwrite la rge blocks o f  cons o l ida t i on-backed 
securi t ies , came to play a more prominent part in the deve lopment of t he 
ma rket . �1 
4 9Navin and Sears,  pp . 1 3 6 -137 . 
�0See Ne lson , pp . 9 3 - 9 4  for a compa rison o f  the proport i on o f  
indust rial common and preferred stock is sued f o r  cash during 1 8 9 7 - 1 9 0 2  
t o  t h a t  is sued directly f o r  property or other indust rial  secu r it ies . 
5 1During the f i rs t  me rger wave o f  1 8 8 8- 1 8 9 3 ,  ve ry l i t t le cash 
actually changed hands du ring the ma jority o f  indust rial ist-init iated 
conso li da t ions . The usual pract ice was t o  exchange the securit ies o f  
the consol idation di rect ly for the securit ies or propert ies o f  the 
companies that we re being consolidated . During t he later period, more 
cash was used in t he consummat ion of consol idat ions because of the way 
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The financial  pract ices of the suga r refining and mea t  pack ing 
industries du ring 1 8 7 5 - 1 9 0 5  closely paral lel t he gene ral t endencies 
observed by Navin and Sea rs in t he developing ma rket , although both made 
use of t he co rporate device and corporate stock in ways t hat do not fit  
conven ient ly into  t he "typica l "  patterns of  behavior described in t he i r  
four-stage model of  security ma rket devel opment .  P rior t o  t he 
incorporat i on of t he American Suga r Re fining Company,  which absorbed t he 
seventeen independent sugar refineries t hat were consol idated under t he 
Sugar Trust in 1 8 8 7 ,  a l l  American sugar refineries were e ither 
partnerships , proprietorsh ips , or,  in a handful of  cases , very c losely 
held corpor�t ions . Among incorporated suga r ref ineries , t he use of  
stock wa s con fined t o  the specif icat ion of the pro-rat a  share in t he 
company ' s  ea rnings t o  wh ich each of the firm' s na rrow c i rcle of  owners 
was ent i t led; such s t ock was very se ldom t raded, even informa l l y . In  
order t o  fac i l i tate t he consolidat ion of the independent ref ineries 
under the Suga r Trust , it was neces sary for each to incorporat e . The 
ent ire capit a l  stoc k  of each corporat ion was t hen exchanged for an 
ident ically va lued block of t rust cert ificates ; t he s t oc k  of t he 
previou s ly independent corporat ions was held by t he t rastees unt i l  t he 
forma t ion of  the American Sugar Re fining Company in 1 8 9 1 . 
in  which t hey were s t ructured . Increased cash requi rements result ed 
f rom t he increased use of opt ions , which often had t o  be purcha sed for 
cash on t he out st anding stock of the f i rms t ha t  were being consolidated, 
t he increas ingly common pract ice of  ret i ring t he indebtedness of 
conso l idated companies be fore they were officia l l y  consol idated within a 
s ingle corpora t ion, t he increased leve l of cash compensat ion which was 
commonly given to s tockholders of  merged corporat ions for t he i r  
company ' s  cash asset s ,  and t he need to provide f o r  working capital in 
t he case of consolidat ions that acqu ired only t he f ixed assets ( sans 
invento r ie s ,  i tems in process and cash asset s )  of  consolidated f i rms . 
The inc reased use of cash during the later period did not result ,  a s  
Lance Davis and Jonat han Hughes suggest , from t he use o f  consol idat ion 
backed securit ies t o  raise capital  t o  fund t he phys ical expans ion o f  
consol idat ed corpora t ions . For more on t h i s ,  see Navin and Sea rs ,  p .  
1 3 0  and A l f red Chandler " The Beginnings of ' Big Bus ine::Js'  in Amer ican 
Indu s t ry , " in The Essen t ia l  Alfred Chandler :  Essays t oward a Historical 
Theory o f  B ig Bus iness ,  ed . Thomas McCraw ( Boston : Ha rvard Bus iness 
School P ress , 1 9 8 8 ) . 
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The American Suga r Refin ing Company acqui red a l l  the stock 
cer t i ficates o f  the corporat ions that had earlie r  been consol idated 
under the t rust , in exchange for which the holders of � he t rust 
certi f icates rece ived the ent i re capital s tock of  t he new company . The 
directors o f  the Ame rican Suga r Re fining Company t hen had t he 
consol idated corporat ions dissolved, and took t it l e  t o  the actual 
properties that had forme rly been owned by the various individua l 
corporat ions . P ract ica l ly no cash changed hands during t he format ion of 
the t rust ,  or the subsequent consolidation of  t he p ropert ies cont rolled 
by the t rust unde r  the Ame rican Sugar Re fining Company . P rior t o  1 9 0 0 ,  
each new i ssue o f  the company ' s  capital stock wa s exchanged direct ly for 
t he securities o r  propert ies of addit iona l suga r ref ining companies . In  
Septembe r ,  1 9 0 1 ,  t he company issued its first block o f  stock for cash . 
The proceeds f rom the sale of the s tock , however ,  were u sed in an 
ident ical fa shion to the stock cert i ficates that t he f i rm is sued 
direc t ly for property and the secu rit ies of  other companies dur ing the 
earlie r  period : to acqu i re cont rol of  addi t ional refining p ropert ie s ,  
this t ime in t he beet suga r industry . The Ame rican Suga r Ref ining 
Company did not use the cash proceeds o f  its 1 9 0 1  stock issue t o  finance 
t he expansion of its product ive capacity or its working capita l  needs . 
The meat packing industry did not undergo a gene ra l consol idat ion 
du ring 1 8 7 5-1 9 0 5 ,  a l though one was attempted during 1 9 0 1 - 1 9 02 . F rom 
1 8 7 8 ,  when western dressed bee f first appea red in s igni ficant quant i t ies 
in eastern ma r ket s ,  to 1 8 8 5 ,  all of  the western dressed bee f sh ipper s  
were o rgani zed as e ither proprietorships o r  partnerships . Obviously 
none we re capable of  us ing stock for any purpose . In  1 8 8 5 Swift & Co . 
was incorpo rated; its  ent ire initial issue o f  stock was s ubsequently 
used t o  acqu i re the a ssets of the various Swift a f f i liated partne rships 
and proprietorships . The company' s  capita l i zat ion increased several 
t imes during 1 8 8 5 -1 8 9 5 ;  each new issue of common s t ock was paid for in 
full  i n  cash . The company' s stockholders,  however ,  received ext ra cash 
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dividends shortly in advance of each new stock i ss ue t hrough 1 8 9 3 ,  which 
in prov ided t hem with the funds to purchase approximately f i fty percent 
of each new i ssue in advance of it forma l ly being offered for 
subscripti on . As a result of this unusual dividend policy,  Swift & Co . 
exper ienced no net inflows of cash f rom its stockholders during 1 8 8 5-
1 8 9 3 . Its new issues of stock were equiva lent t o  the �apita l i zat ion of 
earned s u rplus reserves through payment of dividends i n  t he form of 
addit ional s tock . 
Othe r companies wit hin the meat packing indu s t ry began 
incorporat ing during 1 8 8 7 ; by 1 9 0 2  a l l  t he ma j o r  western dressed beef 
shippe rs had incorpo rated . With the except ion of  Swift & Co . ,  howeve r ,  
which is sued s ome s tock i n  exchange f o r  cash f rom i t s  sha reholders,  the 
other corpo rat ions inc reased the i r  capital s tocks by capit aliz ing 
surplus rese rves through the issue of dividends payable in stock ; none , 
with the except ion of Swift & Co . ,  issued any stock for cash 
s ubsc ript ion . The use of incorporation and corporate stock was much 
more impo rtant in enabl ing the western dressed beef s hipper s  to 
establish,  coordinate and cont rol their  dist r ibut ion and t ransportat ion 
subsidia r ies . The dressed bee f shippers fi rst used stock to coordinate 
the o ld dis t r ibut ion system of jobbers , wholesa le rs , independent 
butchers , and ret a i l  meat dealers . This wa s often acc0mp l ished, 
particularly in the case of Swift & Co . ,  through t he estab li s hment of 
f inancial  a l liances between individual dressed bee f shippe rs and meat 
reta i lers and wholes a lers . The usual method was for each t o  acqui re a 
port i on of  t he equity in the bus ines s of t he othe r . Yea rs later the 
dressed beef s hippers consol idated cont rol over t he i r  dis t ri bu t i on 
networks by "buying out " the individua ls with whom f inanc i a l  a l liances 
of  t he t ype descr ibed above had been formed, and t h rough whom t he i r  
profitable eastern dist ributorsh ips had forme r ly been ope rated . There 
is st rong evidence to support the hypothesis t hat much of the p roceeds 
of Swift & Co . ' s  s t ock sales went for this purpose , which the other 
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companies accomplished t h rough the use of  inte rna l l y  generated f unds . 
In other ins tances the packers established new b ranch dist r ibutorships 
in eastern and midwestern ma rket s ;  in a lmost a l l  cases , const ruct ion of 
new distribut ion faci l it ies was financed us ing reta ined earnings 
supplemented by short term borrowings . Such propert i&� were usua lly 
later operated through the agency of subs idiary corporat ions . 
Subsidi a ry corporat ions and corporate stock we re used in a s imi l a r  
fashion t o  �oordinate the re f rige rated t ransportat i on and by-products 
subs idia ries o f  the western dressed beef shippe rs , the former o f  which 
appea r t o  have been ent i rely se lf-financed, once estab l ished . 
During 1 9 0 1 - 1 9 02 the ma jor  dressed bee f  shippers attempted t o  
implement a f o rma l ,  indust ry-wide cons ol idat ion . After t h e  investment 
syndicate that had been formed to unde rwrite the proposed merger 
withdrew f rom t he ag reement fol lowing conce rn about its  legal it y  and t he 
onset of  s t ringency in the money ma rket s ,  the large dressed bee f 
shippers formed a j o intly owned holding/ ope rat ing sub� idiary, in which 
each held a port i on of  the vot ing stock . The newly c reated 
holding/ operat ing company subsequent ly acqui red a number of independent 
packing companies that had earlier been purchased by the t h ree l argest 
dressed beef s hippe rs in ant ic ipat ion of  the fai led general 
consol idat ion . Th rough the agency of the j o intly owned subs idiary, t he 
la rge packers we re able to coordina te investment and output in the 
indust ry t hrough 1 9 1 2 ,  when the company was dissolved by court orde r . 
S t ra tegic vs . Ta c t i ca l  Finance 
I am aware of  no cohe rent set of  p roposit ions t ha t  adequately 
exp l a ins the s imi larity o f  the phenomena I have obse rved in analyz ing 
the f inanc ial histories of the meat pack ing and suga r ref ining 
indust ries . The most readi ly appa rent of  such phenomena involves t he 
eme rgence o f  a new " t ype " of  finance , which rema ined la rge ly sepa rate 
and dis t inct ,  yet coexis tent with more t radit iona l financ i a l  p rac t i ces . 
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The t radit ional f inanc ial methods cons isted of the use of  va rious t ypes 
of short term c redit to fund wo rking capital needs , thus f reeing the 
owner' s equity for investment in fixed capita l . The higher ea rnings on 
equity made possible by t hese pract ices ,  coup led with the highe r rate of 
t u rnover of  wor king capi tal facil itated by new mas s  production , 
dis t ribut ion, and t ransportat ion technologies ,  generated a suff ic ient 
volume of earnings to fund the ma intenance and expansion of p roduct ive 
capacity and a commensurate expansion ( t h rough the use of equ ity and 
accumu lated surplus as collatera l )  o f  short term c redits t o  f und 
proport ionate increases in working capital .  These f inanc i a l  techniques , 
which const itute a part icular aspect of f inanc ial behavior that I s ha l l  
c a l l  " tactical f inance , " we re di rected t owa rds funding the various 
aspect s  of  a f i rm' s day-t o-day ope rat ions , and appear t o  have sufficed 
for such purposes with l i t t le change t hrough 1 9 0 5 . 
The new f inanc ial methods cons isted of  the use of new business 
devices ( t he operat ing corporat ion , the subs idia ry company, and t he 
holding company ) , and the creat ion an9 apportionment o f  various t ypes of 
corporate secu rit ies in o rder to establish and ma int a in coordinat ion 
between dif ferent funct iona l ent i t ies within vert ically i ntegrated 
f i rms , or between funct iona lly identical f irms in hori zont a lly 
integrated indust r ies . Such techniques , which const itut e  an ent i rely 
different t ype of financ ial behavior than t he methods of " tactical 
finance , " I sha l l  call  " st rategic f inance . "  " S t rategic f inance " had 
l i t t l e ,  if anyt hing, to do with the establishment of  new product ive 
capacity,  t he funding of  t he incorporation o f  new technologies into a 
pa rticular product ion process , or the financing of  any other aspect of 
t he actual manufactu re of  phys ical obj ects .  The impe rat ives which gave 
r i se to the inc rea sed use of the techniques of " s t rategic f inance " 
cons isted of  those related to the problems created by exces s  capacity in 
increas ingly volume- and investment- intens ive indust ries such a s  suga r 
re f in ing, the coordinat ion of increas ingly far f lung multi-funct ion 
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enterprises such as those which dominated the dressed beef indust ry, and 
the uncert a inty of  the va lue of  investment in the many indust ries which 
were wea kened by "cutthroat competition" du ring the late nineteenth 
centu ry . 52 
The Corpora t e  Revol u t i on, the Managerial Revol u t i on and "Stra t egi c 
Finance " 
According t o  Berle and Means,  one of the salient fea tures o f  t he 
t ransformat ion of  the Ame rican economy during t he "corporate revolution" 
of the late nineteenth cent ury was the extension of t he idea of  p roperty 
t o  encompass " intangible s "  such as business relat ionships , o rganizat i on ,  
and the exclus i ve possession of  information . 53 I f  one accepts t he i r  
hypothes i s ,  t hen "tact ical f inance" may be thought o f  a s  a way o f  
f unding t h e  c reat i on of new tangible assets ,  t owards which convent ional 
e conomic t heory supposes all  f inanci a l  act ivity is directed . 
Conversely, " s t rategic finance " may be thought o f  a s  a way of  f unding 
the c reat ion of intangible as set s ,  an increase in the value of which 
would come about when a bus ines s combines with othe rs to c i rcumvent 
market forces within an industry ,  or extends its scope into 
ope ra t iona l ly related l ines l i ke marketing and dist r ibut ion ,  or  any 
combinat i on of the organi zat iona l innovat ions enabled by hori zont a l  and 
vertical combinat ion . 
The new organi zat ional forms that the pract ices of " s t rategic 
finance " we re meant to facil it ate were an integra l part of  the 
52This is not to say t hat the prospect of windf a l l  p rofits  f rom t he 
i ssuance and exchange of  merger backed securit ies was not a s igni f icant 
incent i ve for many corporate ins iders to cons ide r consol idat ion ( see , 
for example , Richard B .  DuBoff and Edward S .  Herman , " The P romot ional­
Financ i a l  Dynamic o f  Merger Movements, " Jou rna l o f  Economic I ss ues 2 3  
Ma rch , 1 9 8 9 ) : 1 0 7 -1 3 4 . I am del ibe rate ly overlooking this a spect o f  
f inanc ial behavior in order to focus on the role of  i�corporat ion, 
consolidat ion and corpo rate securit ies in a more narrow t heory of  late 
nineteenth cent u ry bu si ness finance . 
53Be rle and Means ,  p .  xii . See also Thorstein Veb len,  The Theory 
o f  Business Enterprise . 
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o rganizat ional revolut ion that was necess itated by t he new business 
behaviors that eme rged in response to the equally fund�ment a l  
revo lut ions in p roduct ion and dist ribution technologies . The latter 
cons isted of  improvements in communicat ion, t ransportation,  mach inery as 
applied t o  product ion and distribut ion in a wide range o f  indust ries . 
Again,  t he import ance of such innovat ions for f inancial  hist ory de rives 
not f rom the expense of the i r  incorporat ion into a given process o f  
p roduct ion, but f rom the new forms of behavior that they made poss ible 
( o r  in some cases , neces sary) , which in turn required the coordinat ion 
and admin ist rat ion of product ion and dis t r ibut ion in ways t hat had never 
be fore been attempted . 
The development and perfection of the t echniques o f  " s t rategic 
f inance , " as det a i led in the f inancial histories of t�� meat packing and 
suga r ref ining indust ries presented be low, and t he inst itut ions and 
inst ruments t hat made such techn iques pos sible , may be cons idered the 
f inancia l counterpa rt of the o rganizational revo lut ion in American 
bus iness f i rst described by Al fred Chandle r . 5� Mode rn , mul t i-unit 
and/ o r  mul t i-funct ion incorporated business enterprise s ,  with t he i r  
securit ies and s ophist icated financial pract ices ,  came into being when 
the use of finance to facil itate coo rdinat ion permit ted higher earnings , 
g reater product ivity and lower costs than the use o f  f inance t o  expand 
and improve capac ity . The expans ion of uncoo rdinated, non-integrated 
p roductive capacity could have been ( and was )  financed us ing the t ime 
honored methods o f  " t actical finance . "  The new financial t echniques and 
inst it ut ions as sociated wit h the corpo rate revolut ion did de r ive f rom 
the demand for a new type of finance, but a demand which had litt le t o  
d o  with t he problem of f inancing the accumulat ion of newly c reated 
tangible asset s . The organizat iona l revolut ion described by Chandler 
consisted of t he emergence of  di f ferent layers of management , with some 
respons ible for the al locat ion of resources and long range planning 
wchandler The Vis ible Hand, pp . 6-12 . 
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within a pa rt icular bus iness ( st rategic management ) ,  and others 
responsible for t he day-t o- day operat ions o f  pa rticular depa rtment s  
within the bus iness ( tactical management ) .  The bifurcat ion of  f inancial 
practices de scribed above was ana logous to the sepa rat ion of the 
funct ions of management , with " st rategic f inance" directed t owa rds t he 
formalizat ion of  the mechanisms of planning and coordinat ion within and 
between f i rms, and t actical finance di rected t owards t he more prosaic 
end of f unding thei r day t o  day operat ions . And, j ust a s  i n  t he realm 
of  management , where the creation of ent i rely new manage rial funct ions 
and s t ructures ( rather than t he pe rfect ion and adaptat ion of t he old 
functions to new imperatives ) permitted management to bett e r  coordinate 
flows of inputs and output s t hrough the process of p roduction and t o  
ma rket - - s o  t o o  did t he c reat ion of new f inancia l techniques and 
st ructures facilitate the apport ionment of cont rol and power ove r  
product ion and investment decisions within and bet ween individual f i rms . 
The innova t ive f inancial techniques that emerged enabled the 
recon f igu rat ion and coordinat ion of product ive capacity under t he 
"visible hand" of  management , and provided for the creat ion of  
int angible assets insofa r as companies employing the techniques o f  
st rategic finance were able t o  capitalize t h e  va lue of  consol idated 
p roduct ive capacity that was in excess of its value if operated 
independent ly . This phenomenon , the emergence o f  the new f inancial 
s t ructu re s ,  techniques , and institut ions o f  " s t rategic f inance , " was 
one of t he most impo rtant features of nineteenth centu ry f inanc ial 
deve lopment . 
I now t u rn to a detai led account of t he f inanc ial deve lopment of  
two indust r ies . Chapter t wo out l ines the f inanc ial histories o f  a 
number o f  New York s uga r refineries before t he format ion of  the Sugar 
Trust in 1 8 8 7 . Chapte r three focuses on t he format ion of  t he t rust , t he 
f inanc ing of  the refining f i rms t hat we re consol idated under the t rust , 
and t he formation and f i nanc ing of  the t rust ' s  succes�0r,  t he Amer ican 
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Sugar Refining Company . Chapter four contains t he f inancial  histories 
o f  t h ree early dressed bee f  shippe rs who ,  by 1 8 9 0 ,  had come to dominate 
t he meat packing indus t ry ;  and another dressed beef sh ippe r that wa s 
absorbed by a British inves tment syndicate in 1 8 8 7 . Chapt e r  five 
details the f inanc ial histories of the dominant f i rms within t he meat 
packing indust ries a fter 1 8 9 0 ,  and a l so conta ins an account of t he 
indus t ry ' s unsuccessful at tempt at forma l consol ida tion and the 
format ion o f  a jointly owned subs idiary holding company, the Nat ional 
Packing Company . Chapter s ix cont ains a summary o f  the f inancial  
hist ories p resented in  the preceding four  chapters , and t he i r  
impl icat ions f o r  both the "Textbook Explanation" o f  t h e  relat ionship 
between indust rial and f inanc ial deve lopment , the "Alternative 
Explanat ion , "  and my hypothesis on the evo lut ion of t he pract ices of 
s t rategic and tact ical f inance . 
No attempt has been made in this study to ana lyze changes in the 
st ructure and pe rformance o f  the meat pack ing and s uga r refining 
indu s t r ies during 1 8 7 5-1 905 . This important aspect of t he i r  development 
during this pe riod that has been described in great deta i l  e l sewhe re . ss 
The reade r may mi ss the usual emphasis on the acqu i s i t ion, use and abuse 
of ma rket power by the o ften colorful ent repreneurs , or robber ba rons ,  
o f  whom I write . This is , however,  primarily a s tudy that focuses on 
how the c reators of  la rge f i rms secured the f inance t o  do what t hey did, 
and not on t he just ice or injustice of what t hey did . 
5 5In compil ing these f inancial  histories , I have made extens ive use 
of a number of seconda ry source s ,  such as Alf red Eichner ' s  s t udy o f  the 
n ineteenth century sugar refining indust ry and Ma ry Yeage r ' s history o f  
the mea t  pac king indust ry,  t hat analyze the development of  each indust ry 
f rom a more t raditiona l ,  industrial organizat ion pe rspec tive . The 
changing s t ruct u re and pe rformance of each indust ry during the 
n ineteenth century is  described in det a i l  in these and other works . For 
more on the re lat ionship between a number o f  the seconda ry sources used 
in comp le t ing this s t udy, and the f inanc ial histories of the meat 
packing and suga r  re fining indus tries , see Appendix A .  
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CHAPTER I I  
THE FINANC IAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUGAR REFINING 
INDUSTRY, 1 87 5- 1 8 9 0  
Overview 
The Sugar Refining Indus t ry :  1 795-1 8 8 7  
The total  United States domest ic output of  ref ined s ugar during 
1 7 95 was est imated to have been approximately 1 , 0 9 2 , 0 0 0  pounds . 1 By 
1 8 8 7 ,  the yea r  of the format ion of The Suga r Re fineries Company, at  
least f ive individua l re fineries were capable o f  producing 1 mil l ion 
pounds each of ref ined suga r da ily . 2 While t he Suga r refining industry 
duri ng the f i rst half of the nineteenth centu ry was cha racter i zed by a 
sma l l  number of p roducers us ing primitive met hods t o  p roduce a product 
of va rying t ype and qua l ity for sale in local ma rkets ,  the t h i rd qua rter 
of the centu ry witnes sed the rapid eme rgence of a technological ly 
advanced, highly competi t ive indust ry cons ist ing of a growing number of 
increas ingly l a rge f i rms producing a homogeneous p roduct within a 
unified nat iona l ma rket . Because of their p roximi t y  t o  t ransshipment 
faci l it ies for the raw material ,  Boston , New York and P h ilade lphia g rew 
in importance as refining centers . Due to its importance as t he 
nat ion ' s leading po rt , its numerous credit ins t itut ions , t he 
ava ilabil i t y  o f  inexpens ive anth racite coal to power ref ining facilities 
1Litt le is known about the colonial suga r re f ining indu s t ry . As 
early as 1 6 8 9 ,  howeve r ,  a refinery is reported to have been const ructed 
on Liberty s t reet in New York . By t he t ime of the revo lu t iona ry war ,  
several  l arge plants had been established, prima rily in P h ilade lphia , 
New York and Boston . See Paul L .  Vogt , The Suga r Ref ining Indus t ry in 
the United States " Publicat ions of t he Univers ity o f  Pennsylvania Series 
in P o l i tica l Economy and Publ ic Law, " no . 2 1  ( Philadelphia : P ub l ished 
for the University,  1 9 0 8 ) pp . 6-7 . 
2Jack S impson Mu l l ins , The Sugar Trust : Henry 0 .  Havemeyer and The 
Ame rican S uga r Ref ining Company ( Unpublished Ph . D .  Dissertation,  
University o f  South Ca ro lina , 1 9 6 4 ) , pp . 1 - 1 0 . 
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and its extens ive t ransportat ion network, New York soon became the 
center of  the re fining industry in the United States . 3 By 1 8 7 0  s uga r 
ref in ing had become that city ' s most important manufactu ring industry, 
process ing about f i fty-f ive pe rcent of all impo rted raw suga r . By 1 8 7 2  
that f igu re had cl imbed to fi fty-nine percent , and b y  1 8 8 7 ,  to  sixty­
e ight percent . 4 
By 1 8 7 0 ,  the total  number of suga r ref i ne ries in  operat ion i n  the 
U . S  tota led f ifty-n ine , a n  increase of  approximately forty-five percent 
over 1 8 6 0 . Total capitalization of the sugar ref in ing i ndust ry in 1 8 7 0  
amounted to approximately $20 . 5  mi l lion ,  a n  increase o f  over $ 1 1  mil lion 
f rom that which was reported at the beginning of the preceding decade . 5 
Although capacity and output cont inued to increase throughout the 1 8 7 0 s  
and early 1 8 8 0 s ,  the number of fi rms i n  the i ndust ry began t o  dec l ine 
after 1 87 0 . By 1 8 8 0 ,  despite an increase i n  tot a l  capital i nvested of 
s l ight ly less than $7 mi l l ion ove r 1 8 7 0 ,  the numbe r o f  f i rms in  
operat ion dec lined by ten to forty-nine . 6 Although bet ween the end o f  
the Civil Wa r a n d  1 8 87  about thirty-six ref ine ries went out o f  busines s ,  
by 1 8 8 6 , the year be fore the formation o f  the Suga r Re f iners Company, 
the annual capacity o f  the remaining fi rms was in  excess o f  1 . 9 6 mil l ion 
t on s ,  o r  over 3 1 8 , 0 0 0  tons over total  annual domestic s a les . 7 
3A l f red S .  Eichner,  The Emergence of Ol igopoly : Suga r Ref i ni ng as a 
Case Study ( Ba lt imore : The Johns Hopkins P ress,  1 9 6 9 ) , p .  4 3 .  
4Eichne r ,  pp . 42- 4 3 .  
5Vogt , p .  9 .  
6Vogt , p .  1 0 . 
'Vogt , p .  1 8 . 
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Excess Capaci ty and Consolida t i on ,  1 88 7-1 905 
The prima ry problem t he indust ry faced during 1 8 7 5 - 1 8 8 7  was excess 
capac ity . 8 While t he large r ,  bet ter equipped and more favorably 
located refineries we re able to ma int ain earnings at  an adequate leve l  
even dur ing pe r iods when the margin between raw a n d  refined sugar 
approached the cost of refining they increas ingly carne to f ind the 
severe compet it ion within the i ndust ry unsuited to the i r  best 
interests . 9 Furthermore , whi le f i rms which were most s uscept ible to the 
rigors of competit ion con t i nued to leave the indust ry,  many of the 
marginal  f i rms which cont inued to p roduce showed few s igns o f  wishing to 
exit the i ndust ry . 1 0 Such f i rms , whenever the ma rgi n  between raw and 
refined s uga r decl ined below the i r  average variable cost s  of  p roduct ion 
would tempor a r i ly discont inue product ion unt i l  the ma rgin rose again . 
As long a s  the plants themse lves would fetch l it t le i f  dismant led and 
sold f o r  scrap, and the costs of leaving the typica l p�ant idle were 
la rgely implicit , t hey could cont inue to ope rate in this manner 
indefinitely . 1 1 
8No rel i able figures a re ava ilable for t ot a l  indust ry 
capitalizat ion or annual re fining capacity for the two dec ades p receding 
the forma tion of the t rust . According to f igures ta ken f rom Willett and 
G ray' s S t at ist ic a l  Trade Journal ,  however ,  tot a l  domestic consumpt ion of 
re f i ned suga rs increased by a n  ave rage of s lightly ove r e ight percent 
between 1 8 8 1  and 1 8 8 7 . Meanwhile,  dur ing the same per iod, the ave rage 
annual p r ice of ref i ned suga r fel l  by approximately seven and one-hal f  
percent and the ma rgin between raw and ref ined ( wh ich takes into a ccount 
the mit igating effect of  fall ing raw prices on the dec l in ing prices of 
refined) fe l l  by a total of n ine percent ( see Vogt , p .  4 6 ,  p .  1 1 6 ) . 
S ince t he ma rgi n  fell by an even greater amount than the price o f  
ref i ned s uga r ,  t he average rate of prof it would l ikely have been fal l ing 
throughout t he pe riod . Th is st rongly suggests ongo ing excess capacity 
i n  the suga r refining indust ry . 
9E ichner ,  p .  6 3  
10E ichne r ,  p .  6 3 . 
1 1 Eichne r ,  p .  6 3 . Re fining f i rms dur ing this t ime were a lmost 
completely f ree of  long term f ixed obl igations . Liabi l i t ies outstanding 
typical ly inc luded ( a s ide f rom equity) , in descending o rder o f  
import ance , s ingle name pape r outstanding, fore ign a n d  domestic trade 
c redit s ,  short term bank loans . The cost s  to owners of holding a plant 
idle, once inventories had been l iquidated and short term obl igat ions 
ret i red, were thus la rge ly impl icit . 
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Efforts t o  solve the problems of overproduction and exces s  
capacity within t he industry resulted in t h e  forma tion o f  t h e  Suga r 
Refineries Company ( the " Suga r Trust " )  on October 2 4 ,  1 8 8 7 . Whi le 
high ly e ffective in  facil itat ing the coordinat ion of output and 
investment in  t he industry,  the t rust was not highly esteemed by the 
public . I ntense gove rnment scrut iny of the indu s t ry culminated in t he 
North Rive r Suga r Re f in ing Company case, which des t royed t he legal basis 
o f  t he t rust device . Whi le final appeals were s t i l l  be ing heard in the 
case , howeve r ,  the t rust was complet ing plans to reconst itute itself as  
a holding-operat ing company under the corporate s tatutes o f  New Jersey . 
The Ame rican Suga r Re fining Company was incorporated in New Jersey 
on Janua ry 1 0 ,  1 8 9 1 ,  and subsequently acqui red t he p roperties which were 
earlie r  cont rol led by the t rust . Although t he business pract ices o f  t he 
new consol idat ion we re subject to intense critic ism a lmost f rom its 
incept ion , t he lega l it y  of its form was a f f i rmed by the U . S  S upreme 
Court in  t he E .  C .  Kn ight case , which decl a red that combinat ions i n  
manufacturing could not be const rued to be in  violation of t he Sherman 
Ant it rust Act . 
During the f i rst 1 5  yea rs of its l i fe ,  the American Suga r Re fining 
Company grew by ove r 2 3 0  pe rcent ( as measured by t he book value of tot a l  
asset s ) , la rgely t h rough the acquisition of independent compan ies in  t he 
cane and beet sugar indust ries . The company' s securit ies were among the 
most heavily t raded i n  t he unlisted department o f  the New Yor k  Stock 
Exchange , and between 1 8 8 7 - 1 9 1 1  the number of registered sha reholde rs 
inc reased from 2 0 0  to over 1 9 , 0 0 0 . 12 By 1 9 0 5  t he f i rm, the s ixth 
la rgest in the country with ove r $ 1 4 0  mi l l ion in  asset s ,  had t aken on 
many of t he cha racterist ics of the modern corporat ion , operat ing sugar 
refineries across the count ry while exe rcising direct con t rol ove r 
1 2U . S . ,  Congre s s ,  House o f  Representat ives , Special Commit tee on 
the I nves t igat ion o f  the Ame rican S uga r Ref in i ng Company and Others , 
Hea rings . 6 2d Cong . ,  2d sess . ,  1 9 1 2 ,  p .  2 2 4 ,  he rea fter referred to as  
Ha rdwick Committee, Hea rings . 
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others through subs idiary a rrangements . 1 3 Although the p roport ion o f  
total domestic refined sugar consumpt ion produced b y  the American Sugar 
Refining Company and its subs idia ries decl ined f rom approximately 90 
percent in  1 8 92 to 58 pe rcent in 1 9 0 4 ,  it was able to exercise indirect 
control ove r a much greater share of indust ry output and re lated l ines 
of  bus iness th rough its st ockholders a nd by way of substant ial 
securities holdings in  company' s which it did not own outright . 
The Da t a  
Without except ion, a l l  U . S  suga r ref i ning establishments i n  
existence prior to the formation of The Suga r Refineries Company were 
e ither pa rtnerships , proprietorships or closely he ld corporat ion s . S ince 
the securities of  such concerns were not norma l ly t raded in markets 
which required the disseminat ion of  accurate financia l information , and 
since their f inancial st ructures were relatively uncomp licated, the need 
( o r  requi rement ) for sophist icated, uniform account ing procedures o r  
regul a r  disclosure of  income o r  asset / l iabi l ity statements w a s  
minima l 14 • Consequent ly,  very little in the way o f  precise,  nume r ical 
data exists to enable analysis o r  compa rison of the early f inancing 
p ract ices a nd f inancial st ructures of f i rms within the s ugar ref i ning 
indus t ry . 
A wea lth of  less systematic f inancial data on the sugar ref i ning 
indust ry f rom this earlie r  period exist s ,  howeve r ,  in  the form of 
records compiled by R .  G .  Dun & Co . ,  an important n i neteenth century 
1 3Eichner ,  p .  2 6 6 . 
14This characteristic was not peculiar to the s uga r ref in i ng 
i ndus t ry . With the except ion of private fi rms within indust ries o f  a 
quas i-public character possess ing high rat ios o f  f i xed investments to 
tota l asset s ,  s uch as rai l roads , municipal utilities and communicat ion s ,  
o r  those whose fort unes were c lose ly t ied t o  such indust r ie s ,  such a s  
mining,  t h e  widely he ld, public corporat ion rema ined a n  anomaly in  
virtually all  manu facturing and se rvice industries 
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commercial credit report ing agency . 1 �  A summa ry o f  t he records o f  that 
company rega rding t he financial affairs of  some o f  t he l a rger a nd 
sma l le r  New York suga r refining establishments wil l  se rve t o  
characterize t he i r  f inancial pract ices during t h e  t wenty years  p receding 
the format ion of  t he Suga r Refineries Company . 1 6 
The Suga r  Refin ing Indu s t ry in New York 
By 1 8 8 7  New York stood at the center o f  the s ugar refinin g  
indust ry in  t h e  Uni ted States . During that yea r  i t s  p roduction o f  
ref i ned suga r f rom imported raw sugar accounted for  s i xt y-eight percent 
of  the total domestic outturn of refined f rom imported raw cane suga r ,  
and i n  n o  yea r  between the end o f  the Civi l War and the date of  t he 
format ion of the Suga r Re f iners Company was it exceeded in number o f  
re fineries by the other impo rt ant re fining centers , Boston and 
Phi ladelphia . Of the twelve New York re fining establi shments i n  
operat ion at  t he t ime of the format ion of  t he t rust , a t  leas t  t hree had 
da ily re fin ing capacit ies of greater t ha n  1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  pounds , whi le t wo 
had dai ly refin i ng capacit ies of only 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  pounds . 17 Of t he e ighteen 
ref in i ng f i rms which eventually jo ined t he t rust ( n ine of which were 
1 �A s i zable numbe r of the nineteenth century comme rcial  c redit 
reports of  R .  G .  Dun & Co . a re housed at t he Baker Libra ry,  H a rvard 
G raduate School o f  Business Administ ration , Cambridge , Massachusset s . 
1 6Due to the wea lth of deta i l  conta ined in the records of R .  G .  Dun 
& Co . on man y  o f  the suga r re fining establ ishments in  t he New York a re a ,  
I have decided t o  focus o n  those firms exc lusively a t  t h e  expense of  
ref ining establishments located in Boston and P h i ladelph i a . There is  no 
reason t o  suppose that the f i nancial behavior o f  the f i rms located in 
t he latter two cit ies wa s s ignificantly dif ferent f rom that o f  f i rms 
located in New York . Firm size,  of which t he New York refining i ndust ry 
is  representat ive of bot h ext remes ( see bel ow ) , p robably was a more 
important dete rminant of the types of di fficu lties and opportun i t ies 
t hat a refining establishment was likely to face than the city i n  which 
it  was located . 
1 7Mu l l ins , p .  4 8 . 
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located in New Yo rk)  both the la rgest and sma l lest were l ocated 
there . 1 8 The f inancial a f f a i rs of t he New York refining indust ry may 
thus be cons idered to be b roadly representat ive of t hose of t he early 
refining industry a s  a who le . 
Financing the Sugar Refining Industry Before the Trust 
Capi t a l i z a t i on and Profi t s :  Overview 
The typica l suga r refining f i rm of the 1 8 7 0 s  and 1 8 8 0 s  was either 
a c losely held corporat ion , or more l ikely, a n  unincorpo rated 
proprietorship or partnership in which the owne r ( s )  was c losely involved 
with the day to da y ope rations of the bus i ness . The initial  
capit a l i zat ion was more likely than not t o  have been drawn f rom t he 
prior accumulat ions of the f i rm' s owne r/manager,  and g rew as p rofits 
were ret urned t o  t he bus iness in  the form of  reserves 0 r  increased 
p roduct ive capacity . Just as t he init ial purchase of  a factory, t he 
land on wh ich it was located and the machinery with which it was 
out fit ted WdS f inanced out of funds placed at the disposa l  of the 
bus iness by its na rrow c i rcle of owner s ,  so too were later improvements 
la rge ly funded by the return of net earnings t o  the f i rm by its owne rs . 
Although partners and stockholde rs were occasiona l ly called upon t o  
increase the i r  initial  investment in t h e  f i rm as a result of  some 
pressing bus iness exigency, addit ional long t e rm capita l  was a lmos t  
never solic ited f rom individua ls o r  inst itut ions t hat were n o t  a l ready 
closely connected with the business . The relat ive ly l imited sources of 
long term funds ava i lable to the early suga r refiners �oes not appear to 
1 8The Havemeyer a nd E lder ref inery, located in B rooklyn , was the 
l argest of  those which subsequent ly came under the cont rol of the Trust,  
having a da l l y  re f i ning capacity o f  approximately 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  pounds ; 
while the Oxnard Brother s ,  North River Suga r Ref i ning Company and 
Mol le r ,  S ie rck & Company re fineries had dai ly ref i ning capac ities of 
only 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  pounds . Only one refinery that was later b rought into the 
t rust , t hat of the Fo rest City Suga r Ref ining Company of  Port land, 
Ma ine , wa s as sma l l . See Mu llins , p .  4 8 . 
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have hindered the i r  f i rms ' abi lity to build new refining capacity,  t o  
expand as des i red, to replace outworn or obsolescent equipment with that 
which embodied newer technologies,  or to add to wo rking capital as their 
bus inesses expanded . 
Borrowing and Indebtedness : Overview 
Although the f inanc ial histories of the New York suga r ref ining 
establ ishments suggest self-reliance in financing the establ ishment , 
ma intenance and expans ion of their product ive capacity, it is also t rue 
that most were frequent short-term borrowers . Whi le the la rger refining 
establishments appea r to have been more re liant on short t e rm borrowings 
than their smaller counterpa rt s ,  most of whom relied mo re heavily on 
t rade c redit than cash c redi t ,  both made extens ive use of short term, 
borrowed capita l  f rom out s ide sources . The ma j o r  reasons for the 
reliance of most re finers on short term sources of funds included : the 
widely f luct uat ing prices of the raw material,  which made it 
advant ageous for re fine rs to pe riodically lay in large r s uppl ies of raw 
suga r than could be u sed dur ing a short time ; the gene rally large and 
ever changing amounts of  raw suga r wh ich had to be kept on hand to meet 
a s imil a r ly unstable demand for the f ini shed product ; and, the fact that 
the use of short-term c redit increased the port ion of  the initial 
investment and reta ined earnings that could be a llocated towa rds the 
purchase or ma intenance of product ive capac ity . 
Most sho rt term bor rowing took the form of the extens ion of 
ext remely s ho rt-term t rade credits ( usually between seven and t h i rty 
days ) by sugar importers and commiss ion house s ,  and the sale of  
commercial pape r . Ve ry few f irms seem to have expe rienced more than 
t ransitory difficulty in obta ining the credit needed to carry on their 
business .  Most of  the early suga r ref ine rs do not appear  to have been 
highly rel iant on bank bo rrowings , although banks f requent ly pu rchased 
sugar refine ry pape r in the secondary ma rket . 
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While most ref iners were h ighly re liant on short term borrowings 
to f inance the i r  working capital needs , they also made extens ive use of 
internally generated capital to finance inventories and the purchase of 
raw materia l s . 19 Whi le the use of  interna l ly generated funds and the 
personal resources of a sma l l  circle of  owners or partners for the 
purchase and ma intenance of product ive capacity appea � s  to have remained 
constant through 1 8 8 7 ,  their  rel iance on internal ly generated funds for 
working capit a l  appears to have increased over t ime . I ronica l ly ,  as the 
successful New York s uga r refineries grew i n  f inancial  st rength and 
the i r  ability to borrow, they f requent ly reduced their re l iance on 
out s ide c redit by substituting reta ined earnings for issuances of their  
single name pape r and commercial bank borrowings in funding their 
wo rking capital  needs . 
Financial History of Seven New York S ugar Refining Firms , 1 875- 1 8 8 7  
A Brief Hi s t ory o f  Seven New York Sugar Refineri es 
Each of the seven New York sugar ref in ing f i rms for which I was 
able to obt ain informat ion displayed the tendenc ies noted above . 
Havemeye r  & Elde r ,  phys ically the largest of  the refin ing f i rms which 
later ente red the Trus t ,  had its beginning in 1 8 60 when const ruct ion of 
a ref ine ry begun three years ea rlier by Frede rick C .  Havemeyer ( the 
father of Hen ry 0 .  Havemeyer )  was completed . Const ruct ion of  the plant , 
1 9I t  i s ,  o f  course, impossible to spec i fy with any degree of 
prec is ion the po rtion of  fixed and working capit a l  expenditures of the 
ea r ly sugar ref iners that were f inanced through the use of s hort -term 
c redit or f rom other sou rces . Furthermore, it is a ls o  t rue that the use 
of s hort-term c redits inva riably enables the rea li zat ion of  a higher 
yield on invested capit a l  than could be rea l ized if a firm did not ava i l  
itse l f  of  the abi lity to borrow . Heavy short -term bor rowing may thus be 
as sociated with a greater re liance on internally generated funds during 
subsequent periods . The use of  short-term borrowings and the volume of 
ea rnings which were subsequent ly reinvested in the various refining 
establishments a re therefore interdependent .  For a more deta i led 
desc r ipt ion of  the possible interrelat ionsh ips between short-term 
borrowings and the u se of  retained earnings to f inance the accumu lation 
of  f ixed and working capita l ,  see Chapter 1 .  
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located on the edge of  the East River i n  Brooklyn , was unde rtaken with 
funds drawn large ly f rom the pe rsonal resources of F rederick C .  
Havemeye r and Lar ry Elder . Init ially the Havemeyer and E lde r re f i nery 
had a da i ly ref i n ing capacity of  approximately 3 0 0 , 0 0 0  pounds , and 
incorporated all of the latest ref ining techniques available in  both the 
United States and Europe . As ide f rom the sophisticated techniques which 
the refinery employed in the actual production of  ref ined s ugar ,  it a lso 
posses sed a decis ive advantage over many of its compet itors due to its  
wat e r f ront locat ion,  which enabled the f i rm to avoid the conside rable 
expense of  having to impo rt its raw suga rs t h rough customs wa rehouses 
ma inta i ned by the gove rnment . 20 
A second f i rm, the Havemeyer Suga r Refining Company, res ulted f rom 
a combinat ion , engineered by John E .  Searles Jr . ,  o f  Hector Havemeyer' s 
two i ndependently organized refineries , Havemeyer ,  Eastwick & Co . and 
Havemeye r Brothers & Co . .  2 1 The latter f i rm owned a ref inery on the 
wate r f ront in  Greenpoint , Brook lyn while the former ope rated another 
wate r f ront re f ine ry in Jersey City, New Je rsey . 
DeCastro and Donne r ,  one of the few corporations which existed in 
the early suga r ref ining i ndustry, began operation s  i n  1 8 7 3  and operated 
a la rge ref inery in New York City, possessing a dai ly ref in i ng capacity 
o f  1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  pounds . 22 Although incorporated, the f i rm rema ined 
20The waterf ront location of the Havemeyer & E lder refinery enabled 
the f i rm to take advantage of an 1 8 5 4  law which sanct ioned t he use o f  a 
system o f  p rivate bonded wa rehouses , in  which imported goods could be 
stored unt i l  ready for  use , as opposed to the old s ystem in which 
imported goods were requi red to be stored in government wa rehouses . 
This enabled Havemeye r & Elder to avoid the expense of storing their 
imported s uga r in government warehouse s ,  and paying t ransportat ion costs 
to move the raw suga r  f rom the government owned warehouse t o  the sugar 
refinery . See Eichne r ,  pp . 4 0 - 4 1 . 
2 1 Eichne r ,  p .  6 1 . 
22New York,  vol . 3 7 3 ,  p .  1 5 0 7 ;  vol . 4 1 6 ,  p .  1 0 0  a 1 4 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & 
Co . Col lect ion ,  ( Ba ke r  Library, Ha rva rd University Graduate School of 
Bus iness Admi n i s t rat ion ) . 
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c losely held by Theodore and Hen ry Havemeyer and t he i r  cou s i n ,  Cha r les 
Senff ,  who were a l so t he ma jor co-partners o f  Havemeyer a nd Elder . 
The F .  0 .  Matthiessen & Weichers Suga r Re f i ning Co . ,  formed in 
1 8 7 0 ,  was a consol idat ion of  the co-pa rtnership of  Mat thiessen and 
We ichers & Co . a nd the New Je rsey Suga r Ref ining Co . .  At the t ime of 
the forma t ion o f  the Suga r Re fine ries Company, the refining capacity of 
the plants which i t  cont rol led was exceeded only by that of  Havemeyer 
and Elde r .  23 
Dick & Meye r ,  with a da ily refining capacity of  9 0 0 , 0 0 0  pounds at  
the t ime of  t he formation of  the Trust , was a partnership comprised o f  
Wi l l iam Dick , a longt ime membe r of the industry, a n d  Carl Meye rs , 
formerly of t he bone black busines s .  2� 
Moller and Sierck & Co . and the Oxna rd Bros . f i rm, both of which 
were pa rtnerships , cont rol led smalle r  ref i neries ; each had a da ily 
refin ing capacity at the t ime of the forma t ion of  the T rust of  
app roximately 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  pounds . 
Ha vemeyer & Elder : Capi t a l i z a t i on, Profi t s  and the Use of Credi t ,  1 8 75-
1 88 7  
I t  is  somewhat diff icult to trace the changes in  t he 
capit a l i zat 1on of the va rious fi rms named above with any degree of  
precis io n ,  both because of the secret iveness of the owners and the 
degree t o  which t he unincorporated f i rms ' financial a f fa irs we re often 
inte rtwined with those of the pa rtners . 2� The init i a l  capi t a l i zation of 
23New Yor k ,  vol . 3 8 0 ,  p .  130 , R. G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion ; Mul l ins,  
p .  4 8 .  
24New York , vo l . 3 5 2 ,  p .  1 32 4 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
2�Hen ry 0 .  Havemeye r of  Havemeyer and Elder,  and later the D irector 
o f  the Amer ican Suga r Refining Co . ,  was notorious for secret iveness and 
his repeated refus a l  t o  cooperate with the various congres s ional 
committees and state as semblies that sought t o  uncove r the inner 
wor kings o f  the Trust , even go ing s o  f a r  as  t o  refuse t o  give 
informat ion rega rding the company' s financial operat ions t o  stockholders 
o r  t he other off icer s  of the corpo rat ion . Havemeyer ' s re luctance to 
disclose financial informa t ion re lating to the Trust had ample p recedent 
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Havemeyer & Elder a nd the price paid for const ruct ion of  the i r  refinery 
rema i n  unknown , alt hough s imi larly equipped ref in i ng f i rms that emerged 
du ring the decade fol lowing the Civil War reported i n i t i a l  pa id i n  
capit a l i zat ions of be tween $350 , 0 0 0  and $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 26 B y  1 8 7 5  the va lue 
of the company' s suga r refining buildings a nd appointments were 
est imated at 1 . 7  mi l lion dol lars upon which mortgages outstanding 
amounted to $ 5 4 7 , 9 9 4 . 7 0 . 27 S ince no increases in the f i rm' s paid in 
capit a l i zat ion we re repo rted, a nd the bulk of  t he company ' s  mortgaged 
debt had been as sumed du r ing const ruct ion of t he factory, it is a lmost 
certain  that the bulk of the f i rms phys ical expan s i on up t o  this point 
was interna ll y f ina nced . 18 
in  his behavior du ring his tenu re as general partner in  Havemeye r and 
Elder . He should not be s i ngled out in  this rega rd : such ret icence on 
the part of the owne rs of the va rious suga r re fining establi shments was 
not unusua l ,  as such informat ion was thought to be quite helpful to 
compet itors and of  l i t t le bene fit to the f i rm giving it . See The 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle , 1 8 8 9- 1 9 0 0 ;  New Yo rk,  Legislature ,  
Joint Committee t o  I nvest igate Trusts ( Lexow Committee ) , Repo rt and 
P roceedings ( Albany : Wynkorp ,  Hal lenbrec k ,  C rawford, 1 8 97 ) , 
cited herea fter as Lexow Commit tee , Report ; Ha rdwick Committee, 
Hea rings , pp . 2 9 35-3 6 ) . 
26The Havemeye r & Co . ref inery, cont rolled by t he same branch o f  
the Havemeyer fami ly that owned Havemeyer and Elder represented a 
capital inves tment o f  $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  in 1 87 2 . The Havemeye r B rothers & Co . 
and Havemeye r ,  Eastwick & Co . re fineries , controlled by the descendant s 
o f  Wi l l iam F .  Havemeye r ,  the forme r mayor o f  New York City,  were 
capit a l i zed at $ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0  and $350 , 0 0 0  respectivel y . See Eichne r ,  p .  4 4 .  
27Evidently,  the company was unwi l ling to disclose any informat ion 
rega rding even the cost o f  its  ref inery . R .  G .  Dun & Co . in  Ma rch, 
1 8 7 5 ,  noted that " ( Havemeye r a nd Elder)  a re ret icent about t he i r  a f fa i rs 
the refore our informat ion is de rived mainly f rom t he i r  nea r bus iness 
friends . "  After a "di l igent compa r ison o f  views " the cor respondent 
ascertained the f igure given he re . See New Yo rk,  vol . 3 7 7 , p .  220  sub 
a l ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion . 
28Larry Elde r ,  t he deceased former pa rtner of  the f irm, had 
obtai ned a mortgage f rom the company upon advancing it  the bulk of  the 
funds which were used to fina nce the const ruction o f  t �e ref inery . Upon 
his death the mo rtgage was t ransfer red to Frederick C .  Havemeyer a s  the 
executo r  o f  Elder' s wi l l . I t  was reported i n  Ma rch,  1 8 7 5 ,  t hat Havemeyer 
owned $ 4 55 , 0 0 0  of the $ 5 4 7 , 9 9 4 . 7 0 mortgaged debt of t he f irm . The 
mortgage formerly held by Elder appears to have served a s  a mechan i sm 
for  enabl ing h im to secure preference over the other partners with 
rega rd t o  t he f i rms as set s ,  and was not extended in connect ion with 
loans obtained f rom outs ide sou rces . See New Yo r k ,  vol . 3 7 7 ,  p .  2 2 0 ,  
sub H ;  p .  2 2 0 ,  sub a l ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
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Once t he ref inery had been outfitted with a l l  the latest 
accout rement s ,  and its capacity expanded to the des i red leve l ,  earnings 
were s imply added to surplus reserves . By 1 8 7 8 ,  statements made by 
Henry Havemeyer to a " leading Wa l l  St reet banker"  indicate t hat the 
company ' s  " cash capita l  invested in [ the ) busines s ,  over and above a l l  
l iabil i t ie s ,  refinery and [ real estate ) " amounted to approximately $ 2  
mi l lion . 29 
With t he exception of the brief pe riod during which they we re 
drawn into t he f inancial di fficu lt ies of DeCas t ro & Donne r ( described 
below in this section ) , Havemeyer & Elder appear  to have enj oyed an 
uninte rrupted per iod of business success du ring 1 8 75- 1 8 8 7 ,  and a 
reputat ion for f inanc ial resil ience . By Apr i l ,  1 8 7 8 ,  it  was noted that 
Havemeyer & E lder had "eme rged f rom thei r entanglements with DeCastro & 
Donner and f rom known losses on the importat ion o f  sugar with more 
rapidit y  than was genera lly ant icipated . " � As noted e�rlier,  Henry 0 .  
Havemeyer ' s claim during that same month t hat t he f i rm possessed a $2 
mil l ion cash surplus stood unchallenged . 
Subsequent repo rts by R .  G .  Dun & Co . show t he f i rm t o  have made 
s ubstant ial profits th rough 1 8 8 1 ,  whi le simu lt aneously reducing its  
indebtedness ( see below, this  sect ion) . 3 1 After t h ree yea rs o f  relat ive 
good fortune, Havemeyer & Elder experienced a ma j o r ,  though short l ived, 
setback when port ions of  their re finery were dest royed by f i re on 
January 9, 1 8 8 2 . Total losses from the f i re amounted to $ 1 . 3  mi l l ion , 
29Although t hese figu res were thought to be high, "no object ion was 
offe red" by the banke r . See New York, vol . 3 7 3 ,  p .  1 5 0 7 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . 
Collect ion . 
30New York, vol . 3 8 5 ,  p .  1 3 0 0  sub a ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion . 
3 1While 1 8 7 9  and 1 8 8 0 were good years for the ref ining indust ry, 
1 8 8 1  proved to be except iona l due to a success ful , though short l i ved, 
attempt on r.he part of  re finers to curtail  output and " an active "  demand 
for ref ined s uga r .  1 8 82 p roved to be a still  bet te r  yea r  for mos t  of t he 
industry,  a s  on Janua ry 9 , 1 8 8 2  the Havemeyer and E lder re f inery, in 
wh ich nea rly three-fou rths of the nation ' s hard suga rs we re p roduced, 
was des t royed by f i re . See New Yo rk, vol . 3 8 5 ,  p .  1 3 0 0  s ub a, R .  G .  Dun 
& Co . Collect ion and Eichne r ,  pp . 63- 6 4 . 
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with virtually a l l  of the i r  hard sugar ref ining fac i l it ies des t royed . 32 
Havemeyer & E lde r were fortunate in that they were insured against t he i r  
loss , with the sett lement amounting to approximately $ 1  mil l ion . 
Although contempo rary estimates placed t he cost o f  reconst ruct ing t he 
dest royed part of the ref inery at $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  later accounts place t he 
f inal f igure much higher . 33 
Regardless of  which account is correct , t he f inanci a l  damage to 
t he f i rm appea rs t o  have been minima l . Just six  months a fter the f i re ,  
t he f i rm was reported t o  "have made cons iderable money ( la rgel y  by 
shifting wo rk t o  the re finement of soft s uga rs ) " whi le t he i r  business 
paper " was s ought after at the lowest rates . " 34 Twelve months late r ,  by 
the t ime const ruct ion of their new ref inery was completed, t he f i rm 
owned a daily re f ining capacity that was twice as greaL as t he i r  next 
la rgest competitor,  and we re capable of ope rat ing at cost ( not inc luding 
a return on capit a l ) of 0 . 4 4 cents per pound of ref ined suga r ,  a f igure 
t hat was not t o  be improved upon even during the heyday of t he t rust . 3s 
Havemeye r  & Elde r ,  despite the t rials t hey endured f rom accident s ,  
f a l l ing ma rgins ,  and a n  i l l  conceived business a l l i ance with t he 
DeCas t ro and Donner re finery, we re able to finance t he i r  a scendancy t o  a 
dominant posit ion in the re fining indust ry largely t h rough s hort term 
32New Yor k ,  vol . 3 8 5 ,  p .  1 3 0 0  sub a ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collection ; 
Eichner ,  p . 6 5 .  
33R .  G .  Dun & Co . estimated the t otal loss t o  the f i rm after 
insurance at $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 . Eichner ,  howeve r ,  notes t hat the Havemeyer 
fami ly ' s biographer stated that "the cost ( o f  rebui lding ) exceeded t he 
early est imates , and as a result , the ent i re financ ial resources o f  the 
fami ly were needed . "  The Ha vemeyer fami ly ' s means , howeve r ,  were not 
incons ide rable . R .  G .  Dun & Co . est imated the net worth of  the f i rm in 
1 8 8 2 ,  inc luding the pe rsona l resou rces of the pa rtne rs at "between 3 and 
4 mil l ion ( dollars ) . "  If the cost of rebui lding the dest royed pa rt o f  
the ref ine ry was g reater than was earlier antic ipated, it may be because 
the f i rm mode rni zed and added to capacity du ring reconst ruct ion . See 
New Yo rk,  vol . 3 8 5 ,  p .  1 3 0 0  sub a, R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion and 
Eichne r ,  p .  6 5 . 
34New Yor k ,  vol . 3 8 5 ,  p .  1 3 0 0  sub a ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lection . 
3sEichner ,  p .  6 5 . 
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borrowing and by drawing on t he interna lly generated f inancial  resources 
of t he i r  re fin ing ope rat ions . By 1 8 8 4 ,  Havemeyer & Elde r  owned the 
largest ,  most technologically sophisticated sugar ref inery in the 
count ry, and possessed abundant financial resources t o  f und t he 
maintenance and improvement of their  product ive capacity and t heir  day 
to day opera t ions . In August , 1 8 8 4 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . h ighlighted t he 
cons iderable f inanc ial st rength and operat ional advantages which the 
concern en j oyed a s  follows : 
This is a c lose corpo rat ion having the control of abundant 
means to enable them to take advant age of any opportunity 
offering in the raw suga r ma rket . The machinery and plant 
i s  kept up with the latest improvements and dis cove ries in 
refining and the cost of producing their refined suga r is 
reduced t o  t he minimum . The company is in unque s t ioned h igh 
standing and credit and the capacity of the suga r refineries 
in the United States is  far in advance of  the consumpt ion . 
Consequently there is  little probability that t hey w i l l  have 
to add to t he i r  rea l  or personal property at least for years 
to come ( New York , vol . 385,  p .  1 3 0 0  sub a,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . 
Col lection) . 
The c redit hist ory of Havemeyer & Elder mus t  be conside red in 
light o f  its  un ique relat ionship with DeCa st ro & Donner ,  another l a rge 
New York suga r ref ining fi rm . 36 Although Havemeyer & E lder were one o f  
t he few re f in ing f i rms to have a incurred a rather l a rge mortgaged debt 
dur ing the t wo decades preceding the forma tion of t he t rust , their 
abi lity to bor row f reely was most severely tested by their close working 
relat ionship with this firm . 37 Havemeye r & Elde r  appear t o  have 
incurred a s i zable short-term debt , in addit ion t o  their mortgaged debt , 
during t he t roubled pe riod 1 87 3 - 1 8 7 8 . I n  February, 1 8 7 5 ,  t he company 
was reported to have had between $5 0 0 , 0 0 0  and $ 6 0 0 , 0 0 0  of paper upon the 
36Havemeye r & Elde r acqu i red a con t ro l l ing interest in Dec as t ro & 
Donne r in 1 A 7 4 in  exchange for the t ransfer of  ref ining buildings and 
rea l  estate to t he latter f irm . This was the only recorded instance of 
ext ra-fami l i a l  interowne rship among New York suga r refining f i rms prior 
to the format ion of t he t rust . 
37The mo rtgaged debt of Havemeyer & Elde r was recorded a s  having 
been $ 5 4 7 , 9 9 4 . 7 0 in Ma rch, 1 8 7 5 ,  aga inst total re f ining property which 
ini t ia l ly cost $ 1 , 7 0 0 , 0 0 0  and was estimated to have a "present asset 
val ue "  in 1 8 7 5  o f  between $ 1 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  and $ 9 00 , 0 0 0 . See New York, vol . 
377 , p .  2 2 0  sub a 1 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion . 
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ma rket , which, due t o  their deepening f inancial  involvement in DeCa s t ro 
& Donne r ,  a f fo rded them a working capital est imated a t  only $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 38 
After assuming a cont roll ing interest in DeCa s t ro & Donner in 
early 1 8 7 4  the pr ice of  Havemeye r & Elder' s pape r s teadi ly fell . 
Despite reports that t heir bus iness credit had earl ier stood 
unques t ioned, by Octobe r ,  1 8 7 5 ,  thei r posit ion in t he ma rket was 
recorded as having deteriorated and the price of t he i r  paper f a l len 
because "both [ Havemeyer & Elder and DeCast ro & Donner )  a re a f fected by 
the same factors . . .  and any serious t rouble occu r ring to [ the latter)  
would amount t o  serious trouble for [ t he fo rmer ) . "  Although t he c redit 
of  Havemeyer & E lder appears to have been widely discussed in t he 
commercial paper ma rket as  a result of  t heir  relat ionship with DeCastro 
and Donner the i r  t rade c redit appea rs not t o  have suffe red . At the t ime 
of  t he report cited above , it was noted that "the i r  purchas ing c redit 
cont inues high " , whe re it appears to have rema ined unt i l  the i r  a f fa i r s  
t ook a turn for the better i n  1 8 7 7 . 39 
Meanwh i le t he st and ing of  Havemeyer & Elde r in the commercial 
pape r ma rket continued to deteriorate . In Janua ry, 1 8 7 6 ,  it  was 
reported that : 
The i r  business pape r is not sell ing so f reely as  formerly,  
and s a les a re e f fected at high rates , consequent upon t he 
p reva i li ng opinion t hat thei r business is much extended 
and . . .  t ha t  they a re too much mixed up in the a f fa i rs o f  t he 
DeCastro and Donner Suga r Re f ining Co . (New Yor k ,  vo l .  4 1 6 , 
p .  1 0 0  a 1 4 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lection ) . 
Through January, 1 8 7 8 ,  the involvement o f  Havemeyer & Elde r in t he 
a f fa i r s  of  DeCas t ro & Donne r deepened . By Octobe r ,  1 8 7 7 ,  Havemeyer & 
Elder were forced t o  assume the management of  t he f i rm, having short ly 
before t hen become respons ible for a debt of $1 mi l lion a dvanced t o  t he 
38New Yo rk,  vol . 4 1 6 ,  p .  1 0 0  a l 4 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect i on . 
39New York , vol . 4 1 6 , p .  1 0 0  a l 4 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion . 
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company by a g roup o f  p rominent New York bankers . 40 Although previous 
reports indicate that Havemeyer & Elder were able t o  generate s u f ficient 
working capital  through succes sful operat ions t o  enable them "to go 
a long with apparent ease " ,  thei r deepening involvement with the 
be league red DeCa s t ro & Donne r company taxed t he i r  resou rces to t he 
utmost .  
I n  Octobe r ,  1 8 77 , the company assumed act ive management o f  
DeCas t ro & Donner . In December,  1 8 7 7 ,  Havemeyer & Elde r  wa s f orced to 
hypothecate s ome o f  the i r  la rge stock of raw sugar ,  a lthough whether on 
beha l f  o f  t hemselves or DeCastro & Donne r it is not certain . Despite 
these unusua l occurrences , it was also reported du ring that same month 
that " so f a r ,  [ Havemeyer & Elder]  have exhibited great f inanci a l  
st rength & i ndependence & given n o  indicat ion to test the i r  
[ c redit ] . " 4 1 
By t he end of Janua ry, 1 8 7 8 ,  however ,  the s ituat ion had worsened 
dramat ically . In orde r to a l lay considerable concern �ega rding the 
the i r  respons ibi lity for the debt of Decastro & Donner ,  Havemeyer & 
Elder init iated an unusual t ransact ion whereby the persona l p roperty o f  
the pa rtner� wa s t ransferred first to their att orney and then t o  t he 
pa rtnership itse l f ,  t he purpose of  which was t o  leave no doubt a s  t o  its  
ava i labil it y  t o  cove r the obligat ions o f  DeCa st ro & Donner which, 
acco rding t o R .  G .  Dun & Co . ,  were "unde rstood to be unusually l a rge " . 
40The one mi ll ion dollar  advance wa s repo rtedly t o  be repaid within 
one yea r ,  and wa s accompan ied by the tempo ra ry t ransfer of one mi l lion 
dol lars  in DeCast ro & Donner stock to the lenders and the gua rantee of 
Havemeyer & Elder . By Novembe r ,  1 8 7 7 ,  DeCastro & Donne r was " in t he 
hands o f  its  st ockholders . . .  rep resented by a committee who was managing 
( thei r )  a f fa i rs and meet ing obl igat ions as  they mat u re " . Appa ren t ly,  
the unnamed "prominent bankers" who advanced this s um •1pon the s t oc k  of 
the company we re concerned about the va lue of t he i r  collatera l ,  as 
Havemeyer & E lder were b rought into the picture t o  enable DeCa s t ro & 
Donne r " . . .  t o  rea l i ze on t heir asset s " . The latter company' s  
di f f icult ies were appa rently due to mismanagement and a sharp dec l ine in 
the ma rgin bet ween raw and re f ined sugar as  the company was reported to 
have " ample act ive assets . . .  to ma ke good [ the $ 1  mil l ion ] advance . "  See 
New Yor k ,  vol . 3 8 5 ,  p .  1 2 7 1 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
4 1New York,  vol . 3 8 5 ,  p .  127 1 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
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Unl i ke the report of  just a month ea rlie r ,  by this date it  was noted 
that " [ a l l ] indica t ions point to the fact that [ Ha vemeyer & Elde r ]  a re 
using t he i r  c redit to the utmost . "42 
In Ma rch , 1 8 7 8 ,  DeCastro & Donner underwent reorgan i z a t ion , 
becoming, for  a l l  pract ica l purposes ,  a subs idia ry o f  Havemeye r  & 
Elder . 43 Whether because of  imp roved condit ions in t he ma rkets f o r  
ref ined and r a w  sug a r  or the ability of DeCa stro & Donne r to resolve i t s  
c ri s i s  unde r t h e  management o f  Havemeye r & Elder i t  is impos s ible t o  
say , but b y  Apri l ,  1 8 7 8 ,  the f inancial condit ion o f  both had t a ken a 
d ramatic  t u rn for t he better . By that date,  Havemeye r & Elder ' s  paper 
out st anding had been reduced to $20 0 , 0 0 0 ,  and its  t rade c redit returned 
to its  f o rme r leve l ,  thus inspiring confidence that t he company had 
begun to eme rge f rom its di f f icul ties . As i f  to  con f i rm such 
speculat ion , Ha vemeye r & Elde r ,  whose pape r was s t i l l  sel l ing a t  rathe r  
low prices , began a pract ice of  making a ma rket f o r  such paper by 
purchas ing it t hemselves when the discount rose above seven percent . 44 
As t he a f f a i rs o f  DeCast ro & Donne r were put back in o rde r unde r 
the management o f  Havemeye r  & Elder,  and the market for ref ined suga r 
g radual l y  improved, the st anding o f  Havemeyer & Elde r  in the c redit 
ma rket cont inued to rise . By May , 1 8 7 9 ,  due in pa r t  to t he factors 
ment ioned above and the fact that the f i rm had continued t o  reduce its 
paper out s t anding to an amount est imated at $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ,  the rate o f  
discount fell  to a round four percent , at wh ich p rice it  w a s  report edly 
" s ought after . "  Meanwh ile,  it was noted of  Havemeyer & Elde r  that " they 
42New Yor k ,  vol . 3 8 5 ,  p .  1 2 7 1 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collection . 
43See the f inanc i a l  history of DeCas t ro & Donner ( be low , this 
chapte r )  f o r  a brief des c r ipt ion o f  the te rms o f  t he reorganizat i on . 
44New York,  vol . 3 8 5 ,  p .  1 2 7 1 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Co l lect ion . 
Havemeyer & Elder ' s  pape r sold f reely at between 6 . 5  and 7 . 5  percent 
du ring early 1 8 7 8 ,  prior to the i r  having init iated the pract ice of 
repurcha s ing it  when it  rose above seven percent . It is not c le a r  
whether t h e  funds which were used to ret i re the f i rm' s pape r came f rom 
its  s u rplus or were borrowed f rom some other source at a rate o f  less 
than 7 percent . 
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exhibit great f inancial  st rength ,  and a re seeking no favors a t  the i r  
bank, " a n d  h a d  e a r l ier reduced the rate at  which t hey st ood ready t o  
repurchase t he i r  pape r t o  s ix percent . 4� 
While bu siness condit ions for the refining indust ry ranged f rom 
poor t o  indifferent during the 1 8 7 0 s ,  the early 1 8 8 0s dppear to have 
been quite p ro f itable, despite a smaller ave rage di f fe rence bet ween the 
price of raw and ref ined suga r than was obse rved during most of t he 
1 8 7 0 s . 46 Evident ly,  Havemeyer & Elder thought it wise t o  cont inue t o  
reduce t he i r  indebtedness during this t ime , a s  t he amount of t he i r  
business paper outstanding dec l ined to $ 4 0 , 0 0 0  b y  Janua ry, 1 8 8 1 ,  and 
$2 0 , 0 0 0  by July , 1 8 8 2 . Similarly,  their  total indebtednes s ,  inc luding 
t rade and bank c redi t had been reduced, by January, 1 8 8 1 ,  t o  
approximately $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 4 ' 
Appa rent ly the f i re that dest royed Havemeyer & Elder ' s hard suga r 
refini ng capacity in January, 1 8 8 2 ,  did noth ing t o  dim the i r  reputat ion 
in the eyes of t he i r  c redit ors or cause them to revers� course i n  
reducing the i r  indebtedness . Seven months after t he f i re the i r  bus ines s  
paper cont i nued to be " sought a fter at the lowest rates " ,  while t he 
amount out standing dec lined to $2 0 , 0 0 0 . Th rough 1 8 8 4  the company' s  h igh 
standing and credi t rema ined in force, as t hey added t o  their reputa t ion 
as "one of the l a rgest and wea lthiest concerns in the suga r t rade . " 49 
Havemeyer & Elde r cont inued t o  withdraw the i r  business paper f rom 
the ma rket because they planned to reorganize in late 1 8 8 2 . Although 
the tenms of t he p roposed reorganizat ion show that Havemeyer & Elder was 
planning to incorporate and officially absorb the ref ining f i rm of 
DeCastro & Donner ,  the plan was not consumma ted prior to the format ion 
4 �New York, vol . 3 8 5 ,  p . l27 1 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
46Mul l in s ,  pp . 12- 1 3 . 
47New Yor k ,  vel . 3 8 5 ,  p .  1 3 0 0  sub a ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
48New Yor k ,  vol . 3 8 5 ,  p .  1 3 0 0  sub a ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Co l lect ion . 
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o f  the t rust . Although a charter o f  i ncorporat ion was t aken out in the 
name of "Havemeyer & Elde r Co . " , the old Havemeye r & Elde r  continued t o  
ope rate under the l a t t e r  name , and DeCa s t ro & Donne r w a s  neve r 
o f f ic i a l ly absorbed by the newly c reated corporat ion . 49 
DeCa s t ro & Donner : Capi t a l i z a t i on, Profi t s  and t h e  Use of Credi t ,  1 8 78-
1 88 7  
DeCas t ro & Donne r wa s ,  f rom the t ime o f  i t s  format ion in 1 8 7 3 ,  
c losely connected with the firm o f  Havemeyer & Elde r . Shortly after t he 
incorporation o f  t he former firm, the owners o f  Havemeye r & E lde r sold 
property va lued at $ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0  t o  DeCa stro & Donner in exchange for an 
ident ical ly va lued block of stock in the latter company . The pa rtners 
o f  Havemeye r and Elder thus became the ma j ority stockholders in the 
c losel y  held DeCas t ro & Donner concern . 50 Havemeyer & E lde r later 
increased their f inancial stake in De Cas t ro & Donner;  by Ma rch , 1 8 7 5 ,  
loans b y  Havemeyer & Elder t o  DeCas t ro & Donne r amounted to $ 3 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 5 1 
By the end o f  1 8 7 5 ,  the interest of Ha vemeyer & Elder in DeCas t ro & 
Donne r had increa sed to $ 1 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . u 
Although possess ing a relat ively la rge , mode rn ref inery by the 
standa rds o f  t he day , DeCast ro & Donner began t o  expe r ience diff iculties 
within a yea r  of commencing product ion . In  late 1 8 7 4 , concern was 
expres sed ove r  " the corporate company be ing too cumbrous for s uccess fu l  
working and va luat ions be ing too high . " 53 
49New Yor k ,  vol . 3 8 5 ,  p .  1 3 00 sub a ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Co l lect ion . 
50New Yor k ,  vol . 3 7 3 ,  p . 1507 ; vol . 4 1 6 , p .  1 0 0  a 1 4 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & 
Co . Col lect ion . The init ial capit a l i zat ion o f  DeCa s t ro and Donne r was 
$ 2 , 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  of which $ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  was pa id in . S i nce the stock which was 
exchanged for the prope rty conveyed t o  De Cast ro and Donner represented 
seventy percent o f  that company' s paid in capi t a li zat ivn, Havemeyer and 
Elde r  became ma jority stockholders in the corporat ion upon complet ion of 
t he t ransact ion . 
5 1New York,  vol . 4 1 6 , p .  1 0 0  a 1 4 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Co l lect ion . 
52New York, vo l . 4 1 6 ,  p .  a 1 4 6 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
53New York , vol . 37 3 ,  p .  1 50 7 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
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Furthermore , DeCast ro & Donner overextended t hemselves short l y  
a f t e r  commencing operat ions , became h igh ly leveraged, and d i d  not emerge 
f rom the diff icu l t ies caused by the i r  accumulat ion of debt unt i l  
rel inquish ing cont ro l  o f  their assets and liabi l i t ies t o  Havemeye r  & 
E lde r in 1 8 77 . Alt hough reportedly in high st anding in the c redit 
ma rkets during 1 8 7 4 ,  with thei r "paper selling f reely . . .  ( and] having 
l a rge f inanci a l  faci l it ies , "  the f i rm soon began to expe r ience 
di f ficult ies . Although the early and middle 1 8 7 0 s  were not p rosperous 
t imes f o r  the suga r ref ining industry in genera l ,  DeCa s t ro & Donne r ' s 
p roblems can be t raced to a more fundament a l  cause , which would 
certainly have been aggravated by the depre ssed bus iness condit ions of 
the early 1 8 7 0 s . Wh i le f a l l ing prices for ref ined suga r t hrough 1 8 7 5  
caused a reduct ion in the va luat ion o f  the bu lk of t he i r  assets , which 
was widely thought t o  have been too h igh in the f irst p lace , the company 
began to a rouse concern among their  c reditors due to t he i r " . . .  capita l  
not ( be ing) adequate to the la rge bus ines s they undertake "  a n d  because 
t hey were " ( too ] f requent bor rowers among t hemse lves and t he i r  
f riends . .. �� 
Meanwhile ,  through 1 8 7 5 ,  with a level of indebtednes s  only 
s light ly below the i r  paid in capitalizat ion o f  $ 1 , 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  DeCastro & 
Donner cont inued to expand their re f ining capacity ( a l ready est imated at 
a lmos t  one mi l l ion pounds da ily)  and import heavi ly of  raw s ugar s  on 
t he i r  t rade account . Although the extension o f  t rade c redit t o  t he f i rm 
cont inued at h igh levels  th roughout t he yea r ,  by June , 1 8 7 5 ,  t he 
company' s  business pape r was repo rted to be sel l ing at between e ight and 
n ine percent while money on call could be had for bet ween two and one­
half  and th ree percent . �� By the end of 1 8 7 5 ,  DeCastro & Donne r ' s  debt­
equity rat i o  had risen to a level of 1 . 2 8 .  By January ,  1 8 7 8 ,  despite an 
�4New Yor k ,  vel .  3 7 3 ,  p .  1 5 6 7 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lection . 
��New York , vol . 3 7 3 ,  p .  1 5 6 7 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Co :. lect ion . 
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approximate doubl ing of  its paid in capital ( t o  $ 3  mi l l i on ) , i t s  debt 
equity-ratio  dec l ined only s l ight ly to 1 . 17 . 56 
By Octobe r ,  1 8 7 7 ,  the sums which could be obtaiu�d through the 
sale of the f irm' s business pape r, upon which the discount had grown 
prohibit ivel y  large , we re no longer adequate to a llow the f i rm t o  
cont inue its  operat ions . I n  order t o  cont inue in bus ines s ,  the f i rm was 
forced to negotiate a $ 1  mi llion dol la r  loan with an unnamed, prominent 
New York banking house , against which the lende rs were able to secure an 
unknown ( though reportedly large ) quant ity of the company ' s  stock as 
col latera l ,  and t he gua rantee of the firm of Havemeye r & Elde r ,  who by 
t hen were t he ma jority s tockholders in DeCastro & Donner . �' 
Shortly a fter the advance wa s granted, t he ma nagement o f  DeCast ro 
& Donner pas sed into the hands of Ha vemeyer & Elde r .  A commit tee was 
formed cons ist ing of  the partners of  the latter f i rm, who a r ranged t o  
buy, s e l l  and pay a l l  the debt s of DeCastro & Donner, and otherwise 
exerc ise close control over its day to day ope rat ions . 58 By t he end of 
1 87 7 ,  it was reported that DeCastro & Donner had lost " a l l  standing and 
c redit in the ma rket . "  Hen ry 0 .  Havemeyer ,  appa rent ly wel l  aware of  
this , c ited the a rrangement between Havemeye r & Elde r  and DeCa s t ro & 
Donner as  obvia t ing the need for the credit community to cons ider the 
lat ter f i rm as  an independent ent ity, dec laring that the company " [ was )  
not ent i t led t o  a rat ing on [ R .  G .  Dun & Co . ' s )  books " and that the 
c redit of Decast ro & Donne r should be predicated solely upon the 
s tanding o f  Havemeyer & Elde r . 
Apparent ly,  the difficult ies of DeCa s t ro & Donner came t o  a crisis 
in early 1 8 7 8 ,  when t heir  total debt outst anding rose to a level which 
exceeded the amount of  their pa id in capital ( which by t hen had been 
5�ew York, vol . 3 7 3 ,  p .  1 5 0 7 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion . 
5�ew York , vol . 3 7 3 ,  p .  1 5 6 7 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co Col lect ion . 
»�w York,  vol . 3 7 3 ,  p .  1 5 6 7 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
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increased t o  $ 3  mi l l ion do llars ) by over $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . After an addi t iona l 
advance o f  $ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0  by the stockholders , secured by a second mortgage on 
the ref i n ing property,  and the forma l i za t ion of  t he agreement whereby 
Havemeyer & E lder assumed act ive management o f  t he f i rm, DeCa s t ro & 
Donner s lowly began t o  eme rge f rom t heir  dif ficult ies . By t he end o f  
1 8 7 8 ,  t h e  company' s total debt had been reduced t o  s l ight ly less than $2  
mil lion,  a l though i t  subsequent ly rose to something ove r $ 2 . 7  mi l l ion in 
Janua ry,  1 8 8 0 ,  a level at which it rema ined at least through 1 8 8 1 . 
Whi le no informat ion i s  avai lable for the per iod 1 8 8 2 - 1 8 8 3 ,  a report 
released by the f irm in February, 1 8 8 4 ,  shows that it had been able t o  
reduce i t s  out standing debt t o  s l ight ly ove r  $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  wh i le 
s imul taneously reducing its capi t a l  stock t o  $ 1 . 5  mi l lion,  appa rently by 
repu rchas ing half  o f  its formerly out standing shares . �9 Between 1 8 8 1  
and 1 8 8 5 , under the auspices o f  Havemeyer & E lde r ,  t he bus iness  appears 
to have been restored to f i nanc ial hea lth . By the end o f  1 8 8 4 ,  t he 
company was once aga in repo rted as  do ing a " very remunerat ive bus iness . "  
Furthermore , DeCast ro & Donner rega ined the i r  abi lity  t o  seek credit 
under t he i r  own name ,  and thei r standing in the mar ket was reported to 
have been " unquest i onably high . " 60 The company rema ined hea lthy and 
solvent t h rough 1 8 8 7 ,  when its stock was acqui red by t he Suga r Trust . 
The Ha vemeyer Suga r  Refi ning Company : Capi t a l i z a t i on ,  Profi t s  and t he 
Use of Credi t ,  1 8 75-1 887 
Like Ha vemeyer & Elder,  the other New York City sugar ref ineries 
rel ied prima r i l y  on t he resources of  a sma l l  group of owner-managers and 
inte rna l ly generated funds to finance t he const ruct ion , improvement and 
maintenance o f  t he i r  re f ining p rope rt ies . Havemeye r B rothers & Co . ,  
�9New York, vo l . 3 7 3 ,  p .  1 6 0 0  a 9 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co Col lect ion . 
60New York, vo l . 3 7 3 ,  p .  1 6 0 0  a 9 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion . The 
c redit of DeCa st ro & Donner cont inued to be predicated upon t he i r  c lose 
re la t ionship with Havemeyer & Elder,  although the latter had 




which was later succeeded by The Havemeyer Sugar Re fin ing Company, was a 
partne rship cons ist ing of Diedrich Baltman,  forme rly a we l l  known New 
York g rocer ;  Hecto r  C .  Havemeyer ,  previously of Havemeye r and Co . ( which 
was consolidated with Havemeyer and Elder in Februa ry,  1 8 7 0 )  and John C .  
Havemeyer .  Ba ltman purchased a Greenpoint , Brooklyn ref inery in 1 8 7 1  
f o r  $20 0 , 0 0 0 . Initially the purchase was mortgaged and Baltman was 
obligated t o  pay in monthly insta l lments of one t housand dol la rs , 
although the exact te rms o f  t he loan appear to have been f lexible, with 
payments governed by his abi lity to furnish the money . 
Shortly after pu rchas ing the prope rty Baltman spent a sum 
est imated at $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  in refurbishing it . Between this and t he init ial 
purchase price , Ba ltman wa s said to have virtually all t he funds he 
accumu lated during his yea rs in the groce ry business t ied up in t he 
s uga r ref ining ventu re . 61 In addit ion to Baltman ' s  cont r ibut ion , 
Hector C .  Havemeye r paid in $ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0  cash capital t o  t he f i rm,  a lt hough 
his cont ribution was thought to have been de rived f rom a loan f rom his 
brother,  John . In addit ion to the advance t o  Hector,  John was t o  
furnish t h e  b u l k  of the f i rm' s working capital once ope rat ions 
commenced . 62 
Havemeye r Bros . & Co . was a success f rom the outset . Despite the 
general t rava i l s  of the indust ry th roughout the 1 8 7 0 s ,  t he f i rm 
gradually improved its f inancial pos ition . By 1 8 7 4  the f irm' s total 
assets we re est imated at $ 3 5 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0  and they we re noted as having 
" accumulated cons ide rable profits"  wh ile the i r  " standing and c redit [ had 
come ) to be established at a h igh [ level ) , having con f i rmed t he best 
61Diedrich Ba ltman had also accumulated substant i a l  rea l  estate 
holdings while engaged in the grocery busines s ,  much o f  which he 
liqu idated in o rde r t o  out fit the new ref inery . For reasons t hat a re 
unc lea r ,  but might have der ived f rom Bal tman ' s  greater proport ionate 
share in the init ial investment than the other pa rtners , t he G reenpoint 
property appea rs to have rema ined in Baltman ' s  name unt i l  1 8 8 0 ,  when the 
partne rship wa s abso rbed by Havemeyer Bros . & Co . See New York , vol . 
3 5 0 ,  p .  1 2 0 0R, R .  G .  Dun & Co . Co llect ion . 
62New York , vo l .  3 5 0 , p .  1 1 1 6 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collection . 
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expectat i ons of their friends by their  able and successful management . "  
By 1 8 7 8  the f i rm' s a ccumu lat ions had appa rent ly grown t o  t he point where 
t hey we re able to state that t hey were " independent of  c redit and 
[ could] buy for cash if  they need [ ed)  to . "  By November ,  1 8 7 9 ,  t hey were 
reported to have "made money • . .  and consequently [ we re ]  s t ronger in 
capit a l . " 63 
The partnership of Havemeyer Bros . & Co . wa s dissolved in 
September 1 8 8 0  by mutual consent , and its asset s ,  a l ong with those of 
another partnership,  Ha vemeyer ,  Eastwick & Co . ,  we re absorbed by a newly 
c reated New York co rporation, the Ha vemeyer Suga r Ref in ing Co . Unde r 
t he incorporat ion agreement , the former two f i rms t rans ferred t he r ight s 
and t it le t o  the i r  Greenpoint and Jersey City refine ries , with da ily 
refining capacities,  respect ively, of 2 mil l ion and 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  pounds , to  
the new corpo ra t ion in exchange for $ 7 5 0 , 0 0 0  in stock . The new 
corpo rat ion , capi t a l i zed at $1 mi l l ion under New York State 
manufactu ring law cla imed to have prope rty worth $ 7 5 0 , 0 0 0  and a paid in 
cash capit a l  o f  $25 0 , 0 0 0 ,  alt hough the corpo ra t ion ' s o f f icers asse rt ed 
" t hat the va luat i ons pl aced on the properties we re a t  the lowest point 
and much less t han t hey [ were )  actually wort h . " 64 
The proces s  of accumulat ion o f  cash rese rves begun in the 1 8 7 0 s  by 
Havemeyer Bros . & Co . ,  and appa rent ly a l so by Havemeye r ,  Eastwick & Co . ,  
per s isted up t o  t he t ime o f  their  dissolut ion . At the t ime o f  i t s  
incorporation i n  1 8 8 0 ,  both the rea l  estate and cap i t a l  o f  t he Havemeyer 
Suga r Re f i ning Co . wa s reported to have been " f ree f rom a l l  c la ims and 
encumbrance s , " indicat ing that no liabilit ies othe r  t han the issuance of  
s t oc k  were incurred by the new corporat ion during t he acqu i s i t ion of  the 
p roperty of the pa rtnerships . 6s Indications are, t he refore,  that t he 
63New Yo rk , vol . 3 5 0 ,  p .  1 1 7 2 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
64New Yo r k ,  vol . 3 5 0 ,  p . 120 0LL,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion . 
6�New Y.:>rk , vol . 3 5 0 ,  p .  1 2 0 0 LL, R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion . 
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conce rns absorbed by t he Havemeyer Sugar Ref ining Co . both ret i red 
whateve r  debts were incu r red in t he const ruct ion or improvement of t he i r  
p ropert ies ( such a s  the mortgage given b y  Diedrich Ba ltman in the 
pu rchase of  the Havemeyer Bros . & Co . ' s  Greenpoint ref inery ) , and that 
the i r  later fixed capital  expenditures we re f inanced t !lrough the use of  
interna l ly generated funds . "  
The early 1 8 8 0s we re a t ime of  relat ive prosperity for most f i rms 
within the s uga r re fining industry . During the s ix months following its  
incorporat ion, t he Havemeyer Sugar Refining Co . was  reported t o  have 
"made cons iderable money . "  During 1 8 8 1 ,  the yea r  of  a short l ived 
a t tempt at forma l ,  indust ry-wide coope rat ion, the company was reported 
to have ea rned $ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 . A f t e r another h ighly succes s fu l  yea r  in 1 8 8 2 ,  
the company decla red i t s  f i rsc dividend, which amounted t o  one-hundred 
percent of its  init ial  capital izat ion of $ 1  mi l l ion . 67 
The Havemeyer Suga r Ref ining Company made ample,  t hough judicious , 
use o f  various types o f  short-term credit prior t o  bei ng consolidated 
under the sugar t rust in 1 8 8 7 . During the 1 8 8 0 s ,  t he company ' s  use of 
bo rrowed money (as opposed to t rade credit ) appe a rs t o  have become 
prima r i l y  a matter of convenience rather t han necess ity . The company 
a lso was able to establish and ma int a in an impeccable reputat ion among 
its  c reditors . 
Havemeyer Bros . & Co . ,  the antecedent of  t he Havemeye r S uga r 
Refining Co . ,  commenced ope rat ions in 1 8 7 2  with a mortgage on i t s  
refining property,  but otherwise rel iant solely o n  t he resou rces o f  its  
owne rs . As  was  the case with  all  the pa rtnerships in the indust ry ,  its  
66Hei ke t es t i f ied in 1 9 1 2 that bet ween 1 8 7 3  and 1 b 8 3  no dividends 
were pa id on the capital  stock of Havemeyer Bros . & Co . ,  Havemeye r ,  
Eastwick & Co . o r  the H avemeyer Suga r Refining Co . .  On t he pa rtnerships 
and t he and t he corpo ra t ion under which they were later consolida ted, 
Heike a ls o  test i f ied "they kept the i r  prof its in the bus ines s ( e s ]  and 
made a l l  imp rovements out of earnings . "  See Ha rdwick Commi t tee , 
Hearings , pp . 2 8 0 -2 8 1 .  
67New York, va l . 3 5 0 , p .  1 2 0 0 LL ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
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initial  standing in the credit ma rkets wa s predicated less on its  
pro spect s  as  a going concern and more on  the personal resource s ,  
standing a n d  cha racter of the pa rtners . 68 
Once established, the character of the bus iness itself  became a 
conside rat ion . By October,  1 8 7 3 ,  it  was reported that " thei r  bus ines s  
h a s  been cons tantly increa sing , and [ they ) have h a d  a good run o f  t rade 
f rom the start , " and despite the gene ra l dec l ine in prices which 
occur red dur ing 1 8 7 3 ,  the concern was " thought s a fe for what t hey do . "  
By May, 1 8 7 4 , a fter cont inued succes sful operat ion du r ing an ext remely 
difficult pe riod for most ref in ing f i rms , it  was reported that " [ it s ]  
s tanding and c redit [ a re ]  h igh, having confirmed the bes t  expectat ions 
of t he i r  friends by their  able and successful management . " 69 
The reported credit-worthiness of the f i rm cont inued t o  improve 
throughout the 1 8 7 0 s . I n  1 8 75 the firm' s bus iness pape r ,  of  which only 
a "mode rate amount " had been issued, was reported to have sold a t  " fa i r "  
rates ; b y  Ju ly,  1 8 7 6 ,  i t  was known to " now b e  selli ng a t  low rates " ;  and 
by January,  1 8 7 7 , wa s sel l ing at f rom f ive to five and one-h a l f  percent 
per yea r .  Meanwh i le ,  their abi lity t o  obta in t r ade c redit s  for raw 
sugar had become f i rmly established, as they were repo rted to be " in 
exce l lent reput ation ,  standing and credit with a l l  the leading 
( import ing ) houses . " 7 �  
68 I n  an entry dated September ,  1 8 7 1 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . c a re fu l ly 
det a i led t he resources of  each of the pa rtners . Diedrich Ba ltman,  the 
individual  in whose name t he ref ining p rope rties were purchased, was 
noted as having been a successful and wel l  known grocer for many year s ,  
in which capacity h e  wa s est imated to have accumu lated rea l  estate and 
other assets worth approximately $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 . Hecto r  C .  Havemeyer' s was 
thought to be wo rth " some mode rate means " ,  whi le his brother John ' s net 
worth wa s "est imated by his friends to be . . .  $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . "  Hector wa s 
reported as  having been rega rded by the t rade as  " re l iable and 
s t raight fo rwa rd" wh ile s imilar  encomiums a re appl ied to the characters 
o f  the othe r  pa rtne rs . I t  i s  only mentioned in pas s ing that t he 
prospect s of  t he bus iness itself we re cons ide red t o  be " opt imist ic . "  
See New York , vol . 3 5 0 ,  p .  1 1 1 6 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
69New York,  vol . 3 5 0 ,  p .  1 1 7 2 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion . 
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As the f i rm became more successfu l ,  t he i r  pat tern o f  borrowing 
became wel l  established, as did their idiosync rat ic att itude t owa rd 
disc losure of f inancial  informat ion . The former consisted o f  
outst anding paper va rying i n  amount between $ 2 5 , 0 0 0  and $ 7 5 , 0 0 0  during 
1 8 7 8 -1 8 8 0 ,  increas i ng at t imes to as  much as  $ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  as reported in 
1 8 82 . At t he same t ime their reluctance to disc lose informat i on to 
potent i a l  c reditors about thei r f inanc i a l  condit ion caused t he rates 
they pa id on borrowed money to be somewhat h ighe r than t hey might have 
been , as this cou rse of act ion l imited the sale of t he i r  paper to those 
fami l i a r  with the conce rn, and precluded the "pos s ibi l ity of a general  
c redi t "  on  favorable te rms . Appa rent ly,  the re luctance of t he f i rm to 
disc lose f inanc ial informat ion derived f rom t he i r  des i re t o  attain a 
measure o f  f inanc i a l  self-reliance -- they we re reported t o  have 
decla red t he i r  independence f rom c redit and st ated t ha t  they " could buy 
for cash i f  they wanted to . " 71 Fu rt hermore , t hey purchased a lmost a l l  
the i r  r a w  ma terial f rom one " leading South S t reet house " ( appa rent ly, 
t he same impo rter pat ronized exc lus ively by t he branch o f  the fami ly 
ass ociated with Ha vemeye r & Elder)  which repo rtedly " thought them safe 
for what they [ would) do , " and extended them a l l  the t rade c redit t hey 
requi red i n  t he norma l course of t heir bus iness . 72 
The establ ishment of The Havemeyer Sugar Ref i n ing Co . ,  which 
absorbed H avemeyer ,  Bros . & Co . and Havemeyer ,  Eastwick & Co . in 1 8 8 0 ,  
placed both o f  the consol idated f i rms among t he most c redit-worthy o f  
re f ining est abl ishment s .  Alt hough the new company ' s  out s tanding paper 
had r isen t o  $ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  by Apr i l ,  1 8 8 2 ,  this amount mus t  be cons idered 
aga inst t he total  capita l i zat ion of t he combined concerns ,  which even at 
its nominal va lue of $1 mi l l ion (wh ich reportedly was much lowe r  t han 
t he a ctual va lue of t he a ssets cont rol led by the f i rm) suggests t hat the 
7 1New York , vol . 3 5 0 ,  p .  1 2 0 0R, R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lection . 
nNew Yo rk,  vol . 350 , p .  12 0 0R, R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
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amount o f  short-term debt assumed by the company was wel l  within the 
l imit s  prescribed by conservative f inancial pract ice . 73 The Havemeyer 
S ugar Re f i ning Co . ,  though pe rhaps prof itable enough f rom the outset to 
run t he i r  bus i ness on a st rictly cash bas i s ,  cont inued to engage in 
moderate amounts o f  short term borrowing after 1 8 8 2 ,  both in the form o f  
acceptance o f  t rade credits and the is suance of bus iness pape r . The 
company ea rned $ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0  in net profits for 1 8 8 1 ,  and decla red a one-
hundred percent dividend out of surplus rese rves and net earnings for 
1 8 82 . Their  paper ,  howeve r ,  rema ined upon the ma rket , and i n  February, 
1 8 8 3 ,  wa s reported as  being " sought a fter at the lowest rates . "  This 
was not an uncommon pract ice among the handful of ref i ne ries which may 
have been able to gene rate a l l  their working capital j nterna l ly ,  and 
appears to have been underta ken ma inly to accustom the ma rket to the 
p resence of  the pape r of  the bor rowing concern . 7� 
F .  0 .  Ma t t hiessen & Wei chers : Capi tali z a t i on ,  Profi t s  and the Use of 
Credi t ,  1 8 75-1 8 8 7  
F .  0 .  Mat thies sen & weichers , which owned the second l a rgest 
refining capacity in the indust ry at the t ime o f  the forma ti on of the 
Suga r Re f ine ries Company, grew out of a pa rtne rship, Matthiessen and 
We ichers & Co . ,  which was fo rmed in December ,  1 8 6 3 . The latter f i rm' s 
init ial  paid in capita l i zat ion of  $ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  was inc rea sed in 1 8 67 to 
$ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  with the gene ra l partners cont ribut ing two-thi rds of the 
addit ional $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0  that was paid in . '� While no informat ion on the use 
73New Yo rk,  vol . 3 5 0 ,  p .  120 0R, R. G .  Dun & Co . Col lection . 
74New Yor k ,  vo l .  350 , p .  1 2 0 0 LL ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
'�The partnership cons isted of two "genera l partners " (Matthiessen 
and We ichers ) ,  and s i x  " spec ial partners " .  At the t ime of the company' s  
forma t ion,  the gene ral pa rtners pa id in a combined amount of $2 5 , 0 0 0 ,  
whi le the addit ional $ 1 7 5 , 0 0 0  was subscribed t o  b y  the s ix special  
partners , five of whom cont r ibuted $2 5 , 0 0 0  apiece and one who 
cont ributed $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 . It is unclear what the legal d i f ferences were 
bet ween the special  and genera l partne rs . See New Yor k ,  vol . 3 8 0 ,  p .  
1 3 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion . 
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of short t e rm c redit is avai lable for t he New Jersey S uga r Re f in ing Co . 
for the years preceding t he consol idat ion ,  t he p recursor o f  F .  0 .  
Mat th iessen & Weiche rs Suga r Re fining Co . ,  Mat th ies sen & Weichers & Co . ,  
appears t o  have enj oyed bot h a high c redit standing and t he luxu ry o f  
seldom having h a d  t o  use it . At the t ime of its  f o rma t ion, the 
partnership of Mat th iessen & Weichers & Co . was described as being 
compri sed o f  "good bus inessmen of exce llent character,  having ample 
means for t he bus iness . . .  good and rel iable [ and ] able to buy for 
cash . " 76 
Although t he f i rm was repeatedly judged t o  be " in good standing 
and c redi t "  through 1 8 6 9 ,  they found l i t t le occas ion to test t he i r  
abil ity t o  borrow . In 1 8 6 7 ,  when increases in the i r  sca le o f  operat i ons 
necessit ated an addi ti ona l infus ion of cash, t he f i rm was able to draw 
upon the res ou rces of the pa rtne rs, from whom $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0  ( one and one-half  
t imes t he f i rm' s origina l capital i zation )  wa s immediately obta ined . At 
the same t ime , the f i rm wa s repo rted to have "but a sma l l  amount of 
paper out standing . "  The re are no indicat ions that Mathiessen & We ichers 
was ever forced to re ly more than l ight ly on any t ype of outs ide funds 
during any period prior to the consolidat ion . '' 
I n  Feb ruary,  1 8 7 0 ,  a f ter six yea rs of succes s ful operation,  the 
suga r re fining f i rm of Mat thies sen and We ichers & Co . was conso l idated 
with the New Je rsey Sugar Re fin ing Co . unde r the name of F .  0 .  
Mat thiessen & Weiche rs Suga r Re fining Co . ,  a New Je rsey corporat ion with 
capita l i za t ion of $ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 78 The act of incorporat ion f i led with the 
New Jersey State Legis lature a lso contained an unusua l provision that 
76New Yo rk,  val . 3 8 0 ,  p . 1 3 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Co l lect ion . 
77New Yo rk,  val . 3 8 0 ,  p .  1 3 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
78The consol ida t ion ' s init ial paid in capit a l i za t ion represented 
the fixed assets o f  bot h concerns . The addit i ona l $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0  which had 
been added to the capi t a l i zat ion of Mat thiessen and Weichers  & Co . 
se rved as  pd rt o f  the f i rm' s working capital and was withdrawn by the 
partners prior to its  consol idat ion with the New Je rsey S uga r Ref in ing 
Co . .  
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authori zed the company t o  issue $ 1 . 2  million of " spec i a l  stock t o  those 
who may advance money ( to the f i rm) , which stock sha l l  form no pa rt o f  
t he capital stock and sha l l  not be voted upon . " 79 The " speci a l  s tock" 
issued by Mat th iessen & Weichers was a precursor t o  the pre ferred stock 
which became popul a r  with indust rial corporation s  and investors during 
1 8 90-1 9 0 5 ,  but had yet to come into gene ra l use ( at least among Amer ican 
manufacturers ) by 1 8 7 0 . Despite the somewhat mis leading nomenclature 
attached t o  t he i ssue , the special stock had preference with regard t o  
the company ' s  assets ove r the common stock , but not over the c l a ims o f  
other c reditors , pa id a f ixed rate o f  ret urn when the company' s  ea rnings 
permit ted, had a f ixed date of  repayment , and did not ent i t le holders t o  
parti cipate in t h e  cont rol o f  t h e  company . R .  G .  Dun & Co . noted of  the 
spec ial  stock that it  "must be cons ide red [ a s )  borrowed money, as  this 
stock is a l iability aga inst the conce rn , and not an asset . " 80 While 
inst ruments simi l a r  t o  this " spec ial stock" later gained popularity as  
f i rms sought t o  exchange equ ity for property and cash in more forma l 
t ransact ions , i t  was de f initely unusual ,  and therefore an item o f  
general not ice , i n  1 8 7 0 . 
Despite t he earlier success o f  Matthies sen and Weichers & Co . ,  t he 
new corporat ion commenced ope rations in a somewhat tenuous f inanci a l  
condit ion . The gene ra l impress ion in the industry was that : 
The act ive capital o f  the concern [ had been ] abs 0rbed in 
property,  bu i lding, mac hinery and previous losses , and that 
for wo rk ing capital they [ were )  dependent on the s a le of  the 
special  stock payable Feb ruary 1, 1 8 8 0  ( New York , vol . 4 1 6 , 
p .  1 0 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion ) . 
By May,  1 8 7 0  the whole of  the spec ial  stock had been sold at  par 
for cash to exist ing sha reholders , each of  whom took t h ree shares of  
special t o  one o f  regula r stock . Appa rent ly, the company a s  o rigina l ly 
organized ( without the provis ion a l lowing for the issue o f  the speci a l  
79New York,  vol . 4 1 6 ,  p .  1 0 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect i on . 
80New Yo rk,  vol . 4 1 6 , p .  1 0 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
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stoc k )  was gross ly unde rcapitalized, as  the who le o f  the proceeds f rom 
t he subsc ript ion of the specia l stock wa s immediately put to use a s  the 
company' s working capit a l . Had the f i rm been fo rced t o  resort t o  short 
term bo r rowings on its own account for a s imilar  amount , it would l i kely 
have found the necessary amount very di f f icult t o  raise on a total  
capita lizat ion o f  only $ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 81 
Despite the generally unsett led conditions in t he indust ry du ring 
the early 1 8 7 0 s ,  and t he unce rta inty surrounding the special s tock 
issue , the f i rm gradually grew st ronger . By 1 8 7 3 ,  a yea r  o f  gene ra l 
depression, they we re repo rtedly able t o  " realize pro f i t s  above 
expenses " ,  dec l a re a "good dividend" , and establish a surp lus reserve of  
$ 5 4 0 , 0 0 0 . By Septembe r,  1 8 7 5 ,  a fter two more yea rs o f  pro f itable 
operat ions , the net worth of  the company was est imated ( with t he spec ial  
stock not  counted as  equity)  at  $ 1  million, over 2 5 0  percent o f  t he i r  
o rigina l capi t a l i zat ion . �  
I n  1 8 7 5  t he company received permiss ion f rom the New Jersey State 
legislature t o  amend the i r  charter, rec lassi fying the spec ial  stock as  
regu lar  stock,  at which t ime it assumed t he same relat ion to i t s  ho lder 
81 I t  i s  n o t  cert ain why, i f  the company w a s  undercapit a l i zed, 
addi t iona l regula r stock was not is sued t o  the exist ing sha reholde rs . 
S i nce it is l ikely that the existing shareholders  made use o f  pe rsonal 
bo r rowings in o rder t o  purchase the " speci a l  stock"  it i s  pos s ible t hat 
the special sha res we re pledged as  collateral for t he loans t hat we re 
used t o  obta in t hem . Due to the unusual provis ions of t he spec ial  
stock, including a stated fixed rate of  return and date of  repayment , it  
may wel l  have been devised t o  se rve as a more de s i rable collateral than 
t he company' s common stoc k  for the borrowings of  the shareholders , 
which, i f  the above is t rue , were being subst itut ed fer  t he borrowings 
of the newly incorporated f i rm ( the credit-wo rthiness of which had not 
yet been establi shed within the f inancial community)  in f inanci ng its  
working capi t a l  needs . Put another way, t he special stock may have been 
i ssued as a way for  t he f i rm to indirectly obt ain short-term credit s .  
S ince t he s ha reholde rs obvious ly did not wish t o  purchase additional 
regular  share s ,  and s ince t he corporat ion would have l i kely found i t  
impos s ible t o  borrow a s u f f ic ient amount to f inance i t s  working capit a l  
needs w i t h  n o  establ ished standing among c reditors a n d  an initi a l  pa id 
in capit a l i zat ion o f  only $ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  the spec ial  s tock was perhaps issued 
t o  serve as  collateral for the short term bor rowings of  t he 
shareholde r s ,  the proceeds of which we re subsequently used to "pu rchase" 
the special stock . 
82New Yor k ,  vol . 4 1 6 ,  p .  1 0 0  sub 00 , R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
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as the concern ' s o rdinary shares , a lthough it cont i nued to pa rti cipate 
i n  ea rnings at  a lowe r rate than the stock t ha t  was init ia l ly is sued 
when t he f i rm was f i rst incorporated . 83 The o f f ic i a l  capita l i zat ion of 
the company was t hereby established at $ 1 . 6  mi l l ion,  with a working 
capita l  at  t he end of  1 8 7 5  of  $ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 . Meanwh ile,  the company reported 
net ea rnings of s ometh ing ove r ten pe rcent on its  new capital  s t oc k ,  but 
pa id its 1 8 7 5  div idend in addit ional stock instead of cash so that t hose 
e a rn ings could be returned to the business to f i nance planned addit ions 
t o  its re f inery . 84 
Although the special  stock appears t o  have provided t he bus iness 
with ample working capital for a t ime , it eventual l y  found i t  des i rable 
to solicit out s ide c redit from other sources . Once t he pro f itability of  
t he f i rm had been f i rmly est ablished (pa rt icularly during t he dif f icult 
period of  1 8 7 2 - 1 8 7 3 ) , and its capita l proven adequate for t he normal 
vicissitudes o f  t he re f ining business , the concern expres sed earlier 
over the e ffects of  the special stock on the f i rms performance seems to 
have evaporated . By June , 1 8 7 4 ,  the f i rm was reported t o  have been in 
" good { c redi t ] for wa nts , "  while t heir bus iness paper sold for " about 
7 % "  t h rough September,  1 8 7 5 . Du ring the same pe riod, the f i rm had no 
diff icult ies secur ing advances f rom suppliers and we re reportedly " fully 
c redited for business want s . " 8 �  
B y  t h e  end o f  1 8 7 6 ,  the company had increased its c a s h  reserves t o  
1 . 1  mi l l i on do l la r s ,  while earnings o n  its  recent ly augmented capital 
83 It is l ike ly that the company' s  surplus noted above was used to 
ret i re the obl igat ions for which the " spec ial  stock" tad se rved as 
collatera l ,  thus releas ing it to its subscribers . I f  this i s  t rue , t hen 
the company ' s  " special stock , " once it wa s reclassi f ied as regu l a r ,  
became t h e  equiva lent of  the declarat ion o f  a dividend payable i n  stock 
to the sha reholders ,  s ince it wa s t ransferred to t hem for l i t t le o r  no 
consideration whatever,  as ide f rom the short term c redit s  that were 
extended to t he corporat ion through the agency of t he stockholders and 
ret i red in the manner descr ibed above . 
84New York , vol . 4 1 6 ,  p . 1 0 0  sub 00, R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
asNew York , vol . 4 1 6 ,  p .  1 0 0  sub 00, R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
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st ock had r isen t o  ove r fi fty-f ive percent . 86 Although no reco rds a re 
available for the pe riod 1 8 7 8- 1 8 8 0 ,  subsequent reports indicate that the 
concern was huge ly success ful du ring t hose year s . By Ju ly,  1 8 7 7 ,  the 
rate which t he company paid on its bus iness paper,  of which 
approximately $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  wa s thought t o  be outstanding , dec l ined to s ix 
and one-ha l f  percent , at which it was repo rted t o  be " se l l ing f reely . "  
No reports a re ava ilable for 1 8 7 8 - 1 8 8 0 ,  but by autumn , 1 8 8 1 ,  the 
company' s  surplus wa s said to be "very la rge " ,  whi le the i r  c redit was 
reportedly " unquest ioned for all t hey want . "  By 1 8 8 1 ,  t he f i rm had 
taken to pu rchas ing the i r  raw sugar direct l y  f rom Cuba on th ree-day 
t rade accept ance s ,  against which the company was able t o  use bo rrowed 
money on call  at t he lowe st rates preva i l ing in t he money ma rket . In 
Jul y ,  1 8 8 1 ,  the f i rm repo rtedly obta ined $ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0  in that way . In a l l  
other a re a s ,  their credit and standing rema ined " unquest ioned . " 8 1 
Due to unusually high ea rnings during 1 8 8 1 - 1 8 8 2  the company wa s 
reportedly able to ret i re a l l  its bus iness paper by Janua ry , 1 8 8 3 . 88 
During that month the company was also able t o  decl a re and pay a 
dividend o f  one hundred pe rcent on its  original capit a l i za t ion , whi le 
paying out an undisclosed amount to t he holders o f  the $ 1 . 2  mill ion o f  
what had formerly been the company' s spec ial  stock . Meanwhile,  their 
surplus grew rapidly th rough 1 8 8 4 ,  as ea rnings cont inued at h igh levels . 
By Oct ober,  1 8 8 1 ,  the compa ny was reported to have accumulated a " ve ry 
la rge " su rplus , while by 1 8 82 t he t otal  unencumbered value of  t he f i rm' s 
real estate,  machinery and cash assets wa s est imated at  $ 1 , 4 3 3 , 0 0 0 . By 
June , 1 8 8 4 ,  t he f i rm' s net worth had repo rtedly r i sen t o  we l l  over $2 
mil l ion . 89 
86New Yor k ,  vo l . 4 1 6 ,  p . 1 0 0  sub 00, R .  G .  Dun & Co . Co l lect ion . 
87New York, vo l .  4 1 6 ,  p .  1 0 0  A 1 4 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
8 8new York,  vol . 4 1 6 ,  p .  1 0 0  sub A1 4 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
89New Yo rk,  vol . 4 1 6 ,  p . 1 0 0  a 1 4 0 , R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion . 
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Although it  is likely that the company made use o f  t rade c redit 
of  one form or another throughout this period, there a re no reports o f  
it  having i s sued more bus iness paper t hrough 1 8 8 4 . By Octobe r ,  1 8 8 5 ,  i t  
wa s reported that , should the company' s  bus iness papet appear  on t he 
ma rket , it  " would sel l  at very low rates , " indicati ng that , had they 
found i t  expedient to ma ke use of  borrowed funds t h rough t he f i rst h a l f  
of  1 8 8 5 ,  t h e  te rms l i kely would have been as  good as  could have been had 
by any ot he r  refine r . R 
Dick & Meyer :  Capi t a l i za t i on ,  Profi ts and the Use of Credi t ,  1 8 75-1 8 8 7  
The expe r ience of  D i c k  & Meyer ,  another la rge ref ining concern 
which was later to enter the Trust , parallels that of  the f i rms 
described above . Fo rmed in 1 8 7 3  and init i a l ly capi t a l i zed a t  $ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  
Dick & Meye r was a pa rtne rship cons ist ing of  William Dick,  who had been 
in the re f in ing indust ry for some t ime , and Carl Meye r s ,  the f o rme r 
owner of  a bone-black bus iness . 9 : The f i rm' s initial  capit a l i za t ion 
was drawn ent i rely f rom the pe rsonal accumulat ions of  t he partners , and 
went f o r  an investment in machinery and rea l estate of $ 2 6 4 , 0 0 0 ,  with 
the remain ing $ 1 4 6 , 0 0 0  reserved for working capita l . No borrowed funds 
were u sed by t he f i rm prior t o  the i r  commencing ope rat ions . 92 
As was t rue of the other la rge f i rms ( w ith t he except ion of  
DeCas t ro & Donne r ) , Dick & Meye r wa s a success f rom t he outset . 
Although the partners saw fit to increase the f i rm' s capitali zat ion to 
$ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0  sho rtly a fter the company' s format ion , this appears to have had 
90New Yo r k ,  vol . 4 1 6 ,  p .  1 0 0  sub A1 4 0 ,  R. G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
9 1Bone-olack is a blac k ,  ca rbonaceous substance obt a ined by 
calc ini ng bones in c losed vessels . I t  was commonly used a s  a decoloring 
or f i l tering agent . 
92New Yor k ,  vol . 3 5 2 ,  p .  1 3 2 4 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
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more t o  do with t he scale of operat ions upon which the business rapidly 
came to be establ ished than with any appa rent financ i a l  wea knes s . �3 
Appa rent ly,  the addit iona l infus ion o f  cash provided by the 
increase in capit a l i za t ion noted above was s u f f i c ient to establish the 
f i rm' s finances on a sound basis,  at a level commensurate with their 
volume o f  bus iness , for the ent i re rema inder of  t he period preceding t he 
format ion o f  the t rus t . Despite suffering l osses s imi l a r  t o  t hose o f  
other suga r ref iners during early 1 8 7 8 ,  the cap it a l  o f  t he f i rm was 
reportedly "not impa i red to any serious extent , "  while later in the yea r  
t hey we re s a id t o  have had " a n  excess o f  capit a l  over their wants . "  By 
Ma rch , 1 8 8 0 ,  the pa rtners had begun to seek out let s  for a la rger surplus 
capit a l  t han could pro f itably employed in the bus iness by buying the 
paper of  other commercial concerns , having a lready pu r�hased $ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0  
worth o f  U . S .  Government Bonds i n  1 8 7 9 . By December ,  1 8 8 2  t he company 
was repo rted t o  have " a  large surplus of  ready money, "  and " a  l arge 
amount . . .  invested in f i rst class securitie s , " of wh ich the amount held 
in U . S .  Gove rnment Bonds had increa sed to $ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 94 
The partnersh ip of  Dick & Meye r was establ ished a s  a concern o f  
" h igh standing and c redit i n  the t rade" and in t he c redit ma rkets a lmost 
immediately upon commencing operat ions , due in la rge pa rt t o  t he wel l  
establ is hed reputat ions o f  the pa rtners i n  the indu s t ry a s  
" [business ] men o f  substant i a l  character and very reliable . "9� By 
January, 1 8 7 5 ,  a fter a "moderately successful"  yea r  in 1 8 7 4 , the f i rm' s 
bus iness pape r was repo rtedly " selling at the lowes t  rate for ref ine r' s 
paper . "  Despite repo rts f rom later that yea r ,  that "probably no suga r 
paper [ sells ] a s  readi ly as  theirs in the market a t  the present t ime , " 
93New York,  vol . 3 5 2 ,  p .  1 3 2 4 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collection . The 
increase in Dick & Meye r ' s capital stock was paid in by the f i rm' s 
owners ; it  did not resu lt f rom the capital izat ion o f  surplus reserves . 
94New York, vol . 352 , p .  1 4 0 0  a 1 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion . 
'�New Yor k ,  vol . 352 ,  p .  1 32 4 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
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the f i rm appears to have been reluctant to make use o f  the t rade c redit 
that undoubtedly would have been f reely extended in t he i r  case,  
preferring t o  " as k  no favors [ and] buy exc lus ively for cash . " % 
Evidence o f  t he concern ' s  f inancial s t rength and excel lent c redit 
appears increas ingly f requent ly as the indust ry emerged f rom the 
t roubled 1 8 7 0 s . I n  late 1 8 7 8 ,  the company' s  bus iness pape r was 
reportedly "much sought a f ter at three and one-half  percent pe r annum . "  
I n  Ma rch, 1 8 8 0 ,  t he f i rm began invest ing the i r  la rge surplus in t he 
bus iness pape r o f  other conce rns , and by Janua ry, 1 8 8 1 ,  we re est imated 
to have "but $ 5 0 , 0 0 0  o f  ( bus ines s )  pape r out " against  an excess o f  
assets over l iabi l i t ies est imated at approximately $ 1 . 2  mi l l ion . 97 
Dick & Meyer appear to have cont inued to purchase t he i r  raw 
material for cash at least through 1 8 8 1 ,  and a lmost certainly t hrough 
1 8 8 4 . Meanwhile,  no encumbrances appeared aga inst the i r  property 
( indeed,  none had ever been recorded) , wh i le the i r  bus iness paper 
cont inued to " f ind a ready sale at lowest rates for f i rst class 
commerc i a l  pape r . " 98 By  t he end o f  1 8 82 ,  the f i rm was reported t o  " buy 
wholly for cash and ask no credit f rom banks , " and " requ i re no use of 
bus iness pape r ,  a lt hough [ issuing] some a t  t imes to accust om the ma rket 
to its presence . "  By the end of the following yea r ,  t he f i rm' s paper had 
been complet e ly withdrawn from the ma rket , wh i le i t s "means , standing 
and c redit [ rema i ned] unquest ioned" at the highest lev"!! . 99 
96New Yor k ,  vol . 3 5 2 ,  p .  1 32 4 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
97New York,  vol . 3 5 2 ,  p .  1 32 4 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion . 
98New Yo rk,  vol . 3 5 2 ,  p .  1 32 4 ;  p .  1 4 0 0  s ub A 1 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . 
Col lect ion ) . 
99New Yo rk,  vol . 3 52 ,  p .  1 4 0 0  sub Al , R .  G .  Dun & co Co llec t ion . 
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Moll er, Sierck & Co . :  Capi t a l i z a t i on, Profi t s  and the Use of Credi t ,  
1 8 75-1 8 8 7  
Sma l ler refining f i rms cont inued to coexist w i t h  t he larger f i rms 
described above , suggest ing that s i ze wa s not the only dete rminant o f  
success within the indust ry . At the t ime of t h e  format ion of  the t rust , 
Moller,  S ie rck & Co . and oxnard Brothers each had da i l y  re f in ing 
capa c i t ie s  that were equal to only about ten percent o f  the re f i ning 
capacity of  the l a rgest suga r house ( Havemeyer & Elde r )  . Nevertheless , 
i n  the t wenty yea rs preceding the format ion of  the t rust , t hey, and a 
not incons ide rable numbe r of  other smaller ref ineries , survived 
a longs ide the la rge r re f ineries . 1 00 
Mol le r ,  S ierck & Co . began as a pa rtne rship unde r t he name of  
Moller,  S ierck,  Henken & Co . The firm, as  o rigina l l y  const ituted, 
commenced ope ra t ions in Janua ry, 1 8 6 8 ,  with a paid in capital of 
$ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  and a refinery purchased from the defunct f i rm o f  Wintzen,  
Dick & Co . for $20 0 , 0 0 0 . By July,  1872,  Mo l le r ,  S ierck & Co . had 
established itself  as  "a wea l thy and very re l iable concern . . .  composed of  
wel l  known and expe rienced me rchant s . . .  run with great care and skill  
( and) amply gOOd fOr their engagementS , u ! D I  
Later in 1 8 7 2 ,  t h e  death of  Al rech Henken resulted in t he 
dissolut ion o f  the o ld partnership, and its  recons t i t ut ion a s  Mol le r ,  
S ierck & Co . . The new pa rtnership, capitalized a t  $ 8 4 5 , 0 0 0 ,  con s isted 
o f  four individua l s ,  among whom Josh Mol le r  and Cha rles S ie rck 
cont ributed over e ighty-five percent o f  the paid in capit a l . The 
company ma intained its  high st anding in the indust ry and c redit markets 
through the di f f icult early and middle years o f  the 1 8 7 0 s ,  reportedly 
1 000 f  the e ighteen re fineries t ha t  entered the S uga r Ref ine r ies 
Company, ten had da i ly ref ining capacities o f  less than o r  equal  t o  
5 0 0 , 0 0 0  pounds , as  compa red t o  2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  pounds da i l y  f o r  Havemeyer & 
Elde r . Of  t hese ten sma l ler re fineries , the s ix located in Boston,  New 
York and P h i lade lphia had a l l  been in operation s ince at least 1 8 6 8 . 
See Eichne r ,  pp . 3 3 9- 3 4 2  and Mu llins,  p .  4 8 . 
1 0 1New York , vol . 3 7 8 ,  p .  2 4 1 , R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
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"cover ing t he i r  expenses . . .  and something ove r"  i n  a l l  but one yea r  . 1 02 
The death of  Frederich Byrnes , one of  the partners , i n  1 8 77 necessita ted 
a mino r rest ructuring of  the f i rm' s obligations . After wit hdrawing a 
sma l l  port ion o f  her late husbands share in the partnership, Byrne s '  
w idow dec ided to leave $ 5 0 , 0 0 0  i n  the concern, f o r  which she wa s secured 
with a mo rtgage upon the f i rm' s prope rty . As ide f rom this  minor 
encumbrance , the pa rtne r s '  statement for 1 8 7 7  showed their business 
p remises t o  be owned f ree and clear by Moller and Sierck;  the i r  refinery 
building, appra ised at approximately $ 63 0 , 0 0 0 ,  to  have. had a pa rt i a l  
l ien aga inst i t  of  $7 0 , 0 0 0 ;  a cash surplus of  $ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 ; and, with the 
except ion of  a small  amount of t rade credit ,  a complete absence o f  
out standing short -term obligations . : oJ 
There a re no reports of changes in the f i rm' s capi t a l i za t ion a fter 
1 8 7 7 . Conside r ing, howeve r,  the generally f avorable condit ions i n  the 
indu s t ry t hrough 1 8 8 4 ,  and subsequent reports which uni f o rmly cite t hem 
as being " a wea lthy f i rm [ and ] a ve ry successful  business . . .  cons idered 
unquest ionably good for . . .  cont ract s , " it is safe to assume that their 
capitalization inc reased as  surpluses accumula ted, and that i t  rema ined 
f inanc i a l ly st rong and independent through the yea rs that immediately 
preceded the format ion o f  the t rust . : o <  
Mol le r  & S ie rck,  t hough far sma l ler than the concerns dea l t  with 
heretofore , appe a rs to have enj oyed a s imi lar  standing within the short­
t e rm c redit ma rkets to most of its la rge r,  success f u l  counterpa rts . 1 05 
P rior t o  1 8 7 3 ,  the f i rm continually stood " in h igh standing and c redit "  
within the indust ry, a l t hough they appear to have bor rowed litt le ,  and 
l 02New Yo rk,  vol . 3 7 8 ,  p .  2 4 1 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lec t i on . 
: 0 3New Yo rk,  vol . 3 7 8 ,  p .  2 4 1 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Co l lect ion . 
1 04New York,  vo l . 37 8 ,  p .  2 4 1 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
105Mol le r  & S ierck ope rated under the name o f  Mol le r ,  S ierck,  Henken 
& Co . prior to 1 8 7 3 ,  when t he death of Al rech Henken necessitated its  
reconst itut ion under the fo rmer name . 
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made no use of t rade c redit . Throughout the rema inder o f  the 1 8 7 0 s t he 
f i rms a f fa i r s  cont inued to be managed in simil a r  fash ion . Issuing very 
l i t t le bus iness pape r ,  and buying the i r  raw material  on f rom seven to 
thirty days t rade c redi t ,  but mainly for cash , t he f i rm rema ined l argely 
dependent on its  own resources to fund its working capit a l  needs . 106 
As the f i rm grew to modest s i ze dur ing the early 1 8 8 0 s ,  it 
occasiona lly found it convenient to is sue its own business pape r ,  which , 
when ava i lable , was repo rted to " sell  readi ly at low rates . "  Despite 
the occas ional use of c redi t ,  however ,  the f i rm' s abi lity to borrow 
rema ined untaxed, as they cont inued to buy la rge ly for cash,  and never 
extended themselves beyond a level o f  indebtedness desc r ibed only as 
" sma l l . " 107 
The Oxna rd Bros . Refi nery : Capi t a l i z a t i on, Profi t s  and the Use of 
Credi t ,  1 8 75- 1 88 7  
The Oxna rd Bros . Ref inery had a s  its antecedent t he Fulton Suga r 
Ref inery, a proprieto rship owned by Thomas Oxna rd . The o riginal 
capital izat ion of t he latter f i rm, the amount of which i s  unknown , 
appears to have been drawn ent i rely f rom the accumu lat ions o f  Thoma s 
Oxnard, a longt ime membe r of the ref ining indus t ry .  Oxna rd ente red the 
suga r bus i nes s  i n  Cuba in 1 8 6 8  after having success f u l ly ope rated a 
ref inery in Bost on for some yea rs . After several yea rs in the raw suga r 
l ine , Oxna rd decided t o  retu rn to this count ry in 1 8 7 5  and begi n  once 
aga in in the ref i n ing bus iness , having f i rs t  purchased "a cons iderable 
amount of Cuban suga r ,  upon which a banking house advanced money . "  From 
the t ime o f  his return unt i l  1 8 7 6  Oxnard conducted his business f rom a 
106New York , vel . 378 , p .  2 4 1 ,  p .  5 7 6  sub A, R .  G .  Dun & Co . 
Collect ion . 
107New York, vel . 3 7 8 ,  p .  5 7 6  s ub A, R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
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ref inery leased f rom the creditors of the late refining f i rm o f  Wheat ly,  
Wi l l iams & Co . for $2 5 0  pe r month . 1 08 
In  Ma rch, 1 8 7 6 ,  a fter Oxnard' s lease on t he ref ine ry exp i red, he 
purchased it for approximately $50 , 0 0 0 ,  and immediately invested an 
addit ional $2 5 , 0 0 0  in improvement s ,  a l l  of which were paid for either 
out of Oxna rd ' s personal accumulat ions o r  the resources of the f i rm . 109 
Through 1 8 8 0  Oxnard ' s re f inery appears to have operated at  a modest 
profit . R .  G .  Dun & Co . repeatedly cite the concern ' s f inanc ial 
s t rength and adequate leve ls of capital  during 1 8 7 6- 1 8 8 0 ,  and appear  t o  
have rega rded the concern as amply credit -wo rthy t hroughout the 
pe riod . 1 1 0 
By Decembe r ,  1 8 8 0 ,  the f i rm' s prope rty was reva lued at  $ 1 2 5 , 0 0 0  
against which n o  mo rtgages we re said t o  exist ;  the inc rease i n  t he 
va luat ion o f  the prope rty ref lected improvements made t o  t he ref inery 
out of ea rnings reta ined in the business . After an ext remely successful 
yea r  in 1 8 8 1 ,  and a more lackluster 1 8 8 2 ,  the f i rm was reorganized a s  a 
partnership unde r the name of  Oxnard Bros . Re f ine ry with Thomas Oxnard' s 
sons , Robert and Ben j amin, as the general pa rtne rs . The f i rm commenced 
ope rat ions unde r exclusive cont ract with B .  H .  Howe l l ,  Son & Co . ,  a New 
York commiss ion house that was later to f igure p rominently in the 
c reat ion of the Nat ional Suga r Re fining Co . ( see Chapter 3 ) , with the 
commiss ion house functioning as the sole buying and sell ing agents for 
t he Oxna rd Bros . Ref inery . With the bus ines s ' s cap i t a l  reported t o  be 
furnished ent i rely by Thomas Oxnard ( who was s t i l l  invo lved with t he 
f i rm in fact i f  not in name ) , and a l l  the f i rm' s t rade c redit be ing 
furnished th rough B .  H .  Howe l l ,  Son & Co . ,  t he Oxn a rd Bros . Re f ine ry 
remained a lmost ent i rely f ree f rom rel iance on outs ide funds t hrough 
l oaNew Yo rk,  vol . 1 3 5 ,  p .  4 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . CollP.c t ion . 
I 09New Yo rk,  vo l . 1 3 5 ,  p .  4 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion . 
I I ONew Yor k ,  vol . 1 3 5 ,  p .  4 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
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1 8 8 7 . Meanwhile,  t he bus iness was repo rted to have p rospe red, with the 
concern al legedly "ma king money" during every yea r  of  its ope rat ions 
prior to j o ining the t rust . 1 1 1 
The Oxna rd Bros . Ref i nery and its  various predecessors appear  t o  
have exper ienced n o  di f f iculty i n  obtaining the sma l l  volume of  short­
term c redi t of which they regularly made use, pract ica l ly a l l  of which 
was extended by the raw suga r importing and commiss ion house of B .  H .  
Howe l l ,  Son & Co . The Fulton Suga r Refinery, t he parent of  Oxna rd 
Bros . ,  had a successful run of  bus iness t h roughout t he 1 8 7 0 s  and early 
1 8 8 0 s . Despite t he occas ional yea r  when the f i rm fai led t o  cove r 
expenses , it  was reported t o  have rema ined f ree o f  encumbrances aga inst 
its prope rt y ,  met engagements prompt ly, and " rema ined safe for any 
ordinary [ t rade ] credit , " all of which we re extended by a "prominent 
[ impo rting ]  house"  be l ieved to be t he f i rm of B .  H .  Howe l l ,  Son & Co . 
The f i rm did not solicit accommodat ion out s ide this channe l ,  e ither 
t h rough its bank o r  the sale of business paper ,  though regarded a s  " safe 
for any ordinary c redit . " 1 12 
I n  1 8 8 3 ,  when the Fu lton Suga r Ref inery wa s succeeded by the 
partnership o f  Oxnard Bros . ,  the pa rtners entered int o forma l agreement 
with the commiss ion house o f  B .  H .  Howe l l ,  Son & Co . ,  whe reupon that 
company became the exclusive buying and se ll ing agent for Oxnard Bros . 
S ince , according t o  t he te rms of the agreement , the commi ss ion house wa s 
t o  " give the i r  chec k for a l l  purchases , "  and Thomas Oxnard, t hough not 
formally associated with the f i rm, wa s expected to provide his sons with 
all the f inancial  ass istance they requ i red, the partnership was not 
expected to be forced to solicit  c redit in the ma rket . This prediction 
1 1 1New Yor k ,  vol . 1 3 5 ,  p .  4 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Co l l-.:ct i on . 
1 1 2New York, vo l . 1 3 5 ,  p .  4 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lec t ion . After 
being reconst ituted as Oxna rd Bros . ,  the f i rm employed t he import 
commis s ion house of B .  H .  Howe l l ,  Son & Co . a s  t he i r  exclusive buying 
and selling agent s ,  and became ,  in effec t ,  a manufactur ing s ubs idia ry of 
that concern ( see be low) . 
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was proven correct,  as Oxna rd Bros . continued to depend upon B .  H .  
Howe l l ,  S on & Co . t o  " supply them ( and] sell  a l l  t heir  p roducts . "  
Moreove r ,  due t o  t he pa rtnerships rel i ance on t he resources o f  B .  H .  
Howe l l ,  S on & Co . and Thomas Oxnard their "name or pape r ( neve r 
appeared] on the ma rke t "  prior t o  entering the t rust , a t  which t ime t he 
f i rm was disso lved . 1 13 
1 13New York,  vol . 1 3 5 ,  p .  4 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col l ect ion . 
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CHAPTER I I I  
THE FINANC IAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUGAR REFINING 
INDUSTRY , 1 8 9 0 - 1 9 0 5  
Financial History o f  the S ugar Refining Industry, 1 8 87-1 8 9 1  
Excess Capa ci ty and Early At t empts a t  Coopera t i on 
The recurring problem that plagued the suga r ref ining indust ry 
dur ing the 1 8 7 0 s  and 1 8 8 0s  was excess product ive capacity . By 1 8 8 6  the 
s hr inking numbe r of f i rms that were able to cont inue in operation 
possessed an annual capacity to produce t hat exceeded t he total market 
for ref ined sugar by over 600 mi llion pounds . 1 The e f forts of the ma jor  
suga r re fining f i rms t hus came to be directed les s  towa rds formulat ing 
and implement ing competit ive st rategies t o  oust r i va l s  f rom the 
ma rketplace , and more towa rds establi shing a viable mechanism to enable 
t he coordina t ion of investment and product ion within the indust ry . The 
financ ial pract ices of the industry thus came to be shaped by t wo 
di f fe rent sets o f  imperat ives : those related to f inancing t he day-to-day 
operat i ons o f  f i rms for which there was no need t o  contemplate additions 
to p roduct ive capacity,  and t hose directed towa rd estab li shing a 
community o f  mutual  f inanc ial interest within t he i ndust ry t hrough the 
c reat ion and reapport ionment o f  long term f inanci a l  assets and 
l iabi l i t ies . As techniques for establ ishing indus t ry-wide coordinat ion 
grew increasingly sophist icated, the informa l a rrangements and fami lial 
t ies which had ea r l ier se rved to establ ish some mea sure o f  coope rat ion 
among t he ref ine rs gave way t o  formal combinat ion,  and consol idat ion of 
cont rol ove r most o f  the formerly independent ,  compet ing f i rms within 
1Vogt , p .  1 8 .  In 1 8 8 6 ,  the yea r  before the format ion o f  the t rust,  
the  annual ref i ning capac ity o f  the factories t hat rema ined i n  bus ines s 
was est imated at  3 . 9 2 6  bill ion pounds , whe reas total sales of ref ined 
suga r were approximately 3 . 3  bill ion pounds . The capacity t o  produce o f  
t he ref i ne r ies st i l l  i n  existence i n  1 8 8 6  was thus s l ightly less t han 
1 2 0  percent of the total quant ity of ref ined sugar sold . 
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the indus t ry . Within this movement toward the forma l izat ion o f  intra­
indust ry coordinat ion , finance became the sugar refiner' s mos t  important 
tool . 
Att empt s at  informa l combination began in ea rnest in t he 1 8 8 0 s . 
The f i rms o f  F .  o .  Mat thiessen & Weiche rs & Co , , the Brooklyn Sugar 
Ref ining Company ( t he fifth largest ref inery in the New York a rea ) and 
the various ref ine ries cont rolled by both branches o f  t he Havemeyer 
family pe riodically attempted to rest rict output during periods o f  
declining prices ,  but such a rrangements were a lways informal and short 
l ived . 2  A complex pool ing a rrangement was established by a numbe r o f  
refining fi rms in June , 1 8 8 0 ,  after a decline in t he ma rgin between raw 
and ref ined s ugar of s l ightly over twenty-two percent dur ing 1 8 7 9 . 
Init ially,  t he a rrangement was successfu l ,  as the margin rose s l ightly, 
and t he indust ry was reported as " [ having ] done a very succes s f u l  
bus iness [ in 1 8 8 0 ]  i n  consequence of the i r  unit ing to sustain prices . "3 
As was the case with most such schemes du ring the pe riod, howeve r ,  t he 
pool proved to be short lived, although the exa ct cause o f  its  f a i lu re 
is unknown . 4 
2Mul lins,  p .  3 3 . One branch of the Havemeyer f ami ly consisted of 
the descendant s o f  F rederick Havemeyer ,  who , a long with his o lde r 
brothe r ,  Wi l l iam C .  Havemeye r ,  were the fi rst member s  of  the fami ly to 
enter the sugar re fining business in the United States . Hen ry 0.  a nd 
Theodore Havemeye r we re the youngest sons o f  Frede rick C .  Havemeyer ,  
were general pa rtners in the refin ing firm of Havemeye r & Elde r ,  and 
owned a substant ial inte rest in the DeCa stro & Donner refine ry . The 
other branch of the fami ly cons isted of the descendant s of Will iam C .  
Havemeye r .  Hect or and Wi l l iam Havemeye r ,  grandsons o f  Wi l liam C .  
Havemeye r and second cousins of Theodore and Henry 0 .  Havemeye r ,  were 
general pa rtners  in the Ha vemeye r Suga r Refining Co . For a more 
deta iled account of the Havemeyer family' s involvement in the early 
sugar ref ining indust ry,  see Eichner,  pp . 3 0 - 6 1 . E ichne r ' s det a i led 
account o f  t he Havemeyer fami ly is derived f rom a privately p rinted 
biography writt en by Hen ry 0. Havemeye r ' s s on ,  Henry 0 . ,  Jr . that is not 
generally avai lable . 
3New Yo rk,  vol . 3 7 8 ,  p .  5 7 6  sub A, R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion . 
4According t o  the ag reement ,  an execut ive commi ttee was t o  be 
appointed to administer the pool . Each firm part icipat ing in the 
a rrangement wou ld pay into a common fund, to  be managed by t he 
committee,  one cent for each pound of sugar it  refined . The fund was to 
be divided each week according to a formula based on t he mel t ing 
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Al l early attempts to rest rict output within the indust ry failed, 
not because improving ma rket condit ions rende red t hem unnecessary ( the 
price of re f ined sugar dec lined a lmost cont inuous ly t h rough 1 8 8 7 ) , but 
because no wel l  de fined, forma l and lega l mechanism existed that would 
enable the coordinat ion of investment and product ion decis ions within 
t he industry . Although pr ices recovered tempo rarily following the 
Havemeyer & Elde r  f i re on January 9, 1 8 8 2 ,  t hey quickly resumed their 
dec line fol lowing the reconst ruct ion o f  t he f i rm' s new re f inery e ighteen 
month s  later . � During 1 8 8 6 ,  the average dif ference between raw and 
refined suga r was 0 . 7 8 1  cent s per pound -- evident ly a level that did 
not a f ford refiners what most thought was an adequate ret urn on t he i r  
investment .  On the other hand, due to the dif fe rence between the va lue 
of ref inery property as sc rap and its  worth as part of a going business 
concern , ref ine rs could t ransfer t he i r  capit a l  to othe r ,  more 
remunerat ive endeavors only "at  a cons ide rable loss . " 6 
capacity of each re f inery as determined by t he largest amount of raw 
sugar me lted in any four consecut ive weeks prior to the pool ' s  
establishment . Re fi ners we re expected t o  submit da ily reports  on their 
mel t ings to the committee , and the commi ttee was given the power to 
c lose down se lected ref ine ries should the price of re f ined suga r f a l l  
below a cert ain leve l . Of course , none of t h e  poo l ' s p rovisions we re 
legal ly enforceable, which a lmost certa inly a llowed widespread cheat ing 
and the eventua l col lapse of the a rrangement . See Eichne r ,  pp . 6 3- 6 4 . 
�The new Havemeyer & Elde r ref inery, having a da i ly refining 
capacity of approximately three mi l lion pounds , was reportedly able t o  
operate at  a n  average pe r unit cost o f  0 . 4 4 cents per pound ( not 
including the cost of capital ) of refined suga r p roduced . The minimum 
average cost at which other la rge refineries we re capable o f  producing 
was reportedly not less than 0 . 5  cents pe r pound . P resumably these 
f igure would be h ighe r when plants we re not run at full capacity, as per 
unit costs we re t hought to rise cons iderably when the daily output o f  a 
refine ry fe l l  be low t he max imum level attainable . See E ichne r,  p .  6 5 ;  
Vogt , p .  1 0 3 . 
6According t o  Al f red S .  Eichner ,  Joseph Mo ller,  o f  Mol le r  & Sierck,  
once complained t o  a f r iend that " t here was not much money in sugar 
re f ining" any more , and that " bus iness was bad . " When a s ked why he 
didn ' t " get out " of the busines s ,  he repl ied " we a re s t i l l  making 5 or 6 
pe rcent , and i f  I go out I will only get 4 . "  It  shou ld be noted t hat 
Mo ller obviou s ly failed to cons ider the addit iona l loss that wou ld be 
incurred if he attempt ed to liquidate his re fining property . See 
Eichne r,  p .  67 . 
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Competit ion during the winter o f  1 8 8 6- 1 8 8 7 ( no rma lly a dul l  season 
for the east coast refine ries even during the bes t  of t imes ) ,  was 
part icularly seve re . Although the ma rgin between raw and re fined sugar 
had f a l len by s l ight ly ove r f i fty pe rcent since 1 8 8 0 ,  re f inery p rofits 
(assuming an ave rage tot a l  per unit re fining cost o f  0 . 5  cents pe r 
pound ) , est ima ted a s  the difference between the price per pound of 
re f ined sugar and the price per pound o f  raw sugar plus the refining 
cost per pound, had dec l ined by almost seventy percent , to approximately 
one-third the leve l preva iling in 1 8 8 0 . Beginning in late 1 8 8 6 ,  John E .  
Searles Jr . ,  an of ficer in the Havemeyer Sugar Refining Co . ,  after 
receiving encou ragement from Wi lliam Havemeye r ,  began a concerted 
attempt to replicate in the suga r re fin ing industry the mechanism that 
had been emp loyed succes s f u l ly by John D .  Rockerfe l le r  in bringing about 
a community of interest among the nation ' s pet roleum suppliers . His 
e f forts culminated in the format ion o f  the Suga r Refineries Company on 
October 2 4 ,  1 8 8 7 . 
The Forma t i on of the Sugar Trust 
The format ion of the Suga r Trust was es sent ial ly a f inancial 
mat ter,  and, prior to intense gove rnment sc rut iny of t he indust ry, t he 
dif ficult ies the indust ry faced in reconst itut ing itself  as a t rust were 
prima r i ly f inancia l .  It had to be decided how and t o  what extent the 
owner s  o f  t he consolida t ing properties wou ld be compensated for t he i r  
interest s  in t hose bu sines ses , and how t he proceeds o f  t he operat ions o f  
t h e  consolidat ion would be dis t ributed among t h e  interested pa rties . A 
durable mechanism for establishing and apport ioning owne rship and 
management ove r the combinat ion a lso had t o  be estab l ished . 
Following a process o f  " long and de licate" negot iat ion bet ween 
John E .  Sea r les Jr . and most of the re finers in t he t h ree ma j o r  re fining 
centers , an agreement was st ruck whereby e ight re f ineries in New York , 
five in Bost on and one in Phi ladelphia agreed , " in principle " t o  t he 
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scheme o f  consolidation proposed by Sea rles . 7 The o rigina l scheme 
p roposed by Sea r les and t he Havemeyers , who once be ing induced t o  
part icipate i n  t he proposed cons ol idat ion played a leading role in i t s  
format ion , was " t o  form a corporat ion t hat would t ake t it l e  to a l l  the 
refining p ropert ies involved . "  This corporat ion was t o  be capit a l i zed 
at $ 1 9 . 5  mil l ion, of which $ 3 . 5  million was to be in p referred shares , 
and $ 1 6  mil l ion i n  common stock . 8 
John R .  Dos Passes , t he lawye r reta ined by Sea r les t o  " work out " 
the detail s of t he proposed conso l idat ion, was thought to be t he f i rst 
to suggest t hat the combi na tion assume a di fferent form than t hat 
o r igina lly proposed by Sear les and the Ha vemeye rs . Dos Passos ' s ob ject 
in suggest ing that the combinat ion assume the t rust form wa s to ensure 
that i t s  a ff a i rs would be conducted in sec recy . Acco rding t o  h im, the 
format ion of a corporation to acqu i re cont rol over previous l y  
independent f i rms would involve ,  "as  a matter o f  law, " t hat i t s  a f fa i rs 
be made open t o  public scrut iny . 9 The a rgument advanced by Dos Passos 
evident l y  convi nced Sea rles and the Havemeyers o f  t he des i rabi l it y  of a 
t rust as a means o f  combining their va rious propert ies , a s  the plans for 
consol idat ion we re shortly t hereafter revised . 
Dos Passos later explained the det a i l s  o f  f o rming a t rust : 
As sum [ ing ) t hat certain persons . . .  des i re t o  become owners o f  
s ome manufacturing bus iness o r  commercial  enterprise which 
is owned by, say , s ix corpo rat ions ; having bought the sha res 
of these compan ies ,  they get together and they make what i s  
called a t rust deed, o r  a t rust agreement . That t rust 
agreement rec ites the te rms unde r which the secu rit ies a re 
he ld;  that i s ,  the stock, the sha res of t he i r  s ix 
7Eichne r ,  pp . 7 5-7 6 ;  Mu l l ins,  p .  3 5 . See E ichne r ,  pp . 7 0-7 6 for 
det a i led account o f  t he negot iat ions leading up t o  the format ion o f  the 
Suga r Ref ine r ies Compa ny . 
8Eichne r ,  p .  7 6 . Eichner notes that , in keeping with accepted 
bus ines s  pract ice of the t ime , the amount of the i ssue of p referred 
stock proposed initially wa s probably equal t o  the actual va lue o f  the 
phys ical p rope rty owned by each of the individual refineries being 
b rought into the consolidat ion ,  and t hus probably represented what t he 
va rious p ropert ies were thought t o  be worth as independent concerns . 
�Eichne r ,  pp . 7 6-7 7 . 
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cons t i tuent compan ies , a re taken and placed in t he hands of 
a t rustee ,  who has no actual o r  rea l  ownership, except t hat 
he i s  t he custodian -- the shares belong, accordingly, to  
the t rustee, to  administer t he t rust ( John R .  Dos Passos,  
Commercial T rus t s ,  New York : Putnam' s ,  1 9 0 1 ,  pp . 1 2 -1 3 ) . 
The t rustee t hen is sues to t he former holders o f  the stock a rece ipt 
called a t rust certi ficate . 
The t rust agreemen t ,  which set forth t he terms unde r which the 
t rust would operate , and the rights and respon s ibi l i t ies o f  the t rustees 
and the former owne rs of the combining propertie s ,  was drafted by Dos 
Passos and John E .  Pa rsons , counsel to t he Havemeye r f amily,  during the 
Spring o f  1 8 8 7 . The actual deed, which was later s igned by a l l  o f  t he 
e ighteen f i rms that entered the t rust , conta ined t he following 
p rovi s ions . l o  
1 )  The boa rd o f  t rustees , which wa s des ignated as The Sugar 
Re f ineries Company,  was t o  receive the ent ire capital  stock o f  each f i rm 
entering t he combinat ion . The boa rd was init ially t o  cons ist o f  e leven 
members chosen for seven yea r terms , but t o  provide for cont inuity in 
leade rship t he i r  terms we re t o  be s taggered so that at  any one t ime no 
more than four vacancies on t he boa rd would exist . P rovision was also 
made for t he addit ion o f  two more members t o  t he boa rd should some of 
the ref in ing f i rms who init i a l l y  were not included i n  the agreement 
decide to join the consol idat ion . : : 
2 )  Each o f  the corpo rat ions enter ing into t he t rust was t o  remain 
nomina l ly independent "maintain [ ing] the i r  separate o rganiza t ions 
and . . .  carry [ ing ] on and conduct [ ing ] [ thei r ]  own bus i ness . "  Each 
10A copy o f  t he uns igned t rust deed i s  repr inted i n  U . S . ,  Congre s s ,  
House o f  Representat ive s ,  Committee o n  Manufacture s ,  Repo rt on T ru st s . 
H .  Rept . 3 1 1 2 ,  5 0 t h  Cong . ,  1st  sess . ,  1 8 8 8 ,  pp . 3-7 ( he rea fter referred 
to as U . S .  House Committee on Ma nu facture s ,  Repo rt on Trust s ) . 
1 1U . S .  House Commit tee on Manufactu res , Report on Trus t s ,  pp . 3 - 4 . 
The f i rst  boa rd of t rustees cons isted of Henry 0 .  Havemeyer ,  F .  0 .  
Ma tthiessen,  John E .  Sea rles Jr . and Julius Stursbe rg , each o f  whom was 
t o  serve init ially for seven yea rs ; Theodore A . Havemeye r ,  Joseph B .  
Thoma s ,  John Jurgensen and Hector C .  Havemeyer ,  who were t o  serve 
init ially for f ive yea rs ; and Cha rles Sen f f ,  Cha rles o .  Fost e r  and 
Wi ll i am Dick, each o f  whom would se rve for th ree yea rs . 
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corporation, however,  was to be subject to the ult imate authority o f  the 
board of t rustees . In orde r t o  establish full  cont rol over the various 
corporat ions which had t ransferred t heir capital stock t o  the t rust t he 
boa rd wa s empowe red to t ransfer portions of t he s tock t hat it  held to 
va rious individuals to qua l i fy them for pos itions as o f ficers o r  
directors i n  the va rious corporations . The boa rd o f  t rustees , act ing as 
t he sole owne rs of t hose concerns , would t hen vote t he individuals 
selected by t hem into the office for which t hey we re chosen . S ince 
members of the boa rd o f  t rustees were permit ted to cont inue as 
interested pa r t ies in the businesses which had t ransferred the i r  s tock 
to the t rust , they were able to function simu ltaneou s ly in the i r  role as 
t rustees and as office rs , manage rs , or direct ors in t he va rious f i rms 
which we re consol idated unde r the Sugar Re fine ries Company . 
3 )  The deed prov ided for the issuance of t rust cert i f icates in an 
amount not to exceed $5 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  each of which would have a nominal 
face value of one hundred do l lars . No plan was given in the deed as to 
how these cert i f icates would be apport ioned among t he consolidated 
f i rms . 12 The net earnings f rom the business of each corporation were to 
be t ransfe rred t o  the board, and dis tributed p roport iona lly among t he 
cert if icate holde rs at the discret ion of the trustees . 
With the except ion of employees cont ract s ,  each corpo rat ion wa s t o  
ma ke provis ions to f ree itself from a l l  indebtedness bef o re t ransferring 
its stock t o  t he boa rd . The owne rs of the corpo rat ions were given the 
1 2Although an addendum to the deed a l legedly contained schedules 
desc ribing t he "actual va lues " of the machinery, facto ry bui ldings and 
rea l  estate of t he various re fineries , there is no evidence that this 
schedu le was used as a gu ide in the distribut ion of th� cert i f icates . 
None o f  the various gove rnment committees which invest igated t he Trust 
we re able t o  determine the principles by which the cert i f icates were 
dis t r ibuted . Hen ry Ha vemeyer ,  when asked about t he general principle 
t hat was adopted i n  f i xing the valuation o f  the dif fe rent plants that 
came into the organizat ion replied t hat " . . .  we bought t he stock at what 
we could buy it for,  which was cons idered the va lue ,  according t o  what 
we termed va lue . "  u . s .  Indust rial Commission , Repo rt s ,  vol . 1 ,  pt . 2 
( Washington D . C . : Government P rint ing Office ,  1 9 0 0 ) , p .  1 1 0 .  Other 
test imony on the mat ter by Havemeyer ,  Pa rsons and Sear les wa s s imilarly 
vague ( see be low, this chapter ) . 
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opt ion o f  e ither cancel ing the debts themselves o r  paying in cash t o  the 
board an amount equal to the corporat ion ' s  indebtedness at the t ime o f  
the t ransfer o f  the stock to the direct ors . Upon t he execut ion o f  t he 
agreement , each corporat ion was a lso to receive compensat ion f rom the 
boa rd for a l l  current asset s ,  including invent ories of all p rope rt ies 
" useful for  the conduct of business , "  but not embraced in the schedules 
o f  va luat ion t hat re f lected the worth of the fixed asset s of the 
corporat ions . The boa rd also made p rovis ion to compensat e ,  eithe r  by 
cash payment o r  payment in t rust ce rtif icates , t he owne rs of  ref ineries 
with improvement s  in progre ss for cont racted expenditures for s uch 
improvements prior t o  the i r  actua l ly having been completed . 1 3  
4 )  F rom each a l lotment of t rust ce rt i f icates t h e  receiving 
co rpo rat ion was to deposit fi fteen percent with t he boa rd, to  be used 
for the acquis i t ion of other refineries , payment f o r  additional 
capacity,  o r  for cash appropriat ions to the various ref ine r ies . The 
boa rd wa s a l so given powe r to e ither exchange the cert i f icates depos ited 
with it by the consol idat ing corporat ions for the capital stock o f  other 
suga r re fining compa ni es or  companies that we re direct ly or indirect ly 
related to suga r ref ining, to se ll the t reasury cert ificates to provide 
funds for such pu rchase s ,  or with the ma jority consent o f  the board, t o  
i ssue addit iona l cert i f icates for the purchases o f  such p roperties . 
Should the boa rd have dec ided to do so,  it was a ls o  given the powe r to 
make such purchases by bo r rowing money against the prope rty of  t he 
various corpora t ions , although such an ope rat ion could only have been 
executed by a corpora t ion ' s officers at the init iat ive of the boa rd . 
: JThis provision ,  which applied to Havemeyer & Elde r ,  F .  0 .  
Mat thies sen & Weiche rs Suga r Refining Company t he Bay State Sugar 
Refining Company and Mol le r ,  Sierck & Co . was p robably included because 
of the disproportionate representat ion that the forme r two f i rms had on 
the boa rd o f  t rustees . There is a certain f inanc ial  logic t o  t he 
provision,  howeve r ,  as t he funds expended on such improvements would not 
have inc reased t he va lue of  the equity of t he old stockholder s  prior to 
t he complet ion of the improvement s ,  but would certainly have bene fitt ed 
the t rust ce rtificate holders,  who wou ld own a proport ionate sha re in 
t he soon t o  be imp roved propert ies upon the execution o f  t he t rust deed . 
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The execut ion of the agreement was not accomplished without s ome 
di f ficulty . In orde r to enable the t rans fe r  o f  control over t he 
independent ref ining prope rt ies to the t rustees, and promote "harmony in 
the fundamental business ba sis of each re finery, " t hose re f ine ries which 
we re partnerships or proprietorships f i rst had to be incorporated . u 
The propert y of the previously unincorporated concern wou ld then be 
t rans fe r red to the co rpo rat ion, and the entire capital stock o f  t he 
corporati on then t rans fe rred t o  the t rustees . I t  was later disc losed 
t ha t , while the idea of the t rust was being promulgated, some of the 
ma jor refiners had purcha sed controlling interests in ref ineries with 
which they had previously been unconnected.  Appa rently,  this operat ion 
was carried to the extent that , by the t ime the trust deed was executed, 
the eleven t rustees had acquired cont ro l l ing interests  in all t he 
corporat ions that were pa rties to the o rigina l agreement . Of course , 
s ince the t rustees had ga ined cont rol over t he cons t it uent corporat ions , 
a fter t he exchange of the t rust certif icates for the stock o f  t hose 
corporat ions had t aken place , the t rustees held a cont roll ing interest 
in the t rust itsel f . 1 5  
By August 1 6 ,  1 8 8 7 ,  informa l commitments to join t he t rust had 
been exacted f rom seventeen of the twent y-one re fineries s t i l l  in 
business east o f  the Roc ky Mountains . 1 6  The number of t rust 
14Four companies we re inco rporated immediately a fter t he execut ion 
of t he t rust deed . They we re : The Havemeyer & E lde r Sugar Ref ining Co . ,  
Oxnard Brothe rs Company, The Dick & Meyer Company and Moller,  S ie rck & 
Co . ,  each incorporated under the laws o f  New York . The other refineries 
which ente red into the t rust were a l l  corporat ions prior to t he 
execution o f  the deed unde r the laws of the various states in which t hey 
operated . U . S .  Dist rict Cou rt for the Southe rn Dist rict o f  New York, 
United States v .  American Suga r Re fin ing Co . et a l . :  Original Petit ion 
(New York : J .  W .  P ratt , 1 9 1 3 ) , pp . 4 0 - 4 3  (hereafter re ferred to as U . S .  
v .  ASRC, Original Pet ition ) ; u . s .  House Committee on Manufacture s ,  
Reoort on T rust s ,  pp . 4 3 -4 4 . 
1 �Vogt , p .  3 7 . 
1 6The s ituat ion with t he refiners in California would not be 
resolved unt il late 1 8 8 7 ,  when the American Suga r Ref ine ry of San 
Francisco joined the t rust , while the Cali fornia Suga r Ref ining Company, 
owned by Claus Sprecke ls ( s oon to be a formidable compet itor of the 
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cert i f icates t o  be exchanged for the stock o f  t he va r ious companies was 
ult imately determined through independent negotiat ions with t he 
individual refine r s ,  with the terms of the ba rga in f requently hinging on 
a ref iner' s insistence that he would not "come i n "  unless he got " so 
much . " 1 7 
No attempt was made t o  apport ion the t rust ' s  capital  stock among 
t he conso l ida t ing corporat ions in a way t hat wa s commensurable with 
their several va lues as  independent going concerns , n0r did t he amount 
of t rust certi ficates received by the va rious corpo ra t ions bea r a f ixed 
relationship to their capacity or capitalizat ions . The par va l ue o f  t he 
t rust ce rt i f icates rece ived by each co rporat ion that ente red the t rust , 
a long with their capi t a l izat ions , is shown in Table 1 .  
The Havemeyer & Elder concern,  though having a da i ly ref i ning 
capac ity o f  s l ight ly ove r t wice that of F .  o .  Mat t h iessen & Weiche rs ,  
rece ived ove r t h ree t ime s t he number o f  t rust cert i ficates that t he 
latter f i rm received . Both f i rms were reported capita l i zed at  s imi l a r  
amount s p r i o r  t o  t he i r  entry into t h e  t rust . The Havemeyer S ugar 
Ref ining Co . ,  whose cap i t a l ization wa s twice as h igh as  Havemeye r & 
Elde r ' s ,  received only about two-fifths of the t rust ce rt i f icates that 
the latter f i rm received, though s l ight ly less than t wice as much as 
Dick & Meye r ,  wh ich had an ident ica l da i ly re fining capac i t y .  
John Sea rles,  tes t i fying before t h e  New York State Legislature ,  
stated t ha t ,  "There was n o  de finite relat ion bet ween the capi t a l  stock 
in any o f  t he subsidia ry co rpo ra tions and the amount o f  cert i ficates 
they received in excha nge for that stock . " : e  John E .  P a rsons test i f ied 
that the pa rt ies to each i ndi vidua l agreement pa id l i t t le regard to the 
capit a l i z�t ion o f  the companies , but rather "to the actual value o f  the 
t rust ) chose to rema in independent . 
1 1Ei chne r ,  p .  8 0 . 
1 8Lexow Committee, Report , p .  2 0 0 . 
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TABLE 1 
THE COMPOS IT ION OF THE TRUST AND THE DI STRIBUT I ON 
OF THE TRUST CERTIFICATES 
F I RM 
Havemeye r & Elder 
DeCa st ro & Donner 
F .  o .  Mat thiessen & We ichers 
Havemeyer S .  R .  C .  
Brooklyn s .  R .  C .  
Dick & Meyer 
Moller  & S ierck 
Oxn a rd Bros . 
No rth Rive r S .  R .  C .  
St anda rd S .  R .  C .  
Boston S .  R .  c .  
Continent a l  S .  R .  C .  
Bay State S .  R .  C .  
Pl anters S .  R .  C .  
Louis iana S .  R .  C .  
S t . Lou is S .  R .  C .  




$ 1 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
6 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
5 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
3 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
90 0 , 0 0 0  
7 0 0 , 0 0 0  
7 0 0 , 0 0 0 
2 , 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 
1 , 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 
1 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  
9 0 0 , 0 0 0  
8 37 , 0 0 0  
8 37 , 0 0 0  
5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
unknown 
4 4 , 07 4 , 0 0 0  
CAPAC I TY 
( in lbs . / day )  
2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0  
1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
90 0 , 0 0 0  
2 0 0 , 0 0 0  
2 0 0 , 0 0 0  
2 0 0 , 0 0 0  
7 50 , 0 0 0  
5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
3 50 , 0 0 0  
3 5 0 , 0 0 0  
2 5 0 , 0 0 0  
3 5 0 , 0 0 0  
4 0 0 , 0 0 0  
2 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 0 , 9 0 0 , 0 0 0  
NOTE : The t rust cert i f icates received by t he consolidat ing 
corporat i ons l i sted above does not include the 1 5  percent which we re 
returned to the t rustees as  t reasury stock . 
SOURCE : Eichne r ,  The Eme raence of  Ol igopoly, p .  8 5 ;  Mul l ins , The 
Suaa r Trust , p .  4 8 . 
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propert ies . " " In comparing the va rious capacities o f  the re f ineries 
entering the t rust with the amount of cert i f icates received, Paul Vogt 
a lso noted, " I f  t he value of a plant bea rs any re lation to capacity, [ it 
appears evident ] that . . .  each t ransact ion was independent of the 
others . " 20 
I t  is not surpris ing t hat attempts by the various invest igat ive 
bodies which probed into the work ings o f  t he t rust t o  establ ish a 
p rinc iple of valuat ion based on the capacities o r  capit a lizat ions of  the 
several corpo rat ions prior to t he format ion of  the t rust should meet 
with fai lure . The industry was stricken with chronic excess  capacity, 
and many of the conce rns that ente red into the agreement became only 
ma rgina lly profitable during the three years preceding the t rust ' s  
forma t ion . S ince t he exchange of stock for t rust cert i f icates amounted 
to an exchange of sha res in the earnings of individual corpo rat ions for 
shares in the ea rn ings of the industry as a whole,  the proport ion of 
t rust cert i f icates rece ived by each corpo rat ion wa s uLdoubtedly related 
in some fashion to the cont ribut ion of each firm t o  t he expected total 
earnings o f  the industry when ope rated unde r the authority o f  t he t rust ; 
o r  similarly,  t o  t he cost to the consolidated f i rms i n  terms o f  foregone 
ea rnings by leaving t he firm to operate independent ly . 
Henry Havemeye r ' s test imony be fore the U . S .  Industrial Commiss ion 
i llust rates this princ iple and confirms t hat this was the general scheme 
of valuation that was used by the boa rd in deciding whether t o  accept o r  
reject t he te rms of exchange advanced b y  each of t he independent 
ref i ner ies before coming into the t rust . When asked about the method 
used by the boa rd in fi xing the va luat ion of t he different co rpora t ions 
that were consolidated unde r t he t rust , Havemeyer repl ied " we bought the 
stock at what we could buy it for . . .  acco rding to what we termed va lue . 
1 9U . S .  House Committee on Manu factures , Report on Trus t s ,  p .  3 2 . 
20Vogt , p .  3 8 . 
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Some plants we bought probably more on account of t he i r  rea l  estate 
value ; others we t ook for their st anding ; others had ve ry valuable 
t radema rks ; a l l  of t hese t h ings figured in . "  Then , whan a sked whether 
t he real quest ion wa s to what extent the corporat ions " would cont r ibute 
to t he profit of the new organization , " Ha vemeye r  repl ied, " Yes . " 2 1 
Later,  he explained why the t rust was willing t o  pa rt with 
ce r t i f icates va lued f a r  in excess of  the "actual value"  o f  t he 
re fineries for which t hey we re . exchanged . 
Suppose you and I a re in  bus iness and we run our bus inesses 
t o  suit ourselves . I say let us form a t rus t ;  you say 
no . . . .  I go alone and I put up the price a qua rter of a 
cent , and that enables you to make a fair  profit . Now, I 
say t o  you , wha t do you want for your plant ? You say this 
plant is  worth a mi ll ion dollars . . .  but you wi l l  o f fer i t  to 
me for two, and I take it . I can make more money by buying 
that  plant for $2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  with the advance in p rice than I 
can by leaving you out , and I give you t he ent i re advantage 
of you r  work on that plant (U . S .  I ndust rial  Commiss ion , 
Reeo rt s ,  vol . 1 ,  pt . 2 ,  p .  1 2 4 ) . 
Most of  the inqui ry re lat ing to the princ iple of  valuat ion used in 
determine the proport ion of t rust cert ificates rece ived by each of t he 
consol idated compan ies was conce rned with uncovering evidence of  " water" 
in the capita l i zat ion o f  t he t rust . 21 Despite the fact that the 
capi t a l i z at ion of the t rust wa s undoubtedly in exces s  of t he cost of 
reconst ruct ion of t he va rious refineries , and seve ral t imes l a rge r t han 
t he o r iginal capi t a l i zat ion of its component part s ,  the capita l i za t ion 
2 1U . S .  Indust rial  Commission, Report s ,  vol . 1 ,  pt . 2 ,  pp . 1 1 0- 1 1 1 . 
22Repea ted att empt s we re made to gain evidence of the over­
capit a l i zation of t he t rust du ring t he test imony of John Searles be fore 
the New Yo rk Legislature ,  John E .  Pa rsons ' test imony before t he U . S .  
Congress a nd ma ny others . Sea rles repeatedly s teered the inqu i ry in 
other di rect ions o r  professed ignorance on the matter wheneve r t he 
subject wa s int roduced . Pa rsons claimed that t he reproduct ion of  the 
property ove r which the t rust gained cont rol would have requi red f rom 
s ixty to seventy percent of its capitali zat ion , not including t he va lue 
of  patents and proprietary refining techniques . Later,  in  1 9 1 2 ,  a fter 
reviewing ove r  t hree thousand pages of test imony ,  much o f  which was on 
t he subject of  ove r-capit a l i zat ion , t he Ha rdwick Commit tee est ima ted 
that between $ 2 5 - $ 3 0  mil l ion of the Trust ' s  capit a l i zat ion was not 
represented by " real va lue " , a nd therefore wa s " wa te r "  (Ha rdwick 
Committee,  Repo rt , p .  2 5 ; Lexow Committee, Report , pp . 3 8 0-4 0 3 ;  U . S .  
House Commit tee on Manufactures , Report on Trus t s ,  p .  3 3 ) . 
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of the t rust wa s not excessi ve as measured by i t s  abi l i t y  to pay 
dividends on its capital stock, by t he logic that guided t he format ion 
of the consolidat ion , or indeed, if measured by its bearings on the 
individual interests of Henry 0 .  Havemeye r .  
Between Apr i l ,  1 8 8 8 ,  and January, 1 8 9 1 ,  t he t rust cont inued t o  pay 
a 2 . 5  percent qua rte rly dividend on the pa r va lue of its cert i f icates . 
In addit ion , in 1 8 8 9 ,  the t rust declared an ext ra dividend o f  8 percen t , 
payable in t rust cert i f icates ; and by 1 8 9 1  had accumu lated a s u rplus o f  
$7  mil l ion,  the equiva lent of another fou rteen percent dividend . 23 
Furthe rmo re ,  de spite the many attempt s by various government 
invest igative committees to est imate the " real va lue " ,  or the cost of 
reproduct ion ,  of the consol idated refineries , this measu re was 
completely i r relevant g iven the ci rcumst ances faced by the indust r y  at 
the t ime the t rust was formed . A more appropriate measure o f  va lue ,  
a lbeit one t hat would have st rengthened the impression that t he t rust 
was overcapitali zed, wou ld have been the price that t he independent 
conce rns would have fetched i f  offered for sale . I n  this  l ight , it  
becomes clea r that  the "actual value " of an independent concern in an 
indust ry suffering f rom excess capacity will be far less than its  value 
as part of a combination . As Henry Ha vemeye r rema rked when it  was 
pointed out to h im that most re f ine ries we re los ing money and a l l  but 
worthless unde r condit ions prevailing in 1 8 8 7 : " They were not worthless 
under condit ions t hat we re about to preva i l . " 24 
Despite the cont roversy that late r ensued over t he 
cap i t a l i zat i on o f  the t rust , and the diff icult ies that emerged in 
nego t iat ing the amount of cert i f icates that each ref ine r y  was to 
rece ive , the actua l execut ion of the t ransfer,  with one except i on ,  was 
accompl ished with lit t le difficulty . The " f inancing" o f  t he t rust , or 
23Eichne r ,  p.  1 1 8 . 
24U . S .  Indust rial Commission ,  Repo rts,  vol . 1 ,  pt . 2 ,  p .  1 2 4 . 
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the a rrangements made pu rsuant to the actua l acquisit ion o f  control over 
the individual re fineries by the t rus t ,  was accomplished with only 
$ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0  in cash changing hands . 
In t he case of the pa rtnerships that incorporated immediately 
prior t o  the forma t ion of  the t rust , t he individua l pa rtners t ransferred 
t he i r  properties to the corporat ions that they f o rmed, rece iving the 
stock of  t he corporat ion in exchange . The stock o f  these corporat ions 
was then t u rned ove r  to t he directors,  who is sued cert i f icates against 
t he stock t o  the individuals who previously he ld the stock . I n  t he case 
of companies that had a l ready incorpo rated, only the latter  s tep was 
necessary . In  no case was cash exchanged bet ween the boa rd and t he 
membe rs of t he consolida t ing co rporations . 2� 
In on ly one case did the exchange of  cash accompany t he 
incorporat ion of a f i rm into t he t rust . The stockholders o f  t he North 
River S uga r Re fin ing Compa ny, who had been promised $ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0  in 
cert i f icates in exchange for their stock,  had been led t o  bel ieve that 
they wou ld rece ive t he same for the i r  prope rty as  did Hector  and Wi l l iam 
Havemeye r for the stoc k  of the Havemeye r Sugar Re f in ing Co . When t hey 
found out that the lat ter company had actua l l y  received cer t i ficates 
worth over seven t imes more than the amount that they had been promised, 
t he owners of the North Rive r Suga r Refining Company decided to explore 
other ways o f  dispos ing of the i r  p roperty . Ea rlier,  rumors had 
c i rcu lated that t he prope rty on which the North River re f inery was 
located was t o  be condemned for a public pa rk . The owne rs evidently 
dec ided that they cou ld negot iate better te rms with t h� city than with 
the t rust , and rescinded the authority of George Mol le r ,  the act ive head 
2$U . S .  House Commit tee on Manu factures , Report on T rust s ,  p .  32 . 
The ma rket va lue of the ce rtif icates was reported t o  have been 
approximately f i f t y  dol lars immediately fol lowing t he execu t ion of t he 
t rust deed . The cash va lue of  the f i rms that entered into t he t rust 
would t hus have been equa l t o  approximately one-half the va lue o f  t he 
t rust cert i f icates (assuming that a l l  the cert i f icates could be sold a t  
t he reported price ) t h a t  they received i n  exchange for the i r  p roperties . 
See Vogt , p . 3 8 .  
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of t he f i rm, t o  s ign the t rust agreement . Fina lly,  a fter  a series of  
threats and counter-threats  between representa tives of  the f i rm and the 
t rust over t he legal bat t le that was expected t o  ensue , John E .  Sea r les 
a t tempted t o  reso l ve the i ssue by o f fe ring t o  pay t he North River 
stockholders $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0  in cash for t heir  interest in the concern . The 
North River st ockholde rs quickly agreed to the terms p roposed by 
Sea rles,  whereupon t he company ' s  stock wa s t rans ferred f i rs t  t o  h im, and 
t hen to the t rust . Sea r les was then given the $ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0  in cert i f icates 
t hat had o rigina l ly been promised to the North River f i rm . 26 
The figures presented in Table 1 above showing the divis ion of  t he 
cert i f icates among t he consol idat ing corporat ions were adjusted t o  
ref lect t he f i fteen percent that was deducted in each case and returned 
to the t reasury of the Suga r Re f iner ies Corporat ion . The pos it ion o f  
each cer t i f icate holde r  with respect to the t rust ' s  t reasury s tock was 
s imi l a r  to that of a regu lar stockholder with respect t o  a corporation ' s 
accumu la ted cash surplus . The t reasury stock a lso se rved a s imi l a r  
purpose to t h e  t rust . Each cert i f icate holder was ent it led t o  a pro­
rata share in the cert i ficates ret urned to the t rust . Therefore,  
a lthough each received a nominal amount wo rth f i f teen percent less than 
t ha t  which had been ag reed upon dur ing the negot iat ion of  t he t rans fer,  
the actua l va lue of  t he cert i ficates received by h im �·)Uld t heoret ica lly 
be worth f i f teen percent mo re than the i r  st ated va lue due t o  t he fact 
t ha t  the t reasury cert i f i cates comprised an asset of  t he t rust . John 
P a rs on s  l ater test i f ied that eve ry cert i f icate redepos ited with t he 
t rust was " just a s  valuable" t o  its former holde r  " a s  i f  it  were in his 
own pocket . " 27  
It i s  not c lear precisely what became of  t he t reasury 
cert i f icates . Pa rsons stated tha t  he bel ieved some were used t o  
26Eichne r ,  pp . 8 5 -8 6 ;  Mu l l ins , p .  3 9 . 
27U . S .  House Commit tee on Manu factures , RePort on Trus t s ,  p .  52 . 
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compensate the stockho lde rs of refiner ies that ente red t he t rust after  
the redeposit o f  cert i f icates had begun,  and that  t he rest had rema ined 
on hand . Searles tes t i f ied that he thought t he ce rt i f ica tes had been 
used to compensate the stockholders of t he St . Loui s  Suga r Re f ining 
Company, t he Louis iana Suga r Refining Co . and t he Planters Sugar 
Ref i n ing Co . for the stock of t heir  respective compan ies when they 
entered t he t rust . 28 Some must a lso have been used to acqu i re the stoc k  
of the Amer ican S uga r Re f inery in Ca l i fornia du r ing t he winter o f  
1 8 8 7 . 29 Fina l ly ,  a t  lea st a port ion o f  the cert i f icates must have been 
returned to thei r forme r holders in the form of the dividend payable in 
t rust cert i f icates that the t rustees dec la red in 1 8 8 9 . 
The execut ion of the rema ining provis ions o f  t he deed was a lso 
accomp l ished with a min imum amount of cash actua l ly pass ing t hrough the 
hands of the boa rd o f  t rus tees . No cash o r  othe r quick assets were 
t ransferred to the t rust by the consol idat ing corpo rat ions in exchange 
for t rust cert i ficates ; the prope rty that wa s t ransferred t o  the 
t rustees in exchange for the t rust cert i f icates con s i s ted solely of rea l 
estate,  factorie s ,  refin ing equ ipment and goodwi l l . In accordance with 
the t rust deed, the forme r owners of the consol ida t ing corporations were 
compensated in cash for a l l  qu ick assets t hat were not inc luded in the 
schedule of valuat ion that was used in negot iat ing the exchange of the 
t rust cert i f icates . Th is,  howeve r ,  was not a ccomplished in the manne r 
sugges t ed by the t rust deed, acco rding t o  which the boa rd was t o  
t ransfer funds to the t reasurer o f  each co rpora t ion in exchange for the 
company' s  qu ick assets prior to the exchange o f  stock for cert i ficates . 
Acco rding to statements made later by John E .  Sea rles �nd John Pa rsons , 
after the old s t ockholde rs o f  each conce rn had surrendered t he i r  stock 
28U . S .  riouse Commit tee on Manufactu res , Repo rt on T rus t s ,  p.  2 9 ;  
Lexow Commi ttee , Report , p .  2 1 5 . 
29See Eichne r ,  pp . 8 7 - 9 2 ,  for  a det a i led account o f  the t rust ' s  
attempt to extend its i n f l uence to Cali f o rnia . 
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to the boa rd, the va lue of  each company ' s  quick assets wa s ent e red on 
t he company ' s  books ( t he company now cont rol led by t he t rust ) a s  a 
c redit t o  the former stockholders . The quick assets we re t hen 
l iquidated by t he newly consol idated co rpora t ion and t he proceeds 
t ransferred to the o ld st ockholders ,  at which t ime the c redit s  t o  t he 
o ld stockholders were canceled . 30 
The debt ext inction provision of t he deed provided f o r  the 
ret irement o f  a l l  i ndebtedness on the part o f  t he consolidating 
corporat ions , so as  to prevent the " inequal ity [ that ) would have 
resulted i f  one corporat ion had been f ree from debt and the other had 
not . " 3 1  This wa s implemented in two ways . In some case s ,  an  amount 
sufficient to ret i re the debt of a part icula r corporat ion was 
t rans ferred to Pa rsons or Dos Pas ses , who acted as  receivers for the 
fund . These s ums were later t ransferred back to the corpora t ions , upon 
the books of which t he former indebtednes s  had continued to stand,  and 
se rved as the working capital of those concerns . S ome f i rms , s uch as  
Havemeye r & Elder,  Ma tt hiessen & We ichers and the Bay State Company 
30According to Sea rles , a new set of  books was s t a rted f o r  each 
corporat ion upon its entry into the t rust . Pa rsons had earl ier 
test i f ied that one of  the pu rposes in providing for t he compensat ion o f  
the forme r owne rs o f  each company ' s  cash assets was t o  enable each o f  
t he companies t o  be "balanced" against a l l  the othe rs a t  the t ime the 
t rust agreement took e ffect . This provis ion , and the others described 
below, i ndi cates that the boa rd took s ome care in making sure that each 
cert i ficate holder,  rega rdless of the concern with which he was formerly 
a f f i l iated, was p laced on a similar bas is with other ce rt i f icate 
holders . The way in which the stockholde rs were compensated for the 
quick assets of  t he consol ida ted co rporat ions is quite nove l . One of  
t he ma j o r  reasons why increas ing amounts of  cash we re necessary to 
faci l i t a te later combina tions was so that  shareholders in consolida t ing 
corporations could be compensa ted for the qu ick assets that were 
t ransferred to consol idations along with the f ixed and intangible assets 
o f  the consol idat ing corporat ions , the latter of  which we re norma l ly 
"paid for"  th rough the direct exchange o f  stock . The method employed by 
t he t rust in acqu iring the qu ick assets of the consol i1ated corpora t ions 
obviated the need to obt a in la rge amounts of  cash in advance of the 
actual execution of the consol idation agreement . See the Ha rdwick 
Committee,  Repo rt , pp . 2 3 1 -2 3 3 ,  and U . S .  House Commit tee on 
Manufactu res , Report on Trusts,  p .  27 for more on t he prov� s �ons of  t he 
t rust deed governing t he t ransfer of the quick assets of  the 
conso lidat ing compan ies . 
3 1U . S .  House Commi t t ee on Manu factu re s ,  Report on Trusts , p .  1 8 .  
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were undergoing enlargement or improvement o f  t he i r  fac i l i t ies at the 
t ime o f  t he i r  ent ry into the t rust . S ince a l lowance had been made in 
the deed for cash payment to these f i rms in compensat ion for work in 
p rogre s s ,  t hey were pe rmit ted to let their  indebtednes s  stand,  and use 
the funds t hat wou ld otherwise have been used to ret i re t he i r  debt t o  
f inance t he pending improvement s . In  most ca ses such as  these , the 
amount owed t he t rust wa s s imilar to the amount that t he t rust owed the 
individua l corporat ions . The amount s  were permi tted t o  o f f set , and no 
cash actually changed hands . n 
Fi nancing The Opera t i ons of the Trus t ,  1 88 7-1890 
Short ly a f ter gaining cont rol of the conso l idating corporations,  
the t rus tees began the process of consol idating and rat ional i z ing the 
indust ry' s product ive capac ity . During 1 8 8 7  t he factories o f  the North 
Rive r  Sugar Re f ining Company, Mol ler,  S ierck & Co . ,  t he Oxna rd Bros . 
Company, Bay State Suga r Re f ine ry Company , Boston Suga r Ref ining Company 
and St . Louis Suga r Re fining Company we re closed, and most were later 
dismant led . 33 The Havemeyer Suga r Re finery in Brooklyn, which was 
dest royed by f i re in June , 1 8 8 7 ,  was rebuilt in 1 8 8 8 ,  but ceased 
operat ions in 1 8 8 9 .  The Dick & Meyer plant bu rned in 1 8 8 9  and was not 
rebu i lt . The North River Ref inery was condemned in 1 8 8 8 ,  and the land 
on which it  st ood t urned into a publ ic pa rk . The Forest City ref inery, 
a sma l l , poo rly located facility,  was c losed in 1 8 8 9 .  All  t h ree plant s 
o f  t he DeCa s t ro & Donne r company were closed in 1 8 8 9 ,  a l though t he two 
32U . S .  House Committee on Manufactures , Report on Trus t s ,  pp . 1 9-
2 4 . It  appears that , despite the debt ext inc t ion provision,  mos t  o f  the 
corporat ions that ente red the t rust did so without t he i r  levels  of debt 
having been reduced . Howeve r ,  since the i r  cash assets were increased by 
the t ransfer o f  f unds f rom t he account managed by Sea r les and Dos Pa sses 
to their respective t reasuries , the e ffect on t he i r  net worth,  which was 
the ma j o r  concern to the cert ificate holde rs ,  was identical  to that 
which would have occur red had t he debt actua l ly been ret i red . 
nu . S .  v .  AS RC, Origi n a l  Pet it ion, p .  4 5 .  
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which we re loca ted in Brooklyn cont inued to be used as  warehouses for 
t he Havemeyer & E lder plant . 3� 
As t he t rust wa s clos ing and dismantling plants a c ross t he 
count ry, it  bega n the process o f  concent rat ing and rat ional i z ing 
p roduct ion in the refineries that it pe rmit ted to cont inue in ope rat ion . 
The Matthiessen & Weichers plant and the Havemeyer Sugar Ref inery 
factory , which were located adjacent to each other i n  Jersey City, were 
consol idated and operated as a unit unde r t he name of the forme r f i rm .  
The Havemeyer & E lde r factory and the plant o f  the Brooklyn Suga r 
Refine ry we re a l so consol idated and ope rated as one . S imi la r 
combinat ions took place between the Cont inent a l  and Standa rd ref ineries 
of Boston;  and the P lanters ' and Louisiana ref ineries �n New Orleans . 35 
Of t he twenty refineries ult imately acqui red by the t rust during 
1 8 8 7 ,  only the four consol idated facil it ies l isted above , and the plant 
leased by the Ame rican Sugar Re f inery in San F rancisco,  we re a l lowed to 
cont inue in ope rat ion . Despite the closure of ove r ha l f  the ref ine ries 
consol ida ted unde r the t rust , those that rema ined open under the scheme 
o f  ra t iona l i zat ion and consolidat ion implemented by t he t ru stees had a 
combined da i l y  re f ining capacity that wa s 1 5 0 , 0 0 0  pounds g reater than 
that of the various independent l y  operated plant s cons ol idated under t he 
t rust . 36  
The ma nagement and financ ing of  the day-to-day a f fa i rs of t he 
plant s that rema ined in ope ration cont inued in much th� same fa sh ion as 
before the consolidat ion . The policy of  the t rust concerning the 
individual corpo rations wa s formu lated by two committees : a mercant ile 
g roup that handled decisions related to the purchase o f  raw suga r and 
34Mu l l ins , p .  57 . 
35Mu l l ins , pp . 57- 5 8 . 
36Vogt , p .  3 6 . The increase in da i ly re fining capa c i t y  among the 
plants that were pe rmi tt ed to cont inue in operat ion wa s appa rent l y  due 
t o  economies rea l i zed by integrat ing ref ining f a c i l i t ies that we re 
previously run independent ly . 
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sale o f  re f ined suga rs ; and a manufactur ing committee ,  which dec ided how 
much ref i ned suga r each facility wou ld produce . 3' Subject to the 
ult imate autho rity o f  the boa rd and the direct ion of the commit tees ,  
each corporat ion was f ree t o  manage its  own bus ines s .  As Jul ius 
Stursberg later test i f ied, "eve ry company cont inued to con t ro l  its own 
a f f a i rs unde r the guidance of its  of f icers who reported . . .  to the 
respect i ve committees o f  the Suga r Ref ineries Company . "38 
The t rust itself  was l i t t le more t han a "paper o rgan i za t ion . "  I t  
had n o  f ixed place of bus i ness and kept n o  books , except f o r  a record o f  
cert i f icate holders . The discret ion of the boa rd of t rustees was 
l imited t o  appo int ing and elect ing corporate o f f icers and directors,  and 
removing them at the end of thei r terms i f  their pe rformance proved 
unsa t i sfactory;  and oversee ing t he redi stribut ion of t he prof i t s  of t he 
consol idated corporat ions to t he cert i f icate holders , which t hey 
recei ved in t he form o f  dividends on the stock of t he consol idated 
corporat ions . 39 Each corporat ion was "ent ire ly indepenoent " with rega rd 
to c redit unde r the t rust . " ' The t rust itself ne ither borrowed nor lent 
money, nor was it involved in managing t he day-t o-day operat ions of t he 
individual  corpora t ions . Un fortunately,  no informa t ion i s  ava i lable on 
the precise nature o f  t he pract ices and inst ruments employed by t he 
corporat ions in f inanc ing the i r  businesses during t he yea rs t hey were 
con t ro l led by the t rust . 4 �  Seve ra l inferences , howeve r ,  a re pos s ible . 
37Eichne r ,  pp . 1 0 4 - 1 0 5 . 
38United States v .  Ame rican Suga r Ref ining Co . et . a l .  P re t r i a l  
Tes t imony, 1 9 1 2 ,  p .  4 7 4 0 . C ited in Eichner,  p .  1 0 6 . 
3 5 . 
39U . S .  House Commit tee on Manu fact ures , Report on r rus t s ,  pp . 3 4 -
40E ichne r,  p .  3 6 .  
� 1The records o f  R .  G .  Dun & Co . cease for most f i rms a round 1 8 8 5 ,  
t he t ime a t  which d i f f i cu l t ies i n  the indust ry became especi a l ly severe . 
The book s  o f  the individua l corporat ions appear t o  have been lost , and 
were not a subject of gene ra l interest among the va rious invest igat i ve 
bodies that inqu i red into the work ings of the t rust . 
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Most f i rms examined earlier in this chapte r  we re able to achieve a 
subs tant ial  measure o f  financial independence and s t rength by 1 8 8 5  
through t he accumulat ion o f  la rge surpluses and t he use o f  those 
surpluses as  a part i a l  subst itute for other sources of wo rk ing capital  
s uch as  ban k  c redit , t rade credit and commerc ia l  pape r borrowings . S ome 
f i rms we re eventua lly able to limit their rel iance on c redit t o  t he 
importat ion of raw suga r on seven-day or less open account , and the 
occasional issuance of commercial paper in order t o  ma int a in t he i r  
st anding i n  the c redit ma rkets . After 1 8 7 5 ,  virt u a l ly a l l  improvements 
and replacement o f  outworn equ ipment were f inanced out of reta i ned 
ea rn ings gene rated on a high rate of turnove r of working capit a l . 
The f i rms that cont inued in ope rat ion under the regime of plant 
closure and consolidat ion implemented by the t rust were a lmost 
immediately p rofitable , as indicated by t he dividends that were pa id on 
the t rust cert i ficates . Nevertheles s ,  due t o  the l iquidat ion o f  t he 
qu ick assets o f  the va rious corpo rat ions and t he cance ling of t he 
c redits to the forme r st ockho lde rs with t he proceeds , t he f i rms t hat 
compri sed the t rust we re a lmost immediately fo rced to seek s hort term 
capit a l  f rom outs ide s ources . Short ly a fter the t rust deed was executed 
the consolidated companies we re reported to have borrowed about $ 1 0  
mi l l ion t o  be used a s  work ing capita l .  Three yea rs later,  immediately 
prior t o  t he organi zat ion of t he Ame rican Suga r Refining Company in 1 8 9 1  
t he various corporat ions had reduced the i r  short term indebtednes s ,  
including t rade c redits ,  t o  $8 , 0 6 3 , 2 9 6 . The working capital  provided by 
the initial  $ 1 0  mi l l ion in bor rowings by the va rious corporat ions must 
thus have been more t han suff ic ient to t ide t hem ove r unt i l  t hey could 
begi n  t o  rea l i ze on t he i r  assets under t he regime of cooperat ion 
implemented by the t rustees . '2 
Net expendit u res on improvements t o  property,  plant and equipment 
by t he va rious corpo rat ions dur ing the t hree yea rs that t he t rust was in 
4 2Comme rc i a l  and Financ ial Chronicle 5 1  ( November 1 ,  1 8 9 0 ) : 6 1 0 . 
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existence amounted t o  $ 2 , 75 4 , 53 1 . Virtually a l l  this  wa s f unded out of  
net earn ings on borrowed working capital and accumu lated surpluses,  as  
t he total long term debt of the consolidated companies in November ,  1 8 9 0 
wa s only $ 2 0 1 , 7 7 8 .  No stock was issued by t he consol idated corporat ions 
under t he t rust , and no borrowing for the individu a l  co rporat ions by t he 
boa rd of  trustees o f  any type t ook place . 
I have est imated the replacement value of the f i xed phys ical  
as set s cont rol led by the t rust , as they may have appea red on t he books 
of  t he individual corporat ions , at approximately $ 2 0  mil l ion by 
November ,  1 8 9 0  ( see below, this chapter)  . Due to net improvements 
undertaken prior to Novembe r, 1 8 9 0 ,  this amount mus t  be reduced by 
approximately $3 mi l l ion to arrive at an est ima te of t he init i a l  value 
of the f ixed assets of  the consol idated corporat ions . It i s  imposs ible 
to determine prec isely what the total va lue of the asset s con t ro lled by 
t he individual corpo rat ions wa s upon their entering the t rust . By 
November ,  1 8 9 0 ,  howeve r the tot a l  stated book va lue o f  t he asset s owned 
by the conso l idated corporations (exc luding the va lue of f ixed asset s )  
was $2 0 , 5 37 , 8 3 6 ,  o f  which approximately $ 8  mil l ion was i n  the form o f  
cash and accounts rece ivable . 43 
The co rpo ra tions consol idated unde r the t rust we re able to pay 
dividends short ly a fter commencing opera tions unde r the overs ight of the 
t rustees , which the trustees subsequent ly dist ribut ed pro-rata t o  t he 
cert i ficate holders . Div idends were declared on t he cert i f icates 
beginning in Apr i l ,  1 8 8 8 ,  and f rom that t ime unt i l  the format ion o f  the 
American Suga r Re f ining Company in Janua ry, 1 8 9 1 ,  cont inued to be paid 
regularly at a rate of  ten percent annua l ly . 4� The t ru stees a l s o  
43Commercial and Financ i a l  Chron icle 5 1  ( Novembe r, 1 ,  1 8 9 0 ) : 6 1 0 . 
4 4E ichne r,  p .  1 1 8 . The cert i f icates themse lves were t raded in t he 
unlisted depa rtment of  the New York Stock Exchange , which wa s "created" 
in  1 8 8 5 t o  a ccommodate t hose who wished to t rade in t he securit ies o f  
indust r i a l  corporations,  t rusts and other concerns whose lega l status 
was not wel l  de f ined . The un l isted department d i ffered f rom t he l is ted 
department in that bus inesses whose cert i f icates we re dea lt in there 
1 0 0  
authorized an e ight percent dividend 1 n  1 8 8 9  payable i n  t rust 
cert i f icates,  and by Janua ry,  1 9 9 1 ,  had managed t o  accumulate a surplus 
of $7 mi l l ion, or the equiva lent of another fourteen percent 
dividend . 4� 
The dividends paid on the t rust cert i f icates de rived solely f rom 
dividends pa id on the shares he ld by the t rust in t he consolidated 
corpora t ions . This level o f  prof itabil i ty meant t hat t he ref i ne ries 
that rema ined in operat ion would have had to generate suf ficient 
ea rnings to pay dividends on both their individual capi t a l i za t ions , and 
on the sha res o f  the plants that were c losed by the t rustees after 1 8 8 7 . 
The t rust ' s prof itabi lit y de rived bot h f rom t he rea l economies 
enabled by the consolidation and rat iona l i zat ion of p roduc t ion in a few 
manufacturing fac i l i t ies , and the pecuniary economies ef fected by the 
boa rd' s ability to cont rol the rates of investment and output within the 
indus t ry . The savings ef fected by the conso lidat ion o f  product ion in a 
few re f in ing faci l i t ies we re cons ide rable . Labor costs were lowe red 
because the numbe r of empl oyees wa s reduced as plants were c losed . The 
t rust a lso wa s thought to have ga ined an advant age by combining t he 
abil i ty and expe r ience of the foremost experts  in the indust ry .  But by 
fa r t he most important savings was repo rted to have resulted f rom the 
were not requi red to ma ke any statement rega rding the i r  f inances or 
operat ions . The pr ice of  the t rust cert i f icates f luctuated widely ( see 
below, this chapte r ) , which caused them to be , or pe rhaps resulted f rom 
t he i r  be ing, a favo r ite item of  speculat ion . By t he last ha l f  o f  1 8 8 9 ,  
acco rding t o  Thoma s R .  Na vin and Ma rian v .  Sea r s ,  the ave rage vo lume o f  
sugar t rust shares wh ich changed hands amounted t o  app roximately 1 5 0 , 0 0 0  
sha res pe r week,  while the investment g rade stock o f  the Pul lman C a r  Co . 
t raded at  a rate of about 2 , 0 0 0  shares per week . Navin and Sea rs , "The 
Rise of a Ma rket for Indust r i a l  Securities,  1 8 7 7 - 1 902 . "  
4 �Commercial  and Financial Ch ron icle 5 1  ( November 1 ,  1 8 9 0 ) : 6 1 0 . 
Although t he t rustee ' s withheld the last two qua rterly dividends for 
1 8 9 0 ,  they we re later pa id to the cert i ficate holders when t he 
cert i f icates were exchanged for the stock of the Ame rican Suga r Re fining 
Company in Janua ry, 1 8 9 1 . Exc luding the dividend payable in t rust 
cert i f icates , the t rustees paid out a total of  $ 1 1 , 9 0 0 , 9 9 2  in dividends 
du ring 1 8 8 8 - 1 8 9 0 . 
1 0 1  
abil ity of  the t rust to run the few plants that rema ined in ope rat ion 
uninterrupted at full  capac ity for extended pe ri ods of t ime . q 6  
The manu facturing committee o f  the Ame rican S uga r Re f ining Company 
reported in 1 8 92 that the cost of  running a ref inery at one-ha l f  
c apacity inc reased p roduct ion costs by approximately 0 . 0 8  cents  pe r 
pound, while a t o t a l  st oppage o f  work entailed a loss of  a t  least 0 . 12 5  
cents pe r pound upon t he ent i re rema ining melt ing capacit y  o f  the plant . 
The forme r represented the increased cost pe r pound o f  actua l ly ref ining 
suga r that re sulted f rom running a ref inery at less t han full  capac ity, 
whi le t he latter represented the f ixed costs that had t o  be pa id whether 
t he f i rm ope rated o r  not . The combinac ion, insofa r a s  it  was able t o  
operate t he plants that it pe rmit ted to cont inue i n  operat ion 
unint e r rupted a t  full capac ity, thus had an advantage over both 
competitors and its cons t ituent f i rms ( i f ope rated as  independent 
ent it ies ) of approximately 0 . 2  cents per pound . 4 7 At t he t ime of the 
format ion of the t rust in 1 8 8 7 ,  this saving was equal to over one-
quarter of  the ma rgin bet ween raw and ref ined suga r .  
The economies rea l i zed by the concent rat ion o f  p roduct ion in a few 
f ac i l i t ies , and t he rationa l i zat ion of such product ion so t hat t he 
facilit ies that rema ined in operat ion were able t o  run a t  full  capac ity 
for extended pe riods , would not have been imposs ible had the t rust not 
a lso been able to gain cont rol over a la rge port ion of the indust ry' s 
capac ity to produce . c a Through the elimination of  excess  capacity,  and 
the coordina t ion and cont rol of a large pa rt of  the re fin ing capacity 
t hat was left int act , the t rust was able to ensure that output , rather 
46U . S .  I ndus t rial  Commiss ion Repo rt s ,  vol . 1 ,  pt . 2 ,  p .  1 1 0 . 
47Ha rdwick commit tee , Hearings , vol . 3 ,  p .  2 9 9 8 . Cited in Mu l l ins , 
p . 5 8 .  
48Fo r an exce l lent di scus sion o f  the details o f  t he economies that 
we re rea l i zed by the t rust ' s  apport ionment of  output among t he seve ra l 
ref ineries that we re le f t  in operat ion, and the monopsoni s t ic posit ion 
it  occupied with respect to its prima ry sou rce o f  raw materials ,  the 
Cuban Suga r growe r s ,  see Eichne r,  pp . 1 0 4 -1 1 4 . 
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than p r ices would adjust t o  maintain balance between demand and supply . 
The t rust was able t o  closely coordinate the level o f  output o f  ref ined 
suga r wit h ma rket demand . 49 The refore, the problem of inc reased levels 
of  investment in re fin ing facilit ies that inevitably re sulted wheneve r 
the margin rose above a particula r level , was great ly reduced; and the 
excess product ive capacity that the t rust had l a rge ly e l iminated t hrough 
its policy of plant c losure was for a t ime prevented f rom 
reappearing . so 
The Suga r Trust and the Governmen t 
The Suga r Ref ine ries Company became the subject of  intense 
gove rnment scrutiny a lmost immediately a fter its forma t ion . Disclosure 
o f  t he results o f  var ious state and federal invest igat ions into t he 
workings o f  t he t rust , such as those undertaken in 1 8 8 8  by the New York 
Senate ( the Arnold Commi ttee Investigat ion) , and t he United States House 
of  Representa t i ve s '  Commit tee on Manufactures ( Report on Trust s ) ,  
� 9Alf red Eichner dis cove red that each ref inery had t o  f ile a daily 
repo rt showing its pu rchases of  raw suga r ,  its  da ily outturn, its sale 
o f  ref i ned s uga r ,  and the prices it paid o r  cha rged . Auditors we re 
periodical ly sent a round to ensure the accuracy o f  the repor ts .  On the 
bas i s  of these repo rt s ,  the t rustees set general policy, and were able 
to monitor the per formance of the corporate o f f icers insta l led by t hem 
in adhering to such policy . See Eichner,  p .  1 0 5 . 
�0By 1 8 8 8 ,  it wa s est imated that the t rust had ga ined control over 
at leas t  seventy pe rcent of the domest ic suga r ref ining capacity . In 
the f i ve years prior to the format ion of  the t rust , the ave ra ge ma rgin 
between raw and re fined suga r averaged 0 . 8 53  cents pe r pound, whi le in 
the five yea rs that followed , t he average ma rgin was 1 . 0 1  cen t s  per 
pound . During the two years immediate ly fol lowing the f o rmat ion o f  the 
t rust , t he price of  re f ined suga r advanced by approximately seventeen 
percent , as t he t rust implemented its pol icy of plant c losure and 
consol idat ion ; and the close overs ight of  those f ac i l i t ies that  rema ined 
in opera t ion . Appa rent ly,  the t rust set the leve l  of output s l ight l y  
t oo low,  a s  t h e  high ma rgins that prevai led dur ing 1 8 8 8 - 1 8 8 9  encouraged 
a f l u r ry o f  new investment in ref ining facilit ies , and gave r i se t o  
renewed competit ion du ring 1 8 9 0-1 8 9 1 . See Eichne r ,  p .  1 1 3 ,  p .  1 1 8 ,  and 
Mul l ins , pp . 1 2 - 1 3 ,  p .  5 4 . 
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eventual l y  resulted in judicial act ion aga inst the Suga r Ref iner ies 
Company and the North River Suga r Refining Company . 5 1 
A suit a l leged by the New York At to rney General  origina lly sought 
to f orce the forfeit of  the charter of  the No rth River company on t he 
g rounds that it  had " usu rped and abused" its corporate f ranchise by 
surrender ing its  autonomy t o  another agent ; and t o  dissolve t he boa rd of  
t rustees for  unde rmining corporate f ranchises without t he lega l right t o  
do so . 52 The origina l decis ion, handed down i n  t h e  New Yo rk State 
Supreme Court , o rde red the revocat ion of  the North Rive r company ' s 
corporate charter on the g rounds that the provis ions o f  the deed t ha t  
t ied t he North River company to the t rust were i l lega l ,  and t hat the 
t rusts behavior const ituted an un reasonable res t raint of  t rade " wh ich 
tended to b reed monopoly . " 53 
The decis ion was immediately appealed by the defendant s ,  with both 
s ides bas ing the i r  a rguments on broade r issues t han those conta i ned in 
the o rigina � suit . Wh ile the pla inti ffs pointed t o  t he soc ial  evi ls 
t hat we re p resumed to be associated with the monopol i s t ic pract ices in 
which t he t rust wa s a l leged to have engaged, the a t to rney for  t he 
appe llant s ,  John P a rsons , laid pa rt icula r emphas i s  on t he t rusts socia l 
des i rabil it y ,  using both economic reason ing and h i storical precedent to 
support his case . � 4  
On June , 2 4 ,  1 8 9 0 ,  the New York State Cou rt o f  Appeals , though 
f inding on beha l f  of the plaint i f f ,  a f f i rmed the decis ion o f  the lowe r 
court on much nar rowe r grounds : that unde r New York State common law,  
51Mul l ins , pp . 6 0 - 6 1 . Ne ither invest igation generated any 
conclusi ve f indings . The i r  ma jor impact wa s confined t o  ma king t he 
public and other gove rnment agencies more aware o f  t he extent o f  t he 
t rust ' s  i n f luence , thus paving the way for subsequent legal and 
legislat i ve act ion aga inst the t rust . 
52Eichne r ,  p .  1 2 0 ;  Mu l l ins , pp . 62-63 . 
53Mu l l in s ,  p .  63 . 
54Eichne r ,  p .  1 4 5 . 
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separate and independent corporat ions were prohibited f rom engaging in 
pa rtnerships " whether directly,  o r  i ndirect ly through t he medium of a 
t rus t . " 5 5  The court refused t o  rule on t he quest ions o f  competit i on ,  
monopoly,  rest raint o f  t rade o r  i ssues o f  poli t ical economy . s' 
Fol lowing the o riginal disposit ion o f  t he case by the New York 
Supreme Cou rt in 1 8 8 9 ,  the t rust began t o  make a rrangement s to remove 
its  a f fa i rs f rom the sc rut iny of t he o f f icers o f  that state . During t he 
Spring o f  1 8 8 9  provis ions were made t o  t ransfer t he t rusts assets t o  a 
Connecticut corporation,  The Commonwealth Ref in ing Company, a charter 
having short ly before then been secured f rom the Connect icut legi s lature 
by the t rustees for just such a pu rpose . The rece ive r  appo inted by the 
state of New York for the No rth Rive r compa ny, Henry W .  Gray, fea r ing 
that the t rust would t ransfer the assets of the North River company to 
t he Connect icut corporat ion, obtained an inj unct ion en j oi ning the t rust 
f rom " t rans ferr ing assets or di spos ing of  prope rty through the payment 
of dividends o r  in any other way . .. s, 
The Suga r T rus t ,  as it was o rgani zed in 1 8 9 0 ,  was clearly i l legal 
unde r t he North Rive r decision . 58 On t he other hand, due t o  the 
in j unct i on tha t  prohibited it from divest ing itself of  t he assets it  
cont rol led, it was not permi tted to recreate itse l f  ir, any other form .  
The on ly alternat ive that immediately presented itself  was for  the 
authorit ies to void the charters of the other New York re f i ning 
compan ie s ,  sel l  t he i r  assets for whatever they would bring ,  dis t r ibute 
t he p roceeds to the cert i f icate holde rs ,  and hope that a new refin ing 
i ndustry would eventually emerge . Due t o  the potent ia l ly serious 
rami ficat ions o f  such a course of  act ion for the cert i f icate holders and 
� 5E ichner ,  pp . 1 4 5- 1 4 6 . 
s'Mu l l in s , p .  6 4 . 
57Mul lins , p .  6 5 . 
s8This a rgument follows Eichner ,  pp . 1 4 7-1 4 8 . 
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for  employment in the New Yo rk suga r ref ining indus t ry,  another scheme 
was hatched by the authorities . It wa s sugge sted t o  the t rustees that , 
should t hey agree t o  reo rga nize the individua l corporat ions t hey 
cont rol led under a s ingle corpo rat ion cha rtered by t he State of New 
York , the state might be willing to l ift the in j unct i on that was tying 
up the assets o f  the t rust . The t rust thus set about negot iat ing the 
other serious suits they we re fac ing and working t owa rds establ i sh ing 
themse lves as  a legal corpo rat ion in the state of New Yor k . $' 
A number of  factors caused the t rust to abandon the scheme 
proposed by the New York authorities in favor o f  reorga n i z a t ion a s  a New 
Jersey corpora t ion . New Jersey had revised its  gene ra l laws in 1 8 8 8  to  
permit one corporat ion chartered in that state t o  purcha se and own stock 
in corporat ions chartered in other states th rough the use of stock 
speci a l l y  issued for that purpose . New Jersey co rporat ions were not 
requ i red to disc lose f i nanc ial informat ion to the pub l ic o r  to t he i r  
compe t itors , only to the i r  own st ockholders . Furthermo re , New Jersey' s 
tax rate on corpo rate f ranchises was lowe r than that o f  New Yor k ,  and 
the state was pe rce ived as be ing generally more f riendly t owa rd 
bus i ness . 60 
Financial History of the Sugar Refining Industry, 18 9 1- 1 9 0 5  
The Forma t i on of the Ameri can Suga r Refin ing Company 
On Janua ry 1 0 ,  1 8 9 1 ,  the Ame rican Suga r Re f i ning Company was 
incorpo rated in the state of New Je rsey . Except f o r  i t s  new legal form, 
s'ouring the t ime between the final di spos it ion of the Nort h Rive r  
Case by t he New York Court of  Appeals and the incorpo rat ion o f  t he 
Ame rican Suga r Refin ing Compa ny in January,  1 8 9 1 ,  the t rust was involved 
in a runn ing lega l ba tt le both with receive r Gray, and with seve ral 
g roups of  cert i f icate holde rs who sought to eithe r  have the t rust 
dissolved o r  cease and desist in its plan o f  reorganizat ion . See 
Mu l lins , pp . 65-7 0 ,  and Eichner pp . 1 4 6- 1 4 8 ,  for an excel lent and 
thorough discuss ion of these lega l ma neuve rings . 
60Mul l ins , p .  6 9 . 
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t he combinat ion itself was initially unchanged . Henry o .  Havemeye r ' s 
response , when as ked wha t the change f rom t he S uga r Re f ine r ies Company 
to the Ame rican Suga r Re fining Company amounted to,  was reported to have 
replied,  "We l l , f rom be ing i l legal as we we re , we a re now lega l as  we 
a re ;  change enough , is n ' t it . " 61 Despite the s imi l a r it ies between t he 
two organizations , the holding-ope rat ing company form a dopted by t he 
Suga r Ref ineries Company in its reorganization as  a New Jersey 
corporation enabled it to st rengthen its cont rol ove r  t he f i rms which 
had earlie r  been cons ol idated under the t rust . Fu rthermore, t hrough the 
holding company provi sions of the revised New Je rsey corpo rate statutes , 
t he consol idat ion ' s  abi li ty to directly exchange i t s  stock for  the stock 
of  p reviously independent corporat ions made it easier for it t o  extend 
its infl uence t h roughout the rema inde r of  the indust ry .  
As its  plan for  reo rganizat ion from t rust t o  co rporat ion began t o  
t ake shape during t he summe r of 1 8 90 the t rus tees began t o  t ake ce rtain 
steps to facilitate the exchange of  stock in the new corporat ion for  
t rust cert i f icates . They a l so took measures that would enable t he new 
corpo rat ion to establish direct cont rol ove r the assets  of t he 
individual re fining compa nies,  which had previous ly been owned 
indirect l y  by the boa rd of t rustees t hrough the owne rship o f  the stock 
of the va rious conso l ida ted corporations . As was t rue of the formation 
of the t rust , the reorganization of the t rust as  a New Je rsey 
corporation was executed by way of t he direct exchange of f inancia l 
asset s . No debt was incurred by the new consolidat ion in the 
reo rganizat ion , no r ,  as ide f rom discharging the re lat ive ly sma l l  expanse 
incurred du ring reorganizat ion, wa s money used in the exchange of stock 
for t rust cert ificates . 62 
61Louisi ana P lanter 35 (November ,  4 ,  1 9 0 5 ) : 3 0 1 . 
62Although each cert i f icate holde r  was to rece ive f ive per cent o f  
the va lue o f  t he i r  cert i f icates in cash , this should n o t  b e  considered 
an expense of reorgan iz at ion ,  as it was compensat ion for dividends t ha t  
had been withheld du r ing the l a s t  t wo quarters of  1 8 9 0  due t o  the legal 
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In August , 1 8 9 0 ,  t he Central Trust Company o f  New Yo rk,  act ing on 
behal f  of t he reo rganizat ion committee appointed by the t rust ,  announced 
its  readines s  to exchange its cert i f icates o f  deposit for  t hose o f  t he 
Sugar Ref ine ries Company . Each cert i ficate depos ited was t o  be counted 
as  a vote for approva l of the proposed plan o f  reorganizat ion . In 
addit ion to act ing as  receiver of the ce rt i f icates , the Central  Trust 
Company wa s to receive and disburse dividends on the cert i ficates 
depos ited with it , and pay them to t hose who he ld its  cert i ficates o f  
deposi t . The reorganizat ion commit tee wa s given the authority by the 
board to " wind up" the a f fa i rs of  the t rust , and reconstitute it  
according t o  New Jersey law once the proposed plan o f  reorganizat ion was 
approved by a ma jority of cert if icate holders . The reorganizat ion 
commit tee was a lso g iven the powe r to o f f icially vote those cert i f icates 
wh ich had been deposited with the t rust company by those i n  favo r  of  the 
proposed plan of  reorganizat ion, and by December ,  1 8 9 0 ,  ove r $ 4 5  million 
had been deposited there . 63 
Meanwhile,  t he investment banking f i rm of  Kidder ,  Peabody and 
Company, wh ich was a lso represented on the reorganiza t ion committee,  
enlisted the se rvices o f  the London account ing f i rm o f  De loit t e ,  Deve r ,  
G r i f f iths & Co . to  examine the trust ' s books for t he pe riod f rom 
Octobe r ,  1 ,  1 8 8 7 ,  to Septembe r ,  1 ,  1 8 9 0 . The t rust ' s f inanc ial a f fa i rs ,  
which had a lways been shrouded in sec recy ,  were thus brought i n  t o  the 
dif f icult ies surrounding t he planned reorganizat ion . The actua l expense 
of t he reorgan izat ion amounted to $82 7 , 2 5 0 ;  $ 7 7 , 2 50 of which wa s given 
t o  John P a rsons and $75 0 , 0 0 0  to Kidde r ,  Peabody & Co . It i s  not clear 
whether the two pa rt ies named above rece ived stock o r  cash for  se rvices 
rendered du ring the reorganization . For more on the actual f inancing of  
the new conso lida t ion , see Ha rdw ick Committee , Hea rings , p .  2 4 8 . 
63Commercial & Financial  Chronicle 5 1  (August 2 3 ,  1 8 9 0 ) : 2 4 1 ;  
(Decembe r 2 0 ,  1 8 9 0 ) , 8 7 7 . The reorganizat ion commit tee wa s comp r ised of  
Theodore A.  Havemeye r ,  John E .  Searles J r . ,  J .  B .  Thoma s ,  J .  A .  
Stursbe rg ,  t he Centra l  Trust Company and Kidder ,  Peabody & Co . .  For a l l  
pract ical purpose s ,  f u l l  cont rol of  the reorgani zat i on wa s given t o  the 
latter t wo f i rms , as  each possessed the power t o  vet o  a l l  act ions 
ca r ried by a ma j o r i t y  vote of  the committee . Commercial and F inancial 
Chronic le 5 1  ( August 2 3 ,  1 8 9 0 ) : 2 4 4 . 
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open to a l lay the fea rs o f  ce rtif icate holders who we re suspicious o f  
t he intent o f  t h e  t rustees i n  promulgat ing t he reorgan i za t ion plan . 
The statement submit ted by t he account ing f i rm retained by Kidde r ,  
Peabody & Co . det a i led the f inancial condit ion o f  t h e  corpora t ions 
cont rol led by the t rust as  o f  September ,  1,  1 8 9 0 . 64 The assets o f  the 
membe r corporat ions (exc luding plant , equipment and rea l estate)  
total led $2 0 , 5 3 7 , 8 3 6 ,  o f  which ove r $ 8  mi llion cons isted o f  cash . The 
tot a l  liabi l i t ies of the member corporations ( exc luding the equity 
surrende red t o  t he t rust ) totaled $ 8 , 7 9 4 , 1 8 1 .  The excess o f  assets over 
l iabil i t ies totaled $ 1 1 , 7 4 3 , 6 5 4 ,  which understates t he t rue val ue o f  
equity in t h e  member corpo rations b y  t he va lue o f  t he plant , machinery 
and rea l estate owned by the membe r corpora t ions , s ince these were not 
accounted for in the report . Assuming that the actua l va lue o f  the 
fixed phys ical assets owned by the membe r co rpo rat ions was at least $20 
mil l ion as  est imated be low, the tangible assets that the successor t o  
t he t rust st ood t o  acquire through the planned reorganizat ion we re worth 
s l ight ly ove r  $ 4 0  mi l l ion . e 
64Mul l ins , pp . 7 0-7 1 ,  makes severa l observat ions concerning t he 
a ccountant ' s  report that a re incorrect . The inaccuracies a l l  derive 
f rom his fai lure t o  cons ider the precise nature o f  the relat ionsh ip 
bet ween the Sugar Re f ine ries Company and the cons ol ida ted corporat ions . 
The ba lance sheet presented by the account ing f i rm in no way describes 
the financial condit ion of the t rust , nor can it be used to generate 
infe rences regarding the f inanc ial  behavior o f  the t rust . The t rust 
neither owned prope rty, nor did it have the powe r to borrow for the 
membe r corpo rat ions . The statement presented by the account ing f i rm 
cou ld not apply to the t rust s ince it cont a ins ent r ies corresponding t o  
t he ownership of phys ica l assets and the is suance o f  l iabi l it ies t h rough 
borrowing . 
6�Excluding the Western Suga r Ref ining Company ( wh ich leased t he 
re f ine ry it operated ) , t he corporat ions cont rol led by the t rust had a 
da ily re fining capac ity o f  at least 2 6 , 0 0 0  ba rrels  ( 8 , 6 6 6 , 5 8 0  lbs . )  in  
1 8 9 0  (Mu l l ins , p .  8 8 ) . According t o  Claus Dosche r ,  a re finery out f it ted 
with a l l  the necessary accout rements having a da ily re f ining capacity of 
one mi l l ion pounds could be const ructed for $ 1 . 5  mi l l ion . H .  0 .  
Havemeyer ,  when quest ioned about the va lues o f  the plant s owned by the 
corporat ions which entered the trust , thought this f igure too low . 
Another est imate,  by a membe r o f  the Arbuckle Bros . f i rm, places the 
f igure a t  $ 2  mil l ion, exclus ive o f  rea l  estate . $2 mi l lion dol l a rs 
seems a reasonable lower bound est imate per one mi l l ion pounds ref i ning 
capacity,  mak ing the va lue o f  plant and equipment owned by the 
corporat ions that the American Suga r Company was about t o  acqu i re wo rth 
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The plan of  reorga nizat ion st ated that the new corporation would 
be capita l i zed at $50 mi l l ion, cons ist ing of  $ 2 5  mi l l ion in seven per 
cent cumulat ive prefe rred stock and $25 mi l l ion in common s t ock . Each 
Cent ra l Trust Company cert i f icate of was to be exchanged sha re for share 
for s tock in the new corporat ion, one h a l f  of  which would be in 
preferred sha res , and one half  in common sha res . In addit ion each 
Central Trust Company cert i f icate holde r was t o  receive f ive percent o f  
the value of  his  cert i f icates i n  cash as  compensat ion for  dividends that 
had been withheld on the t rust cert i f icates pending the consumma t ion of 
t he reo rganizat ion . 66 The new corporat ion was also given the authority 
to is sue f i rst mortgage bonds in the amount o f  $ 1 0  mi l l ion a t  the 
discret ion o f  the di rectors . 67  
Alt hough the new co rporat ion was pe rmit ted by New Je rsey law to 
act as  a ho lding company, issu ing it own stock in exchange for the stock 
o f  other compa nies , the plan of  reorganizat ion proposed that t he New 
Jersey corporat ion wou ld actually t a ke t it le to " t he . . .  propert ies 
represented by t he ce rt i f icates of the Suga r Ref ine ries Company . " 68 
The S uga r Ref ineries Corporat ion went into receive rship on Novembe r 1 1 ,  
1 8 9 0 ,  a fter a group o f  minority cert i ficate ho lde rs obtained an 
injunct ion to re stra in the t rust f rom proceeding with the proposed plan 
of  reo rganizat ion and t ransferring the as set s cont rol l �d by the t rust to 
anot he r corpora t ion . Under the rece ivership agreement o rde red by Judge 
at least $ 1 7  mi l l ion ,  exclus ive of  real estate , which , for prime 
waterfront locat ions , would p robably increase the figu re t o  about $ 2 0  
mil l ion . At the end o f  1 8 9 1 ,  t he fixed assets o f  the Ame rican Suga r 
Ref ining Company were car ried on its  books at $ 4 1 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . See t he 
Comme rcial  and Financ i a l  Chronicle, Investors Supplement 54 ( January, 
1 8 92 ) : 1 4 2 ; U . S .  Indus t r i a l  Commi ssion Repo rt s ,  vol . 1 ,  pt . 2 ,  pp . 9 1 -
1 3 9 .  
6 1 0 . 
6 1 0 . 
6 1 0 . 
66Commercial and Financ i a l  Chronicle 51  ( November 1 ,  1 8 9 0 ) : 6 0 9-
67Commercial and F inanc ial Ch ronicle 5 1  (Novembe r 1 ,  1 8 9 0 ) : 6 0 9-
68Commercial and Financial  Chronicle 5 1  ( Novembe r 1 ,  1 8 9 0 )  : 6 0 9-
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P ra t t  o f  the New York Supreme Cou rt in Brooklyn, a l l  the t rust ' s assets 
( the stock 0f  the consol idated companies ) and all pending suits f i led by 
t rust cert i f icate holders concern ing the planned reorganizat ion were to 
be turned over t o  General Hen ry W .  Slocum, Stephen V.  White , and Henry 
0 .  Havemeye r .  The corporat ions that were consol idated unde r the t rust 
were permitted t o  continue in bus ines s ,  but the t rustee s ,  once having 
lost cont rol of the stock of the consolidated companies , we re st ripped 
of t he i r  power . 69 
Meanwh ile,  on Novembe r 1 5 ,  Judge P ratt ' s  decis ion prohibit ing t he 
reorgani zat ion commit tee f rom proceeding with t he i r  pl3n was reve rsed . 
When i n  early Janua ry, 1 8 9 0 ,  it became plain f rom t he number o f  
certi ficates that had been deposited with the Central  Trust Company that 
a solid ma jority o f  cert i f icate holde rs favored the proposed plan o f  
reo rganizat ion, the minority cert i f icate holders who had init ially 
opposed the pl anned reorganizat ion withdrew their oppos it ion . 70 The 
t rustees then pet itioned the New York Supreme Cou rt to discontinue the 
receivership and to a l l ow the reo rganizat ion to be completed . On 
Janua ry , 1 0 ,  1 8 9 0 ,  their  plea was granted, the recei ve rs discha rged and 
the Amer ican Suga r Re f in ing Company formed under New Jersey law t o  take 
ove r  the assets o f  the t rust . 
Although the stock o f  the American Suga r Re fining Company was 
exchanged as  planned for the cert ificates of  t he Suga r Re f ine ries 
Company, the new co rporation ' s assets did not cons ist  of the stock of 
the consol ida ted companies,  as had been t rue of  t he t rust , but rather 
the p roperty of the corporat ions that had p reviously been cont rol led by 
the t rust . Throughout the pe riod when the reorganizat ion was in 
progres s  t he t rust certi f icates had been submit ted by the i r  owners to 
the Cent ra l Trust Company . After the receivers we re dismissed, t he 
69Mu l l ins , p .  7 1  
70Eichne r ,  p .  1 5 1 . 
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t rust ce rt i f icates we re tu rned over to the reorganizat ion commit tee 
which became , in e f fect , the " owne rs " of the t rust . 11 The 
reorgani za t ion commi ttee thus occupied the same pos i t ion with rega rd to 
the consol ida ted corporations as the fo rme r owners of those corpo ra tions 
prior to having exchanged their  stock for the t rust certi f icates . 
P roceedings we re then begun to dissolve the corporat ions . The $ 1 0  
mi l lion f i rst mortgage bonds that the new consol ida t ion had been 
authori zed to issue we re given to the reo rganizat ion committee in 
exchange for the assets of the individual corporat ions . 72 The bonds , 
which t ook t he place of the property owned by the corpora t ions on each 
o f  their  ba lance sheet s ,  we re later retu rned t o  t he Ame r ican Suga r 
Re f ining Company and redeposited in its t reasury when the corporat ions 
we re dissolved by the reorganizat ion commit tee . 73 The p roperty which 
had thus been acqui red subsequent ly se rved to secu re the f i rst mortgage 
on t he unis sued $ 1 0  mi ll ion bonds , and represented the bulk o f  the 
assets aga inst which the conso l ida t ion ' s capi t a l  stock wa s subsequently 
is sued . 
7 1 Lexow Committee , Report , p .  1 0 4 . 
72Lexow Commi ttee , Report , p . 3 8 4 ;  Mul lins , p .  4 8 . This t ransact ion 
did not inc lude t rans fer of  the assets of  the Ame rican Suga r Re f inery 
Company of San Francisco, itself a holding company, which, though 
origina lly cont rol led by the t rust , had been t rans ferred in 1 8 8 9  to 
Henry and Theodo re Havemeye r and Cha rles Sen f f  to c i rcumvent a 
Cal i fornia Supreme Court decision which sought t o  dissolve t he t rust on 
t he same grounds as the North River dec i s ion . The stock in t he American 
wa s later t rans fe rred by the three men named above t o  the New Jersey 
corporation,  a l though in a di f ferent t ransact ion t han that for which t he 
bonds were used . 
73Robe rt R .  He i ke , tes t i fying be fore the Ha rdwic k Committee ,  gave a 
brief descript i on o f  the way in which the bonds were used t o  f a c i l it at e  
t he t ransfer of  property between the individual corpo ra t ions and t he 
consolidation,  but it is unclea r precisely how the t ransfer was 
accompl ished . I t  is clear, howeve r,  that the bonds we re never is sued, 
but me rely he ld in t rust un t i l  the corpora t ions we re divested of t he i r  
prope rty and formally  dissolved . For mo re on t he u s e  v f  t h e  bonds i n  
faci l itat ing the t ransfer of  prope rty f rom t he t rust t o  t h e  Ame rican 
Sugar Re fining Company, see Ha rdwick Commi ttee , Hea rings , pp . 1 8 4- 1 87 . 
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Financing the Consol i da t i on of Con t rol Over the Ameri can Suga r  Refining 
Indus t ry :  Overview 
The ba lance sheet f i led by the Ame r ican Suga r Re f ining Company 
after the i r  f i rst yea r  of operation shows the i r  capita� s t ock to have 
been a lmost completely absorbed by the acquisit ion of t he plant , 
equipment and intangible asset s of the co rpo rations that were forme r ly 
cont rolled by the Suga r Ref ineries Company . At t he end o f  1 8 9 1 ,  f ixed 
assets comprised over 80 percent of the company' s t ot a l  asset s ,  a f igure 
that wou ld steadily dec l ine t hrough 1 9 0 5 . 74 The prima ry purpose o f  the 
Amer ican Sugar Re fin ing Company, as  was a lso t rue o f  the trust , was t o  
rea l i ze a pos it ive ret urn on i t s  capitalization th rough its  abil i t y  t o  
coordinate investment and producti on within the sug a r  ref ining indust ry . 
I t s  abi l ity to e a rn a h igh rate o f  ret u rn on its capit a l  was only 
indi rect ly related t o  its ability to p roduce more e f f iciently or sell 
more output than its competitors . The Ame rican Suga r Re fining Company 
did not grow la rge and rema in profit able by bu i lding more facto ries , 
producing and sell ing mo re suga r than its competitors , and inc reas ing 
its ma rket sha re ; rather it inc rea sed its ma rket sha re ,  control led more 
factories and sold mo re suga r as a result of its growing la rge through 
the is suance and exchange of its stock for the property or equity of 
othe r suga r refin ing f i rms . The end towa rd which i nc reases in its 
capital  stock we re di rected was the acquisit ion and ma intenance o f  
control ove r st rategic sectors o f  t h e  re fining indust ry t hrough the 
c reat ion of a community of mut ua l f inancial  interest between previously 
independent re f ining establishments,  and the capit a l i z a t i on of the 
ea rnings which we re expected to be rea l i zed by the exe rc ise of such 
cont rol . Due to the la rge dividends it was cons istently able t o  pay on 
its  capital stock,  its  shares became a des i rable subst itute f o r  
74The va lue of t he Ame rican Suga r Re f ining Company ' s  fixed asset s ,  
as  represented o n  the i r  ba lance sheet , includes the capit a l i zed value o f  
the goodwill o f  the indi vidua l corporations , and thus overstates the 
value of the phys ica l property owned by the co rpo rat ion . 
1 1 3 
independent sugar refining p ropert ies in the port folios o f  those 
direc t ly involved in compet it ion with the consolida t ion . 
The holding-operat ing company form adopted by t he Ame r ican Sugar 
Re fining Company enabled it bot h to st rengt hen i t s  conc rol ove r  the 
properties that had earl ier been loose ly consol idated unde r the t rust , 
and which had later come t o  be owned out right by the New Jersey 
corporation,  and thereafter to extend its cont rol t hroughout t he 
indust ry t hrough the issuance and direct exchange o f  its  stock for 
property o r  control l ing interests in other f i rms . One o f  t he ma j o r  
f inanc i a l  advantages enj oyed b y  the company de rived f rom i t s  abi l i t y  to 
is sue its  own stock in di rect exchange for stock in othe r  corpora t ions . 
Rat her than issuing l iabi lit ies for cash c o  finance the product ion of 
goods o r  che const rucc ion o f  factories , the long term f inanc ing of the 
Amer ican Suga r Re f ining Company inc reas ingly came to involve the i ssue 
and d i rect exchange of i t s  equity for the secu rit ies cf f i rms in which 
the company wished to establish an interest . 
Between the t ime of the format ion of the Suga r T rust and its 
reorganizat ion a s  the Ame rican Suga r Re fining Company, the propo rt ion of 
the indust ry' s da i ly re f in ing capacity cont rol led by the conso l idat ion 
declined, whi le the da ily re f ining capacity of the independent 
ref ineries rose bot h absolutely and as a proport i on of total industry 
capacit y .  By Janua ry , 1 8 8 8 ,  the da ily refining capacity cont rolled by 
the t rust tota l led approximately 1 1 , 32 2 , 0 0 0  pounds , or about 75 pe rcent 
of the i ndust ry ' s total capacity . By January, 1 8 9 1 ,  t he da i ly re f ining 
capacity of the independent s had risen by about 5 4  percent , to  5 , 6 9 4 , 3 0 0  
pounds , giving t hem cont rol over 33 pe rcent of t ot a l  domestic suga r 
refining capacity . ' � Du r ing the same pe riod, the ma rgin between raw and 
ref ined suga r fell by about 37 pe rcent , f rom an ave rage o f  1 . 2 32 cents 
7sMul l ins , p .  8 5 ;  U . S .  Indust rial Commiss ion, Reports ,  vol . 1 ,  pt . 
1 ,  p .  6 0 . 
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per pound dur ing 1 8 8 8- 1 8 8 9  to  an ave rage of  . 7 7 4  cents pe r pound dur ing 
the following two years . ' 6  
The indust ry ' s return t o  condit ions which c losely approximated 
those o f  the h igh ly compet it ive period immediately prior t o  the 
forma t ion o f  t he t rust ,  however ,  was short l ived . By March , 1 8 9 2 ,  
s l ight ly ove r  one yea r  a fter the reorganizat ion o f  the t rust , The 
Ame rican Suga r Re f ining Company had established e f fect ive cont rol over 
at least 9 0  pe rcent o f  total domest ic suga r re f ining capacity . 77 At t he 
same t ime , t he proport ion of  its assets that consisted o f  plant , 
machinery and rea l estate decl ined f rom s l ight l y  over 8 0  percent t o  
about 5 5  percen t ,  as  i t s  total assets increa sed b y  ove r  5 0  percent to 
$ 7 5  mi l l ion . Alt hough the Amer ican Suga r Re f ining Company grew rapidly 
during the f i rst two yea r s of its l i fe,  and carne to extend its control 
ove r the industry to a degree never approached by the t rus t ,  it  did not 
do so by driv ing compet itors f rom the industry or  by actua l ly acqu i ring 
t he i r  fixed asset s . As was t rue of subsequent pe riods , the 
establishment o f  f inanc ial t ies among compet ing f i rms through the direct 
exchange of securit ies provided a surer way of increas ing earnings than 
by continuing t he st ruggle for  ma rket sha res through compet it ion . This 
a lso proved to be a less cumbersome , less expensive way of  a chieving 
coordinat ion th roughout the indust ry than could be a ccomplished through 
the actua l pu rchase of the tangible as set s of independent suga r 
re fine r ies . 
76Mul l ins , pp . 1 2 - 1 3 . The fall  in the ma rgin dur ing t he four years 
preceding the format ion of t he Ame r ican Suga r Re f ining Company resulted 
in pa rt f rom a depa rture by that company f rom its e a r ly st rategy o f  
re st rict ing output i n  order t o  ma intain ma rgins a t  a high leve l ,  during 
wh ich t ime the re f ine ries cont rol led by the t rust ope rated a t  bet ween 5 9  
and 6 8  pe rcent o f  total  capac ity . Dur ing 1 8 9 0 ,  t he t rust dec ided t o  
meet its  compet it ion by increas ing its output , result ing i n  lowe r  p rices 
for re f ined suga r ,  a lowe r  ma rgin and lowe r product ion by the 
independent companies . See Mul l ins , pp . 7 4 -7 5 .  
77Vogt , p .  4 8 . 
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A Hi s t ory of the Use of Corpora te S tock by the Ameri can Sugar Refining 
Company, 1 89 1 -1 9 0 1 : The Ext ensi on of Con t rol Over the Domest i c  Cane 
Suga r  Refining Indust ry 
F rom t he t ime o f  i t s  formation,  the t rust ' s most formidable 
compet itor had been Claus Spreckels of  Ca l i fornia . Spreckels had 
establi shed t he Cali fornia Suga r Refining Company in 1 8 67 ,  and later 
made his fortune through the establishment of  a raw suga r emp i re in 
Hawa i i . S ince 1 8 7 9 ,  Spreckels princ iple competitor on t he wes t  coast 
had been the Amer ican Sugar Re f ine ry Company of  San Francisco . While 
the Amer ican Suga r Re finery Company entered t he t rust in Janua ry, 1 8 8 9 ,  
the con so l idat ion was unsuccess ful i n  persuading Sprec kels t o  join . In 
a t tempt ing to b ring Sprecke ls into the t rust , John E .  Sea r les Jr . had 
made it c lear to Spreckels that , should he rema in adamant in his refusa l 
to join,  the t rust might have no a lternat ive but to engage him in 
" f ierce competit ion by buy ing the Ame rican . " n 
Spreckels did not take Sea rles ' threat serious l y ,  and was 
surp rised to lea rn in Februa ry , 1 8 8 9 ,  that the t rust had indeed st ruck 
an agreement with the Ame rican Re f ine ry . 79 Compet it ion bet ween the two 
Cali fornia refine ries began in earnest in Februa ry,  1 8 8 9 . While each 
s ide engaged in repeated attempt s to corner the raw suga r ma rket , the 
t rust sought to bring Spreckels to te rms by keeping prices low in the 
west , whi le ma intaining earn ings through the control of output in the 
east . Spreckels counte red by undertaking plans t o  const ruct a large , 
modern re f ine ry in Philade lphia,  th rough which he could force the t rust 
t o  sell  the i r  output at below cos t ,  the reby forcing t hem t o  incur l a rger 
losses t han he , s ince the t rust ' s volume of  sales in the east was much 
'8Eichne r ,  p .  9 1 . 
79The owne rs of  t he Ame rican Re fine ry, un like Spreckel s ,  we re eager 
to j o in the t rust , having t i red of the three yea r  p rice wa r they had 
been invo lved in with the la rge r Ca l i fornia Suga r Ref ining Company . 
They we re also a fraid that Sprecke ls wou ld come t o  t e rms with t he t rust 
f irst , t hus depriving them of  t he advantages t hey had i n  negot iat ing 
with the t rust . In January,  1 8 8 8 ,  the Ame rican ' s owners surrendered 
t he i r  capi t a l  stock to t he t rust for $ 1 . 5  mi l l i on in cert i f icates . See 
Eichne r ,  pp . 9 0 - 9 2 . 
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larger . 80 Sprecke l s '  Phil ade lphia factory, with a da i l y  re f in ing 
capacity of 2 mi llion pounds , underwent const ruct ion du ring 1 8 8 8 - 1 8 8 9 ,  
commenced operat i ons in December ,  1 8 8 9 ,  and was incorporated in 
Februa ry,  1 8 9 0 ,  with a capital izat ion of $5 mil lion . 8 : Meanwh i le ,  the 
t rust , and the othe r Philadelphia re f ine ries that had rema ined 
independent , found themselves in an increasingly prec a r ious pos it ion due 
to sha rp decreases in t he price of refined suga r that followed t he 
opening o f  Spreckel s '  Philadelphia ref inery . 82 
Short ly a fter the t rust was reorganized as  t he Ame rican Suga r 
Ref ining Company, John E .  Sea rles and Henry 0 .  Havemeyer init iated a 
meet ing with Claus Sp rec kels in an attempt to resolve the price war 
bet ween Sprecke l s '  Pennsylvania and Ca l i f o rnia companies and the 
conso l idat ion . Out o f  that meeting came an a rrangement whereby t he two 
part ies agreed to a consol idat ion of their  respect ive interests on the 
west coast , and the es tablishment of joint ownership c•;e r Spreckel s '  
p rope rty i n  the east . Short ly thereafter,  the Amer ican Suga r Refining 
Company was able to consolida te its pos it ion in both ma rkets by gaining 
pa rtial  control of  the weste rn cons olidation formed by Sea r le s ,  
Havemeye r and Sprecke l s ,  and eventua lly,  f u l l  cont rol ove r  Sprecke l s '  
Phi ladelph ia refine ry . 
80Mul l ins , p .  8 0 . 
8 1Mul l i ns , p .  8 0 . 
82There we re th ree independent suga r re f ine ries in the Philadelphia 
a rea in 1 8 9 0 . The Frank lin Suga r Re fining Co . ,  formerly Harrison,  
Fra z ier & Co . ,  wa s incorporated in 1 8 90 and had a da ily ref ining 
capacity in 1 8 8 8  o f  1 . 9  mi l l ion pounds , making it  t he la rgest 
Philade lphia re f inery at the t ime the t rust wa s f ormed . Cha rles 
Harrison, the f i rm' s owne r ,  had recently purchased the Henry and 
Theodo re Havemeyer' s sha re in his bus iness ,  and fea red once aga in 
f a l l ing unde r their inf luence should he j o in the t rust . E .  C .  Knight & 
Co . ,  a sma l ler Phi lade lphia f i rm, refused t o  accept t rust cert i f icates 
in exchange for its capi tal s tock, and the t rust was unwi l l ing t o  pay 
him in cash as long as Harrison, Fra z ier & Co . remai ned outs ide t he 
combinat ion . The last independent Philadelphia ref ine ry,  the Delawa re 
Sugar  House ,  had a da ily re fining capacity o f  only 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  pounds and 
did not sell its product out s ide the Phi ladelph ia a rea . See Eichner,  
pp . 7 0 - 8 0  for  more on  the Phil ade lphia sugar refin i ng indust ry . 
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The Western Sugar Ref ining Company, a holding company capit a l i zed 
at $2 mil l ion,  was cha rtered on Ma rch , 2 5 ,  1 8 9 1 ,  to br ing an end to t he 
competit ion between the Ame rican Suga r Ref inery Compa ny o f  San F rancisco 
and Sprecke l s '  Ca l i fo rnia Sugar Ref ine ry . 83 Act ing on beha l f  of the 
Ame rican Suga r Refin ing Company in the t ransact ion , but unbeknownst t o  
t he company ' s  other directors,  were H .  o .  Havemeye r ,  T .  A .  Havemeye r and 
John Sea r le s ,  operat ing through the agency of  the pa rtne rship o f  
Havemeye r & Elde r . "  Unde r the agreement reached by both pa rt ies , 
Havemeyer & E lder and Spreckels were each to t ake ha l f  of  t he holding 
company s tock , which wa s given to both pa r t ies for no cons iderat ion . 8� 
Of the f i ve corpo rate directors requ i red by Ca l i fo rnia law,  t wo were 
supposed to be appo inted by each party ,  whi le the f i fth wa s to remain 
neut ral . The holding company was to lease and operate both the 
Cal i fornia re f ine rie s ,  which would cont inue to be owned by Havemeyer & 
E lder and Sprecke l s ,  a lthough short ly a fter the holding company 
commenced ope rat ions it di rected that the sma l l e r ,  less modern American 
re f inery be closed . Soon a f ter t he dea l  was st ruck,  Havemeyer & E lder 
sold the i r  Western Suga r Re f ining Company Stock to the American Suga r 
Ref ining Company a long with complete ownership o f  the American Sugar 
Re f inery in San F rancisco , receiving $1 mi l l ion for the stock and 
$ 1 , 8 1 2 , 3 1 6 . 5 9 for t he re fi nery . 86 
83Mu l lins , p .  8 2 . In response t o  a suit initiated by the State o f  
California against the Suga r Refineries Company in 1 8 8 9 ,  which sought 
its dissolut ion on the same grounds as  the North River case,  the 
t rustees had t a ken the preca ut ion of  t ransferr ing the stock of t he 
Ame r ican Suga r Re f ine ry Company t o  Hen ry 0 .  Ha vemeye r ,  Theodore A .  
Havemeyer and Cha rles H .  Senf f ,  who carried on its  bus iness on t he i r  own 
account , in cooperat ion with the t rust , as pa rtners under t he name of  
Havemeyer & E lder . For the sake of  cont inuity, I cont inue t o  refe r to 
the f i rm as  t he " American Suga r Ref inery Company . "  
84Mul l in s ,  p .  8 3 . 
8 �Commercial and Financ ial Chronicle 52 (April 4 ,  1 8 9 1 ) : 5 3 5 . 
86Mu l l ins , p .  82 . This t ransact ion wa s unusual in that it  was one 
o f  the few ;_nstances that the Ame rican Suga r Re fining Company paid cash 
t o  a cqu i re an interest in another f i rm .  I t  should be noted that t he 
individuals  t o  whom the cash was paid we re o f f icers in the company ( H . 
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At t he t ime o f  the American Suga r Refining Company ' s a cqu i s i t ion 
o f  a one-ha l f  interest in the We stern Suga r Re fining Compa ny, its 
capit a l izat ion had yet to be inc rea sed beyond the leve l that existed a t  
t h e  t ime of  its  f o rmat ion . Of its o rigina l $ 5 0  mi l li on capita l i zat ion 
$ 4 9 , 2 72 , 2 0 0  wa s exchanged for the t rust cert i f ica tes , and $727 , 8 0 0  was 
ret urned to t he company ' s  t reasury, a long with accumu lated dividends , to 
be used for " the pu rcha se o f  addit iona l  property . " 8' The company' s 
assets a t  t he t ime of  its  forma t ion cons isted chiefly o f  the plant , 
equipment ,  rea l  estate and goodwill  acqu i red f rom t he corporat ions that 
were consol idated unde r the Suga r Ref ine ries Company . At t he end of its 
f i rst yea r  of  operat ion s ,  the Ame rican Suga r Re fin ing Company ' s  holdings 
in other companies , inc luding its sha re in the Wes t e rn Sugar Ref ining 
Company, amounted to only $ 3 , 55 8 , 2 8 8 ,  or s l ight ly over 7 pe rcent o f  
total  assets . 88 
The capital  stock of the American Suga r Refin ing Company was 
increased by $25  mi l l ion, half  pre ferred and half  common , in January,  
1 8 92 ,  in o rde r " t o  acqu i re other refinery propert ies , o r  to build, as  
the directors may determine . " 89 The company' s  o f f ice rs,  howeve r ,  had no 
intent i on o f  us ing t he proceeds from the sale o f  the new stock t o  expand 
their p roduct ive capac ity . At t he same t ime that a dea l  had been st ruck 
to l imit competit ion in Ca l i fornia between Sprecke l s  and t he Amer ican 
Sugar Ref inery, a s imi l a r  agreement was reached with Spreckels to 
resolve the pr ice wa r in the east . Ostens ibly act ing on beha l f  o f  t he 
pa rtnership of  Ha vemeye r & E lde r, Hen ry 0 .  and Theodo re A .  Havemeye r ,  
and John Sea r les had acqui red 4 5  pe rcent o f  the stock o f  t he Spreckel s  
0 .  Havemeyer wa s pres ident and John E .  Sea rles was secretary)  during 
1 8 9 1 . The exchange wa s f inanced through l iquida t ion o f  s ome t he quick 
assets that were acqui red from the t rust by t he Ame rican S uga r Ref in ing 
Company . 
8'Commercial and Financ ial Chron icle 5 4  ( Janua ry 1 6 ,  1 8 92 ) : 1 1 9 . 
88Commercial and Financ ial Ch ronicle 5 4  (Janua ry 1 6 ,  1 8 9 2 ) : 1 1 9 . 
8'Commerc i a l  and Financ ial Chronicle 5 4  (Janua ry 1 6 ,  1 8 92 ) : 1 1 9 . 
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Suga r Re fin ing Company in Philadelphia for $2 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0  in c as h . 90 
Meanwhile,  negot iat ions we re initiated in late 1 8 9 1  bet ween 
rep resent atives of the Ame rican Sugar Re f ining Company and the other 
Philadelphia ref ine rs , while the consolidation continued to negot iate 
with Spreckels for full cont rol o f  his Phi lade lphia ref inery . In March, 
1 8 92 ,  a fter  ove r  two yea rs of  bitter competit ion , f o rma l agreements were 
reached with Spreckels and the other independent Philadelph ia re fineries 
to t rans fer complete cont rol of the i r  fi rms to the Ame rican Sugar 
Refining Company . 9 : 
In  accordance with Pennsylvania law, the Philadelphia corporat ions 
remained int act , and in each case a po rt ion of  the new stock issue o f  
t he Ame rican Suga r Re fin ing Company wa s exchanged d i rect ly for t he stock 
of  t he acqui red f i rm . '' The Delawa re Suga r House , t he sma l lest o f  t he 
Philade lphia concerns ,  t rans fer red its  ent i re capi t a l  stock t o  the 
American Suga r Ref ining Company in exchange for $ 5 1 1 , 0 0 0 ,  ha l f  common 
and h a l f  pre f e r red, of the latter company ' s  stock . E .  C .  Knight & Co . ,  
a pa rtnership owned completely by E .  C .  Knight and his  son,  exchanged 
the i r  capital  stock for $ 2 , 0 5 0 , 0 0 0  in equal po rt ions of common and 
preferred sha res of Ame ri can Suga r Refin ing Company stock . The F ranklin 
Suga r Re fin ing Compa ny wa s sold to the Ame rican Suga r  Ref ining Company 
in exchange for $ 1 0  mi llion in equal po rtions of common and pre f e r red 
stock,  twice t he va lue of  the forme r company' s stated capita l i za t ion o f  
$ 5  mi l l ion . S ince Cha rles c .  Harrison , the pres ident of  the company, 
was not wi l l ing to take the ent i re amount in stoc k  that  wa s t hen sell ing 
90Mu l l in s ,  p .  8 3 . The other directors we re not informed o f  this 
t ransact ion unt i l  somet ime in Octobe r ,  1 8 9 1 . The di rectors probably 
authori zed the i ssue of  the addit iona l $ 2 5  mi l l ion in stock to acqu i re 
the other Philade lphia refine ries and compensate Searles and the 
Havemeye rs for t he i r  investment in the Spreckels company once they 
lea rned that Spreckels had decided to come to terms with the 
consolidat ion on bot h the east and west coast s . 
91Mu l l i n s ,  p .  8 6 . 
92Eichne r ,  p .  1 4 7 . Unde r Pennsylvania law no out of  state 
corporat ion could hold rea l prope rty in that stat e . 
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for  about $ 8 0  for t he common and $ 9 3  for the preferred, and s ince it  was 
i l lega l for the American Suga r Ref in ing Company to buy back its own 
stock,  Henry 0 .  Havemeye r promised to purchase h a l f  of Harrison ' s 
Ame rican Suga r Re f in ing Company holdings for $ 4  mi l l ion cash on his own 
account . � 
The bul k  o f  the rema inder of  t he new stock issue authori zed by the 
Ame rican Suga r Re f ining Company' s  shareholders went for the acqu i s it ion 
of Spreckel s '  rema ining inte rest in his Phi ladelph ia ref inery, and as 
compensat ion for the minority interest that was earlier a cqu i red by 
Searles and the Havemeye r ' s .  Spreckels himse l f  rece ived $ 5 . 5  mi l l ion,  
hal f  in common and hal f in preferred, of  American Suga r Ref ining Company 
stock for his remaining $2 . 7 5 mi llion inte rest in the Phi lade lphia 
concern ; while Searles and the Ha vemeyers received 4 5 , 0 0 0  sha res of  
s tock in the i r  own compa ny for the stock they had recent l y  purcha sed 
f rom Sprecke ls for $2 . 2 5 mi llion . M 
The Ame rican Suga r Re f ining Company was a lso able to acqu i re a 
ma jority interest in the Ba lt imo re Suga r Re fin ing Company, a concern 
that had commenced ope rations in early 1 8 9 1 ,  alt hough the i r  e f fort to 
gain complete cont rol was extended ove r  a numbe r of years . 9$ H .  0 .  and 
T .  A .  Havemeye r secretly had been purchas ing sma l l  lot s o f  Balt imore 
S ugar Ref in ing Company stock during 1 8 9 1 ,  and on Octobe r  1 6 ,  1 8 9 1 ,  they 
offered to sell t o  the Ame rican Suga r Ref ining Company a t  cost the 1 57 0  
shares they had a cqu i red during the preceding seven months . The company 
93Ha r ri son probably reg retted ma king use of the opt ion that was 
extended to h im by Havemeye r as  pa rt of the exchange of stoc k ,  s ince 
f rom June to Decembe r ,  1 8 92 ,  he would have found it impos s ible to sell  
the  sha res tendered to Havemeyer under the te rms of  t he agreement for  
less  t han $4 . 8  mi l lion . As ide f rom the gains  that  Havemeyer undoubtedly 
real i zed when he s old the stock , he was paid $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  in 1 8 9 4  f o r  his  
services in fac i l itat ing the excha nge with Harrison . See U .  S .  
I ndust r i a l  Commiss ion, Repo rt s ,  val . 1 ,  pt . 1 ,  p .  67  and Mul l in s ,  p .  8 7 . 
9�U .  S .  v .  ASRC, Origina l Pet it ion , pp . 5 5-58 ; Mul l i n s ,  p .  8 4 . 
MMu l l in s ,  p .  8 5 . 
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accepted, compensat ing the Havemeyers with cash out of  surplus for  t he i r  
e f fo rt s ,  and subsequent ly voted t o  acquire a ma jority interest i n  the 
conce rn , a l locat ing s l ight ly ove r $ 1 8 0 , 0 0 0  cash for t he purchase . After 
experienc i ng cons ide rable dif ficulty in purcha s ing t he requ is it e  number 
of  sha res f rom exist ing shareholders , the directors o f  the Ba lt imore 
concern were s omehow i nduced in October,  1 8 9 1 ,  to author i ze $ 1 . 3  mil l ion 
i n  common s tock for " improvements " ,  which the American Sugar Refining 
Company a cqu i red in its  ent i rety in exchange for an undisclosed amount 
of its  common s tock . '6 The American Suga r Ref ining Company was thus 
able to establish cont rol over the Balt imore refine ry by acqu i r ing a 
ma j o rity interest in it . The rema inde r o f  the Balt imo re concern ' s  
capita l stock wa s fina l l y acqui red by the Ame rican Sug a r  Re f ining 
Company in 1 9 0 3 . � �  
By November 3 0 ,  1 8 92 ,  the American Sugar Ref ining Company had 
is sued $ 2 3 , 5 4 6 , 0 0 0  o f  the $2 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  in new stock t hat had been 
authori zed e leven months earlier . Through the di rect exchange o f  s tock 
for the securit ies of  the acqui red f i rms , the Ame rican Sugar Refining 
Company was able to gain abso lute cont rol  over the Frank l i n  S uga r 
Ref ining Compa ny, t he E .  C .  Knight Company, the Sprecke l s  Suga r Refin ing 
Company and t he De laware Suga r House . Through the use of a smal l  
po rt ion o f  i t s  surplus coupled with the direct exchange o f  s t ock the 
company wa s also able t o  acqui re a ma jority interest in the Balt imore 
S uga r Ref in ing Company . '8 By the end of 1 8 92 there we re only t hree U . S .  
re fining compan ies that we re not owned out right by the Ame rican Sugar 
Ref in ing Company : the Revere Suga r Ref ining Company o f  Bos ton , the 
Western Sugar Re f in i ng Company and the Ba lt imore concern . Of  these 
three , however,  the Ame rican Sugar Re f ining Company owned a s igni ficant 
96Commercial and Fi nanc ial Chronicle 63 (November 4 ,  1 8 9 6 ) : 1 1 57 . 
''Ha rdwick Commit tee, Hea rings , pp . 1 9 1 - 1 9 2 ;  U . S .  v .  ASRC, Origina l 
Pet i t ion , p .  6 3 ;  Mul l ins , pp . 85-8 6 .  
'8Commercial and Financial Chronicle 5 6  ( January 1 4 ,  1 8 9 3 ) : 8 0 . 
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interest in the latter two . Furthermore, the Reve re Suga r Ref i ning 
Company was the la rgest mino rity holder of t he American ' s  stoc k ,  and had 
pledged to forego expans ion in the future both in o rder to help ma intain 
the value of  its  Ame rican Suga r Refin ing Company ho ldings and t o  reap 
t he di rect bene f i t s  of cooperat ion with the consolida t ion . 
As a result o f  t he acquisit ion o f  the Philade lph ia compan ie s ,  a 
one-half  interest in the Western Sugar Ref ining Company and a 
cont rol li ng interest in the Balt imore Suga r Ref ining Company, the 
Amer ican Sugar Re f ining Company ' s  assets came to be weighted much less 
heavily t owa rd f i xed assets than at the t ime of  its format ion , and more 
t owa rds inves tmen ts in other companies . 9• During the f i rst t wo yea rs of  
its  operat ions,  i nves tment in fixed assets fe l l  to s l ight ly over 5 5  
percent o f  total  asset s ,  wh ile investment s in othe r companies rose to 
a lmost 3 5  percent . 
The p reponde rance o f  the company ' s  assets t ha t  involved t he 
ma intenance of  f i nanc i a l  t ies with other f i rms enabled t he American 
Suga r Re f ining Company to resume cont rol ove r product ion and investment 
t h roughout most of the indus t ry . By Janua ry, 1 8 9 3 ,  the fac i l i t ies of  
t he Frank lin Suga r Re f ining Company and the E .  C .  Knight Company had 
been physica l ly consol idated; the new facility thus c reated continued in 
operat ion as a single unit unt il February ,  1 8 9 7 ,  when it was closed by 
o rder of the American Suga r Refin ing Company . The re f ine r ies of the 
Sprecke ls Suga r Re fining Company and the Delawa re Suga r House were a l so 
consol idated and ope rated as  a single unit . Dur ing 1 8 9 2 ,  the total  
output o f  the domestic suga r refi ni ng indust ry was es t imated by John E .  
Sea r les t o  be 1 , 4 0 0 , 0 0 0  tons , 9 0  percent o f  wh ich was p roduced by the 
Ame r ican Suga r Re fining Company or its subs idia ries . 1 00 Mos t  
99This wa s the beginning of  a t rend which wou ld continue 
uninterrupted th rough 1 9 0 5  ( see be low, this chapter ) .  
1 0°Commercial  and Financ ial Ch ron icle 5 6  ( Janua ry , 2 1 ,  1 8 9 3 )  : 1 2 6 ;  
U . S .  v .  ASRC, Origi nal Pet i t ion,  p .  6 1 . 
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important ly,  the consol ida t ion ' s ability t o  extend i t s  cont rol 
t h roughout the industry through t he acquisition o f  complete o r  
cont ro l l ing interests i n  previous ly independent refin ing f i rms enabled 
it to  raise the ma rgin between raw and ref ined suga r during 1 8 92 by 2 5  
percent ove r the previous yea r .  As a result , t h e  consolida t i on was able 
to pay a seven percent dividend on its preferred shares in 1 8 92 ,  and a 
nine pe rcent dividend on the common stock, both o f  which had been 
increased by 50 percent since the company' s  forma t ion . 10 1 
As was t rue during the t rust yea rs , whenever the margin reached a 
high enough level to restore profitabi lity to the indust ry ,  a numbe r of 
new re f ining f i rms emerged to take advantage . Despite t he cost o f  
const ruct ing a new plant , the difficulty o f  compet ing aga inst 
establ ished brands , the scarcity of  technica l expe r t i se in the industry,  
and the risks o f  commenc ing operat ions in an indust ry whe re one f i rm had 
t he capacity to suppl y  over 1 2 0  percent of the total  annual s a les of t he 
p roduct , the pro l i ferat ion of new f i rms in the refinir.� i ndus t ry once 
aga in became a problem in 1 8  93 . 102 
I n  late 1 8 92 the Mo l lenhauer Suga r Re f ining Company commenced 
operat ions with a re f inery having a da ily  ref ining capacity o f  
approximately 60 0 , 0 0 0  pounds . B .  H .  Howell Sons & Co . ,  t h e  New Yo rk 
commiss ion house that was forme rly connect ed with t he Oxnard Bros . 
Ref inery, f o rmed t he Nat iona l Suga r Refining Company in late 1 8 92 . The 
company operated a plant in Yonke rs , New York , having a da ily ref ining 
capacity o f  about 67 5 , 0 0 0  pounds . The McCahan Sug a r  Ref in i ng Company , 
with a da ily re fin ing capacity equal to the Yon ke rs f i rm, was 
1 0 1Commercial and Financ ial Ch ronicle 56 ( January 1 4 ,  1 8 9 3 ) : 8 0 . 
The Ame rican Sugar Re f ining Company' s  1 8 92 earnings de r ived solely f rom 
t he s a le o f  suga r produced at the re fineries t hat it had a cqui red f rom 
the t rust ,  a t  t he higher price enabled by the consolida t ions gre a t ly 
strengthened abi l ity t o  cont rol the ut i l izat ion o f  capacity within the 
indus t ry . No dividends we re decla red on the s t ock o f  t he s ubsidia ry 
companies f rom the t ime of  the i r  acquisit ion unt i l  the end o f  1 8 92 . 
102E ichne r ,  p .  2 0 7 . 
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incorporated in Phi ladelph ia i n  October,  1 8 92 ,  and commenced operations 
early in t he following yea r . 1 0 
Alt hough the decl ine in t he ma rgin between raw and refined sugar 
to 0 . 8 8 cent s -per-pound during 1 8 9 4 -1 8 95 indicates that t hese f i rms did 
actua l ly compete for sales with the consol idat ion, it did not take long 
for the Ame rican S uga r Re fining Company to br ing the newly formed 
independents unde r its i ndi rect cont rol . Thi s  was accomplished, once 
aga i n ,  th rough t he acquisit ion of stock in the independent refineries , 
and the use of other techniques that we re s imi lar  t o  t hose employed i n  
establi shing control over the i ndependent Phi ladelph ia refineries during 
1 8 92 . 
As the Mo l lenhauer refinery was nea ring completion, Cha r les Sen f f ,  
the cous in of Theodore and Henry Havemeye r and one of the Ame ricans 
di rect o rs , acqui red 3 , 0 0 0  shares of its capital stock . 1� Senff later 
exchanged these sha re s for s tock in the Ame rican Sugar Re f in i ng Company, 
giving the latter f i rm a 30 percent interest in the Mo l lenhauer f i rm .  
B .  H . Howe l l ,  Son & Co . ,  the exc lus ive commiss ion agent for both 
the Nat ional a nd Mol lenhauer f i rms , had partic ipated in the format ion o f  
both those compan ies in  o rde r t o  ma intain i t s  place as  independent buyer 
and seller of  suga r ,  a nd had no des i re to engage in a price wa r with the 
consol idat ion . m  Fu rt hermo re ,  it wa s al leged that the B .  H .  Howe l l  
f i rm h ad obtained a sign i f icant interest in the American Suga r Re f in ing 
Company, t hus giving it  further incent ive to coope rate with the 
conso l idat ion . 1 06 The McCahan re finery was t ied to the consol idat i on 
through an agreement with the Frank l in Suga r Ref ining Company, which had 
1 03Mu l l i n s ,  pp . 95- 9 6 . 
1 04U . S .  v .  ASRC, Origina l Pet i t ion , pp . 6 6-67 ; Mu l l i n s ,  p .  9 6 . 
1 0)Eichne r ,  p .  2 0 9 .  The B .  H .  Howell company h a d  also provided the 
two compan ies for which it  served as  commiss ion me rchants with t he bul k  
of  the i r  working capital  during the f i rst two yea rs of  the i r  operat ion . 
It t hus had every incent ive to see t hem rema in solvent . 
106Vogt , p .  4 9 . 
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been a cqui red by the Ame rican Suga r Re fining Company earlier in 1 8 9 2 ,  
and t h e  B .  H .  Howe l l  f i rm .  Representatives o f  t h e  latter two f i rms were 
somehow able to persuaded the head of  the McCahan f i rm to conduct his 
bus iness on a more l imited sca le t han that o f  wh ich it  was capable . 1 07 
The last independent f i rm dealt with by the conso l idat ion prior t o  
1 8 9 8  was t he U . S .  Sugar Company, a New Jersey corpo rat ion formed i n  
Decembe r ,  1 8 9 5 ,  and capitalized at $ 2  mi l l ion . Upon i t s  incorporat ion, 
t he company began const ruct ion of a ref inery in Camden, New Jersey . In 
September ,  1 8 9 7 ,  be fore construct ion o f  the refinery was completed t he 
Amer ican Sugar Re f ining Company purchased its  ent i re capi t a l  stock for 
$ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0  cash . Const ruction on the re f inery was immediately stopped, 
and t he machinery and appu rtenances removed f rom the premi ses and s old 
by t he corporat ions new owners ; the factory neve r actually commenced 
ope rat ions . : ;; • The stock o f  the u .  S .  Suga r Re fi ning Company wa s held 
and voted by the Ame rican Suga r Re fining Company unt i l  the former 
company was disso lved in 1 9 0 9 .  
In May,  1 9 0 0 ,  Henry 0 .  Havemeyer and John E .  P a rsons o f  t he 
American Sug a r  Re f ining Company, and James H .  Post o f  B .  H .  Howe l l ,  Sons 
and Co . entered upon a plan to consolidate and est abli s h  direct , formal 
cont rol ove r the three independent re fineries that had commenced 
ope rat ions dur ing 1 8 92 - 1 8 9 3 :  the Nat iona l Suga r Ref iniag Company, the 
Mol lenhauer Suga r Ref ining Company and the McCahan Sugar Re f ining 
107U .  s .  v .  ASRC,  Original Pet it ion , pp . 6 6-67 . 
1 08U . S .  v .  ASRC, Origina l Pet ition ,  pp . 67-68 . The director of  the 
United States Suga r Ref ining Company was Adolph Sega l ,  a speculator who 
spec ia l i zed in dubious promot ions involving the establ ishment of new 
f i rms in indust ries that had undergone or we re soon to unde rgo 
consol idat ion,  hoping that he wou ld be able to sell  h i s  interest in the 
p roperty to the consol idat ion be fore actua lly having to go into 
p roduct ion . Evidently,  this was his plan for the s uga r ref inery, as  it  
was later found that the facil ity was "poorly located, poo rly 
const ructed and unsuitable for profitable ref ining . "  Atto rney Des 
Passes,  who negot iated t he dea l for the American S uga r Re fining Company, 
appears to have known what Sega l ' s intent ions we re , as he repea tedly 
delayed complet ion of the dea l  unt i l  Sega l was so ha rd pres sed he was 
wi l li ng to sett le for $ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 , half  the amount he was o r igina lly 
p romi sed . Mul l ins , p . 9 9 .  
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Company; and a new compet itor,  The New York Suga r Re fin ing Company, 
incorporated in March, 1 8 9 7 ,  with a capital stoc k  o f  $ 6 0 0 , 0 0 0  and an 
outstanding is sue o f  $ 2 . 4  mi l lion 3 pe rcent bonds . 1 09 The exten s ion of 
the conso l idat ion ' s  cont rol over the four f i rms wa s accompli shed in a 
s imilar  fashion t o  t hat by which the company had established direct 
control over the i ndependent Philadelphia refineries in 1 8 92 . In this  
case , howeve r ,  an  sepa rate , newly created holding company wa s used t o  
acqui re t h e  securit ies of  the four independent firms . The securit ies o f  
the holding company were subsequent ly acqui red and voted b y  the Ame rican 
Suga r Re fin ing Company, or by its pres ident , Henry 0 .  Havemeyer . 
The new holding company, the Nat iona l Suga r Ref in ing Company o f  
New Jersey , was incorporated on May 3 1 ,  1 9 0 0  w i t h  an authori zed capital  
stock o f  $ 2 0  mi l l ion , half  common and ha l f  preferred . 1 1 0  Three days 
prior to t he inco rpo rat ion of the new company , James H .  Post had secured 
opt ions f rom the Nat ional Suga r Refin ing Company of New York, the 
Mol lenhauer Suga r Re fi ning Company and the New York Suga r Re fining 
Company t o  acqu i re between 7 0-75 pe rcent of the stock in each 
corporat ion in exchange for preferred stock in the new consol ida t ion . 
On June 2 ,  1 9 0 0 ,  t he di rectors of the new corporat ion voted t o  purchase 
f rom Post his opt ions for 1 0 , 0 0 0  sha res each of t he Nat iona l and 
Mo l lenhauer ref ineries and 6 , 0 0 0  sha res of the Nat iona l S uga r Ref ining 
Company o f  New York , al ong with the latter company' s ent i re bond i ssue , 
for 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  sha res o f  common and 8 2 , 500  sha res of preferred in t he new 
corpora t ion . Upon rece ipt of the stock by Post , the preferred shares 
were del i ve red to the owne rs of t he o ld corpo ra t ions , whi le the ent i re 
is sue o f  common stock wa s given to Henry o .  Havemeyer . 1 1 1  The bulk o f  
1 09U . S .  v .  AS RC, Original Pet it ion, p .  6 9 . 
1 1 0Mul l i n s ,  p .  1 0 1 . 
n 'Mul l ins , p .  1 0 1 . The st ockholde rs o f  the Na t iona l S uga r Re fin ing 
Company of New York received S225  dollars in preferred sha res of t he 
consolidat ion for every $ 1 0 0  of stock surrende red . The owners o f  the 
Mol lenhaue r Suga r Re f ining Company rece ived $ 3 0 0  o f  prefe r red stock in 
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the rema inde r o f  the Na t i ona l ' s capit al stock was used to acquire an 
interest in the McCahan Suga r Re fining Company th rough James Post , who 
acquired $ 1 , 4 9 0 , 0 0 0  of  the holding company ' s  pre fe r red stock in t he name 
o f  B .  H .  Howe l l ,  Son & Co . ,  which was subsequent ly exchanged for  5 , 0 0 0 
shares , o r  2 5  percent o f  t he McCahan stoc k ,  a t  $ 2 9 8  pe r share . 1 12 
In accordance with the agreement reached by Post and t he 
Mol lenhaue r Suga r Re fining Company, the American Suga r Re f ining Company 
received 9 , 0 0 0  sha res of preferred stock in the Nat iona l of New York for 
the 3 , 0 0 0  shares of  Mo l lenhauer stock it had a cqui red in 1 8 92 f rom 
Cha rles Sen f f  . 1 1 3 On May 2 9 , 1 9 0 0 ,  the Amer ican Suga r Re fining 
Company' s directors autho ri zed the purchase of  an addit ional 4 2 , 5 0 0  
sha res o f  Nat iona l s tock a t  pa r .  On December 4 ,  1 9 0 0 ,  the company 
purchased an addi t ional 4 , 900  sha res at pa r va lue ,  giving them s l ight ly 
over half  of the ent ire preferred stock is sue of  the consolida t ion . By 
Decembe r ,  1 9 0 1 ,  t he Amer ican Suga r Refining Company had acqu i red 5 1 , 2 82 
sha res o f  the Nat iona l ' s prefe rred stock . 1 1 ' 
As part o f  t he agreement between Post and t he consolidating 
corpora t ions , B .  H .  Howe l l ,  Son & Co . was t o  repurchase a pa rt i cular  
proport ion o f  the Nat ional stock t ha t  had been exchanged for  the 
securit ies o f  the consol ida t ing companies . 1 1 ) This amounted t o  t wo-
t h i rds of the stock rece ived by the Na t i ona l and New York stoc kholde rs 
and one-third of  t he stock given t o  the Mo llenhauer owners . B .  H .  
t he consolidat ion for  every $ 1 0 0  in stock del ivered t o  Post . The owners 
of t he New York Suga r Re f ining Company received $ 5 0 0  in preferred sha res 
of the consolida t ion for every $ 1 0 0  of  stock and $ 4 0 0  of  their bond 
i ssue acqui red by Post . The bonds had to be ret i red by the sel lers 
before being t ransferred t o  Post . U . S .  v .  ASRC, Original Pet i t ion,  pp . 
72-7 3 . 
1 : 2Mu ll ins , p .  1 0 3 ;  u . S .  v .  ASRC, Origina l Pet it ion , pp . 7 2 -7 5 . 
1 13Ha rdwick Conunit tee , Hear ings , p .  1 9 8 . 
1 1 4Mul l i n s ,  pp . 1 0 4 - 1 0 5 . Ha rdwick Commit tee , Hea rings , p .  2 3 5 ,  p .  
2 6 8 . 
tnMul l ins , p .  1 0 2 . 
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Howe l l ,  Son & Co . wa s able to acqui re the $ 4 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  necessary to 
execute t he repurchase ag reement through c redit s  est abl ished by Henry 0 .  
Havemeye r and his wi fe . The Ame rican Suga r Refining Company later 
purcha sed this stock f rom B .  H .  Howell,  Son & Co . for $ 4 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0  ( see 
above ) . 1 1 6 
In  return for est ablishing the credit wh ich was necessary to 
execute the repurchase ag reement , Hen ry Havemeyer insisted on receiving 
the Nat iona l ' s ent i re issue of common stock . The s tock was s ubsequently 
placed in Post ' s  name , t hrough whom Havemeye r subsequent ly exercised his 
vot ing right s ,  a lthough Ha vemeyer reserved the lega l r ight to take 
posses sion o f  the stock whenever he wished . 1 1 7 
Th rough the la rge block of  Nat iona l common s t ock cont rolled by 
Havemeyer ( who rema ined a director of the American Suga r Refining 
Company ) ,  and t he prefe rred stock owned di rectly by the Ame r ican Sugar 
Refining Company , the consolidat ion was able to exerc i se complete 
cont rol over t he a f f a i rs o f  the newly created holding company . I n  t urn 
t hey were able to exerc ise close cont rol over i nves tment and product ion 
in the nominally i ndependent consolidated corpo rat ions in which they had 
earlie r  held only a pa rtial  interest . The Ame rican Suga r Ref ining 
Company later st rengt hened i t s  t ies with the Nat ional through t he 
extens ion o f  short term credits to the smaller consol ida t ion,  t he amount 
1 1 6Mul l in s ,  pp . 1 0 2 -1 0 3 . 
1 1 7Mul l in s ,  pp . 1 0 3 - 1 0 4 . Upon rece ipt o f  the Na t iona l S uga r 
Ref i ning Company stock,  Henry 0 .  Havemeye r and Lowe l l  M .  P a lmer 
establ ished a vot ing t rust over the stock,  the bene f iciaries of which 
were Lowell  M .  Palme r ,  W .  B .  Thoma s ,  James H .  Pos t ,  John E .  Pa rsons and 
Havemeye r ' s chi ldren, with themselves as t rustees for a period of five 
yea r s ,  at the end of which the st ock was to be t rans fer red t o  t he 
bene ficia ries o f  the agreement . Palmer soon res igned as  t rustee,  and 
t he rea fter,  Havemeyer wa s in cha rge o f  the t rust . At t he t ime of the 
c reat ion o f  t he t ru s t ,  the stock was recorded upon t he books o f  the 
Nat iona l Suga r Ref i ning Company in the name of James H .  Post and wa s 
voted by h im in accordance with the wishes o f  Havemeye r unti l  his death 
in 1 9 0 7 . For more on the disposition of H .  0 .  Havemeye r ' s persona l 
interest i n  the Na t ional Sugar Refining Company, see u . s .  v .  ASRC, 
Origina l Pet i t ion, pp . 7 6 -77 . 
1 2 9  
of which tota led $ 2 , 3 0 0 , 0 0 0  by Octobe r,  1 90 6 . 1 ! 8 Once again , the 
company ' s assets were increased, and an exchange o f  securit ies executed, 
in o rder to establish more effect ive coordinat ion t h roughout the 
indust ry .  
I n  o rder t o  take advantage o f  a New Yo rk state law which provided 
favorable tax t reatment for corporat ions cha rtered and doing business in 
New Yo rk,  the Ame rican Suga r Re fining Company ef fected the incorporat ion 
of the Amer ican Suga r Re f ining Company of New Yo rk in November ,  1 9 0 1 . 
The New York corporat ion, capitalized at $ 3 . 5  mil l ion, t ook t it l e  t o  the 
American Suga r Re fining Company ' s  New York refining propert ies in 
exchange for t he forme r company ' s  ent ire capit a l  stock . The f ixed 
assets of the New Jersey corporation we re further dec reased, and its 
f inancial  assets increased, by this maneuver . 1 l 9  
The American Suga r Re f ining Company faced i t s  most severe test 
f rom independent competit ors during the period 1 8 9 8 -1 9 0 3 . The 
consol ida t ion ' s  ma jor  opponents in the price war o f  1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 3  we re the 
New York S ugar Ref ining Company, the Arbuckle Brother s ,  and, beginning 
in 1 9 0 1 ,  the Federal Suga r Re fining Company . 120 The New York Suga r 
Refining Company wa s eliminated f rom compet it ion th rough the f o rmat ion 
of t he Nat iona l Suga r Re f in ing Company of New Jersey . Competit ion f rom 
the latter two f i rms , howeve r ,  could not be forestal led us ing the means 
that the Ame rican Suga r Ref ining Company had earlier used to extend its 
con t ro l  ove r  other compet itors . I n  fact , the Ame rican wa s forced t o  
1 1 8Mul l ins , p .  1 0 6 .  Loans were extended to the Nat ion a l ,  with t he 
approva l of t he Ame rican ' s  direct ors , at the discret ion o f  the latter 
company ' s  f inance commit tee . 
1 1 9U . S .  v .  ASRC, Origina l Petit ion , pp . 7 9- 8 0 . 
120Mul l ins , p .  1 1 3 ,  p .  1 3 1 . 
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lea rn to coexist with these two new, powerful  riva l s ,  both of  whom 
rema ined i ndependent th rough 1 9 0 5 . 1 2 1 
The Ame rican Suga r Re f ining Company , and its  director Henry 0 .  
Havemeyer we re , howeve r ,  able t o  use a va riat ion o n  a f ami lia r technique 
t o  e l iminate potent ially se rious compet ition f rom another qua rter du ring 
t he per iod 1 90 0 - 1 9 0 5 . As ide f rom the f i rms l isted above , the Ame rican 
Suga r Re f ining Company' s cont rol over the re f ining o f  cane suga rs was 
threatened by only one f i rm during 1 9 0 0- 1 9 0 5 . The Pennsylvania Sugar 
Ref in ing Company had been organi zed as a Pennsylvan ia corpo ra t ion in 
1 8 8 3 ,  a t  which t ime it was capital ized a t  $ 1 0 0 ,  0 0 0 . 1 22 In 1 9 0 3  its  
capi t a l  stock was increa sed to $5  mil lion . In  that same yea r  the 
company completed const ruct ion of a ref inery capable of producing one 
mi l lion pounds of ref i ned suga r da ily using a l l  of the latest ref in ing 
techn iques . The reported increase in the f i rms capi t a l i z a t ion had not 
been used to obt a i n  cash to const ruct the re finery,  with vi rtua l ly a l l  
t he f unds used i n  i t s  completion being advanced by Frank K .  Hipple,  a 
f inancier and pres ident of  the Real Estate Trust Company o f  
Philadelphia . In exchange for the c redits extended t o  t he company, 
Hipple received f ive-s ixths of  the company ' s  bonded indebtednes s  of $3 
mi l l ion . 1 23 
The company, howeve r ,  had been formed by Adol ph Sega l ,  t he same 
individual who had earlier been involved in the format ion o f  the United 
States Suga r Ref ining Company and its subsequent sale to the Ame rican 
1 2 1The story o f  the r iva l ry between the Ame rican Sugar Ref in ing 
Company and Arbuc kle Brothers is long and compl icated . For an 
outstanding account , see Eichne r ,  pp . 2 1 6-2 2 7 . The e f fect s o f  t he price 
wa r on the Ame rican Sugar Re fin ing Company will  be dea lt with in more 
det a i l  be low in t he discuss ions of pro f i t s  and div idends , and t he 
consol ida t i ons subsidia ry investment s .  
122U .  S .  v .  ASRC ,  Oria ina l Pet i t ion , p .  8 3 . 
l 2Ju . s .  v .  ASRC,  Oriaina l Pet it ion ,  p .  8 3 . The ma jority o f  the 
company' s  capit a l i za t ion was held by its three o f f ice rs , t o  whom it had 
been given for no cons iderat ion . Adolph Sega l ,  t he company' s  president ,  
a ls o  held $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  o f  the f i rms $ 3  mil l ion bonded indebtedness . 
1 3 1  
Sugar Re f ining Company . The Ame rican ' s  of ficials were wary o f  Sega l ' s 
intent in const ruct ing t he new ref ine ry, and wat ched its  progress 
ca refully . Prelimina ry negot iat ions t o  purchase the company f rom Sega l 
were abrupt ly terminated by the American Sugar Ref ining Company in 1 9 0 3  
when , due t o  Sega l ' s deteriorat ing financ i a l  condit ion, Henry Havemeyer 
decided he could get cont rol of the ref inery without having to buy 
i t . 1� Sega l ,  who was in t he mids t of several other pro jects that were 
dependent for the i r  complet ion on the proceeds he expected to rea l i ze 
f rom the sale of  t he Penns ylvania re fine ry, had ove rextended h imse l f . 
Gustav Kisse l ,  a New York financier who had purchased a mo rtgage on an 
apa rtment house in which Sega l was an interes ted pa rt y ,  was approached 
by Segal seeking funds with which to meet his most press ing obl iga t ions 
and complete const ruct ion o f  the apartment house that was mortgaged t o  
Kisse l . Kissel expressed h i s  inability t o  advance the la rge sum, 
est ima ted by him at $ 1 . 2 5 mi l l ion, wh ich wa s neces sa ry to enable Segal 
t o  discharge his obligat ions , but promi sed to help i f  he could . 12 �  
Somehow, Kissel wa s brought into contact with Henry Havemeyer ,  
who,  a fter hea ring o f  Sega l ' s predicament , o ffered to advance the sum he 
requested on beha l f  of the American Suga r Refining Company . 1 26 The 
t e rms o f  the loan we re as fol lows : $ 1 . 2 5  mi l l ion wou ld be advanced to 
Segal a t  6 percent i nterest for one yea r . As collatera l ,  Sega l would 
turn over to the Ame rican $1 mi l l ion of the bonds that had been used t o  
f inance the Phi lade lph ia apa rtment house , $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  o f  the bonds of  t he 
Pennsylvania Sugar Re f in ing Company,  and 2 6 , 0 0 0  shares ( a  52 percent 
interes t )  of the Pennsylvan i a ' s capit a l  stock . The cc.nmon shares were 
given to the Ame rican as pa rt of a t rust a rrangement , whe reby Havemeyer 
woul d  have t he right to appo int four of t he company' s seven direct o r s ,  
1 2�Mul l i n s ,  p .  1 3 8 . 
1 2 �Mu l l ins , p .  1 3  9 .  
1 26Eichne r ,  p .  2 8 4 . I t  is  not clea r ,  according to Eichne r ,  whether 
the idea to approach Ha vemeye r originated with Sega l o r  with Kisse l . 
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and exe rcise discret ion as to whether or not the ref ine ry was t o  be 
ope rated during t he term of the loan . 127 
Sega l wa s neve r able to repay the loan, and t he ref inery he had 
const ructed wa s forced by the directors appo inted by the Ame rican Suga r 
Refining Company to rema in idle through 1 9 0 9 . 1 28 The Ame rican Suga r 
Ref i ning Company kept the loan to Segal on its  books and cont inued t o  
vote t h e  stock i t  had acqu ired as collateral ,  eschewing t he s a le o f  the 
stock and ret i rement of the loan for fea r cont rol of the company would 
fall into t he hands of parties who wou ld wish t o  operate it . 1 2 � 
Although the share of total indust ry output direct ly cont rol led by 
t he Ame rican Sugar re fin ing Company had fal len f rom about 90 percent in 
1 8 92 to s l ight ly less than 58  pe rcent by 1 9 0 1 ,  t he sha re o f  output over 
which the company exe rcised indi rect contro l  through stock ownership and 
cont rol o f  corpo rate directorships was suff icient t o  raise the ma rgin 
during that yea r  to a level only s l ight l y  below that which preva i led in 
18 92 . 1 30 
1nEichne r ,  p .  2 8 4 . 
128A det a i led t reatment of the resolut ion o f  Sega l ' s  complicated 
f inanci a l  a f f a i rs and t he va rious f rauds in wh ich he was engaged, 
particula rly with regard to Hipple and the Rea l  Estate Trust Company, i s  
beyond t he scope o f  this work . Fo r a det a i led account , see U . S .  v .  
ASRC, Origina l Pet it ion, pp . 82-88  and Eichne r ,  pp . 2 8 4 -2 8 9 . 
1 29Ha rdwick Commit tee , Hea r ings , p .  2 7 0 . 
1 30Mu l l in s ,  p .  1 2 ,  p .  1 0 9 . By the end of 1 9 0 2 ,  the only la rge f irms 
in the cane s uga r re fining indus t ry which we re not under the di rect o r  
indi rect cont rol of t h e  American Suga r Re fin ing Company we re Arbuckle 
Brothers o f  Brook lyn , the Federal Suga r Ref ining Company and the Reve re 
Suga r Re fining Company . Of these t hree , the Revere had, since t he 
forma t ion o f  the Suga r Re fineries Company , a lways worked in close 
cooperat ion with the consolidation . Arbuckle Brothers wa s t he Ame rican 
Sugar Refining Company' s  l a rgest competitor,  able to supply 
approximately 10 percent of the domestic ma rket f o r  refined cane suga r .  
The Arbuckle and Fede ra l plant s  combined, howeve r ,  were not capable o f  
p roducing as  much as  t h e  Nat iona l Suga r Refining Company, which was 
under t he cont rol of the k�erican Suga r Refining Company . Eichne r ,  pp . 
2 2 5 -2 2 8 . 
1 3 3  
His t ory of the Use of Corpora t e  Stock by the Ameri can Suga r Refining 
Company, 1 9 0 1 -1 90 5 :  The Es t abli shmen t of Cont rol Over the Domes t i c  Beet 
Suga r Industry 
The ma j o r  threat that confronted the Ame r ican Sugar Ref ining 
Company during the fi rst few years of the twent ieth century did not come 
f rom new riva ls in the re f i ned cane suga r indust ry,  but rather from an 
indu s t ry that rel ied on a substitute raw mate rial  that could be grown 
cheaply in t he western regions o f  the count ry : the suga r beet . When 
faced with compet it ion f rom this new quarter the American S uga r Re fining 
Company immediat e ly sought t o  bring its new riva l s  under its  cont rol ,  
rather than engaging in a prolonged price wa r ,  such a s  that which had 
only recently ( in 1 9 0 1 )  been ended with Arbuc kle Brothers . I n  so doing , 
the Ame rican made use of f i n anc ial techn iques tha t  we re simi lar  to those 
employed in estab l i shi ng cont rol ove r the Na t ional Sugar Re fining 
Company . 
The ma j o r  th rust of the consolidat ion ' s expansion between 1 9 0 0  and 
1 9 0 5  was t he establishment of a commun ity of mutual  f inancial  int erest,  
through t he c reat ion and apportionment of co rpo rate securities,  between 
the beet sugar ma nu facturers of the count ry and the ref ined cane sugar 
inte rests as  represented by the Ame rican Suga r Re f inir:g Company . 
Through the establishment o f  a number of jointly owned operat ing and 
holding companies in which both the ma jor cane suga r and beet sugar 
manufacture=s we re represented, the American Sugar Ref ining Company was 
able t o  f o res t a l l  competit ion f rom t he new industry,  and ma inta in a 
degree of cont rol within the indust ry that seemed on the ve rge of 
disappea ring as  the bee t sugar indus t ry capt u red increas ing shares of 
the domestic ma rket for  re fined sugar . 
The beet sugar indust ry ente red a pe riod o f  rapid development 
during the 1 8 9 0 s ,  a f t e r  having experienced i r regu l a r  growth f rom the 
t ime when t he suga r beet wa s int roduced to t he United States du ring the 
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1 8 3 0 s . 1 31 In 1 8 9 6 ,  only seven factories devoted to the product ion o f  
beet suga r were i n  operat ion , and by the end of  1 8 9 7 ,  ref ined s uga r 
produced f rom sugar beets accounted for only 1 . 4 3 percent o f  total  
domest ic suga r cons umpt ion . 1 32 By  t he end of  1 9 0 1 ,  however ,  the 
manufact u re of  beet suga r was carried on by t h i rty-one sepa rate 
businesses , with eight others prepar ing t o  commence ope rations . The 
output o f  t hese new facilities accounted for 4 . 7  percent of t o t a l  
domestic suga r consumpt ion , a n  increase of  ove r 5 0  pe rcent above the 
previous yea r . : H  By 1 9 0 1  competit ion f rom the beet sugar p roduce rs had 
grown pa rt icu larly wor ri some for t he Ame rican Suga r Re f in ing Company in 
t he western sec t ions of the count ry, in which t he beet suga r p roducers 
enjoyed a s igni f icant f reight advantage over their eastern compet itors . 
This was exacerbated by the behavior of  refined sug a r  p rices during the 
winte r ,  when the demand for the product wa s du l l  and the output o f  t he 
beet sugar producers usua lly re leased upon the ma rket . ' 34  
The Ame rican Suga r Re fi ning Company first  became invo l ved in the 
beet suga r industry in 1 8 9 7 ,  when it purchased one-ha l f  of  the Western 
131Mul l in s ,  p .  1 8 7 . Fo r a det a i led t reatment of  the deve lopment of  
t he beet s uga r indust ry in the United States , see Roy G .  Blakey , The 
United States Beet -Suga r I ndustry and the Tari f f  ( New Yo rk : Columbia 
Un iversity P ress , 1 9 1 2 ) . 
1 32Mul l ins , pp . 1 8 7 - 1 8 9 .  
mMu l l ins , p .  1 8 9 ;  U . S .  v .  ASRC, Origina l Pet i t ion,  p .  9 6 . 
: 34Mu l l ins , pp . 1 92 - 1 93 . Havemeye r a l so fea red the power of  the 
beet sugar interests in Congress , where the issue of the t a r i f f  on raw 
and ref ined sugar was once again be ing debated . As t he Spanish-American 
Wa r drew to a close,  the initiation of f ree t rade with Cuba became a 
dist inct possibi l ity . The duty f ree export o f  raw and ref ined s ugar 
f rom Cuba would have been disast rous for t he Ame rican Sug a r  Ref ining 
Company , because tha t  count ry wou ld have ceased expo rt ing raw s uga r and 
concent rated ent i rely on ref ined . The Ame rican Sugar Re f i ning Company, 
however ,  f avored an agreement whereby the t a r i f f  on raw s uga r f rom Cuba 
would be reduced, wh ile the importat ion of refined s ugar would be 
exc luded t h rough ma intenance of the exist ing t a r i f f .  Sug a r  beet 
interests opposed a reduct ion of the t a r i f f  on raw suga r f rom Cuba . 
Havemeyer saw that by extending his in f l uence ove r  t he beet sugar 
indust ry he could increase his power to a f fect a l l  sub�equent t a r i f f  
legislation,  and furthermo re, put his company in a pos it ion t o  gain f rom 
either reduct ions or increases on the raw suga r dut y .  
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Beet Sugar Company ' s  $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  capital st ock f rom its owne rs , t he 
Spreckels f ami ly,  for $ 7 5 0 , 0 0 0 . At the same t ime it ente red into an 
agreement with Claus Spreckels and his sons to orga n i ze a new beet sugar 
company, in which the Ame rican Sugar Refining Company would be permitted 
to acqui re a one-half  interest . m The new f i rm, incorporated in 1 8 9 7 
a s  the Spreckels Suga r Company and capit a l ized a t  $ 5  mi l l ion,  
subsequen tl y  purchased the plant and rea l estate o f  the Western Beet 
Sugar Company,  and in 1 8 9 9  had that company dissolved . Meanwh i l e ,  the 
company const ructed a la rge factory with a daily beet s l i cing capacity 
of  4 , 0 0 0  t ons nea r Sali nas , Ca li forni a ,  the output o f  which was s old 
ent i rely th rough the We stern Suga r Re fini ng Company ( in which t he 
American Suga r Re fin ing Company also owned a one-ha l f  interest )  in 
ha rmony with the consolidat ion ' s  cane suga r interests on the west 
coast . 1 36 
The autho r i zed capi tali zation of the Amer ican St:•;ra r Ref ining 
Company was inc rea sed by $ 1 5  mi ll ion in Sept embe r ,  1 9 0 1 ,  t o  $ 9 0 mil l ion,  
os tensibly to replenish the company' s t reasury for funds that had been 
"expended in the acquisit ion of prope rty for [ t he company ' s ]  bus iness 
[ and) permanent improvement s ,  etc . "  and to sustain the company' s  
"pecuniary independence . " 1 3 7  Un like the consolidation ' s f irst stock 
issue, the new s tock that wa s authori zed by the company' s  s ha reho lde rs 
wa s t o  be is sued for cash,  with exist ing sha reholde rs ent i t led to one 
sha re of new stock for each five shares owned . Short ly a fter t he 
increase in capit a l i z a t i on wa s author ized, the new stock was admitted t o  
t rading i n  the unl is ted depa rtment of the New York Stock Exchange , where 
the company' s  earlier issues had been t raded a fter  hav ing init i a l ly been 
exchanged f o r  t he assets of the t rust or other consol idated 
mMul l in s ,  p .  1 9 9 ;  U . S .  v .  ASRC, Origina l Petit ion, pp . 9 4 - 9 5 . 
136U .  s .  v .  ASRC ,  Origina l Pet i t ion, pp . 9 4 - 9 5 . 
1 3 7Comme rcial and Fina ncial Ch ron icle 7 3  ( July 27 , 1 9 0 1 ) : 1 8 6 ;  
( Septembe r 1 4 ,  1 9 0 1 ) : 6 1 7 . 
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corpo ra t ions . m  Although Ha vemeye r had earlier cla imed that the 
company did not "propose to buy a single independent plan t "  with t he 
proceeds f rom t he s a le of  the new stock,  by December ,  1 9 0 1 ,  a committee 
consist ing of Havemeyer ,  Washington B .  Thoma s ,  Lowe l l  M .  P a lme r  and 
Walter Donne r had been formed to supe rvise the acquisit ion of beet suga r 
re fining properties in t he west . 139 
Another beet sugar manu facturer, the American Beet Sugar  Company 
had become by fa r the la rgest of a l l  the beet sugar companies by 1 9 0 1 ,  
operat ing factories in Califo rnia , Colorado a nd Nebraska . 1 4° Formed in 
1 8 9 9  and capit a l i zed at $2 0 mil lion , $5  mil l ion p referred a nd $ 1 5  
mi l lion common ( t he common stock represented n o  i nvestment ,  whereas t he 
p referred did not vote ) , the American Beet Suga r Company entered into 
coope rat ion with the Ame rican Suga r Ref ining Company in Decembe r ,  1 9 0 2 ,  
at which t ime the Ame rican Suga r Refin ing Company acqui red one-ha l f  o f  
1 3 8Commerc i a l  and Financ ial Chronicle 7 3  (October 2 8 ,  1 9 0 1 ) : 958 . 
1 39Commercial and Financial Chron icle 7 3  (July 27 , 1 9 0 1 ) : 1 8 6 ;  
Ha rdwick Commi t tee, Hea rings , p .  32 9 .  The re is ample evidence to suggest 
that Havemeyer and t he Ame rican Suga r Re fining Company intended t o  
extend the i r  inf luence into the beet suga r producing regions prior to 
t he t ime when the Ame rican Suga r Re fining Company was authorized to 
increase its  capit a l i zat ion . During the s umme r  o f  1 90 1  ( t he cer t i f icate 
authoriz ing t he increase o f  capit alization was f i led on Oct obe r 3 ,  1 9 0 1 )  
the American Suga r Refining Company manufactured a much l a rger quantity 
o f  ref ined suga r than du ring any similar  period, and made a rrangements 
with va rious ra i l roads t o  have this s uga r shipped a t  dra s t ica lly reduced 
rates to several  of the midwestern markets where the beet suga r 
p roducers usua l ly ma rketed their products .  In Oct obe r,  1 9 0 1 ,  the 
American Suga r Re fin ing Company cut the price of ref iPed s uga r be low the 
cost of  product ion,  and made a rrangement s to rat ion it t o  consume rs in 
such a way as to ma ke it  unl ikely that t hey would buy beet suga r . The 
Ame rica n ' s acquisit ion of beet suga r propert ies did not begin unt i l  
a f t e r  this course o f  act ion had been pursued for at least seve r a l  
months , and many of  t h e  beet suga r companies brought to the b r i n k  o f  
f inanc ial  ruin . See Mul l i ns,  pp . 1 92-1 9 8  and U . S .  v .  ASRC,  Original 
Petit ion , pp . 9 8- 9 9 . 
1 40Mu l l ins,  p .  2 0 1 ;  U . S .  v . ASRC, Origina l  Pet i t ion , p .  1 0 1 . 
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its common stock for cash and s imultaneously cont racted t o  become the 
sole agent for the sa le of its suga r in the west and midwest . 1 4 1  
I n  most a reas of the country in which beet suga r was p roduced, 
howeve r ,  p roduct ion was carried out by sma l l ,  independent ref ineries 
that secured their raw ma terial f rom f a rmers in t he community 
surrounding the f actory and sold t heir  output throughout a l imited a rea . 
I n  these a rea s ,  rather than me rel y  acqui ring a port ion o f  the capit a l  
stock o f  one dominant co rporat ion,  as  i n  the case o f  t h e  American Beet 
Sugar Company, the Ame ri can Suga r Refining Company employed a d i fferent 
st rategy . 1 4 2  
In each a rea in which beet suga r was produced t he Ame rican Suga r 
Re fining Company formed an a l l iance with some agent who possessed 
infl uence in the t rade . I n  Ca l i fo rnia,  the Ame rican Suga r Re f i ning 
Company worked th rough the Spreckels and Oxnard fami l ies . I n  Utah and 
Idaho t he company acted th rough the agency of  Thomas R .  Cut l e r ,  a Utah 
suga r manufacturer . >� !  In Colorado the company made use o f  the services 
141U . S .  v .  ASRC, Origina l Pet ition,  pp . 1 0 1 - 1 0 2 . The Ame r ican Beet 
Sugar Company agreed to the s a le several months after a meet ing between 
James S t i l lman ,  pres ident of t he Nat iona l City Bank and a business 
associate of Henry o .  Havemeyer' s ,  and Jacob Schi f f  o f  the investment 
banking f i rm of Kuhn,  Loeb & Co . ,  who wa s the appo inted representat ive 
o f  the Ame rican Beet Suga r Company . S t i l lman wa s inst ructed by 
Havemeyer to wa rn Schi ff that the American Suga r Refin ing Company was 
p repa red to cut pr ices by an addit iona l  S S  per ton in the market s that 
were served by both the consol idation and the Ame rican Beet Suga r 
Company . Wi th the cooperat ion of the Ame rican Sug a r  Ref i n ing Company, 
Schi f f  was told by S t i l lma n ,  the beet suga r company ' s preferred s tock 
" would not only be secure i n  its dividend, " ( i t wa s eviden t l y  finding no 
sale at $70 in Apr i l , 1 9 0 2 )  but the common stock woul d  be worth 
something as  we l l . The f ina l pa rt of the ult imat um which S t i l lman was 
inst ructed by Havemeyer to de l ive r to Schi ff  was whether t he company 
" [ wou ld) have a l l  the common, without any ret urn,  or ha l f  the common , 
with a very subst ant i a l  return . "  Stenographe r ' s Minutes , U . S .  v .  
American Suga r Re f ining Company et . a l . ,  vol . 6 ,  3 62 1 -2 4 . Cited in 
Mul l ins , pp . 2 0 3-2 0 4 . 
1 4 2A detai led account o f  the exceedingly complex involvement of  the 
American Suga r Re f ining Company in the beet suga r indust ry i s  beyond the 
scope of this  work . For an in depth t rea tment of t h i s  aspect o f  t he 
development o f  the k�e rican Suga r Re f ining Compa ny, see Mu l lins , pp . 
1 8 6-2 2 9  o r  Eichne r ,  pp . 2 2 9-2 6 3 . 
1 43E ichne r ,  p .  2 3 3 . 
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of Chester A .  Morey, a wholesale grocer who had pa rticipated in the 
o rganizat ion o f  one of that state ' s first suga r beet factories . In 
Michigan Cha r les B .  Wa rren,  a Det roit lawye r ,  became the company' s  
unofficial agent . 1 4 �  With the help of these individuals  t he American 
Suga r Ref ining Company qu ietly went about purchasing inte rest s  in 
exist ing beet suga r refin ing companies for cash . 
I t  was the policy of the Ame rican Sugar Re f ining Company t o  
acqui re only a pa rtial  interest i n  f irms over which i t  sought t o  
establish control s o  as  to enable a given outlay of funds to enable the 
extension o f  cont rol over as  great a pa rt o f  the indu s t ry as  
pos s ible . 1 4 �  The Ame rican Suga r Re fining Company was not a direct ly 
seeking a pro f i t able outlet for the employment of s u rplus f unds t hrough 
its investment s in t he beet suga r indust ry,  but rathe r  was st r iving to 
ma int a in the va lue of the cane sugar manufactu ring interest s  i t  a l ready 
possessed by extending i t s  cont rol ove r investment and p roduct ion to a 
new pa rt of the indust ry . 
The Ame rican Sugar Refi ning Company seldom pa rticipated in t he 
cons t ruct ion of new plant s in the beet suga r territories . Wheneve r 
potent ial compe t itors t h rea tened t o  establ ish a new facto ry in a 
desirable loca t ion,  the t rust would attempt to fores t a l l  const ruct ion by 
persuading t he owners to part with their interest in the new project for 
an interest in one o f  the Ame rican Suga r Ref ining Company' s beet suga r 
subsidia ries . The company would establish a new factory t hrough its  
subsidia ries only when it was ce rtain that it would be bui lt anyway . 146 
The American Suga r Re fin ing Company furthe r  s t rengthened their 
cont rol over the growing number of beet suga r producers in wh ich t hey 
144Eichne r ,  p .  2 4 1 . 
mMu l l ins,  p .  2 1 8 . Th is po licy was forma lly approved by the 
directors of the American Suga r Refining Company on June 3 ,  1 9 02 , but 
seems t o  have influenced the behavior o f  the company f rom t he t ime it 
began a cqu i ring the stock of f i rms within the beet suga r indust ry .  
1 46Mu l l ins , p .  2 2 8 . 
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had established an interest th rough the extension o f  sho rt term c redits .  
On October 2 0 ,  1 9 0 3 ,  Hen ry Havemeyer received autho rizat ion f rom the 
consolida t ion ' s directors t o  extend loans to beet sugar producers in 
which the company he ld stock, either direct ly o r  t hrough its beet sugar 
holding subsidia ries . These advances , made a t  s ix percent interest and 
p rovided on demand to any company which requested t hem, s ubsequent ly 
averaged between $6  mi l l ion and $7  mi llion pe r yea r . 1 4 1  
By way o f  the acqu i s i t ion o f  ma jority or st rong minority posit ions 
in a mul t itude of individua l beet suga r producer s ,  and t he l ibe ral 
extens ion o f  short term credi t ,  the American Suga r Ref ining Company was 
able to coordinate output and dist ribut ion within t he growing 
indust ry .  1 4 8 Late r ,  when dissens ion among the nomina l l y  independent 
companies in a pa rt icu lar territ ory became serious and the economies o f  
closer coordina t ion more readily appa rent , the American Suga r Re f ining 
Company e f f ected consol idat ions o f  the exist ing companies th rough the 
c reat ion o f  holding companies in  which , due to their interests in the 
individual f i rms , the Ame rican usua l ly came to possess a cont ro l l ing 
interes t . 1 49 In most such instances , the stock of t he s ubs idia ry beet 
14'Eichner,  p .  2 4 9 . Unl ike mos t of the funds used to a cqui re the 
securit ies o f  beet suga r f i rms (most o f  which appear t o  have been 
obta ined t h rough the issuance o f  stock ) , the fund t hat we re used t o  
provide short term capit a l  to the beet sugar producers  seem to have been 
obt a ined f rom surplus rese rves supplemented by short t e rm funds bo rrowed 
for a low rate by the Ame rican Suga r Re fin ing Company in the east , and 
re loaned at the highe r rate in the west . 
1 48Eichne r ,  pp . 2 6 2-2 6 3 . 
149After a lengthy period o f  minor combinat ions and co rporate 
dissolut ions in Michigan , the beet suga r companies in wh ich t he Ame rican 
Sugar Ref ining Company pos sessed a cont rol l ing interest were 
consolidated unde r the Mich igan Suga r Company, in which t he Ame r ican 
held approximately a 5 0  pe rcent interest . The consol ida t ion of  t he 
Colorado beet sugar companies t ha t  we re cont rol led by t he Ame rican took 
place in Janua ry , 1 9 0 5 ,  when the Great Western S uga r Company, 
capita l i zed at $30 mi l l ion,  was incorpo rated, and a ma jor ity interest 
acqui red jointly by Henry 0 .  Havemeyer and the American Suga r Re fining 
Company . The beet suga r companies in Idaho and Utah in wh ich the 
Ame rican was interested we re consolidated unde r t he Utah- Idaho Suga r 
Company in Ju ly,  1 9 0 7 ,  i n  which , through its  interest in the const ituent 
companies , the American Suga r Ref ining Company acqui red 3 97 , 5 5 0  sha res 
of p re fe r red and 1 5 0 , 0 0 0  sha res of common stock;  Henry Havemeyer ,  on his 
1 4 0  
s ugar factories was su rrendered by the American Sugar Refining Company 
to the newly c reated consolidat ion in di rect exchange for the holding 
company ' s  stoc k ,  through which the company would subsequently exe rcise 
cont rol ove r t he consol idated fi rms . 
The most noteworthy feature of the American Suga r Refin ing 
Company' s involvement in the beet suga r industry wa s t ha t  the extens ive 
f inanci a l  resources o f  the consolidat ion were not used t o  expand o r  
improve its  capacity i n  orde r to counte r  t he threat f rom t h e  new 
indust ry .  I n  fac t ,  the funds used by the American Suga r Refining 
Company to acqu i re i nterests in individual beet suga r p roducers gave 
t hem a measure o f  f inanc ial st rength that they might othe rwise have 
lacked, and served as  a s ign i f icant source of cap i t a l  to finance t he 
const ruct ion o f  additional beet suga r factories . 1 �0 As was t rue of  t he 
earlie r  pe riod, t he consol idat ion grew large r ( a s  mea su red by the book 
va lue of  t o t a l  asset s )  as a result of its success in establis hing a 
community o f  mutual  financial interest between itself  and a g roup o f  
competitors th rough the creat ion and ma intenance of forma l financial 
a l l iances between itself  and a numbe r of nominally independent f i rms . 
As wa s a lso t rue of the ea rlier pe riod, the i nc rease in the 
consolidat ion ' s  capi t a l izat ion that enabled it to establish cont rol over 
the beet sugar industry was o f fset by an increase in t he portion o f  i t s  
assets that we re comprised o f  holdings i n  other companies,  and a 
p roportionate dec rease in the sha re of f ixed in total  asset s . 
own a ccount , became the holder of 2 3 , 1 7 4  sha res of  the Utah- Idaho S ugar 
Company' s preferred stock . See U . S .  v .  ASRC,  Origina l Pet it ion, pp . 95-
1 2 5 . 
1 s0Although the Ame rican Suga r Ref ining Company only rarely f i nanced 
the const ruct ion of new beet suga r facilit ies , a " s ign i f icant pa rt " of 
the funds that we re used to acqu ire int e rests in a l ready exist ing 
facilit ies we re thought to have subsequent ly been used to finance 
addit iona l beet suga r factories . See Eichner,  p .  2 4 9 . 
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The Acqui si t i on of Other Subsidi a ry In t erest s  By the Ameri can Suga r  
Refining Company 
Other indust ries in which the American Sugar Ref ining Company 
acqu i red s ignif icant subsidiary interests inc luded coope rage , glucose 
suga r ,  raw cane suga r ,  and cof fee . Litt le is known about the company' s 
investments in the raw cane suga r indust ry . I t  has been speculated that 
most o f  the f i rm' s inves tment in the product ion of raw suga r was 
achieved indi rec t ly t hrough its stockholders,  who operated their 
facilities in ha rmony with the consolida t ion . 1 5 1 Although Henry 0 .  
Havemeye r  suggested that the $ 1 5  mil l ion increase in capi t a l i za t ion 
authorized by the company in 1 9 0 1  wou ld be used in part to acqu i re raw 
sugar interests in Cuba and Pue rto Rico,  most of the d i rect inves tment 
undert aken by the consol idat ion in the four yea rs following the issue of 
the addit iona l stock was in the beet suga r indus t ry . 1 57 
The Ame rican Suga r Refining Company' s interests in the glucose 
sugar indu s t ry we re establi shed both directly,  t h rough stock owne rship,  
and indirect ly, th rough inter locking directorates with companies in 
which the consol idat ion did not have a direct f inancial interest . I n  
Decembe r ,  1 8 9 9 ,  it was revea led that the Ame rican Suga r Refin ing Company 
owned 9 , 9 0 0  sha res of common and 7 , 0 0 0  sha res of preferred shares o f  the 
United States Suga r Refining Company, a Waukegan,  I l l inois manufacturer 
o f  glucose suga r .  The Glucose Suga r Ref ining Company, a New Jersey 
holding company capitalized at $ 4 0  mil lion counted among i t s  di rectors 
C .  H . ,  F .  0 .  and E .  A .  Mat thiessen, all of whom were c losely connected 
1 � 1Vogt , p .  7 1 . Subs idiary interests acqu ired in t h is fashion a re 
o f  interest in te rms of the degree to which the company' s  influence came 
to be extended t hroughout the re f ined suga r and other related 
indust ries,  but a re not directly related to the f inanc ial a f fa i rs o f  t he 
company . I t  should be noted, howeve r ,  tha t ,  as was t rue o f  t he American 
S ugar Ref ining Company' s acquisit ion of cont rol over othe r  segments o f  
the indu s t ry,  the inf luence i t  exercised over the raw s uga r indust ry 
resulted f rom the f inancial  t ies that we re c reated by t he p ro l i ferat ion 
and dist ribut ion of t he consolidat ions securit ies . 
1 52Commercia1 and Financ ial Chronicle 7 3  (July 2 7 ,  1 9 0 1 ) : 1 8 6 . 
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with the Ame r ican Suga r Re f ining Company . m  After a l ong and 
convol uted se ries of consol ida t ions , the Ame rican Suga r Ref ining 
Company' s  interest s  in the glucose sugar industry came to be exercised 
t hrough one of i t s  l a rgest groups of stockholders , t he owners of the 
S tanda rd Oil Company . These interest s ,  however ,  we re not counted among 
t he assets o f  t he Ame rican Suga r Refining Company . � �� 
The Ame rican Suga r Re f ining Company' s interest in t he cooperage 
business , though an important source of  economy to the company, was 
insign i ficant f inanci a l ly . The conso l idat ion cont rol led t he Brookl yn 
Cooperage Company t h rough complete ownership o f  its  ent i re $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  
capita l i z a t ion , which i t  had acqui red short ly a ft e r  t h� format ion o f  t he 
o riginal suga r t rust . : �� Alt hough not direct ly related t o  s uga r 
re fin ing, the Amer ican Suga r Ref ini ng Company also acqu i red a 
sign i f icant interest in the cof fee industry .  1 �6 During November and 
Decembe r ,  1 8 9 6 ,  it wa s reported that the Ame rican Suga r Re fining Company 
purchased 1 , 1 0 0  shares in the Woolson Spice Company for  $ 1 . 2 6 5  mi l l ion 
cash . 1 �7 In early 1 8 97 t he company reportedly increased its stake in 
the company by pu rchas ing 6 4 0  more sha res for $ 6 4 0 , 0 0 0 ,  mak ing its  t o t a l  
1 �3Vogt , pp . 6 6- 6 7 . 
u4For a somewhat s ketchy account of  the American Suga r Ref ining 
company' s involvement in the glucose suga r indust ry ( a lt hough the only 
one I am awa re o f )  see Vogt , pp . 67-69 . 
� ��Mul l ins , p .  2 3 0 . 
1 HThe Amer ican Suga r Re f ining Company' s  ent ry into t he coffee 
indus t ry was intended t o  counter the ent ry of  the Arbuckle brothe r s ,  who 
were leading ma nufact urers and dis tribut ors of co f fee through the i r  
wholesa le groce ry conce rn , into the suga r re fining indus t ry . F o r  a n  
exce l lent account o f  the price war that ens ued between the Arbuckles and 
t he Ame rican Suga r Re f in ing Company in both the cof fee and suga r 
indus t ries during 1 8 9 6- 1 9 0 0 ,  see Eichner ,  pp . 2 1 6 -2 2 7 . 
1 �7Commercial and Financ i a l  Ch ronicle 63  ( Decembe r 7 ,  1 8 9 6 )  : 1 1 57 . 
The consol idat ion ' s  purchase amounted t o  eleven-eighteenths o f  t he 
coffee company' s  outstanding capital stock . 
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investment in the company over $ 1 . 9  mil l ion . 1 �8 I n  1 8 9 f;  t he American 
Suga r Ref in ing Company a l so o rganized a s ubsidi a ry ,  t he American Coffee 
Company, to const ruct a cof fee roasting plant on one of the company' s 
abandoned Brooklyn propert ies . The plant , which was completed in 1 8 9 9 ,  
wa s ope rated in ha rmony with the plant o f  the Woolson Spice Company 
during the rema inder of the price wa r with t he Arbuck le s ,  and appears to 
have rema ined a subsidia ry of  t he consolidat ion , as  did the Woolson 
Spice Company, t h rough 1 90 5 . 159 
Changes in the Financi a l  Struct ure oE the Ameri can Suga r Refining 
Company, 1 891 -1 905 
A s imp l i f ied account of  the American Sugar Re f in ing Company' s 
f inanc ial st ructure du ring 1 8 91-1 9 0 5  is conta ined in �able 2 bel ow . 
Movements in t he ratios of the American Suga r Ref ining Company' s 
f inanc ial to f ixed assets and quick to f ixed assets confirm the general  
tendencies re f lected i n  the course of  events des c ribed above . Table 3 
shows the dec l ining importance of  fixed assets and the increasing 
import ance of  quick and f inanci a l  assets on the balance sheets of  t he 
American Sugar Re f ining Company du ring the pe riod 1 8 9 1 - 1 9 0 5 . The ratio 
o f  fixed assets t o  f inanc ial assets fe l l  steadily t h roughout t he pe riod . 
During the consolidation ' s f i rst fi fteen yea rs,  it a lso experienced a 
s teady increase in t he value o f  qu ick assets relat i ve to f i xed asset s ,  
1 58Commercial and Financ ial Chronicle 6 4  (Janua ry 3,  1 8 9 7 ) : 4 0 . It 
wa s later a l leged by Theodore Havemeyer that the American Suga r Re fining 
Company had never actually acqui red a stake in t he Woo lson Spice 
Company, but rathe r control led it indirectly th rough the partnership of  
Havemeyer & Elde r ,  which , according to him, actua l ly owned the s tock . 
Howeve r ,  lega l act ion taken by the Arbuckle brothers against the 
American Suga r Re f ining Company in Janua ry, 1 8 9 7 ,  a s  minority 
stockholders in the Woolson f i rm, indicates that  whether o r  not  
Havemeye r & Elder pa rt ic ipated in t he acquisit ion o f  t he Woolson Company 
Stock,  it  e ventua l ly came to be owned by the American S uga r Ref i ning 
Compan y .  See the Commercial  and Financ ial Chronicle 6 3  ( Janua ry 1 6 ,  
1 8 9 7 ) : 1 3 3  a nd the Lexow Committee, Report , pp . 8 0-8 1 . 
1 59Eichne r ,  pp . 220-22 1 .  The Ame rican Suga r refining Company owned 
t he ent i re capital  s t ock of the Ame rican Coffee Company, a lt hough it is  
not ce rtain what the cap ita lizat ion of  that company wa s . 
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TABLE 2 
THE FINANC IAL STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN SUGAR 
REF INING COMPANY, 1 8 9 1- 1 9 0 5  
( a l l  figures i n  thousands ) 
ASS ETS LIABILITIES 
[ RE & MACH CASH SUGAR INVESTMENTS ]  [ STOCK D=:BTS SURPLUS ] 
1 8 9 1  $ 4 1 , 2 5 0  $ 6 , 8 8 7  $ 7 , 1 1 1  $ 7 , 5 9 8  $ 5 0 , 0 0 0  $ 1 1 ,  5 2 2  $ 1 , 3 2 3  
1 8 9 2  4 1 , 2 5 0  1 4 ,  952 8 , 8 82 3 0 , 0 6 5  7 3 , 5 4 6  1 5 , 0 3 7  6 , 5 7 6  
1 8 9 3  4 2 , 9 3 2  2 7 , 6 1 8  7 , 5 4 6  2 6 , 9 8 5  7 3 , 9 3 6  2 2 , 2 0 1  8 , 9 4 3  
1 8 9 4  4 3 , 1 2 0  3 0 , 1 7 0  5 ,  6 0 8  2 6 , 202  7 3 , 3 9 6  2 1 , 3 9 4  9 , 7 6 9  
1 8 9 5  4 3 , 1 4 1  3 0 , 9 62 1 2 , 4 63 2 5 , 6 92 7 3 , 3 9 6  2 5 , 1 4 0  1 3 , 1 8 1  
1 8 9 6  4 3 , 1 4 1  2 8 , 3 9 6  1 3 , 8 6 4  2 8 , 2 5 1  7 3 , 9 3 6  2 7 , 5 3 1  1 2 , 1 8 6  
1 8 97 3 7 , 6 92 2 5 , 5 8 3  2 2 , 4 8 9  3 0 , 3 4 8  7 3 , 9 3 6  3 1 , 1 5 1  1 1 ,  0 2 5  
1 8 9 8  37 , 2 8 6  27 , 5 6 4  2 2 , 2 4 3  3 1 , 0 5 8  7 3 , 9 3 6  3 2 , 9 8 7  1 1 , 22 8  
1 8 9 9  3 6 , 4 1 3  1 5 , 3 0 7  2 0 , 3 4 1  3 0 , 4 2 4  7 3 , 9 3 6  2 1 , 1 52 7 , 3 95 
1 90 0  3 6 , 8 9 1  1 5 , 7 3 7  2 2 , 4 8 9  3 5 , 0 5 4  7 3 , 9 3 6  27 , 4 4 3  8 , 7 92 
1 90 1  3 4 , 3 2 9  3 6 , 8 6 3  1 2 , 2 4 9  3 9 , 1 1 2 8 8 , 2 8 0  2 4 , 3 6 4  9 , 9 0 8  
1 9 02  3 4 , 6 6 9  3 0 , 0 4 7  1 5 , 8 4 3  4 5 ,  2 7 1  9 0 , 0 0 0  2 4 , 9 5 8  1 0 , 8 7 1  
1 9 0 3  3 5 , 1 8 0  3 4 , 638  1 2 , 3 3 9  5 1 , 9 8 6  9 0 , 0 0 0  3 1 , 922 1 2 , 2 6 6  
1 9 0 4  3 5 , 0 5 1  3 8 , 320  2 4 , 937 5 4 , 2 1 2 9 0 , 0 0 0  4 8 , 7 3 4  1 3 , 7 8 6  
1 9 0 5  3 5 , 1 57 3 8 , 6 5 9  1 6 , 6 5 9  5 4 , 0 5 9  9 0 , 0 0 0  4 0 , 52 6  1 4 , 0 0 7  
NOTE : RE & MACH incluses a l l  rea l estate and machinery . CASH 
includes improvement account , accounts rece ivable and mis ce l laneous 
asset s . SUGAR includes a l l  raw and refined suga r on hand . I NVESTMENTS 
includes a l l  securit ies of ot her compan ies , including short t e rm cash 
obl igat ions . DEBT includes all bi lls payable ; the comoany issued no 
long term debt prior to 1 9 0 5 . As sets and liabilit ies may not equal  due 
t o  rounding . 
SOURCE : Commercial and Financial Ch ron icle,  1 8 9 1 -1 9 0 6 ;  Vogt , pp . 
1 1 8 -1 2 1 . 
. 
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YEAR F/C 
TABLE 3 
SELECTED FINANC IAL RATIOS OF THE AMERICAN SUGAR 
REF I NING COMPANY, 1 8 91-1 9 0 5  
F/ I dF/C dF / I  dF dF di 
---------------------------------------------------- ---------------
1 8 9 1  
1 8 9 2 
1 8 9 3  
1 8 9 4  
1 8 9 5 
1 8 9 6  
1 8 97 
1 8 9 8  
1 8 9 9  
1 9 0 0  
1 90 1  
1 9 02  
1 9 0 3  
1 9 0 4  
1 9 0 5  
3 . 7 8 
2 . 7 6  
1 . 5 5 
1 .  4 3  
1 .  3 9  
1 .  52 
1 .  4 7  
1 . 3 5 
2 . 3 8 
2 . 3 4 
0 . 93 
1 . 1 5 
1 .  02 
0 . 9 1 
0 . 9 1 
1 1 . 5 9 
1 .  3 7  
1 .  5 9  
1 .  6 5  
1 .  6 8  
1 . 5 3 
1 . 2 4  
1 . 2 0  
1 . 2 0  
1 .  0 5  
0 . 8 8 
0 . 7 7  
0 . 6 8 
0 . 6 5 
0 . 6 5 
-2 6 . 9 % 
-4 3 . 7 %  
-8 . 1 % 
-2 . 5 % 
9 . 0 % 
-3 . 0 % 
- 8 . 2 % 
7 5 . 9 % 
-1 . 5 % 
-60 . 3 % 
23 . 9 % 
- 1 2 . 0 � 
- 9 . 9 ', 
-0 . 6 % 
8 8 . 2 %  
1 6 . 0 % 
3 . 4 % 
2 . 0 % 
- 9 . 1 % 
-18 . 7 %  
- 3 . 3 % 
-0 . 3 % 
-12 . 1 % 
- 1 6 . 6 % 
-12 . 7 % 
-1 1 . 6 % 
-4 . 5 % 
0 . 6 % 
0 . 0 % 
4 . 1 % 
0 . 4 % 
0 . 0 % 
0 . 0 % 
-12 . 6 % 
- 1 . 1 % 
-2 . 3 % 
1 .  3 %  
- 6 . 9 % 
1 .  0%  
1 . 5 %  
-0 . 4 % 
0 . 3 % 
3 6 . 8 % 
8 4 . 7 %  
9 . 2 % 
2 . 6 % 
- 8 . 3 % 
- 9 . 9 %  
7 . 7 %  
- 4 4 . 5 % 
2 . 8 % 
1 3 4 . 2 % 
-1 8 . 5 % 
1 5 . 3 % 
1 0 . 6 % 
0 . 9 % 
NOTE : F/C  = the proport ion of  f ixed t o  quick asset s . 
F / I  = the proport ion o f  f i xed assets to f inanc ial  asset s . 
7 4 4 . 9 % 
- 1 0 . 2 %  
-2 . 9 % 
- 1 . 9 %  
1 0 . 0 % 
7 . 4 % 
2 . 3 % 
-2 . 0 % 
1 5 . 2 %  
1 1 . 6% 
1 5 . 7 %  
1 4 . 8 % 
4 . 3 % 
-0 . 3 % 
dF/C = the annua l percentage change in the rat io o f  f ixed t o  quick 
assets 
dF/ I  = the annual percent age change in the ratio of f ixed t o  f inanc ial  
asset s . 
dF t he annual percent age change in fixed asset s . 
dC 
= t he annua l percentage change in quick asset s . 
di 
= the annual percentage change in f inanc ial asset s . 
SOURCE : The Comme rc ial and Financ ia l Chronic l e ,  1 8 9 1 - 1 9 0 6 ;  Vogt , 
pp . 1 1 8  - 1 ::?  0 . 
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except during the pe riod 1 8 9 9 - 1 9 0 0  when the p rice wa r  with the Arbuckles 
depleted thP. company' s cash reserves . 1 6c 
Table 3 a lso shows the absolute pe rcentage rate o f  change o f  f ixed 
asset s ,  qu ick assets and investment s in other compan ies . During the 
period 1 8 9 1 - 1 9 0 5  t he book va lue of the Ame rican S ugar Refin ing Company' s  
quick assets inc reased by an average of 1 6  percent annually,  while 
investments in other companies increased by an ave rage annual rate of 58 
percent . 1 61 If the huge increase in f inanc ial  assets du ring 1 8 9 1 -1 8 92 
i s  excl uded, the ave rage annual rate of increase of financ i a l  assets is 
s t i l l  a lmost 5 percent . Fixed assets , howeve r dec l ined by an annual 
average of  1 . 1  percent . The growth of the company th roughout t he f i rst 
f ifteen yea rs of it s l i fe , therefore, cons isted prima r i l y  of the 
a ccumulat ion o f  quick assets and the securit ies o f  other companies , 
rather than rea l  prope rty o r  product ive capacity . 
The f igures p resented in Table 4 amplify t he t rends noted i n  
Table 3 :  the growing re lat ive and abso lute impo rtance o f  investments in 
other compa nies and quick assets in the American Sugar Ref i ning 
Company' s total growth du ring 1 8 9 1 - 1 9 0 5 ,  and the declining importance of 
fixed assets . In  propo rtion to total asset s ,  f ixed assets fell  in a l l  
but t h ree yea rs,  f rom 65 . 6  pe rcent in 1 8 9 1  t o  2 4 . 3  percent i n  1 9 0 5 . 
I nvestments in other compan ies , as a proportion o f  total  asset s ,  
increa sed st eadily,  finally  surpass ing f ixed assets in relat ive 
1 60Du ring 1 8 9 9- 1 9 0 0  the total value of the company ' s  assets fel l  
below the l �ve l that obta ined in 1 8 9 8 ,  prior t o  wh i ch t he company had 
been growing s teadi ly,  due to the deplet ion of  cash rese rves caused by 
the pr ice wa r with the Arbuc kles ( see Table 2 above ) . The va l ue of t he 
company ' s  as set s rose above the 1 8 9 8 leve l in 1 9 0 1  and continued t o  grow 
t h rough 1 9 0 4 . 
161Annua l  averages as  computed here a re equ iva lent t o  the a ve rage 
annua l percent age change in a particular f inancial rat io ,  rathe r  t han 
the t o t a l  change in the rat io divided by the number of years  ove r  which 
the t o t a l  change occurred, and a re meant to enable compa r ison o f  
movement s i n  the rat ios f rom one yea r  t o  the next , rather than annua l 
ave rage of t he total  change in the ratio i f  spread evenly over t he 
pe riod throughout which the cha nge was occur ring . They a re computed by 
dividing each annua l pe rcent age change in the re levant financial  ratio 
by the numbe r of  yea rs ove r which such cha nges occurred . 
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TABLE 4 
SELECTED FINANC IAL RAT IOS OF THE AMERICAN 
SUGAR REF IN ING COMI?ANY, 1 8 9 1- 1 9 0 5  
YEAR F/A I / A C/A dF/A 
1 8 9 1  6 5 . 6 % 5 . 7 %  1 7 . 4 % 
1 8 92 4 3 . 4 '1; 3 1 . 6 % 1 5 . 7 % -3 4 . 0 % 
1 8 9 3 4 0 . 9 % 2 5 . 7 % 2 6 . 3 % -5 . 8 % 
1 8 9 4 4 1 . 0 % 2 4 . 9 % 2 8 . 7 %  0 . 4 % 
1 8 95 3 8 . 4 % 22 . 9 % 27 . 6 % - 6 . 3 % 
1 8 9 6  3 8 . 0 % 2 4 . 9 % 2 5 . 0 % -1 . 2 %  
1 8 97 32 . 5 % 2 6 . 1 % 2 2 . 0 % - 1 4 . 5 % 
1 8 9 8  3 1 . 6 % 2 6 . 3 % 2 3 . 3 % -2 . 8 % 
1 8 9 9  35 . 5% 2 9 . 7 % 1 4 . 9 % 12 . 6 !7 
1 9 0 0  3 3 . 5% 3 1 . 8 % 1 4 . 3 % -5 . 8 % 
1 9 0 1  2 8 . 0 % 3 1 . 9 % 30 . 1 % -1 6 . 3 % 
1 9 02 27 . 6 �, 3 6 . 0 % 2 3 . 9 % -1 . 6 % 
1 9 0 3  2 6 .  2 '. 38 . 8 � 25 . 8 % -4 . 8 % 
1 9 0 4  2 3 . 0 � 3 5 . 5 � 25 . 1 % -12 . 4 % 
1 9 0 5  2 4 . 3 '1. 3 7 . 4 � 2 6 . 7 % 5 . 8 % 
NOTE : F/A = the propo r t ion of  f ixed to tot a l  asset s . 
I /A = the proport ion of f inancial to total assets . 
C/A = t he p roport ion o f  cash to total assets . 
d i / A  
4 5 8 . 1 % 
- 1 8 . 7 %  
-2 . 9 % 
- 8 . 2 %  
8 . 6 % 
5 . 1 % 
0 . 6 % 
12 . 9 % 
7 . 2 % 
0 . 3 % 
1 2 . 7 % 
7 .  7 %  
- 8 . 3 % 
5 . 2 %  
dF /A = t he annua l percentage cha nge i n  t he proport ion o f  f ixed t o  total 
asset s . 
di/A  
= the annua l percent age change in the propo rt ion of  f inancial  to 
total asset s . 
SOURCE : Comme rcial  and Financia l Chron icle , 1 8 9 1 - 1 9 0 6 ;  Vogt , pp . 
1 1 7 - 1 2 1  
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importance du ring 1 9 0 1  as the Ame rican Suga r Ref ining Company expanded 
its holdings in the beet sugar indust ry . Once t he company came t o  be 
wel l  establi shed, and excluding the t wo yea rs during which t he price war 
with the Arbuckles was at its height , qu ick assets comprised a s teady 2 2  
t o  3 0  percent o f  total  asset s . 
As the f igures above suggest,  the bulk of  t he consolida t ion ' s  
g rowt h during 1 8 9 1 - 1 9 0 5  con si sted of the accumulat ion o f  f inanc ial 
assets and working capital ( including cash) . Fixed assets decl ined in 
importance as  a balance sheet item both absolutely and in p ropo rt ion to 
the other t ypes of assets that the company carried on its  books . The 
American Suga r Re f ining Company' s financial histo ry does not include a 
story of  the way in wh i ch net f ixed capi tal  expenditures were funded, 
since such expenditures we re inconsequent i a l . 1 6' Furthermore , the 
periods of greatest decli ne in the relati ve impo rtance of f ixed to total 
asset s ,  and the periods o f  greatest increase in the relative importance 
of f inancial  to total assets,  occu rred during yea rs when t he company' s  
capita l izat ion wa s increased . American Suga r Ref in ing Company stoc k  wa s 
thus being issued la rgely to finance the accumulat ion of  the securities 
tuvogt , pp . 1 1 8 -1 2 1 . It is interest ing to note that the net 
investment of the Ame rican Suga r Company in ta ngible f ixed assets wa s 
nega t ive . An improvement account was ca rried on the company' s  books 
th rough 1 8 9 6 ,  out of which the ma intenance of product ive capacity was 
funded . Dur ing 1 8 9 1 - 1 8 9 6  the f ixed as set s of the company , as  val ued on 
its  books , inc rea sed very slowly . After 1 8 9 6 ,  howeve r ,  the depreciat ion 
account ceased to be recorded, at least in t he figures re lea sed to t he 
public by the company . From 1 8 9 7  through 1 9 0 3 ,  t he company' s  net f ixed 
investment was negat ive ,  indicat ing that it was consuming rathe r  t han 
adding to its f ixed capita l ,  a fter which it stabi l i zed a t  approximately 
zero . I t  is  therefore imposs ible to discuss t he f inancing of the f ixed 
inves tment expenditu res of the Ame rican Sugar Re f i ning Company, s ince 
such expenditures appe a r  to have been non-existent , at least as recorded 
on the company ' s  books . I t  is , howeve r,  a lmost certain t hat its  
re fining a f f i l iates added to product ive capac ity du ring t he pe r iod . 
Since no consol idated ba lance sheets a re available for the Ame rican 
Sugar Re f ining Company during this pe riod, it is impossible to dete rmine 
t he extent t o  which such addi tions took place, or how they were 
financed . It is not unreasonable to suppose, howeve r ,  that the American 
Sugar Re fining Company a ided in the funding of the f i xed capital  
expenditures of its  a f f i liates t hrough the  redist ribu t ion o f  the 
dividends that it rece ived f rom them, or th rough t he establishment of 
pol icies that enabled the retent ion of high volumes of ea rnings in the 
t reasuries o f  its  most p rofit able subs idia ries . 
1 4 9  
o f  other companies ,  and t he capitalization of the expected gains o f  the 
establi shment of cont rol ove r investment and product ion within the 
indust ry .  
The Use of Credi t by the Ameri can Suga r Refining Company, 1 89 1 -1 9 0 5  
I t  is dangerous to attempt t o  attribute di f fe rent speci f ic s ou rces 
of funds to pa rticula r uses . For instance, funds that a re obt a ined 
through short t e rm bo rrowings , wh ich are nominally used to add t o  
inventories , may indirectly f und the expans ion o f  a company ' s  product ive 
capac ity t hrough the use of earnings that were rea l i zed by t he s a le o f  
the expanded inventories . It  is possible, however ,  to  ma ke b road 
genera l i zat ions rega rding the pos sible uses of funds obt ained in va rious 
ways . I n  the case of  the Amer ican Suga r Ref ining Company, t he issue o f  
stock wa s used prima r i ly to acquire t i t le to exist ing p rope rt ie s ,  either 
indirectly th rough the acquisit ion of  st ock in independent companies , 
o r  di rect ly th rough the acquisit ion o f  rea l  p rope rty itsel f .  
But the Ame rican Suga r Re fining Company was a lso an ope ra t ing 
company, and had a s  one aspect of its financial  a f f a i rs t he f unding o f  
its  day t o  d a y  ope rations as  a produce r o f  re f ined sugar . Despite the 
i ncreasing sophist icat ion of  the financial techn iques that it employed 
in establish ing coordinat ion th roughout the indus t ry ,  t he techn iques 
used by t he consol ida t i on in funding i t s  day-t o-day operat ions we re 
rema rkably s imi l a r  to those used by the individual  co rpo ration s  that 
were ea r lier consol idated unde r the t rust . 
The working capi t a l  requ i rements of  t he American Sugar Re fining 
Company appear to have been moderate . Th roughout t he pe riod 1 8 9 1- 1 9 0 5 ,  
wo rking capit a l  as  a pe rcentage of total assets averaged a round 3 6 % 
percent ( see Table 2 J , with  the low being 2 9  percent in 1 8 9 1 ,  and the 
h igh , 45 pe rcent in 1 9 0 4 . Table 5 shows that t he company ' s  leve l  of 
work ing capita l dec l ined du ring pe riods of  part icu l a r ly seve re 
competit ion when its cash rese rves ran low, and rose , pa rt icularly 
during 1 9 0 1  ( fo l lowing t he end of the price wa r with t ne Arbuckles ) ,  
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YEAR 
1 8 9 1  
1 8 92 
1 8 93 
1 8 9 4 
1 8 9 5  
1 8 9 6  
1 8 9 7  
1 8 9 8  
1 8 9 9  
1 90 0  
1 9 0 1  
1 9 02 
1 9 0 3  
1 9 0 4  
1 9 0 5  
TABLE 5 
NET EARNINGS , WORKING CAP ITAL AND RETAINED EARNINGS 
FOR THE AMERICAN SUGAR REFINING COMPAW! , 
1 8 9 1 - 1 9 0 5  
WKG CAP 1t1C /C NET EARN RET EARN CUR 
$ 1 8 , 0 3 7 , 1 3 3  3 6 %  $ 3 , 1 9 8 , 0 0 3  $ 1 , 32 3 , 0 0 3  1 .  5 7  
2 3 , 8 3 4 , 0 1 3  32%  1 1 ,  6 8 8 ,  272 5 , 2 5 2 , 9 9 7  1 .  5 8  
3 5 , 1 63 , 5 3 0  4 8 %  1 2 , 8 2 6 , 0 3 0  2 , 3 6 7 , 1 0 0  1 .  5 8  
3 5 , 7 7 8 , 0 1 9  6 9 %  7 , 7 9 9 , 0 0 4  8 2 6 , 3 8 4  1 .  67  
4 3 , 4 2 4 , 3 0 1  5 9 % 1 0 , 3 8 4 , 3 9 2  3 , 4 1 1 , 7 72 1 .  7 3  
4 2 , 2 6 0 , 657  57%  6 , 0 2 8 , 5 8 4  ( 9 9 5 ,  3 3 6 )  1 .  5 4  
4 8 , 0 7 1 , 8 8 7  6 5 %  6 , 8 62 , 8 9 0 ( 1 , 1 6 1 , 0 3 0 )  1 . 5 4  
4 9 , 8 0 7 , 1 8 9  6 7 %  7 , 2 2 6 , 707 2 02 , 7 8 7  1 .  5 1  
3 5 , 6 4 7 , 2 0 5  4 8 %  3 , 1 9 1 , 4 5 7  ( 3 , 8 32 , 4 6 3 )  1 .  6 9  
3 8 , 2 2 6 , 1 8 7  52 % 8 , 4 2 0 , 9 1 3  1 , 3 9 6 , 9 9 3  1 .  3 9  
4 9 , 1 1 1 , 3 4 2  5 6 �. 7 , 62 5 , 9 6 1  1 ,  l l 5 ,  2 8 4  2 . 02 
4 5 , 8 8 9 , 6 7 5  5 U  7 , 2 6 3 , 8 4 9  9 6 3 , 8 4 9  1 .  8 4  
4 6 , 0 5 4 , 6 5 2  521. 7 , 6 9 4 , 4 9 6  1 , 3 9 4 , 4 9 6  1 . 47 
4 6 , 9 7 6 , 6 8 4  7 0 �, 7 , 8 1 9 , 8 7 5  1 , 5 1 9 , 875  1 . 3  
5 5 , 3 1 8 , 1 7 6  6 H  6 , 52 1 , 4 2 8  22 1 , 4 2 8  1 . 3 6  
NOTE : WKG CAP work ing capital (computed he re as cash 
assets+ invent o r ies ) 
WC/C = wo rking capit a l  as a pe rcentage of total  capital  s tock 
NET EARN = net ea rnings , exc luding interest (computed he re as dividends 
pa id+net change in surplus)  
RET EARN retained earnings (computed he re as  net earn ings-dividends 
pa id) 
CUR = the rat io of current assets to cu rrent l iabi lit ies . 
SOURCE : Commerc i a l  and Financial Chron icle,  1 8 9 1 -1 9 0 6 .  
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when its  cash posi t ion improved . Var iat ions in the company ' s leve l s  o f  
working capi t a l  thus appear t o  have had less to d o  with del iberate 
changes in invento r ies than with periodic f luctuat ions in its  cash 
pos it ion . 1 6 3  
As a proport ion of  the consolidation ' s total capi t a l  s tock , 
work ing capital  ave raged approximately 5 4  percent . Unl i ke t he rat io o f  
working c apital  t o  total as set s ,  howeve r ,  which va r ied more o r  less 
randomly as  a result o f  f luctuat ions in the company' s cash reserves , the 
rat io o f  working capita l t o  capita l stock displayed a pronounced upwa rd 
t rend . 1 64 
The company appea rs to have provided for its work ing capi t a l  
needs w i t h  short t e rm bo rrowings supplemented by reta ined ea rn ings . 
Short term advances tended to t rack changes in qu ick assets quite 
closely, while increases in capita l stock we re less than changes in the 
book va lue o f  qu ick assets . P rior to 1 8 9 7 ,  dur ing a pe riod o f  generally 
high earn ings for t he consolidation, it was consistent ly able t o  add t o  
i t s  surplus , and no evidence appears of  any f inanc i a l  s t ra in . The 
behavior of the company ' s  current ratio,  howeve r ,  s uggests that t he bulk 
of the earnings that we re be ing retained in the bus iness we re not being 
used to add to work ing capit al . : b> La ter,  dur ing the 1 8 97 - 1 9 0 0  price 
1 6JThis point i s  st rongly suggested by t he behavior o f  the company' s  
levels o f  work ing capital  during the price wa r with the Arbuckles . 
During 1 8 97-1 9 0 0  t he value of  suga r and other invento r ies kept on hand 
by the company ave raged over $20 mil l ion, over 25 percent more than the 
company norma l ly kept on hand . Nevertheless , working capital  dec reased, 
as  t he company' s cash asset s and rece ivables , fell  by an even greater 
amount dur ing 1 8 9 9- 1 9 0 0 . Commercia l and Financia l Chron icle , 1 8 9 1 - 1 9 0 6 ;  
Vogt , p .  9 9 . 
1uThese f igures overstate the work ing capital  norma l ly emp loyed by 
the f i rm, as t he cash assets that we re used to compute them include 
dep rec iat ion a l lowances and cash accumulat ions de rived f rom t he is sue of  
stoc k  and the sale of  fixed as sets . 
1 65During t he f i rst f ive years o f  the company ' s l i f e ,  despite t he 
return o f  ea rnings to the bus iness , t he f i rm' s level of  borrowings 
appear to have increased commensurately with i t s  qu ick assets ,  forc ing 
i t s  current rat i o  to rema i n  we l l  below 2 throughout t he pe riod . It i s  
pos s ible that funds that we re ret ained i n  the bus iness we re used t o  
ma int a in t he company ' s  fixed asset s ,  or t o  fund the purchase o f  
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war with the Arbuckles , boa rd of  di rectors repeatedly suggested that 
dividends be f ixed at a lower leve l than had been pa id earlier,  and t ha t  
ea rnings be added t o  t h e  company' s surplus and used t o  increase its  
working capi ta l . Despite the boa rd' s res olve , t he company' s surplus 
dec reased by ove r  $ 3  mi l l ion during 1 8 9 9  while inventories increa sed . 
Fina lly,  in 1 9 0 0  the annua l dividend on the company' s common stock was 
reduced to seven pe rcent . Meanwhile,  the f i rm' s bo r rowings dec reased, 
leaving the current rat io st able at approximately 1 . 4 . 1 66 The boa rd 
subsequent ly adopted resolut ions in January 1 9 0 3  and 1 9 0 4  f ixing t he 
dividend on the common stock a t  7 percent ( t he dividend on preferred 
s t ock rema ined at 7 pe rcent throughout the period )  in t he interest o f  
reserving s urplus earnings for working capit a l ,  but a s  movements i n  the 
current ra t io dur ing those yea rs show , its bo rrowings increa sed more 
rapidly than did its  accumulat ions of cash or inventories . 
Alt hough the company was not a la rge bor rowe r ,  short t e rm 
advances were an impo rtant source of funds in f inancing its  day-to-day 
operat i ons . 1 6 7  S hort t e rm bo rrowings appear to have moved in 
con junct ion with cu r rent asset s during most yea rs , a lbe it in greater 
addit iona l f i nancial assets and properties du ring t he pe riod,  each being 
equally l i ke l y . 
: 66Much confus ion exists rega rding the f inanc i a l  e f fects of  the 
price wa r with the Arbuc k les on the Ame rican Suga r Re f ining Company . 
Acco rding to " common rumo r "  in 1 9 1 2 ,  the company had "expended $ 1 5  
mi l l ion o f  their surplus and gone into the ma rket to bo r row money" 
during the wa r .  It  is  t rue that the value o f  the company' s  assets 
dec lined by some $ 1 5  mi l l ion du ring t he price war ,  but this was l a rgely 
o f fset by a decl ine in t he company ' s  borrowings , giving a net def icit 
for the period o f  $ 3 , 8 3 2 , 4 6 3 du ring t he last yea r  when t he compan ies 12 
percent dividend on its common sha res rema ined in e f fect . See Commercial 
and F inanc ia l Ch ronicle 70 ( Janua ry 1 4 ,  1 9 0 0 ) : 7 8 ;  and Ha rdwick 
Committee,  Hea rings , p .  1 0 . 
1 67Robe rt R .  Hei ke tes t i f ied in 1 9 12 that the Ame r ican Suga r 
Refining Company was not a la rge borrowe r of  money during 1 8 9 9- 1 9 1 2 ,  but 
rather wa s a la rge lende r f rom its cons ide rable surpl us . The company ' s  
ba lance sheets seem to conf i rm t h i s ;  f rom 1 8 9 9 - 1 9 0 5  investments in other 
companies a re cons i s tent ly highe r than borrowings . During t he e a r l ie r  
pe riod,  howeve r ,  bo r rowings we re usua l ly approximately equal to othe r 
investments . Of course , the ba lance sheet item " Investments"  cons isted 
a ls o  o f  t he stock of other sugar refining companies . See Hardwick 
Committee,  Hea rings , pp . 2 1 6-2 1 9 . 
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absolute magn itude , whi le reta ined earnings , which f luct uated f requently 
du ring the period, do not appea r to have systematically a ffected the 
company' s levels o f  work ing capita l .  Short term advances a s  a 
proport ion of  total  assets ranged f rom a h igh of  3 2  percent in 1 9 0 4  t o  a 
low of  approximately 1 6  pe rcent in 1 8 92 ,  but norma l ly did not vary much 
f rom an ave rage of 2 3  pe rcent . Even du ring pe riods when t he current 
ratio approached 1 . 2 ,  the company did not expe rience di f f i culty in 
obt a ining funds in the short term money ma rket , and neve r found it 
necessary to is sue the $ 1 0  million mortgage bonds authorized by t he 
reo rganizat ion committee in 1 8 9 1 . 1 68 
Profi ts, Di vi dends and the Dist ribu t i on of Ameri can Suga r Refining 
Company St ock, 1 891 -1 905 
A record of the conso l idat ion' s ea rn ings and dividends is  
cont ained in Table 6 .  The Ame rican Suga r Re f ining Company experienced 
an early pe riod of high profits from 1 8 9 1 - 1 8 9 5 ,  a period of more 
variable ea rnings f rom 1 8 9 6- 1 8 9 9  and a period of mode rate but steady 
p ro f i t s  du ring 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 0 5 . 1 69 The company' s  f irst dividend of 3 . 5  
pe rcent on t he common stock and 4 percent on the pre ferred was dec la red 
by John E .  Sea r le s ,  the company ' s t reasurer,  in June , 1 8 9 1 . 170 The 
company subsequent ly pa id two semia nnua l dividends in 1 8 92 ,  totaling 7 
percent on t he pre fe r red and 8 pe rcent on the common s�ock,  and then 
dec la red an addi tional qua rterly dividend of  2 . 5  percent on its common 
168Commercial  and Financial Chron icle 7 3  ( November 3 0 ,  1 9 0 1 ) : 1 8 6 .  
The bonds were held by the Cent ral Trust Company unt i l  t hey were 
canceled in late 1 90 1 . The only use to which they were ever put was in 
t he acqu i s i t ion o f  the propert ies owned by the co rporat ions that were 
consol ida ted unde r the t rust , when they me rely se rved as  collateral 
during t he t ransfer of  propert ies . 
16�P rofits here were est imated in the same manne r as  in  Table 3 :  as  
the annual change in the company' s net proprietorship, o r  t he s um o f  
yea rly dividends pa id on both c lasses of  stoc k  and the change in surplus 
reserves . The company relea sed no earnings statements dur ing t he f i rst 
f i fteen yea rs of its l i fe . 
1 7°Commercial and Financial Ch ronicle 52 ( June 1 3 ,  1 8 9 1 ) : 8 9 9 .  
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TABLE 6 
D IVIDENDS AND EARNINGS FOR THE AMERICAN 
SUGAR REFINING COMPANY, 1 8 9 1 - 1 9 0 5  
YEAR PDIV CD IV RETURN EARNINGS 
1 8 9 1  3 . 5 0 %  4 . 0 0 %  6 . 4 0 %  $ 3 , 1 9 8 , 0 0 3  
1 8 9 2  7 . 0 0 %  1 0 . 5 0 %  1 5 . 8 9 %  $ 1 1 ,  6 8 8 ,  272  
1 8 9 3 7 . 0 0 �  2 1 . 5 0 �- 1 7 . 4 8 %  $ 1 2 , 8 2 6 , 0 3 0  
1 8 9 4  7 . 0 0 %  12 . 0 0 %  1 0 . 6 3 %  $ 7 , 7 9 9 , 0 0 4  
1 8 95 7 . 0 0 %  1 2 . 0 0 %  1 4  . 1 5 %  $ 1 0 , 3 8 4 , 3 92 
1 8 9 6 7 . 0 0 %  1 2 . 0 0 %  8 . 1 5%  $ 6 , 02 8 , 5 8 4  
1 8 97 7 . 0 0 %  1 2 . 0 0 %  7 . 9 3 %  $ 5 , 8 62 , 8 9 0 
1 8 9 8 7 . 0 0 %  12 . 0 0 %  9 .  7 7 %  $7 , 22 6 , 7 0 7  
1 8 9 9  7 . 0 0 %  12 . 0 0 %  4 . 32 %  $ 3 , 1 9 1 , 4 57 
1 9 0 0  7 . 0 0 %  7 . 7 5 %  9 . 2 6 %  $ 6 , 8 4 9 , 7 7 3  
1 9 0 1  7 . 0 0 %  7 . 0 0 %  8 . 2 6 %  $7 , 2 9 4 , 9 1 0  
1 9 02  7 . 0 0 'i  7 . 0 0 %  8 . 07 %  $7 , 2 63 , 8 4 9  
1 9 0 3  7 .  0 0 �1 7 . 0 0%  8 . 5 5%  $ 7 , 6 9 4 , 4 9 6 
1 9 0 4  7 .  0 0 �  7 . 0 0�  8 . 6 9 %  $ 7 , 8 1 9 , 8 7 5  
1 9 0 5  7 . 0 0 �  7 . 0 0�  7 . 2 5 % $ 6 , 52 1 , 4 2 8  
AVG 9 . 65't  
NOTE : PDIV = t he annual dividend on  the preferred stock of  the 
Ame rican Sugar Re fin ing Company . 
CD IV the annua l dividend on the common stock o f  t he Ame rican Suga r 
Ref ining Company . 
RETURN = the total rate of  return on equity ( net ea rnings /equit y )  . 
EARNINGS = net ea rnings as computed in Table 3 .  
SOURCE : Commercial and Financ ial Chronicle,  1 8 9 1 - 1 9 0 6 . 
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stoc k  in Oct obe r ,  1 8 9 2 ,  a f ter which a l l  dividends we re pa id 
qua rterly . 1 71 The company' s earnings through t he end of  1 8 92 we re 
derived solely f rom the sale of re fined suga r and inte rest on c redit s  
granted; n o  dividends had yet been decla red o n  the stoc k  wh ich the 
company held in t he Philade lphia ref ineries . n2 
The Philade lphia companies that the American S uga r Ref in ing 
Company acqui red t hrough the direct exchange of  the i r  f irst issue of 
stock dec la red their f i rst dividends at the end of 1 8 92 ,  supplement ing 
the conso l ida t ion ' s  ope rat ing revenues to the extent t hat the dividend 
on the common stock wa s increased to 3 pe rcent qua rter ly . An ext ra 
dividend of 10 pe rcent wa s also decla red on the comma� st ock for 1 8 9 2 ,  
and was paid out of  t he surplus accumulated du ring 1 8 9 1 -1 8 92 ,  which had 
been reserved to supplement the company' s work ing capit a l . 1 73 
Despite a dramatic decrease in the consol ida t ion ' s  earn ings ,  
measured a s  a retu rn on equity,  du ring 1 8 9 6-1 8 9 9 ,  the company cont inued 
to pay the 12 percent annual dividend on its  common s tock and the 
regu lar 7 pe rcent on the pre ferred; it wa s neve r fo rced to pass on a 
dividend . The pr ice wa r be tween the consol idat ion and the independent 
re finer ies came to an end sometime in 1 9 0 0 ,  but not be fore the company' s  
assets had shrunk by a lmost $ 1 6  mi l l ion du ring 1 8 9 9 ,  and it  had been 
forced to dip into its surplus to continue its dividend a t  the rate that 
1 7 1Commercial  and Financial  Chronicle 54 ( January 1 6 , 1 8 9 2 ) : 1 1 9 . 
1 72Commercial  and Financ ia l Ch ron icle 5 6  ( January 1 4 ,  1 8 9 3 )  : pp . 7 9-
8 0 . The company ' s  f i scal year ended on Novembe r 3 0 . A l l  references t o  
ea rnings du ring a pa rt icular  year re late to the Novembe r t hrough 
Novembe r yea r  that the company observed on its  books . 
1 73After Janua ry,  1 8 9 3 ,  it is imposs ible t o  dist i nguish between the 
f i rm' s operat ing and inves tment income . Prior t o  this  date,  howeve r ,  it  
i s  certain that none of  the f i rm' s net ea rnings were der i ved f rom 
dividends pa id on the stock o f  the Philade lphia ref ine ries , leaving the 
Ame r ican Suga r Ref ine ry Company of  San Francisco as  t he only dividend 
paying p roperty in which the company held a s ign i f i cant interest during 
1 8 9 1 - 1 8 9 2 . See the Comme rcia l and Financial Ch ron icle 5 6  (Ma rch 1 1 ,  
1 8 9 3 ) : p .  4 1 3 .  
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had been established du r i ng the more prosperous pe riod prior t o  
1 8 9 6 . 1 74 
The company' s  a f fa i rs improved dur ing 1 9 0 0  and stabil i zed shortly 
therea fter,  with the format ion of the Nat iona l Suga r Re f ining Company o f  
New Jersey ( see above , t h i s  chapter ) ,  and the end o f  cutthroat 
competit ion with the Arbuc kles . Despite improved ea rn ings during 1 9 0 0 ,  
the company adopted a po l icy in late 1 9 00 and ea rly 1 9 0 1  that suggested 
that the st ockholde rs be satisfied with a mode rate pro f i t ,  and t ha t  
surplus reserves be increa sed to fund t he consolida t ion ' s working 
cap it a l  needs and the ma intenance and improvement o f  its  ref ining 
p ropert ies . I n  1 9 0 1  the dividend on both classes o f  stock was f i xed by 
t he boa rd of d i rectors at 7 percent , out of  a total  average retu rn on 
equity of s l ight ly over 8 percent during 1 9 0 1 - 1 9 0 5 . 1 7� Although there 
is no way of know i ng pre c i sely how the company' s increas i ng surplus was 
used, Table 3 above shows addit ions to surplus rese rves dur ing 1 9 0 1-
1 9 0 5  t o  have been less vo lat i le than during the earlier per iod . 
Ve ry l itt le spec i f ic informat ion is ava i lable rega rding t he 
dist r ibut ion of  t he company' s  stock prior to the death o f  the Amer ican 
1 74Vogt , p .  5 3 ,  pp . 1 1 6- 1 1 9 .  Apparent ly,  it  wa s wide ly known that 
the Amer ican S uga r Re fining Company was us ing its surplus t o  cont inue 
dividends at the rate that had been est abl ished dur ing more p rosperous 
t imes in the face of low or negat ive earnings . In early 1 9 0 0 ,  a suit 
was b rought by Robe rt J .  Trimble, a stockholde r  o f  t he Arbuckle Bros . 
f i rm, asking that t he Ame rican Sugar Ref in ing Company be enj o ined f rom 
us ing its  surplus to depress the price o f  suga r and force the Arbuckles 
into the co1nb inat ion . No informa tion is ava i lable on the u l t imate 
re solut ion of  t he suit . See the Commerc i a l  and Financial  Chronicle 7 0  
( June 4 ,  1 9 0 0 )  : 9 9 8 . 
: '�The boa rd of di rectors of  the American Suga r Re fining Company 
passed resolut ions at t he start of  each f i scal year ,  beginning in 1 9 0 1 ,  
st ipulat ing that accumu lated pro f i t s  be reserved f o r  working capital  and 
depreciat ion . The ba lance sheets that t he company f i led with the State 
of Mas sachusset s ,  which contain much of the dat a  used in this study , do 
not def ine a sepa rate depreciat ion reserve account . Appa rently,  t he 
company ' s  depreciat ion a ccount was combined with its  regul a r  rese rve 
account . See the Commercial and Financial Chronic le,  1 90 0 -1 9 0 6 . 
1 57 
S ugar Re f ining Company' s  f i rst president , Henry 0 .  Havemeyer ,  i n  
1 9 0 7 . 1 76 Between t he t ime o f  the format ion of  t h e  Suga r Ref ineries 
Company in 1 8 8 7  and the Hardwick Commit tee I nve s t igat ion of 1 9 1 2 ,  the 
stock of  the two inca rnat ions of the suga r consolidat ion changed f rom a 
favorite ob ject o f  intense speculat ion to a we l l  sea soned "blue chip" 
s tock that wa s h ighly pri zed by long-term investors . This t ransit ion , 
howeve r ,  a long with a gene ra l st abi l i zat ion in the dis t r ibut ion o f  the 
ownership of  the stock,  and release o f  re liable i n forma t ion rega rding 
its  dist ribut ion , did not occur unt i l  after approximately 1 9 1 0 . 1 77 
The Sug a r  Trust and the American Sugar Re f in ing Company, unlike 
the individual companies of  which they we re comprised, came t o  be widely 
held a lmost immediately fo l l owing their  format ion . Most o f  t he initial 
owne rs o f  t he t ru s t  ce rtif icates issued by the Suga r Re f ineries Company, 
who numbered approximately 200  in 1 8 8 7 ,  we re reported t o  have sold t heir  
cert i ficates as  " soon as  poss ible " after having received t hem . 178  Henry 
Havemeye r ,  who ret a ined a la rge portion of the t rust cert i f icates he 
received in exchange for  his interest in Havemeyer & E lder and DeCa st ro 
& Donne r ,  so ld most of t he Ame rican Suga r Company Stock he received in 
exchange for t he t rust ce rt i f icates short ly a fter the latter company was 
organi zed . 1 'q He reta ined cont rol of the company unt i l  his  death 
t hrough control o f  the proxy mach ine ry, by wh ich he wa s annually 
ree lected as  president of  the company . Even Havemeye r ,  t he mos t  
i n fl uent ial  f igure behind the Ame rican Suga r Re f ining Company, did not 
1 76Eichne r ,  p .  3 0 7 . Hen ry 0 .  Havemeye r wa s pres ident o f  the 
Ame rican Suga r Re f in ing Company f rom the t ime of  its format ion in 1 8 9 1  
unt i l  his dea th i n  1 9 0 7 .  
: nFor mo re on the t rans i t ion of  Ame rican Suga r Re fining Company 
stock f rom an item of gene ra l speculat ion to investment grade stock,  see 
t he test imony of He rbe rt R .  He ike,  Ha rdwick Committee,  Hea rings , pp . 
2 2 1 -2 2 4 . 
mHa rdwick Commit tee, Hea rings , p .  2 2 3 . The S uga r Trust 
cer t i f icates we re t raded in the unlisted depa rtment of  the New York 
Stock Exchange . 
1 79Ha rdwick Committee ,  Hear ings , p .  2 2 1 . 
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own any " cons ide rable" block of  Ame rican Suga r Ref in ing Company Stoc k  
f o r  any app reciable length of  t ime . 1 80 
The stock of the Ame rican Suga r Re fining Company was a favorite 
item of  speculat ion in the unlisted depa rtment of  the New York St ock 
Exchange , whe re it  wa s among the most f requent ly t raded i ssues th rough 
1 9 0 5 . I t s  price f l uctuated widely,  f requent ly and within i r regular  
bounda r ies , l a rge ly as  a result of  manipulat ion by the many speculators 
among whom it was regula rly exchanged, rather t han because o f  any change 
i n  the company ' s  business prospect s . 181 Despite the fac�  that no ma j o r  
company pa id h igher dividends than t he American Sugar Refining Company 
du ring 1 8 9 1 -1 9 0 5 ,  the company ' s  stock took an inordinately long t ime t o  
undergo the " seasoning" requi red to make i t s  acqu i s i t ion des i rable among 
long-term investors . This wa s li kely due to the atmosphere o f  sec recy 
in which most of t he company' s affa i rs we re conducted prior to the death 
o f  Havemeyer in 1 9 0 7 ,  and fea rs that the company woul d  be unable t o  
mai nt a i n  dividend payments a t  the high levels established during the 
early yea rs of  its l i fe . 1 81 The fact that t he company' s stock 
cons is tent ly sold above pa r,  and the dis semina t ion of more det a i led 
informat ion rega rding t he company' s f inanc ia l a f fa i rs fol lowing the 
death of Hen ry Havemeye r ,  eventua lly resu lted in t he stock being viewed 
more as  a favorable i tem for long-term investment , and less as  an object 
of speculat ion . The dist ribution of  the stock thus began t o  s t abi l i ze 
a round 1 9 1 0 ;  du ring the fol lowing yea r  the company ' s stoc kholders we re 
est imated t o  have tot a l led approximately 1 9 , 0 0 0 ,  most of whom we re 
1 80Ha rdwick Corrunit tee , Hea r ings , p .  2 9 . Of the o r igina l part ies t o  
t he format ion of t he Suga r Re f ine ries Company i n  1 8 8 7 ,  only t he Thomas 
f ami ly o f  Boston retai ned a la rge interest in the American S uga r 
Ref in ing Company . The i r  ho ldings were repo rted to have numbered between 
1 50 , 0 0 0  and 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  shares in 1 9 1 1  out of a total  o f  9 0 0 , 0 0 0  sha res (pa r 
value $ 9 0 mi l l ion)  is sued . 
1 8 1U . S .  Indus t r i a l  Corrunission,  Repo rt s ,  vol . 1 ,  pt . 1 ,  p .  4 3 . 
1 81Mu l l in s ,  p .  2 3 9 . 
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located in the Boston and New York areas . 183 
183Hardwick Conunittee , Hearings , p .  2 2 3 .  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE FINANC IAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEAT PACKING 
INDUSTRY, 1 8 7 5 - 1 8 9 0  
History of the Meat Packing Industry, 1 875- 1 9 0 5  
The Beginning of t h e  In t ers t a t e  Dressed Beef Indu s t ry 
In late f a l l ,  1 8 7 7 ,  Gustavus Frank l in Swift completed his f i rst 
commercia l ly successful shipment of  refrige rated meat , t wo modif ied box­
cars f i l led with sides of beef ,  f rom Chicago to the east . '  By 1 90 9 ,  
the meat packing f i rm o f  Swift & Co . was the thirteenth l a rges t  
indust rial bus ine ss in the count ry, a s  measu red b y  tot a l  asset s . Armour 
& Co . ,  which began shipping western dressed bee f to the east short l y  
after S w i f t  & Co . ,  was the e ighth largest American industrial  f i rm by 
1 9 0 9 . 2 
During the years  preceding Swift ' s  f i rst dres sed beef shipment s ,  
cured hog p roducts were a much more import ant item o f  inte rstate 
commerce than beef . The meat packing indust ry was cente red in 
C incinna t i ,  and confined primarily to the seasona l process ing o f  pork 
p roduct s ;  most of t he demand for beef wa s s t i l l  suppl iad by local 
s laughterers and ret a i l  butchers . 3 Alt hough mea t  packing had, for 
1 Rudol f  A.  Clemen,  The American Livestock and Mea t  Indust ry (New 
York : The Ronald P ress Company, 1 92 3 ) , pp . 2 3 1-235 . Although G .  F .  
Swift was not the f i rst to ma rket western dressed beef in eastern 
ma rket s ,  t he bus ine ss cannot be said to have been a commercially viable 
be fore his t ime . Earlier dressed bee f  shipments were i r regu l a r ,  and 
prior to the development of  an e f fect ive , rel iable means of yea r  round 
ref rigerated t ransportat ion ( an innovat ion c redited in no smal l  part to 
Swi f t ) f requent ly a rrived at t he i r  dest inat ion in a state of  advanced 
deca y . 
2Al f red D .  Chandle r,  St rateay and St ructure : Chapt e rs in the 
History o f  the Industrial Enterprise ( Cambridge , Mas s . :  MIT P ress ,  
1 9 6 2 ) , p .  4 .  
3U .  S . ,  Bureau of  Co rpo rat ions , Repo rt of t he Commis s ioner o f  
Corpo ra t i ons on the Bee f Indust ry, 1 9 0 5  (Washington D . C . : U . S .  
Gove rnment P rint ing O f f ice, 1 9 0 5 ) , p .  2 ( he rea fter  referred t o  as  the 
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decade s ,  been a " sea sona l ,  local and a tomi s t i c "  indust ry, within ten 
years o f  Swift ' s  f i rst l ong distance shipments o f  dressed beef the 
indu s t ry had come to be domi nated by four large f i rms ope ra t ing in both 
fore ign and domest ic ma rkets . 4 
A series o f  rela ted developments during the pe riod 1 8 7 0 - 1 8 7 5  made 
pos s ible a shift  in the locat ion of  the indust ry, and its  concent rat ion 
a round t he ma j o r  livestock ma rkets of the midwest . While the p rimary 
sources of  l ivestock supply moved steadi ly westwa rd f r�m Texas to the 
catt le ranges of  the far west , the coun t ry ' s populat ion increas ingly 
c ame to be concent rated in the urban manufactur ing a reas of the 
northeast and middle-At lant ic states . Meanwhile,  the r a i l roads 
cont inued to press west ward . Livestock shipments proved t o  be one of  
their most lucrat ive items of  west t o  east t ra f fi c ,  and the rail roads 
competed vigorously among themselves for port ions of t he catt le t rade . 
E laborate reba te s ystems proli ferated and f reight wars ove r t he 
t ra nspo rtat ion of  l ive stock to eastern ma rkets became inc reas ingly 
common . ,  
Without quest ion , the most impo rtant factor in e f fect ing the 
growth o f  the western dressed bee f industry once the count ry' s rail  
network wa s in place were improvements in re frigerat ion techno logy . 
Ref r ige rat ion made it  poss ible not only to slaughte r  beef yea r  round, 
but a l so enabled the t ransportat ion o f  f resh dres sed meat in 
ref r ige rated ra i l road cars ove r long dista nces bet ween we stern 
s laughte ring fac i l i t ies a nd the consuming centers o f  the east . 
Gar field Repo rt ) .  Cu red po rk and provis ions we re t he "mainstays o f  the 
western packing indust ry" through the Civil Wa r ,  while catt le were 
usua l ly t ransported l ive via overland drives and the daveloping r a i lway 
s ystem and o ffe red for  s a le to local s laughterers . See Ma ry Yeager ,  
Competit ion and Regulat ion : The Deve lopment of  Ol igopo ly in the Mea t  
Packing Indust ry ( Greenwich : JAI P ress Inc . ,  1 9 8 1 ) , pp . 6 -7 . 
4Yeage r ,  p .  xxiv . By 1 8 87  the pack ing concerns o f  P .  D .  Armour,  G .  
F .  Swi f t , Ne l son Mo rris  and G .  H .  Hammond cont rol led about 8 5 %  o f  the 
interstate dressed bee f trade . 
;Clemen, pp . 7 -8 . 
1 62 
The mos t  immediate impact of  the deve lopment o f  t he ref r ige rator 
ca r was on t he locat ion o f  t he packing indust ry , t he center o f  which 
moved steadi ly westwa rd . S ince only 4 0 - 4 5  percent of  t he t o t a l  weight 
of a steer cons isted of edible ( and sa lable ) mea t , the t ransportat ion of 
l ives tock over long distances requi red that f reight be pa id on a 
substant i a l  po rt ion of  the anima l that could not be sold . 6 Furthermore 
c a t t le f requently lost we ight or died on the i r  journey eastwa rd and had 
to be fed and wat e red a long t he way . ' Consequently, t he processing o f  
catt le as  close t o  the sou rce of supply a s  pos sible, a nd the subsequent 
shipment o f  dressed beef t o  the point of  consumpt ion , enabled western 
dressed bee f shippe rs to rea lize a s ign i f icant savings in  t ransportat ion 
costs compa red to livestock shippers who shipped l ive cat t le to the east 
for  s a le t o  local s laughterers . 
Although western d ressed bee f  init ially s old for  f a r  less than t he 
product o f  local eastern s laughterers,  we stern packe rs had to ove rcome 
several  formidable obst acles be fore their t rade with t he east cou ld be 
established on a regula r basis . The consuming public viewed western 
dres sed bee f as inferior to loca l ly slaughtered beef ,  an opinion t ha t  
was act i vely cultivated b y  local eastern but chers a n d  s laughterers who 
quite r ight l y  fea red t ha t  t heir  bus ine sses wou ld suffer  f rom the new 
competit ion . Furthe rmore , the rail roads were host ile � o  t he new 
bus iness,  fea ring a loss of  revenue f rom a dec reased t onnage of  cattle 
shipped eastwa rd and t he obsolescence of t he i r  s ubstantial  investment i n  
l ives tock ca rs and feeding and wa ter ing stat ions . 8 
6P rior t o  the advent of  the by products indust ry 5 5 - 6 0  percent of  
the t o t a l  weight of  a steer was cons ide red waste,  and was disca rded 
following the s laught e r .  See Rudolph A .  Clemen,  By-P roduct s in  t he 
Packing Indust ry, (Chicago : University of Chicago P ress ,  1 9 2 7 ) . 
'Yeage r ,  p .  4 9 .  
8Clemen, The Ame ri can Livest ock and Meat I ndus t ry, pp . 1 0 - 1 5 . The 
nove l t y  and pe rce ived riskine ss of the new bus ine ss also made rail roads 
reluctant to invest  in f leet s  of ref rige rator cars and new termina l 
faci l i t ies to accommodate t he western packers . See Yeage r ,  p .  8 8 . 
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The western packers responded to the second o f  these dif f icult ies 
by const ruct ing the i r  own f leet s  of re f rigerat o r  cars wh ich t hey 
subsequently offered to lease to the rail roads ; t he packe rs expected to 
pay an ident ica l t ranspo rtat ion rate pe r car load, not inc luding the 
mileage fee pa id t o  them by the ra i l roads for t he use o f  t he 
refrige rat o r  cars,  as the l ivestock shippers . When the ma j o r  t runk l ine 
ra i l roads rema ined int rans igent in the matter of applying s imil a r  rate 
st ructu res to dressed beef and l ivestock (charging a h ighe r rate pe r 
c a r-load of  ref r ige rated beef than for live c a t t le ) , the packers 
di rected the i r  business to the Canadian Grand Trunk Ra i l road, which due 
to its c i rcuitous northern route,  had neve r been a ma jor  l ivestoc k  
car rier . The Ame r ican t runkl ines , faced w i t h  a substant ia l l o s s  in 
their t r a f f i c ,  qu ickly acqu iesced to the rate demands of t he western 
packers . Meanwhile,  the private ref r igerator c a r  l ines established by 
t he packers became an important source o f  revenue t o  the packer s  in 
their  own r ight , due to leas ing a rrangements with the ra i l roads and 
other distributors of  pe ris hable product s . 9 
The pa ckers count e red res ist ance to the dist ribut ion o f  t he i r  
product s i n  t h e  east by establish ing the i r  own branch di s t r ibuto rships 
in impo rtant consuming centers . : o  Eventua lly,  the cons istent l y  h i gh 
quality and low p rice of  the product provided by the wes t e rn dressed 
beef sh ippe rs,  e roded the pre judice that had l abeled western dres sed 
beef as inferior to the loca l l y  s laughte red va r iety . 
9Yeager,  pp . 8 7 -8 9 .  For a thorough discuss ion o f  t he e a r ly 
relationship between the ra i lroads and the western packers , see Yeage r ,  
pp . 2 7 - 4 0  and pp . 8 7 - 1 0 5 . Also, see below, t h i s  chapt e r ,  for  a 
discussion of  t he f inanc ing of  the packe rs '  p rivate re f r igerator c a r  
l ines . 
1 0By 1 8 g 9  approx ima tely 2 7 6  wholesa le branch out lets had been 
estab l i shed by Armou r ,  Morris and Swift . The f i rst branch houses were 
established by Swift and Armour during 1 8 8 3 - 1 8 8 4 . See U . S . ,  Federal 
Trade Commiss ion . Repo rt on the Meat Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9  (Wash ington 
D . C . : U . S  Gove rnment Print ing Office, 1 9 1 9 ) , Summa ry and P t . 1 ,  p .  1 5 3 . 
1 6 4  
Along with innovat ions in the dist ribut ion of  their p roduct ,  the 
l a rge western packers made a number of s igni ficant advances in t he i r  
"manufacturing" techniques , pa rt icularly those rel ated t o  t he prof itable 
ut i l i za t ion of  t he inedible by-products of  s laughtered a n ima ls i n  the 
manufacture of  other items . 1 1  By 1 8 9 1  all the la rge packers employed 
s t a f f s  of t ra ined chemist s who devised wa ys of manufacturing products 
l ike glue,  o leoma rga rine ,  commercial fert i l izers and s oap f rom what had 
formerly been cons ide red waste,  and which the packers had felt  fort unate 
merely t o  dispose o f  a t  the lowest possible cost . 
P rior t o  the deve lopment o f  an e f fect ive met hod o f  yea r  round 
re f rigerated t ransportation a lmost a l l  meat pa ckers who sold the i r  
product i n  distant ma rkets had been pork packers . : '  After t he p roblem 
of  t ra nspo rt i ng pe ri shable products in good condition ove r long 
dis tances had been solved , the meat pack ing i ndus t ry came to be 
dominated by f i rms whose prima ry l ine of  bus iness was the s laughter,  
t ranspo rtat �on, and sale o f  western dressed bee f in eastern and 
midwestern ma rket s .  The growth of  t he western dressed beef indust ry was 
based on the act ivit ies of  a small  group of individuals who had acqui red 
t he i r  reput at iona l ,  intellectua l and financial capi t a l  in other l ines of  
the cat t le and po rk t rades . Each of  the fi rms that rapidly came t o  
dominate the indus t ry was close ly cont rol led by a proprietor o r  sma l l  
group o f  pa rtners who had formerly been closely involved i n  either 
1 1 These advances proved to be so prof it able that �hen comput ing the 
profits  of  t he l a rge western packers,  The U . S .  Commiss ioner o f  
Corporat ions discovered that , given the cost of  l ivestock a n d  t he prices 
which t he packers rece ived for the edible po rt ions of a stee r ,  t he 
proceeds f rom the manufacture and sale of  it ems made f rom t he inedible 
po rtions we re neces sa ry in order to enable the packers to rea l i ze a net 
profit  on the i r  tota l bus iness . In  other words , due to vigorous 
competit ion , the who lesale pr ice of  bee f had been driven so l ow t ha t  the 
profits  of  the la rge packers on a pe r-an ima l bas i s  were derived ent i rely 
f rom the s a le of bee f by-products i n  va rious stages of  elaborat ion . See 
t he Ga r f ie ld Repo rt , pp . 1 9 7-285 . 
1 2Clemen , The Ame rican Livest ock and Meat Indust ry, pp . 8 - 9 . Most 
po rk product s proces sed by packers prior to 1 8 7 5  were cured or otherwise 
preserved and could be safely t ransported ove r  long distances without 
being ref rigerated . 
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c a t t le dea l ing or the livestock bus ines s ,  or who had deve loped t ies t o  
the l ivestock indust ry a fter having developed a successful  pork packing 
t rade . 13  
Compet i t i on and Coopera t i on Among the La rge Dressed Beef Sh ippers 
As methods of t ransport ing and distribut ing pe rishable mea t  
products we re pe rfected, t he packing indust ry came t o  cons ist  o f  t h ree 
different t ypes o f  f i rms : 
1 )  La rge pac kers , located in the midwest ,  who were invo lved in 
interstate comme rce in all type s of  product s ,  but p rima r i l y  in dres sed 
bee f . 
2 )  Medium s i zed packe rs providing specialty products to regiona l 
ma rket s . 
3 )  Small , local sl aught erers engaged in ret a i l  t rade in a reas that 
we re distant f rom ma jor  populat ion centers . 1 � 
Once the sea rch for a re liable a l l  yea r  ref r ige rator ca r had been 
s olved, and eastern ma rkets for western dressed beef wel l  establ ished, 
packers of t he f i rst type t u rned their attent ion to solving t he problems 
posed by the earlier rapid rates of increase of product ion and 
investment in t he i r  indust ry,  and the rapid extens ion of the i r  
dist r ibut ion networks into virtually a l l  eastern and midwestern u rban 
consuming centers . In  o rde r to assure an adequate retu rn on t he i r  la rge 
investments in plant , equipment and invent orie s ,  the l a rge we stern 
packers we re forced t o  devise new competit ive st rategies to cope with 
s l ac kened indu s t ry growt h rates throughout t he ma j o r  consuming a reas of  
lJClemen, pp . 8 - 9 . 
1 4The Nat iona l P rovis ioner,  The S ign i f icant S i xty ( Ch icago : t he 
Nat ional P rovis ioner Inc . ,  1 9 52 ) , p .  87 ; The Inst itute o f  American Mea t  
Packers,  The Pack ing I ndustry (Ch icago : The University o f  Chicago P ress , 
1 92 4 ) , p .  6 9 . 
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the east and midwest , wh ich had largely been " f i l led up" by their 
earlier rapid expans ion . l � 
In 1 8 8 6 ,  the l arge packers formed a dressed mea t  pool t o  s tabil i ze 
prices and profits  f rom t he i r  New England t rade . 1 6  Throughout the 1 8 9 0 s  
t h e  western pa ckers engaged i n  a number o f  attempt s  t o  per fect the 
earlie r  pooling a r rangement s ,  none of which proved to be pa rticularly 
long- lived or sat isfact ory . Fina lly, in 1 9 0 3 ,  an  abort ive a ttempt a t  
forma l consol idat ion resul ted in the format ion o f  t he Nat ional Packing 
Company, through which the large dressed bee f shippers we re able t o  
informa l l y  coordinate t heir  pricing and output st rategies unt i l  1 9 12 , 
when the f i rm was dissolved by court o rder . 1 7 
Financial History of the Meat Packing Industry ,  1 8 75-1 8 90 
The Founders of t h e  In t ers t a t e  Dressed Beef Trade 
F rom the t ime of t he f i rst commerc i a l ly succes s ful long distance 
s hipment of western dres sed bee f unt i l  approximately 1 8 9 0  t he i nterstate 
dressed bee f t rade wa s dominated by four individua ls : P h i l lip Danforth 
Armou r ,  Geo rge H .  Hammond, Ne lson W. Morris , and Gus tavus F rankl in 
Swift . P r ior to 1 8 8 7  the indiv idua l leadership of  Armou r,  Hammond, 
Morris and Swi f t  in t he interstate dressed bee f t rade stood 
unchal lenged . By 1 8 8 7  the eponymous f i rms o f  Armour & Co . ,  G .  H .  
Hammond & Co . ,  Ne lson Mo rris & Co . and Swift & Co . ,  which grew out o f  
t he many inte r re la ted pa rtnersh ips to which the i r  founders h a d  e a r l ier 
: �Yeage r ,  pp . 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 . 
: 6Yeage r,  p .  1 1 1 . 
PYeage r ,  p .  1 1 1 . See chapter 5 for a det a i led discussion o f  the 
f inanc i a l  aspects o f  coope rat ion among the l arge mea t  pac kers , the 
unsucce s s ful at tempt at consol idat ion within the dressed beef industry 
and t he format ion of  t he Nat ional Packing Company . 
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be longed, suppl ied approximately e ighty-f ive percent oi America ' s 
dressed bee f . 18 
The f i rms that accounted for the greatest p roport ion o f  the 
indust ry' s �a r ly growth rema ined for some t ime a ft e r  the i r  establishment 
c losely as sociated with and t ight ly cont rol led by their founders . All  
had been successfully involved in other bus iness ventures in l ivestock,  
provis ions , or s laughte r ing prior to the initiat ion of  long distance 
f resh meat sh ipment s .  As the ref rigerated beef business got underway, 
their persona l resources and expe rience we re t rans fe rred f rom the po rk 
pac k ing and l ives tock t rades t o  the s laughtering and distribut ion of  
western dres sed bee f ,  and appl ied to promoting the growth o f  t he f i rms 
they had f o rmed in o rder to capt ure a po rt ion of t he r.�w, rapidly 
expanding t rade . The refore,  in orde r to fully  unde rst and the way in 
wh ich ent ry and expans ion in the dressed bee f  indust ry was f inanced, the 
early bus iness a f fa i r s  of  the founders of the t rade must f i rs t  be 
conside red . 
Both Swift and Armour sett led in Chicago in 1 8 7 5 ;  Armour t o  
ove rsee t he ope ra t ions o f  the Chicago plant o f  the pa rtne rship o f  Armour 
& .  Co . and Swift as  a catt le buyer for the partnership of  Hathaway & 
Swift . 1 9 P .  D .  Armou r ' s f i rst bus ines s venture in t he midwest began in 
Ma rch, 1 8 5 9 ,  when he entered into pa rtnership with Mi lwaukee merchant 
F rederick B .  Miles in the grain, produce, and commi s s ion busines s . 20 
After experienc ing four yea rs o f  prosperity,  the partnership was 
dissolved in 1 8 6 3 when Armour entered into bus iness with the most 
important po rk pa cker in Mi lwaukee , John P lankint on . The pa rtnership of  
P lankinton & Armou r prospered during the Civil Wa r ,  a nd rapidly 
1 80f the tota l U . S .  ma rket for dressed bee f ,  Swift & Co . had 2 8 % ,  
Armour & Co . 2 5 � , Ne lson Mo rris & Co . 2 1 %  and G .  H .  Hammond & Co . 1 1 % . 
See Yeage r ,  p .  1 1 2 . 
1 9Thomas W .  Goodspeed, "Gustavus Frank l in Swift , 1 8 3 9 - 1 9 0 3 , " The 
Univers ity Record 7 ( Apr i l ,  1 9 2 1 ) : 9 9 . 
2°Clemen , p .  1 5 1 . 
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a ccumu la ted sufficient means and standing within the f inanc i a l  community 
t o  f inance the expans ion of its Milwaukee operat ion s ,  and the 
establ ishment o f  a branch out let in New York City under t he name of 
Armour,  P lankinton & Co . ,  Commiss ion Merchant s .  In addit ion t o  se rving 
a s  an important out let for t he product of Armou r ' s Mi lwaukee pork 
packing bus i nes s ,  t he New Yo rk house, under t he management of P .  D .  
Armour ' s brother ,  He rman,  se rved t o  facilitate impo rtant contacts 
between the Armour interests and New York ' s t h riving f inanc i a l  
commun ity . 2 1 
After the opening o f  the Union Stockya rds in December ,  1 8 6 5 ,  
Chicago qu ickly esc ablished itself as  the count ry' s leading packing 
center . In  order to take advantage o f  the Chicago ' s r i s ing importance 
as a center of comme rce and t ransportat ion a new partnership was formed, 
which began pa ck ing hogs in Chicago under the name of Armour & Co . in 
1 8 6 5 . 22 Alt hough at f i rst hog pack ing was t he exclus ive bus iness of t he 
new pa rtners hip,  by 1 8 6 8 Armou r & Co . began k i l ling cattle,  and two 
yea rs later began process ing sheep . 23 By 1 8 7 0 ,  the brand of  Armour & 
2 1N .  S .  B .  Gra s ,  Ca sebook in American Bus iness History ( New York : 
F .  S .  Crofts & Co . ,  1 9 3 9 ) , p .  62 6 .  After t he establishment o f  t he New 
York branch, Herman Armour gradually assumed t he role o f  eastern 
f inanci a l  agent o f  t he company ' s  western houses . According t o  Rudolph 
Clemen ,  t he establ ishment of financ ial  t ies with the east was essential 
for P lank inton & Armour because " the financia l condit ion of  t he west at 
that pe riod did not pe rmi t o f  the la rge l ines of  c redit necessary for 
the conduct o f  a bus iness assuming such magnitude (as P lankinton & 
Armou r ) . "  The f i rms access to the city' s f inanc i a l  fac i l i t ies was 
l imited to the money ma rket ; Plankinton & Armour did not a va i l  
t hemselves o f  t he se rvices of the New York investment banking community 
o r  t he l ong term secu rit ies ma rket . For more on the short term 
f inanc ing requ i rements o f  the early packing indust ry, see below, t hi s  
chapter,  and Clemen, p .  1 52 . 
22Clemen, p .  1 52 . P lankinton & Armour were s a id t o  have "made wel l  
over a mil l ion (do l l a rs ) "  during 1 8 6 5 when Armour,  hav ::.ng cont racted for 
heavy future de l iveries of  pork in 1 8 6 4 ,  was able to fulfill  t hose 
o rde rs a t  a substant i a l ly lowe r cost to h im t han t he futures price once 
peace had come . I t  is not c lea r to what extent , i f  any, this  windfall  
addition to the partnership ' s surplus fac i l i t ated t he establi shment of  
the Chicago packing faci l i ty or subsequent inc reases in the phys ical 
plant of Ar�ou r ' s growing busines s .  See Gra s ,  p .  62 6 .  
23Clemen, p .  1 5 3 . 
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Co . wa s repo rtedly " well  known in a l l  the ma rkets o f  the world" and the 
bus iness o f  a l l  the conce rns with which Armou r wa s a f f i l iated had 
increa sed "to dimen sions cons idered phenomenal by the t rade . " 24 
Due t o  t he cont inued we stwa rd migrat ion o f  t he count ry' s l ivestock 
supply, a branch wa s est abl ished by Armour in Kansas City under t he name 
o f  P lankinton & Armour dur ing 1 8 6 9 .  During the f o l lowing yea r  Armour 
o rde red the const ruct ion of a new plant at t he Kans as City locat ion with 
a da ily capacity of 1 , 0 0 0  cattle for pickl ing and expo rt purposes . 2s  In  
1875  the headqua rters of the a l ready substantial Armour ope ra t ions , 
cons ist ing of s laughtering and pack ing facilit ies in  Mi lwaukee , Chicago 
and Kans as City,  was removed f rom Milwaukee and re loca ted to Chicago 
under the full  cont rol of P .  D .  Armou r . 26 
During 1 8 5 9 - 1 8 6 9  Gust avus F .  Swift gradually enla rged the sphere 
of his activit ies f rom sma l l  sca le butchering and mea t  ret a i l ing near 
his Cape Cod b i rthplace ,  to catt le dea l ing and mea t  wholesal ing 
th roughout in land Ma ss achusset s . 77 By 1 8 7 2 ,  a fter having establ ished 
h imse l f  as a reputable and indust rious cat t le dea ler th roughout New 
England, Swift entered into partne rship with James A .  Hathaway, who 
operated a flourishing meat bus iness in Boston . The f i rm o f  Hathaway & 
Swi ft combi ned a loca l dres sed meat t rade with t hat of buying and 
selling l i vestock for  the Boston ma rket , with Hathaway' s 
responsibilit ies centered on the mea t  bus iness and Swift managing the 
purchasing of l ives t ock for the firm . 28 
24Cleme!'l ,  pp . 1 5 3 - 1 5 4 . 
2sGra s ,  p .  62 6 .  
26Although John P lankinton rema ined act ive in t he Chicago branch of 
the bus iness unt i l  1 8 7 8  and in the Kansas City branch unt i l  1 8 8 2 ,  
effective control o f  the businesses appea rs t o  have passed a lmos t  
ent i rely to P .  D .  Armour somet ime prior to 1 8 7 5 . See Gra s ,  pp . 62 6-627 . 
27Goodspeed, p .  9 7 . 
28Goodspeed, p .  9 8 . 
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Swift soon extended the buying end o f  t he bus iness t o  Albany and 
Buf falo to t a ke advant age of the thr iving l ivestock ma rkets i n  t hose 
cit ies . 2� In 1 8 7 5  Swift moved to t he midwest not as a packer ,  but as  a 
cattle buyer ,  after persuading Hat haway to t ransfer the catt le-buying 
pa rt of the business to Chicago , which had earlie r  s u rpas sed Albany and 
Buf f a lo in  importance as  a center of t he domest ic catt le t rade , and had 
a lready become the most impo rtant l ivestock ma rket in  t he count ry . 30 
Ne lson Mo rris ' s  fi rst venture in t he meat packing bus iness began 
during t he early days of the Civil Wa r . 3 1 Du ring the 1 8 7 0s his success 
cont inued as a l ivestock sh ipper and cat t le expo rter to Scot land and 
England . Although Morris began f resh meat shipmen t s  to t he east during 
1 8 7 4-1 8 7 5 ,  h is f res h-meat business with t he east rema ined sma l l  t h rough 
1 8 8 0 ,  and funct ioned more as an ad junct to his la rge r pork pac king and 
l ivestock sh ipping bus iness . 3 1  
Geo rge H .  Hammond , a successful De troit mea t  dea ler and packer,  
undertook what may have been the first commerc ially s ucces sful ove rland 
sh ipment of dressed beef in 1 8 6 9 . 33 Hammond soon obtained sufficient 
29Clemen,  p .  1 0 0 . 
3°Clemen , p .  1 6 1 . 
3 1Clemen , p .  1 5 7 . Mo rris f i rst great s uccess , a ccording to Clemen ,  
was in  securing a se ries of cont racts from the federal gove rnment t o  
suppl y  the Union Army with cat t le and beef . One cont ract was fo r 2 0 , 0 0 0  
cattle f o r  t he eastern Union Armies ,  wh ile another named h i m  as  sole 
supplier o f  bee f  for the a rmy in the west . Morris ' s  a ccumulat ions f rom 
se rving as  provis ioner t o  the Un ion Army and his  l ives t ock sh ipping 
bus iness we re appa rent ly si zable enough by 1 8 7 4  t o  wa r rant his  
class if icat ion in  a contempo rary account as  a " wealthy Chicago packer 
and l ives t ock sh ipper . "  See Clemen, p .  157 and Yeage r ,  p .  5 4 . 
32Yeage r ,  p .  5 4 . 
33Hammond ' s f i rst sh ipment was undertaken in 1 8 6 9  i n  a speci a lly 
des igned re f rigerator c a r  const ructed by the Michigan Car Company of  
Det roit . Hammond' s initial  investment ( a fter t he distribut ion of his 
f i rs t  sh ipment ) in the dres sed beef business amounted to $ 6 , 0 0 0 ,  t wo­
t hi rds of which was supp l ied by a Det roit private banking f i rm and two 
New England Jobbe rs th rough whom he had dist ributed his  first shipment . 
The primitive re fr ige rator car const ructed by Hammond wa s only capable 
of t ra nsport ing dres sed bee f over long distances du ring t he winter 
months . See FTC , Reeo rt on the Meat Pack ing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 , pt . 1 ,  p .  
2 37 a nd Yeaqe r ,  pp . 52-53 . 
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financ i a l  backing, supplemented by his own accumulat ions f rom his  
Det roit pack ing bus iness,  to begin regu lar,  if  somewhat sma l l  and 
seasonal ,  shipment s of  dres sed beef to New England, which he dist r ibuted 
t hrough t he t raditiona l network of wholesalers and commiss ion me rchant s . 
Through 1 8 77 Hammond cont inued to ship western dressed beef regula rly t o  
eastern ma rkets du ring the co lde r mont hs,  while facing virtua l ly n o  
competit ion or opposit ion either f rom the rail roads o r  f rom others i n  
t he mea t  bus iness . 34 
Despite Hammond' s early dressed beef sh ipment s ,  t he interstate 
dressed beef t rade did not really begin to gather momentum unt i l  
Hammond' s f i rst ma j o r  competitor,  G .  F .  Swift , began sh ipping 
refrigera ted bee f to Boston in 1 87 6 ,  and eventua lly inaugu rated t he 
fi rst successful year round shipment s of re f r ige rated bee f i n  December ,  
1 8 7 8 . 3� Once a re liable method of yea r  round ref r igerated 
t ransportat ion had been devised, Swift and Hammond, foll owed quickly by 
Armour and Mor r i s ,  began to devote a ma j o r  po rt ion of  their  e fforts t o  
t he sale of western dressed beef i n  the nort heast , whe re t he loca l per-
capita l ivestock supply had been dwindl ing s ince t he 1 8 4 0 s . 36 
34According to Yeage r ,  Hammond faced litt le ,  if any opposit ion t o  
t he int roduct ion of h i s  product i n  eastern ma rket s .  Due t o  impe r fect ions 
in t he des ign of  the refr igerated ra i l road car which he employed and the 
sma l l  scale upon wh ich his business was conducted Hammond was not able 
to underse l l  loca l butche rs in eastern ma rket s .  His p roduct t herefo re 
p resented no t h reat to the establi shed network  of western l ivestock 
shippe rs and eastern dressed meat deale rs , and wa s probably ma rketed 
more as  a nove lty than as  a staple . Despite the problems exper ienced by 
Hammond in t ransporting his product to the east and dist ributing i t  
a longs ide that of local butche rs and s laught ere rs , sales of  t he Geo rge 
H .  Hammond Co . ( which inc luded product s  other than dressed meat ) ,  
increased f rom app roximately $ 1  mi l l ion per yea r  in 1 8 7 3  t o  a lmost $2 
mil l ion annua l ly during 1 8 7 5 . I t  is not ce rtain what rate of profit 
t hese sales figu res represent . See Yeage r ,  pp . 5 3- 5 4 . 
35FTC, Report on the Meat Pack ing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Summary and P t . 
1 ,  pp . 2 3 8 - 2 3 9 ;  Yeage r ,  p .  B On . 
36Yeage r ,  p .  67 . 
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Capi ta l i za t i on and Profi ts : Overview 
The fi nancial  resources upon which the four o rigin a l  dressed beef 
shippers could draw in establishing t hemselves in the new t rade var ied 
cons iderably . G .  F .  Swi f t ,  whose company' s growt h was t he most rapid of 
the four du r i ng 1 8 7 5 -1 8 9 0 ,  did not even ma ke a start in t he packing 
indust ry unt i l  1 8 7 7 . His later expans ion wa s based on an init i a l  
investment drawn solely f rom t he proceeds of  t he dissolut ion of  t he 
partnership of Hathaway & Swif t ,  alt hough Swift ' s  a ccumula t ions of  
" intangible capita l "  we re considerable, consist ing of  an impeccable 
reputat ion and an abunda nce of personal contact s within the eastern meat 
t rade . 37 Armou r ,  Hammond and Morris we re more favo rably situated 
financ i a l l y ,  the forme r two individua l s  having the i r  t h riving pork 
packing and provis ion ing bus inesses upon which to bui ld,  while Mo rris ' s  
livestock and packing interests we re wel l  establ ished by 1 8 7 5 . 
Regardless of  t he i r  va ried initial s ituation s ,  t he four original 
members of t he indust ry faced s imilar f inancial  problems in establishing 
t hemsel ves in the interstate dres sed bee f  t rade . These included f unding 
t he const ruct ion of f lee ts of ref rige rated ca rs to t ranspo rt their 
product , wh ich the ra i l roads dec l ined to bui ld themse lve s ;  devis ing an 
adequate distribut ion and ma rket ing system for t he i r  nove l and h ighly 
pe rishable product ; and f i nancing the pu rchase of t he volume of  
l ivestock that was necessary for conducting the bus iness on a 
remunerat i ve scale . 38 Financing t he expansion of manufactur ing capacity 
does not  appear t o  have been a s ign ificant p roblem for  the fou r l arge 
37Lou is F .  Swift , The Yankee of the Ya rds : The Biography of 
Gustavus Frank l in Swi f t  (New York : A . W .  Shaw Company, 1 92 7 ) , p .  2 5 . 
Swifts equity in t he dissolved partnership repo rtedly amounted t o  
someth ing ove r $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 ,  wh ich h e  rece ived from Hathaway i n  cash . For 
more on the de r iva t i on o f  the initial capit a l  of  t he four la rge dressed 
mea t  sh ippe rs and t he sou rces of increases in their capi t a lizat ions , see 
be low ,  this  chapte r . 
38Swift , p .  6 7 . The first two p roblems , re lated t o  the acqu i s it ion 
of real f ixed capital a re dealt with in this sect ion . The last prob lem 
is more closely related to short term finance , and is t reated in more 
det a i l  be low . 
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interstate dressed bee f shippers during the i n i t i a l  pe r iod o f  t he 
i ndus t ry' s development . Between 1 87 8- 1 8 8 7  on ly two s laughter i ng plants 
were bu i lt or acqui red by Armour & Co . ,  G .  F .  Swift & Co . ,  Hammond & Co . 
and Nelson Mo r r i s  & Co . The ent i re output of  the four prior  to 1 8 8 7 was 
suppl ied by seven s laught e ri ng plant s ,  i ncluding the two that had been 
acqu i red du r ing t he preceding decade . The fact that the i ndust ry wa s 
scr ambl i ng t o  establ ish  and o rchestrate the i r  dist r ibut ion networks 
dur ing this t ime i n  o rde r t o  c reate and service an ma rket for  t he i r  
p roduct suggests that the s laughtering capacity of the seven plants was 
suff i cient . 39 
The indu s t ry' s pr ima ry sources of funds du r ing this  early pe r iod 
of its deve lopment we re t he resou rces of t he individuals who comprised 
t he various pa rtnersh ips out of which the indust ry' s four dominant f i rms 
eventual ly eme rged, t he commercial paper and ret a i l  loan ma rkets that 
existed among t he banks of the midwest and New England, and, to  a far 
lesser extent , the re sou rces of  the f i rms wh ich we re engaged in t he 
dis t r ibut ion of  we stern dressed beef in the northeast . Th rough 1 9 0 0  the 
indust ry ' s  re l i ance on the growing long term indus t r i a l  secu r i t ies 
ma rket wa s minima l . -. c  
The most sal ient feature of t he early f inanci a l  development of t he 
indust ry, con s ide r i ng its rapid rate of growt h ,  was i t s  heavy re l iance 
f o r  expans i on cap i t a l  on reinvested profit s . Ret a i ned earn ings were 
typically capit a l i zed th rough t he declarat ion of dividends payable i n  
s t o c k ,  thei r equiva lent , o r ,  in the case of t he e a r ly pa rtnersh ips , t he 
implicit augmentat ion of  t he pa rtne rs'  equ ity t h rough t he di rect 
39FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Summa ry and P t . 
1 ,  pp . 1 2 5 -1 2 6 . 
40The Nat iona l P rovis ione r ,  The S ign i f icant S i xty, p .  7 2 . P r i o r  to 
t he 1 8 8 5  incorporat i on of Swift & Co . a l l  of  the interstate dressed bee f 
s hippers were pa rtnersh ips i n  which t he individua l s  who owned t he f i rms 
act i vely pa rtic ipated in some phase of ope ra t ions o r  management . Such 
partnersh ips do not appear  to have cons i sted of  any wea lthy " s i lent 
pa rtne rs " of s ign i f icant means acqu i red in other l ines of bus iness ,  who 
could be cal led upon as a sou rce of addi t i ona l capi t a l . 
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purchase o f  ta ngible assets f rom surplus rese rves . 4 1 This was doubly 
t rue dur ing t he early pe riod of t he industry ' s development ,  when 
f requent turnove r of high volumes of wo rking capit a l ,  most of which was 
f inanced t h rough short term bor rowings f rom commercial banks o r  through 
the issue of commercial paper, provided a steady st ream of pro f i t s  t o  
enable rapid phys ical expans ion and the accumulat ion of  l a rge cash 
surpluses . c 7  
The Use of Credi t :  Overvi ew 
The early dressed bee f indust ry made extens ive use of short term 
c redit . The ea rnings with which the packe rs f inanced t he i r  expans ion of 
plant and equ ipment and the extension of their ma rket ing and 
dist ribut ion networks into the east were dependent on the f requent 
turnove r of a la rge working capital in the form of l ivestock, supplies,  
labor and invent o ries . 4 3 Wh ile primarily self  f inanced in the 
accumulat ion of  f ixed capita l ,  the ext remely h igh p roport ion of  final 
4 1FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 5 ,  p .  8 .  
42The fixed capital requi rement s of the packers increa sed over t ime 
whi le the ra te of  ret urn on invested cap ital dec lined . This was la rge ly 
attributable to the later extens ion of  their  operat ions to many plants 
a s  they s ought t o  follotr: the westwa rd movement of  the count ry' s ma j o r  
sources of  l ivestock supply, and t heir  increased t rade in meat by­
product s  and related ma nufactured art ic les . Due to the t ime consuming 
proces ses by wh ich inedible by-products we re t ransformed int o sa lable 
commodit ie s ,  they experienced a much slower rate o f  tu rnover t han the 
edible mea t  products that were the staple of the indust ry prior to 1 8 9 0 . 
See FTC, Report on the Meat Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Summa ry and P t . 1 ,  
p .  9 5 . For a det a i led t reatment of indust ry p ro f i t s  and their 
appo rt ionment between sha reholde rs and addit ions to surplus rese rves , 
see be low, this chapter and the following chapter . 
4 3FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  S ummary and P t . 
1 ,  p .  9 5 ; The Nat iona l P rovis ione r ,  The S ign i f icant S i xty, pp . 72-7 3 . 
The dres sed bee f indust ry seems to have been a rather low valued-added 
indu st ry . Early est imates placed the va lue of  t he raw material relat i ve 
to the f ini shed product at between 50 and 8 0  percent . Later ,  a fter most 
ma rkets had been " f i l led up"  and the rate of pro f it o f  t he l arge packers 
eroded by compe t i t i on ,  the gross rate of profit on tot a l  s a les was 
est imated by the Commi ss ione r of Co rporations to have been approximately 
2 percent . For more on this aspect o f  the dressed be€ � t rade ,  see 
Clemen ,  The Amer ican Livestock and Meat Indus t ry, p .  1 3 5  and the 
Ga rfield Reoo rt , pp . 1 97 -2 6 9 . 
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receipt s that went for t he purchase of l i vestock and the fact t ha t  the 
t rade in l ive cat t le was conducted a lmost exclusively Jn a cash bas i s  
necessit ated t hat t h e  pa cke rs rely heavily o n  short t e rm bor rowings . 
Although no exact f igures a re avai lable t o  reve a l  the p roport ion 
o f  quick  and f ixed assets in t he packers'  total assets dur i ng 1 8 7 5 - 1 8 9 0 ,  
seve ral  contempora ry account s repo rted t hat a relat i vely sma l l  port ion 
of t he capit a l  of  the early pack ing indust ry was in  t he form of plant 
and equipment , despite the la rge size of t he ma j o r  packing f i rms as  
measured by eithe r  tota l as sets or capital izat ion . �4 The ea rly dressed 
bee f  indust ry t hus appears to have been highly capit a l  intens ive in the 
sense that high volumes of working capital  were necessa ry to conduct the 
bus iness on a remune rative sca le, rather t han in  the sense that t he 
exploitat ion o f  va rious sca le economies requ i red having a l a rge 
investment in plant and equ ipment . 
P r ior t o  the eme rgence of the dres sed beef t rade the packing 
indust ry, s t i l l  devot ed prima r ily to the process ing o f  pork product s ,  
was centered i n  Cincinnati . Although , according t o  Rudolph Clemen,  
natural condit ions we re more favorable for the development o f  the 
indus t ry in I l l inoi s ,  Kentucky and Indiana , the extens ive reliance of 
t he packing indus t ry even then on short term c redit fa c i l i t ies , which 
Cincinna t i  had in abundance , made that city a more favorable locat ion 
for the indust ry' s ma j o r  produce rs . 4 � The eventual shift of t he 
indust ry' s center to Chicago was made poss ible only when t he approp riate 
f inancial  f ac i l i t ies emerged to enable the f inancing of t he packing 
44FTC, Repo rt on the Meat Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 , Summa ry and P t . 
1 ,  p .  9 5 ; t he Nat iona l P rovisione r ,  The S ign i ficant S ixt v ,  pp . 7 2 -7 3 . 
The fixed capital  requi rements of the packers reportedly i nc reased after 
1 8 9 0 ,  when l he e labo rat ion of by-product s a nd the manufacture a nd 
dist ribut ion o f  ob jects other than dres sed beef carne t o  account for  a 
grea ter po rt ion o f  their  total business . I t  is l ikely that t he packer s '  
wo rking capital  requ i rements increased du ring this  pe riod as  wel l ,  
howeve r ,  due t o  the hi gher volume o f  items in p rocess  that had t o  be 
carried on the i r  books,  pa rt icularly items in var ious stages o f  
manu facture from t he by-products of the i r  slaughtering ope rat ions . 
4 �Clernen,  The Ame rican Livestock and Meat I ndust ry, p .  1 3 5 . 
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indust ry to change f rom " a  very risky . . .  bl ind gambling propos i t ion" to a 
h ighly systema t i zed process aided by inst itut ions whose se rvices rapidly 
came to be t a i lored to t he needs of  the packers . 46 The g reat f inancial  
ma rkets that emerged in  Chicago centered a round t he futures exchanges 
and t he commercial banking system . Most bus inesses that located there 
prior to 1 9 0 0 ,  to  t he extent that t hey made use of external sources of 
long term f inance , rel ied on New York and Bost on for that funct ion . 47 
The re frige ra ted bee f sh ippe rs we re a lmost completely reliant upon local 
banking fac i l i t ies for t he di rect financ ing of  t he i r  l ives tock 
purchases,  mos t  of  which were funded ove r t he very short term t hrough 
t he extens ion of overdraft l ines of c redit at one of the many l ivestock 
banks t ha t  ringed t he s t ockya rds . 48 When catt le we re purchased by one 
of t he la rge dressed bee f shippe rs the we ight t icket s igned by t he 
packe r ' s agent on rece ipt of the livest ock became a s ight dra ft t o  t he 
selle r  of the cat t le paya ble at the buye rs bank . The buye r ' s banker 
would in t u rn create a deb it on the packer' s account t o  cover t hese 
dra f t s ;  such l ines of  credit as  were extended were sett led weekly and 
s omet imes dcl ily . 49 
The packers o ften sett led such l ines o f  c redit , and funded most of 
their  other work ing cap i t a l  needs in the same fashion : t hrough direct 
bor rowings f rom comme rc i a l  and private banks and the issue of commercial 
pape r . �° Credi t s  granted by commercial banks we re p robably the mos t  
important source of short-term funds t o  the packers , many of  whom, once 
46Clemen ,  The American Livestock and Mea t  Indust ry, p .  1 4 4 . 
47Melchior  Palyi,  The Chicaqo Money Ma rket ( Chica�o : University o f  
Chicago P res s ,  1 9 4 5 ) , p .  6 4 . 
' 8This  a l so appl ies t o  t he branch packing houses wh ich t he dressed 
beef shippers establi shed in Kansas City , Omaha , St  Louis and othe r 
c i t ies . The pac kers we re heavily reliant on f inancial  instit ut ions in 
the a reas in which t he i r  pa ck ing facilit ies we re loca ted for t he 
f inanc ing of l ives t ock pu rchases . 
49Swift , pp . 4 2 - 4 3 . 
�0Palyi ,  p .  6 4 . 
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having estab l ished reputat ions as  credit -worthy customers , were able t o  
establish c lose wo rk ing relationsh ips with a sma l l  c i rc le of  
institut ions th rough which they did most of  their direct bo rrowing . 
Some of  the dressed bee f sh ippers establ ished the i r  own f inanc i a l  
inst itut ions t o  aid in the financ ing thei r ongo ing operation s ,  as  in the 
case of  Armou r ;  o r  secu red directorships for themsel ves o r  their 
stockho lde rs in important financi a l  institut ions , as  did Swift . � 1 
The is sue of comme rcial  paper,  rather than serving as  a prima ry 
source of c redit , was used prima r i ly by t he packers to re l ieve regu l a r  
banking connect ions f rom a n  overburden of cont inuous borrowing . The 
"packer ' s  pape r "  was thus widely dis tributed among f inanc i a l  
institut ions t h a t  did not se rve a s  the prima ry banking connect ions , 
moderate amounts f requently kept a f loat by the packers even when 
bus ines s  condi t ions did not wa r rant , in o rder to ensure its  wide and 
regul a r  dist r ibut ion, and accustom the ma rket to its  p resence . �2 The 
commercial pape r ma rket appea rs to have served to prov ide the packers 
with a supplement a l ,  inte rmediate term sou rce of c redit , as  many of 
these notes we re renewed repeatedly upon their exp i ra t ion . �3 
What l it t le specific informa tion i s  avai lable on t he borrowing 
behavior and short term indebtedne ss of individual dres sed bee f shippers 
during the early pe r iod of the indust ry' s deve lopment is l imited to the 
� 1 FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Pack ing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Summa ry and P t . 
1 ,  pp . 9 5-9 6 . 
�2The Na t iona l P rovis ioner,  The S igni ficant S ixty, p .  6 0 . The 
s ingle name paper of the packers , so ca l led " packer ' s  paper , "  was h ighl y  
l iqu id, t here ha ving early o n  developed an act ive seconda ry market for 
it . It carne t o  be " h ighly pri zed" among the banks o f  the midwest as t he 
packing indust ry grew in s i ze ,  scope and financ i a l  st rengt h . 
�3The Nat iona l P rovis ione r The S ignif icant S ixty, pp . 5 9- 6 1 ;  Pa lyi , 
p .  1 0 4 . The use o f  comme rcial pape r as a means o f  f a c i l i t a t ing c redit 
rot at ion wa s t hought to have originated in Britain,  whe re s ingle name 
commercial pape r fi rst carne into general use . I t  became popu lar among 
the packers because t hey we re periodica l ly requ i red, even with banks 
with which t hey had establi shed close wo rk ing re lat ionships , t o  pay off 
their loans and l i nes of c redit and engage in no borrowing for a 
spec i f ied pe riod, after wh ich the i r  re lat ionship could continue as  
be fore . 
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experiences of  G .  F .  Swift & Co . ( later Swift & Co . )  and Armour & Co . ,  
as  out l i ned below . These accounts suppo rt the gene ra l i za t ions made 
above , which were obta ined from a number of contempora ry reports on 
indust ry-wide bo rrowi ng behavio r .  
Swift & Co . :  Capi t a l i z a t i on, Profi t s  and the Use of Credi t ,  1 8 75-
1 890 
Litt le informa t i on is available concerning the sources of  long 
term capital and cap i t a l i zations of  the va r ious partnerships with which 
G .  F .  Swift was connected prior to the i nco rporat ion of Swift  & Co . in 
1 8 8 5 .  G .  F .  Swift repo rtedly exi ted the pa rtne rship o f  Hathaway & Swift 
in 1 8 7 6  with " a  l i t t le mo re than thi rty thousand dol l a rs , " s l ight ly over 
one yea r  after having moved to Chicago as cat t le buyer for t he firm .  
This sum, which Swift rece ived in exchange for his interest i n  the 
partne rship,  was t hought to have served as  the init ial  cash capita l of 
G .  F .  Swift & Co . ,  the Ch i cago predecessor of the I l linois corporat ion 
of Swift & Co . '• With the proceeds from the dissolut ion of the 
Ma s sachusset s partne rship,  Swift purcha sed the Chicago s laughterhouse of 
"Billy"  Moo re and began a packing busines s . >� 
G .  F .  Swift & Co . of Chicago was origina l ly a proprietorship, 
owned and cont rol led solely by G.  F.  Swift and reliant for long term 
capi t a l  on Swift ' s pe rs ona l accumulat i ons and ea rnings t hat we re 
reinvested in t he bus iness . In 1 8 7 8  G .  F .  Swift enli sted the a s s i st ance 
of his younge r brothe r ,  Edwi n ,  in establ ish ing G .  F .  Swift & Co . ' s  t rade 
in the New Eng land a rea . G .  F .  Swift & Co . was subsequently reorgani zed 
as a pa rtner ship,  and a new pa rt ne rship, Swift Bros . & Co . ,  was fo rmed 
�� swi ft , p .  2 5 . 
�;C lemen , p .  1 6 1 . 
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i n  Mas sachussets t o  ove rsee the distribut ion of  Swift ' s  ref r igera ted 
beef in New England . � 6  
Whi le det a i led records t racing t he growth of G .  F .  Swift  & Co . and 
Swift Bros . & Co . prior to t he incorporat ion of  Swift  & Co . in 1 8 8 5  a re 
unava i labl e ,  the yea rly reports of R .  G .  Dun & Co . provide a gener a l  
account of  t he f inanc ial  a f fa i rs of the t wo bus i nesses as  ref lected i n  
t h e  changing f inanc ial  a f fa i rs o f  t h e  pa rtners . ; ' B y  1 8 8 0  the 
est imated total  net worth of t he pa rtners,  inc luding the assets and 
l iabi l it ies of the a l l  pa rtnersh ips with which t hey were a f f i l ia ted, was 
reported to have totalled between $ 1 6 0 , 0 0 0  and $2 1 0 , 0 0 0 . sa By Apr i l ,  
1 8 8 1 ,  accord ing t o  a sta tement released by G .  F .  Swift t o  a numbe r o f  
bus iness assoc iates , t he net worth o f  the bus iness had i nc rea sed t o  
approximately $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . '9 A statement dis t ributed by G .  F .  S w i f t  i n  
August , 1 8 8 2 ,  showed t he t ot a l  as set s of t he partnersh Lps t o  have been 
s6Goodspeed, pp . 1 0 3 - 1 0 4 . P r ior to J O �n �ng G .  F .  Swift in Ch icago 
i n  1 8 7 8 ,  Edwin Swift , t hen only 2 9 ,  had been employed a s  foreman with 
r a i l road gang s omewhere in the northern Rocky Moun t ains . I t  i s  un l i kely 
that Edwin had, by t hat t ime , managed to accumulate a s igni ficant store 
of  money on h i s  own account . I t  is theref o re imp robable that he wa s 
sought as  a bus iness partner by G .  F .  Swift for any other reason t han 
because Swift needed the services of a t rusted and i ndus t r ious pa rtner 
i n  bu i lding up the eastern end of his t rade . 
HR .  G .  Dun & Co . l i s t s  the pa rtners of  Swift  Bros . & Co . ( the 
eastern a f f i l iate of G .  F .  Swift & Co . )  in 1 8 8 0 as G .  F .  Swift , Edwi n  C .  
Swif t , D .  M .  An thony (a  New England meat wholesaler ) and Loui s  F . Swift 
( t he eldest s on of G .  F . Swi f t l . I t  i s  be l ieved that  L .  F .  Swi f t  was 
a lso o f f ic i a l ly a pa rtner in G. F .  Swi ft & Co . o f  Ch icago, but t he re i s  
n o  evidence t o  suggest  that D .  M .  Anthony was forma l ly connected with  
t he Chicago pa rtnersh ip . Ma ssachus set s ,  vol . 87 ,  p .  2 62 ,  R .  G .  Dun & 
Co . Col lect ion ( Baker Libra ry, Ha rva rd Graduate School o f  Bus iness 
Admi n i st rat i on )  . 
s8Massachusset s ,  vo l . 8 7 ,  p . 2 62 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
These f igu res do not inc lude t he est imated net worth of  D .  M .  Anthony , 
and there fore p robably unde rst ate the net worth ,  o r  pa rtners equ it y ,  o f  
the va rious pa rtnersh ips . T o  t he extent that they inc lude t he pe rsonal 
assets of t he pa rtne r s ,  they ove rstate t he net worth of  t he 
partne rship$ . Neve rtheless ,  due t o  the lega l nat ure of  co-pa rtne rships 
for which the individual  pa rtners are j o int ly and seve ra l l y  l i able , t he 
means of  the pa rt ne rs ma y be co rrect ly thought o f  a s  be i ng t he means o f  
t h e  bus ines ses w i t h  which they a re a f f i l ia ted . 
s9Massachusset s ,  vol . 8 7 ,  p .  2 62 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lection . Thi s  
particular  f i gu re reportedly reflects the net -worth o f  t he va r ious 
partnerships , and does not include the res ou rces of t he pa rtners . 
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$ 1 , 0 4 3 , 7 6 5 ( o f  wh ich s l ight ly ove r one-t hird were repo rted t o  have been 
in t he form o f  qu ick asset s ) , total l iabi l it ies of $ 3 9 4 , 5 6 6 ,  and total  
partners equity o f  $ 6 4 9 , 1 9 9 . 60 
The resources of the pa rtne rships appe a r  t o  have inc rea sed 
steadily dur ing 1 8 8 3- 1 8 8 4 ,  whi le they were reported to have been doing 
"an enormous bus iness"  throughout the pe riod . 6 1  A statement relea sed by 
G .  F .  Swift on Decembe r 8, 1 8 8 3  shows Swift ' s assets tu have increased 
by about ninety percent ove r August , 1 8 8 2 ,  with quick  assets dec l ining 
s l ight ly to less t han one-t h i rd of total asset s . Meanwh ile,  Swift ' s  
pe rsona l and bus iness liabi lities increased to $ 6 2 9 , 5 0 0 ,  i n  la rge part 
due t o  " t he purchase of ( real estate ] fo r bus iness pu rposes and the 
opening of more branches for the sale of beef . "  The sha rp inc rease in 
Swift ' s  l i abi lit ies notwithst anding, a "discounted" est imate o f  the net 
worth of the bus ines ses ba sed on the net wo rth of  the partners shows the 
partners ' equ ity to have i nc reased to s l ight ly ove r  $ 1 . 5  mi l l ion , an 
inc rea se of ove r one hundred percent compa red with the f igure for  
August , 1 9 8 2 . 1'7 Figures c i ted for  Decembe r ,  1 8 8 4 ,  wh ich inc lude the 
resources of D .  M .  Anthony, show the net wo rth of  the partners dur ing 
that yea r  to have grown to s l ight ly ove r  $2 . 2  mil l ion , an inc rease of 
60Massa�husset s ,  vo l .  8 7 ,  p .  2 6 2 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Co l lect ion . 
Anot her report dated Decembe r ,  1 8 8 2  shows the total net wo rth of the 
pa rtners to have been $ 1 , 2 4 6 , 4 0 3 ,  although R .  G .  Dun & Co . noted t hat a 
discount of f i fty pe rcent should be ta ken on the above f igure t o  bring 
it " down to ha rd pa r "  with the worth of the bus inesses . I t  seems 
l i kely,  there fore ,  that figures showing the net wor t h  of t he pa rtners 
s igni f icant ly overs tate the actua l  equity of the seve r a l  partnerships , 
although t he means of t he partne rs must be cons ide red a t  least in pa rt 
as  the means of t he va rious businesses . See Mas sachusset s ,  vol . 5 9 ,  p .  
1 6 6 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collection . 
61Ma s sachusset s ,  vol . 8 7 ,  p .  2 6 3 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col l ect ion . 
62Ma ssachusset s ,  vol . 8 7 ,  p .  2 6 3 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . This 
f igu re inc ludes the resources of Edwin F .  Swi ft , but does not include 
t hose o f  D .  M .  Ant hony o r  Lou is F .  Swift . The excess o f  assets ove r 
l iabil i t ies in t he case of the Swift a f f i l iated p a rtn( :ships was 
repeatedly "discounted" by R .  G .  Dun & Co . ,  pre sumably t o  reflect t he 
lack o f  a standa rdized me thod o f  account ing for depreciat ion ( f ixed 
assets we re c a r r ied at the i r  purchase price dur ing the i r  useful life)  
and t he exces s  of book over ma rket value for other assets that would 
have had to have been sold in the event of l iqu idat ion . 
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bet ween forty-f ive and f i fty percent over December ,  1 8 8 3 ,  while t he 
total liabilit ies of  the partners dec l ined by s light l J  over fourteen 
percent to $ 6 5 7 ,  0 5 5 . 63 
Although these f igures should in no way be considered t o  be 
complete or de finit i ve ,  they do p rovide a clue as to how the 
pa rtnership' s  capit a l i zat ion increased and how the purchase of f ixed 
tangible asset s was funded prior to the incorporat ion o f  Swift & Co . in 
1 8 8 5 . Short ly a fter having begun the regular sh ipment of  refrigerated 
beef f rom Chicago to the east in 1 87 8 ,  a set of "prima ry pa rtnerships " 
were formed between G .  F .  Swift and his brother , Edwin . 6� Of less 
immediate importance to t he finances and operat ions of the Swift ' s early 
s laughtering and dist ribut ion network were the pa rt ners , D .  M.  Ant hony 
and Louis F .  Swift . The sma l l ,  initial paid in capital  of the partners,  
wh ich went for  the pu rchase o f  their  fi rst s la ughtering fac i l ity,  
supplemented by extensive short term bor rowings , was rapidly par layed 
into a s i zable surplus which wa s used to finance further expans ion . 
The early pe riod o f  expansion of Swift ' s  ref r ige rated beef 
bus iness was f inanced prima rily t h rough t he use of  short t e rm borrowings 
and reta ined ea rn ings . Such funds were used in varying propo rt ion to 
finance bot h  t he expansion of phys ica l plant and the working cap i t a l  
needs of the "prima ry pa rtnersh ips . "  Th roughout the early period o f  t he 
development o f  Swift ' s  interstate dressed bee f t rade , the pa rtne rships 
we re repeatedly repo rted to have been "do ing a large and prosperous 
bus ines s , " and as  hav ing been "highly profitable and remune rat i ve to a l l  
63Massachusset s ,  vol . 8 7 ,  p .  2 6 3 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
64 The term "prima ry pa rtnerships " is u sed he re to dist inguish 
bet ween the firms o f  G .  F .  Swi ft & Co . of Chi cago and its eastern 
a f f i liate,  Swift Bros . & Co . ,  and a numbe r of subsidiary pa rtnership 
arrangements t hat the Swi ft brothers fo rmed with loca l s laughterers ,  
wholes a lers and butche rs when establish ing their dist ribut ion network in 
t he east . For a det a i led account of the financ i a l  aspect s of t he 
extens ion of the western dres sed bee f shipper' s eastern dist ribut ion 
network,  see be low, this  chapter . 
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conce rned . " �� This is not to say that capit a l  wa s plen t i fu l  du ring the 
period when the Swift ' s  we re extending the i r  dressed bee f t rade 
t hroughout New England and the east . However ,  t he ea rnings of t he 
partnerships , gene rated on an inc reas ingly rapid turnove r o f  a 
(prima ri ly )  borrowed wo rking capital provided a s teady , unencumbered 
stream of long term capita l which was sufficient ly la rge to enable Swift 
& Co t o  f inance the i r  early growth, without recourse t o  the means of 
addit iona l partners o r  othe r external sources o f  long term capit a l . '' 
Swi f t  & Co . ( I l l inoi s ) , capitali zed at $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  a l l  common stock,  
was incorporated on April 1,  1 8 8 5  and absorbed the f ixed asset s ,  
l iabi l it ies , and cash as sets of  the Swift a f f i l ia ted pa rtnerships . 67 
The company' s capit a l i zat ion was increased on Novembe r 1 1 ,  1 8 8 6  to $ 3  
mi l l ion,  on May 1 9 ,  1 8 8 8  to $ 5  mi ll ion , and o n  July 3 ,  1 8 9 0 t o  $7 . 5  
mi l l ion . 68 Acco rding to Lou is F .  Swift , each new issue of  the 
company ' s stock th rough 1 9 0 4 ,  including the initial issue , wa s sold at 
pa r for cash . 69 The company' s capital i zat ion was further augmented in 
1 8 9 0  by the issuance of  $2 . 5  mi l l ion in f i rst mortgage bonds , all of 
which were taken up by the company' s exist ing sha reholders  immediately 
fol lowing t he i r  is sue . Ninety-nine percent of  Swift & Co . ' s  stock wa s 
6�Massachus set s ,  vo l .  8 7 ,  pp . 2 62-2 6 3 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
"G .  F .  Swift ' s  biographer noted of  him that " eve ry cent his 
business yi.: lded (prior to its inco rporat ion ) went back into it  again . "  
I have been unable t o  fi nd any evidence t o  suggest othe rwise . See 
Swi ft , pp . 2 6-27 . 
67Ga r f ield Repo rt , p .  2 8 6 . Swift & Co init ial  capi t a l i za t ion 
grossly understated the va lue of  the asset s acqui red f rom the 
partne rships , and wa s later stated to have been is sued " in exchange for" 
t he accumulated cash surplus of  the pa rtnerships . The company' s init ial  
stock  is sue was a lmost certa inly intended to formally  establish t he 
proport iona l interest of each of  the pa rtners in the new business,  and 
l ittle  else . As s uch,  t he stock of  the new compa ny upon i t s  
incorporat ion was noth ing more than a n  admin ist rat ive device ; it was not 
used to solicit  addit iona l capital . 
68Garfield Report , p .  2 8 6 .  
69Swi f t ,  pp . 2 7 -2 8 . As noted above , the init ial  issue of  G .  F .  
Swift & Co . was pa id for with the accumulated cash s urplus o f  t he 
partnerships t hat we re consol idated unde r the new corpo rat ion . 
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held by membe rs o f  t he Swift fami ly following t he dissolu t ion of  t he 
pa rtnerships and t he format ion o f  the corporat ion in 1 8 8 5 . The numbe r 
o f  s tockholders of record increa sed f rom 1 0 9  in  1 8 8 6  t o  6 9 5  i n  1 8 9 0 . '0 
The rapid inc rea ses in the company ' s  capita l i zat ion noted above , 
t he fact that each new issue was "paid for in  cash" and t he w idening 
c i rcle o f  owne rship of the company would seem t o  indicate an inc reas ing 
re l iance on exte rnal r a t he r  than internal funds as a s ource o f  long t e rm 
capit a l . Th i s ,  howeve r ,  wa s not the case ; th rough 1 8 9 0  inte rna l ly 
generated funds were s t i l l  by far  the f i rm' s mos t  important s ou rce of  
long t e rm capit a l . The t iming of  dividend payments and new is sues 
suggests that increases in the f i rm' s capital izat ion t h roughout the 
pe riod we re equivalent t o  the is sue of  dividends payable in stock t o  the 
company ' s sha reholde rs ;  t he pro f i t s  thus retained in the bus iness we re 
either added to cash rese rves or used to fund t he accumulat ion o f  
addit iona l f ixed or  qu ick asset s . 7 : 
Acco rding t o  Lou is F .  Swift , the company ' s  $2 . 7  mi l l ion common 
stock is sue of Decembe r ,  1 8 8 6 ,  was wa r ranted by an invento ry s howing 
70Acco rding to Louis Swi ft , the rema inder of the f i rst  is sue o f  
stock went "pret t y  much t o  eastern f riends and associates ( o f  Swi f t ) -­
wholesale meat dea le rs , re t a i l  butchers,  and livestock sh ippe rs for 
expo rt , "  ( See Swi ft , p .  2 8 ) . There is st rong evidence to s uggest that 
t hese and othe r  i nd i v idua l s  who we re not closely connected with t he day 
to day operat ions of Swi f t  & Co . acqu i red a st ake in that company as  a 
result o f  S w i ft ' s pract ice of  forming busi ness a l l iances with eastern 
mea t  wholes alers and ret a i lers through the exchange o f  shares in each 
othe rs bus ines ses . The subs idiary pa rtnerships thus formed enabled 
Swift to provide for the dist r ibut ion of  his ref rigerated beef in t he 
east without havi ng t o  absorb the cons ide rable cost s o f  const ruct ing his 
own branch dist ributorsh ips , or  face t he organized opposit ion o f  local 
but chers and s laughterers ( see below, this chapt e r )  . 
7 1The pract ice o f  dec laring stock dividends , or  dividends payable 
in stock,  was f requently used by t he incorporated dressed beef shippers 
du ring 1 8 8 5 - 1 9 0 5  as  a way of capi t a l i z ing reta ined ea rnings . Rat he r  
than pay cash dividends , compa nies would typica lly ret urn earnings t o  
the bus inesses s u r p l u s  a c count . Addit ional stock cert i f icates would 
then be is sued aga inst the accumul ated cash surplus , a f ter which the 
surplus could be used to fund the pu rcha se of addit ional asset s . The 
va lue t hus removed f rom surplus account would reappear  under capital  
stock . Fo r more on the use of  dividends payable in s t oc k  a s  a way o f  
capi t a l i z ing reinvested earn ings among t he la rge dressed bee f shippers,  
see be low, this  chapter and chapter 5 .  
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t hat the va luat ion o f  the f i rm' s plant and equ ipment was suf f ic ient t o  
support such a n  increase . '7 Louis Swift was probably cor rect : 
acco rding t o  f igures c i ted ea rlie r ,  the va lue o f  t he assets owned by the 
several  Swi f t  a f f i l i a ted partne rships in 1 8 8 4  were sufficient to have 
s upported a much h ighe r capitalizat ion than Swift & Co . ' s  init ia l 
$ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  had t he init ial  is sue been exchanged f o r  both cash and 
p roperty . Swift ' s content ion, however ,  t ha t  each issue was paid for  in 
cash at  pa r appl ied to the company' s  i n i t i a l  is sue of stock as  wel l  as 
subsequent i s sues ; the company ' s  ini t i a l  issue " went for" the $ 5 4 0 , 0 0 0  
cash surplus that Swift & Co . acqui red f rom t he Swift a f f i l iated 
pa rtne rships . 73 
Tha t  t he company wa s grossly undercapi t a l i zed upon its  forma t ion 
is suggested by its f i rst yea rs ea rnings,  wh ich bet ween Apri l ,  1 8 8 5  and 
Octobe r ,  1 8 8 6 ,  we re repo rted to have been $ 6 9 1 , 07 4 . 2 7 ;  equa l t o  an 
annual rate of  retu rn of  almost three hundred percent on t he company' s 
t ot a l  capi t a l  stock and almost 1 3 0 pe rcent on total pa id in 
capi t a l i za t ion . 1( I f  the f i nanc ial statement s  of  the pa rtners , as  
recorded by R .  G .  Dun & Co . for  the yea r  preceding the incorporat ion, 
possess any deg ree of  accuracy, then the actua l net worth of  t he 
pa rtnerships prior t o  the i r  assimi lat ion by Swift & Co . would have been 
somewhe re in the ne ighbo rhood of $2 mi l l ion . Reported earn ings f o r  t he 
f i rst yea r  of t he f i rm' s operat ions would thus have represented a f a r  
more rea l is t ic ret u rn on equity o f  approximately 3 5  percent , a f igure 
that is s imi l a r  in magnit ude to the annua l est imated increases in the 
net worth o f  the partnerships prior to 1 8 8 5 . 
. ,1Swi f t , pp . 2 7 -2 8 . 
73Lou is Unfe r ,  " S w i f t and Company : The Deve lopment: o f  the Packing 
Indust ry, 1 8 7 5 - 1 9 1 2 "  ( Unpubli shed Ph . D .  Dissert a t i on ,  University o f  
I l l inoi s ,  1 9 5 1 ) , p .  1 1 6 . 
74Unfe r ,  p .  1 1 6 . 
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Even i f  Swi f t  & Co . ' s  f i rst is sue of  stock ( fo l lowing t he is sue 
that represented t he company ' s  initial  capit a l i zat ion ) me rely re f l ected 
a more accu rate va luat ion of  the company ' s  f ixed asset s ,  i t  doe s not 
a lt e r  the fact that t he i ssue was pa id for  in f u l l ,  in cash,  rat he r  t han 
issued in t he form of  addit ional sha res of  stock t o  exi s t ing 
shareholders in l ieu of  cash dividend payments . ') Table 7 s hows the 
dividend history of Swi f t  & Co . th rough 1 8 9 3 . The most notewort hy 
feature of  the figures l i sted he re is that dividend payment s t h rough 
1 8 9 0 we re suff icient to provide st ockholde rs with approximately 5 0  
percent of  t he c a s h  neces sary to subscribe to new is sues o f  capi t a l  
stoc k  at  pa r ,  and t o  compensate stoc kholders a lmost ent i rely for  t he i r  
prior cash investment before each new is sue . Before each inc rease i n  
t he company' s capita l i zat ion, a n  ext ra dividend was dec la red within days 
or months of the new stock is sue . 76 Furthe rmo re ,  bet ween the t ime of  
t he company' s incorpo rat ion in 1885  and Apr i l ,  1 8 9 3 ,  $ 7 , 37 6 , 0 7 5  wa s pa id 
'�A company whose net worth has increased to the extent that i t s  
s t o c k  is t rading for a price s ign i f icant ly above pa r wi l l  often 
capi t a l i ze its increased su rplus value by is suing a ddit iona l shares t o  
exist ing s tockholders . Such sha res a re usua l l y  "given"  t o  stockholders 
of record in propo rtion to their interest in t he company, as under t he 
terms o f  a " st ock split . "  S ince the va lue of  a company ' s  sha res 
inc reases when dividends a re withheld and ea rnings ret a i ned i n  t he 
business , t he is sue of  new stoc k  to exist ing sha reholders may be 
undertaken by a compa ny that wishes t o  use i t s  earnings f o r  pu rchase o f  
addit ional asset s ,  rather than pa y them out as dividends . This is what 
is meant by the expre s s i on ' t he capit alization of  surplus ea rnings by 
way of the declarat ion of dividends payable in stock . '  In t he case of  
Swift  & Co . ,  the i r  f i rst i s sue of stock ( following t he i n i t i a l  i ssue ) 
could have been i s sued in this  fash ion , but was i s sued for cash instead . 
Thus , the sha res would have cont inued t o  be unde rvalued on t he books of  
t he c ompany . 
''Th is fea ture o f  Swi f t  & Co . ' s  early f inancia l h i story was noted 
in FTC, Report on t he Mea t  Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  p .  2 0 ,  wherein i t  i s  
stated tha t ,  t hrough t he t ime ly declarat ion o f  these ext ra c a s h  
dividends,  " st ock dividends we re subs tant ia l ly e f fected . " T h i s  i s  not 
ent i rely t rue , howeve r ,  as  the cash dividends pa id amounted to s l ight ly 
less t han 5 0 %  o f  each new is sue at the t ime o f  t he issue . The dividend­
issue pol icy of Swift  & Co . amounted to the dec la ra t ion of "delayed" 
dividends pa yable in  stock , whereby surplu ses we re capit a l i zed be fore 
t hey had act ually  been ea rned by way of  short term cash " bo rrowing s "  
f rom exist ing shareholders . Prior to August , 1 8 9 3 ,  t hase cash payments 
f rom sha reholders to the company we re retu rned to the sha reholders prior 
t o  each new issue i n  the form of  norma l and "ext ra " dividend payment s . 
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CAP ITAL 
$ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0  
3 0 0 , 0 0 0  
3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
7 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
7 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
7 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
7 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
7 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
7 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
7 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
7 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
7 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
7 , 50 0 , 0 0 0  
7 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
7 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
TABLE 7 
D I VIDEND H I STORY OF SWIFT & CO, 1 8 8 6 - 1 8 9 3  
DATE 
Jan .  2 1 ,  1 8 8 6  
Oct . 1 1 ,  1 8 8 6  
May 2 ,  1 8 8 7 
Dec . 2 9 ,  1 8 8 7  
May 3 1 ,  1 8 8 8 
July,  1 6 , 1 8 8 8  
Nov . 5 ,  1 8 8 8  
Jan . 1 4 ,  1 8 8 9  
Mar . 2 5 , 1 8 8 9  
July 2 9 ,  1 8 8 9  
Nov . 4 ,  1 8 8 9  
Jan . 2 0 ,  1 8 90  
Apr i l  2 1 ,  1 8 9 0 
June 3 0 ,  1 8 9 0 
Aug . 4 ,  1 8 9 0 
Sep . 2 9 ,  1 8 9 0 
Jan . 1 2 ,  1 8 9 1  
Apr i l  6 ,  1 8 9 1  
July 1 3 ,  1 8 9 1  
Oct . 5 ,  1 8 9 1  
Ja n .  4 ,  1 8 92 
April  4 ,  1 8 92 
July 5 ,  1 8 92 
Oct . 3 ,  1 8 92 
Jan . 3 ,  1 8 9 3 
Apr i l  3 ,  1 8 9 3  
Apr i l  1 7 ,  1 8 9 3  
July, 3 1 ,  1 8 9 3  
Oct . 1 0 ,  1 8 9 3 
PERCENT 
6 %  
2 2 4 %  
5 %  
7 %  
1 5 %  
2 %  
2 %  
2 %  
2 %  
2 %  
2 %  
2 %  
2 %  
2 %  
32 % 
2 %  
2 %  
2 %  
2 %  
2 %  
2 %  
2 %  
2 %  
2 %  
2 %  
2 %  
2 3 %  
2 %  
2 %  
AMOUNT 
$ 1 8 , 0 0 0  
67 3 , 0 7 4  
1 5 0 , 0 0 0  
2 1 0 , 0 0 0  
4 5 0 , 0 0 0  
1 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 , 6 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 5 0 , 0 0 0  
1 5 0 , 0 0 0  
1 5 0 , 0 0 0  
1 5 0 , 0 0 0  
1 5 0 , 0 0 0  
1 5 0 , 0 0 0  
1 5 0 , 0 0 0  
1 5 0 , 0 0 0  
1 5 0 , 0 0 0  
1 5 0 , 0 0 0  
1 5 0 , 0 0 0  
1 ,  7 2 5 , 0 0 0  
2 4 4 , 4 0 4  
2 4 4 , 4 0 4  
TOTAL 
$ 6 9 1 , 0 7 4  
( 2 3 0 % )  
8 1 0 , 0 0 0  
( 2 7 % ) 
2 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
( 50 % )  
3 , 3 7 5 , 0 0 0  
( 4 5 % )  
8 8 8 , 8 0 8  
( 4 % )  
NOTE : The co lumn labe l led " tota l "  refers to total  dividends paid 
prior to each new issue o f  cap ital stock . Swift & Co . ' s  capit a l i zat ion 
inc reased t c  5 3  mi l l i on on Dec . 1 ,  1 8 8 6 ,  to  5 5  mi l l ion on June 1 ,  1 8 8 8 ,  
t o  $7 . 5  mi l l ion on Aug . 1 1 ,  1 8 9 0 ,  and t o  5 1 5  mi l l ion o n  Apr i l  2 2 ,  1 8 9 3 . 
SOURCE : FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Pack ing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 5 ,  p .  
2 5 ;  Unfer,  p . 1 1 8  
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out in dividends , whi le $ 7 . 5  mi l l ion was re tu rned to the company ' s  
t reasury in t he form of cash subscript ions for new s t ock issues . '' I f  
the "ext ra " $ 2 4 0 , 0 0 0  which was paid i n  by the pa rtnerships i s  a lso 
cons i de red, then the undis counted amount pa id out by t he company during 
1 8 8 5- 1 8 9 3  t o  stockho lde rs is  vi rtua l ly identical t o  the amount which 
they pa id in . 78  There fore, just as  t he init ial increase in the 
company' s capita l i zat ion resulted f rom a more rea l i s t i c  va luat ion o f  i t s  
a s s e t s  (despite t he fact that the is sue wa s pa id for  in cash ) , so too 
did subsequent increases prior to 1 8 93 re flect the interna lly funded, 
ongoing accumulat ion of addit ional product ive capacity and working 
capita l .  S i nce t he bus iness expe rienced no net infus ions o f  long term 
funds during t he pe riod, its  growing cap i t a l i za t ion can only have 
res ulted f rom prof i t s  that we re re inve sted in the bus ines s ,  and used to 
fund the purchase of  f ixed and quick assets . Th i s ,  however was 
accomplished in a ve ry unusual and subt le fash ion -- bi way of ea rnings 
that we re " returned" to t he bu siness by sha reholders shortly be fore 
having been ea rned , a f ter which they we re subsequent ly retu rned in full  
in t he form o f  "ext ra" cash dividends to the company' s stockholders . 
Most o f  t he ava i lable informa tion conce rning the p ro f i t s  of  t he 
Swift  a f f i l iated pa rtnersh ips and Swif t  & Co . is  conta ined in t he 
f igures noted above , which re flect changes in the i r  net worth du ring 
''Swift & Co . ma inta ined the i r  unstated po licy of t he t imely 
compensat ion of  st ockholde rs for the i r  cash subscript i vns t o  new stock 
issues even whi le funding the extension o f  the i r  s l aughtering f ac i l i t ies 
westwa rd . The company const ructed a new slaughterhouse in Kansas City 
in 1 8 8 8 ,  and in 1 8 9 0  completed const ruct ion of  a s laughtering f ac i l ity 
begun in 1 8 8 8  in South Omaha . See Goodspeed, p .  107  and Unfer ,  pp . 5 9-
6 1 )  . 
78Due t o  t he t iming of  dividend payments and s t ock issue s ,  the 
dis counted va l ue of  pa id in  cash subsc ript ions would have been higher 
than t hat o f  dividend pa yment s ,  alt hough the de lay o f  s ubscript ion 
payment s a f ter de l i very had been ta ken on the s tock would have mit igated 
this  e f fect . 
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1 8 7 5- 1 8 9 3 . 79 The records of  R .  G .  Dun & Co . suggest that t he 
approximate annua l rate o f  profit on the total net worth o f  the partners 
du r ing 1 8 7 8 - 1 8 8 5  ranged f rom about 3 0  percent during 1 8 8 0 - 1 8 8 1 ,  to 
approximately 1 0 0  percent dur ing 1 8 8 2- 1 8 8 3 . 8c  
No f igures a re ava ilable showing annual addit ions t o  surplus 
reserves dur ing t he f i rst e ight yea rs of Swift & Co . ' s  existence, making 
it  imposs ible to compute approxima te rates o f  pro f i t  a s  above . Dividend 
reco rds for that pe riod, which don ' t inc lude annual  addit ions to surplus 
rese rves and t he refore probably understate the annual rate of pro f i t ,  
show the annua l rate o f  return on capital stock varying between e ight 
percent and forty percent . The cons ide rable va riat ion bet ween these 
f igures is highly mis leading , howeve r ,  because of  t he ext ra cash 
dividends t ha t  the compa ny always dec lared prior to each new stoc k  
is sue . These funds we re undoubtedly accumulated o u t  o f  profits ove r  
t ime , and held in surplus rese rves unt i l  it  wa s judged expedient t o  
re lease them t o  stoc kho lde rs i n  orde r to compensate them for  the i r  prior 
cash subs cr ipt ion prior to each new issue of  stock . Due to the 
i rregu l a r ity and magnit ude of  these ext ra cash dividend payment s ,  a more 
accurate picture of the company ' s  prof its during 1 8 8 5- 1 8 9 3  is g iven by 
the ave rage annual rate of return on equity, which between Apr i l ,  1 8 8 5  
and Apri l ,  1 8 93 tota led 4 5 . 4  percent . Excl uding the f i rst yea r  and one­
h a l f  of t he corpora t i on ' s l i fe ( Apri l ,  1 8 8 5 to Decembe r ,  1 8 8 6 ,  during 
which the c ompany wa s grossly unde rcapita l i zed) t he ave rage annua l rate 
o f  return on equity minus surplus was s t i l l  only s l ight ly less than 20 
79It is poss ible t o  est imate net profits  by comput ing changes i n  a 
f i rm' s net worth ( equity + surplus reserves ) plus dividends paid ove r a 
pa rticula r  account ing pe r iod . For more on this  technique , see David M .  
Be ights ,  " F inancing Ame rican Rubbe r Manu factu ring Companies"  
( Unpub l ished Ph . D .  dissertat ion, Uni versity of I l l inoi s ,  1 9 3 2 ) . 
80Massachusset s ,  vol . 8 7 ,  pp . 2 62-2 6 3 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collect ion . 
The net wo rt h of the pa rtne rs probably ove rstates the aet worth o f  the 
several pa rtnerships , thus understat ing the rate of profit of the 
seve ra l  bus inesses . 
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percent . 8 1 As noted above , s ince this f igure does not inc lude addit ions 
to surplus rese rves out o f  pro fit s ,  it probably underst ates the a ve rage 
net rate of profit  on capi tal stock . However ,  s ince the denominato r  o f  
net p rofits /equity i s  correspondingly reduced, t h e  e ffect o f  t h e  f a i lure 
t o  include additions to surplus reserves on the ave rage net rate o f  
ret urn on t ot a l  equity ( capital stock plus surplus re serves ) i s  
ambiguous . 
I n  any event the impo rtant fact , as a l ready noted, was t ha t  the 
leve l of  pro f its expe rienced by Swift & Co . during t he f i rst eight yea rs 
o f  its exi stence was s u f f ic ient t o  fund ent i rely,  with a short lag,  a l l  
increases in i t s  capit al stock with no net infus ions of  cash f rom t he 
corpo rat ions st ockho lde rs du ring t he pe riod . In  a roundabout way, all  
inc reases in capit a l i zat ion were thus accompli shed by way o f  t he 
capita l i zat ion o f  surplus rese rves through the equ iva lent of  t he i ssue 
of  dividends payable in stock . I n  this sense , despite the regular issue 
of new stock and an ever widening c i rcle of ownership ( see t able 1 0  
below ) , the company ' s  long term funds we re acqu i red i n  a manner t ha t  was 
substant ively s imilar  to that employed by the Swift a f f i l iated 
partnerships prior to the incorporat ion of  Swift & Co . .  
Of a l l  the ref rigera ted beef shippers,  G .  F .  Swift made the most 
extens ive use o f  external sources of long term capit a l  in f inancing t he 
expans ion o f  his dres sed beef bus iness,  even though such rel iance was 
pe rhaps not nea rly so great as it at f i rst appea rs . Swift was a l so 
a:This figu re wa s computed us ing the f igures conta ined in Table 5 
above by est imat ing the ave rage annual rate of  ret u rn on capi t a l  stoc k  
for  e a c h  succe ssive value of  the capital stock p r i o r  to Apr i l ,  2 2 ,  1 8 93 ,  
when Swift & Co . ' s  capital stock wa s increased f rom $7 . 5  mil l ion t o  $ 1 5  
mi l lion . Each average annual rate o f  return f igure t hus derived was 
then weighted by t he length of t he period ( in qua rt e r� ) du ring which the 
capita l s t oc k  rema ined constant prior to a subsequent inc rease . This 
f igure wa s then divided by the total numbe r o f  qua rters ( 3 1 )  bet ween the 
company' s f i rst and last dividend payment s ,  inc lus i ve ,  prior t o  t he 
Apr i l  17 , 1 8 9 3  inc rease in the company ' s  capit a l  stock . This method 
assigns a lower we ight to the relat ively short per iod ( 1 8 8 5 : 2 - 1 8 8 6 : 4 ) 
dur ing which the company ea rned an ext reme ly high annua l return on its  
stock,  and a h ighe r we ight to later pe riods , and also pe rmit s  adjustment 
for  increases in capita l stock that occu rred in the middle o f  a yea r . 
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rather more re l iant on short term bo rrowings f rom a va r iety o f  s ou rces 
than we re his compe t itors , due in part to the rapid fashion in which his 
bus ine ss expanded and to t he fact that he began shipping dressed beef on 
a less well established f inancial basis than his compet itors , most o f  
whom had f a r  more extensive f inancial resources upon which t o  draw . 
According t o  Lou is F .  Swi f t ,  G .  F .  Swi f t  rega rded c redit " a s  his  
g rea test as set " and f rom his ea rliest days with Hathaway & Swi f t  had 
built an " unbroken record of prompt payment " with his c reditors . 82 
By 1 8 8 0 ,  the bus ines s  o f  G .  F .  Swi ft & Co . ,  a long with G .  F .  Swift  
himse l f ,  had come t o  be rega rded as  " rel iable , capable . . .  and good for  
[ t he i r )  wan t s "  by R .  G .  Dun & Co . ,  and by 1 8 8 3  merited a c redit rat ing 
of "A1 " with t he c redit report ing agency' s Boston o f f i ce . Th rough the 
date o f  the incorpora t i on o f  Swi ft & Co . ,  at wh ich t ime report s on t he 
bus iness by R .  G .  Dun & Co . cease , Swi f t ' s reputat i on within  t he 
f inanc ial  commun ity rema ined unblemished . 83 
When Swift f i rst came t o  Chicago he was reliant on his connect ions 
in the east for mos t  of his sho rt term c redit . Through individua ls with 
whom he had established business relat ionships in the stockya rds and 
meat centers o f  the northea s t ,  Swi ft wa s able to secure substant i a l  
l ines o f  c redit f rom eas t e rn banke rs,  bot h  th rough pe rsonal c a l l s  and 
correspondence . H i s  re l i ance later shi fted t o  local  midwestern 
f inanc ial inst itut ions , many o f  which came to grant him " unusua l favors"  
as  a matter  o f  course as  he extended his reputat ion t hroughout the 
midwest . 84 
81Swi f t ,  p .  2 8 . Rudolph Clemen ha s sugge sted that Swi ft g rew in 
his abi l i t y  t o  bor row la rge sums o f  money al ong with growi ng mo re adept 
at orga n i z i ng and o rchest rat ing his bus iness . But it appea rs as i f  his 
inc rea sed abi l ity t o  bor row followed t he growing success and reput a t ion 
o f  h i s  bus i nes s ,  rather than preceding o r  occu r ring concurrent ly with 
i t . See Clemen,  The Ame r ican Livestock and Meat Indust rv ,  p .  1 0 3 . 
83Massachusset s ,  vo l .  8 7 ,  p .  2 62 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lect ion . 
84Swi f t , pp . 4 2 -4 3 . G .  F .  Swift dea lt heavily with the Nat i onal 
Livestock Bnnk and other Chicago f inanc ial  inst itut ions , both in terms 
o f  di rect bor rowing and the use of overdra ft facilit ies t o  dis count his 
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Once h is credit-worthiness became a ma tter of  general  knowledge 
within t he f inancial commun ity, Swift purs ued a de l ibe rate policy o f  
diversifying his  c redit connect ions through the regul a r  issue of  
commercial  pape r . Swift ' s pract ice was t o  ma ke modest amounts o f  his  
paper available to eve ry bank, both la rge and sma l l ,  t hat wanted i t . 
After Swift had proved himse l f  as a worthy custome r ,  many became 
enthus iastic  l a rger holders of  his paper . By 1 8 9 3  most banks in New 
England and New York he ld at least some of Swift ' s  pape r ,  wh i le 
practically every la rge bank in Chicago and other l a rge midwestern 
c it ies had Swi ft ' s notes in more substant ial  amount s . 8� 
Despite Swift ' s  extens ive connect ions within t he f inanc ial  
communit y and f requent bor rowing, he cont inued to rely on his own means 
and the means of  others connected with the bus iness t o  he lp of fset his 
extens ive wnrking capita l needs . Du ring 1 8 8 5- 1 8 8 6 ,  the f i rst yea r  a fter 
the incorpora t ion o f  Swi f t  & Co . ,  G .  F .  Swift reportedly furnished t he 
company wo rk ing capit a l  out of  his own pocket at 6 percent annually . 86 
livestock t ic ket s . However ,  he never seve red his connect ions with t he 
eastern f inancial  commun ity . D .  M .  Anthony , one o f  the o f f icers of  
Swift Bros . & Co . and an early pa rt of Swi ft ' s  eastern dist r ibut ion 
netwo rk , , wa s a l s o  a di rector of the Nat ional Union Bank o f  
Massachusset s .  Other New Engl and meat wholesalers and s laughters with 
whom Swift f o rmed pa rtne rsh ips in establ ishing his eastern dist ribution 
network we re promi nent and wea lthy membe rs o f  the i r  c ommun it ies , and may 
t hus a lso have he ld directorships in local  banks . Ma s�achusset s ,  vol . 
8 7 ,  p .  2 6 2 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Col lection . 
8 �Swift , p .  4 3 ,  p .  7 7 . According t o  Louis Swi f t , much o f  G .  F .  
Swift ' s  f inanc ial  st rength lay in the fact that his pape r was so widely 
dist ributed, and the refore unlikely to be ca l led a l l  a t  once . While 
Swift p robahly u sed his s ingle name paper as  pa rt of a s t rategy of 
c redit rotat ion, it a l so undoubtedly se rved him we l l  in  the capacity 
noted above by his  son : as  a way of  establish ing c redit with as  many 
banks in as many d i f f e rent regions of the count ry as poss ible . 
Appa rently,  many banke rs were in the habit of demanding immediate 
payment f rom their l oan customers on the ba sis o f  the most insubst ant i a l  
of  rumors , despite the stated te rm of  the loan or reputat ion o f  the 
cust omer . Lou i s  Swi ft notes many such instances in his biography of  G .  
F .  Swi f t ,  inc lud ing an episode dur ing the Panic of  1 8 9 3 when many o f  
Swift ' s  we l l  established Chicago bank ing connections "evinced t he 
greatest des i re to col lect their loans and not t o  renew them" despite 
Swift ' s  impeccable c redent ials within t he Ch icago banking community . 
86Unfe r ,  p .  1 1 6 . 
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G .  F .  Swi ft a lso re lied on l oans f rom employees and associates . 
According t o  Swift ' s  biog raphe r "many a livestock commission man . . .  had 
lent $ 1 0 , 0 0 0  or even $2 5 , 0 0 0  on [ notes endorsed by S wi f t ) whi le loans 
g ranted t o  him by his employees ranged " f rom only a few hundred dol l a r s "  
to  " we l l  u p  into five f igures . " 87 F o r  most of  the pe riod du r ing which 
Swi ft & Co . was unde r the di rectorship of  G .  F .  Swi f t ,  t he aggregate of 
these loans by employees was reported to have been qu ite la rge . 
Armour & Co . : Capi t a l i za t i on ,  Profi ts and the Use of Credi t ,  1 8 75-1 890 
The bee f s l aughtering and packing interests of  Phi l l ip Danforth 
Armour we re not inco rpo rated unt il  one yea r  prior t o  his death in 1 9 0 1 . 
P r i o r  t o  the incorpo rat ion of  Armour & Co . ( I l linois ) ,  the seve ral f i rms 
under P .  D .  Armou r ' s cont rol we re a l l  pa rtnerships . The initial long 
te rm capi t a l  of  the early Armour a f fil iated pa rtne rships of  Armour & 
Co . ,  H .  0 .  Armou r & Co , Pl ankinton & Armou r ,  and Armou r ,  P l ankinton & 
Co . wa s provided solely by the f i rms ' owne r-manage r s ,  John P la nkinton 
and the Armour brothe rs ; there is no record of  any " s i lent pa rtne r s "  
having been connected with the businesses . Through 1 8 90 these 
pa rtnerships g rew prima r i ly by way of reinvested earning s ,  a lt hough t hey 
did make extens ive use of short term bo rrowings . No long t e rm funds 
we re solici ted f r om outs ide sources du r ing the pe riod prior to t he 
inco rpo ra t ion o f  Armour & Co . .  
The Milwaukee pa rt ne rship of  Plankinton & Armour was formed in 
1 8 6 3 . P lankinton, a long time Milwaukee res ident , was t he la rgest of 
that city' s pork packe r s ,  and one of  the la rgest in the country . Armour 
became Plankinton ' s junior pa rtne r a ft e r  having gained the latter 
individua l ' s  not ice th rough his  succes sful management o f  the pa rtnership 
87Swi ft ,  p .  32 . 
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o f  Armour & Miles , which was dissolved in 1 8 6 3 shortly a fter  Armour wa s 
persuaded t o  j o in P l ankinton in the pork packing t rade . 88 
P lank inton undoubtedly provided the bul k  of the capital  for this 
venture ,  which for h im wa s me rely a cont inuat ion of the s l aughtering 
bus ine ss he had begun with Frederick Layton in 1 8 5 0 ,  and which s ince 
1 8 6 0 had been conducted by Plankinton a lone . 89 Armour had returned 
form a journey to the Cali fornia gold fields in 1 8 5 8  with a personal 
accumulat ion of some $ 8 , 0 0 0 ,  and his init ial  investment in t he 
partnership of Armour & Mi les had been approximately $ 5 0 0 . While the 
provisioning f i rm o f  Armou r & Miles repo rtedly "prospe red beyond the 
hopes o f  t he pa rtners , "  the total accumulat ion brought by Armour to the 
new pa rtnership of  Plankinton & Armour was probably f a r  less important 
to its cont i nued success than his " o rgani zat ional s k i l l  and indust ry, " 
and was l ikely insign i f icant compa red to P lankinton ' s cont r ibut ion of  
cash and prope rty to the total pa rtne r ' s equity . 90 
Whi le P lankinton & Armour ' s  Milwaukee bus iness t h r ived , Armour 
became involved in other bus iness ventures in the Ch icago a rea . H .  0 .  
Armou r & Co . wa s a grain commission business , establi shed i n  Chicago by 
P .  D .  Armour and his brothers shortly be fore the fo rmat ion of Plank inton 
& Armou r .  Armou r & Co . ,  another pa rtne rship cons i s t ing o f  John 
P lankinton and P .  D .  Armour, became the Chicago branch of the Mi lwaukee 
bus iness in 1 8 67 and began packing hogs during that yea r ,  and in 1 8 6 8  
began s l aughtering cattle f o r  local consumpt ion . In 1 8 7 0  the f i rm o f  
Armour & Co . t oo k  ove r a l l  the Ch icago operat ions o f  P l ankinton & 
Armou r ,  as  we l l  as  the grain f i rm of  H .  0 .  Armour & Co . . In 1 8 7 1  a new 
pa rtnership was fo rmed in Missouri under the supe rvis ion of P .  D .  
Armou r ' s brothe r ,  S imeon, t o  begin slaughte ring operat ions in Kansas 
''G ra s ,  p .  62 6; Clemen ,  p .  1 5 1 . 
89Clemen , p .  1 4 0 . According to Clemen , P lankinton ' s s laughtering 
establi shment was the fourth la rgest o f  its  k ind in the count ry in 1 8 6 3 . 
9°C lemen , pp . 1 5 1 - 1 52 . 
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City . 91 Armour a l so took measures to establ ish a system to p rovide for 
the east ern dist r ibu ti on of the cu red meat products of  his  western 
s laughtering facili t ies . In 1 8 6 5 He rman 0 .  Armour,  who had formerly 
been head of  the Chicago grain and commi s s ion bus ines ses owned and 
operated by the Armour brothe rs ,  was pe rsuaded by P .  D .  Armour to 
surrende r cont rol o f  that bus iness to a younge r brothe r ,  Joseph Armour .  
Herman Armour was then given cha rge o f  a newly formed New York 
pa rt ne rship, Armou r ,  P l ankinton & Co . The New York f i rm had as i t s  
prima ry funct ion the deve lopment of  Armou r ' s east coast wholesale 
ma rkets . 92 
During this  time , according to Rudo lph Clemen,  F· . D .  Armou r ' s 
influence ove r the interests of  P lankinton & Armour was on the rise 
he had become t he "dominant spi rit " of  t he Kansas City,  Ch icago and 
Milwaukee partnerships , and was in la rge pa rt respons ible for the i r  
expans ion into the latter two cit ies . 93 I n  1 8 7 5 ,  P .  D .  Armour moved 
f rom Milwaukee to Chicago t o  assume management of Armour & Co . a fter his 
brothe r ,  Joseph , became i l l . Wit h Armou r ' s move to Ch icago, t he center 
of  cont rol of  Armou r & Pl ankinton ' s slaughtering and meat packing 
interes ts also  moved to that city . 
At the t ime of  Armou r ' s move to Chicago , the pa rtnersh ips with 
which he was a f f i l iated owned slaughte ring and packing plants in 
Chicago , Milwaukee and Kansas City; since 1 8 6 9  a l l  had been dis t r ibut ing 
cured pork and provis ions th rough Armour & Co . ' s  dist ribut ion house in 
' :Clemen,  pp . 152- 1 5 3 ;  Gra s ,  pp . 62 6-627 . 
92Clemen , p .  1 5 3 . According to Clemen , H .  0 .  Armour soon became 
the eastern f inanc ia l agent of the Armour interests and was able t o  
establ ish t he western f i rms ' c redit within the New York banking 
community du ring a t ime when " the financial condit ion o f  t he wes t  . . .  did 
not pe rmit of the la rge l ines of  c redit necessary for the conduct of  a 
bus ines s  as suming such a magnitude ( a s  Armour ' s ) . "  H .  0 .  Armou r ' s 
financ ia l  se rvices t o  the bus iness appear to have been l imited to 
establ ishing useful cont acts within the New York commercial banking 
communit y ;  there is no reco rd of him ha ving establi shed contact with any 
of the cit y ' s l ong term financiers du ring this early pe riod . 
'l>c 1 eme n ,  p 
. 
1 5  4 . 
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New Yo rk . Alt hough Armour was init ially skept ical about the comme rcial  
fea s ibility o f  the inters tate ref r igerated bee f shipments init iated by 
Swift  during 1 87 7 -1 8 7 8 ,  he soon came to view t he dressed bee f  t rade as a 
logical extension of  his  pork and provis ion bus ines s . 9 • Although 
Armou r ' s Kans as City slaughtering facility began shipping dressed beef 
to the east coast in  1 8 7 6 ,  Armour & Co . did not begin regul a r  west t o  
east re f r ig�rated bee f  shipments unt i l  1 8 82 ,  four yea rs a fter Swi f t ' s  
f i rs t  commercially successful shipment . 9' 
As the management of  the va rious Armour a f fi l iated pa rtnersh ips 
came to be cent ra l i zed in Chi cago , e f fect ive cont rol of the P l ankinton & 
Armour s laughter ing and packing interes ts passed into t he hands of  P .  D .  
Armour and H .  0 .  Armour . In 1 8 7 8  John P lankinton ret i red f rom the f irm 
o f  Armour & Co . ,  leav ing Joseph , H .  0 .  and P .  D .  Armour as  the sole 
pa rtne rs . In 1 8 8 2 ,  a f ter the death of  Joseph Armour and t he ret i rement 
of  H .  0 .  Armour f rom Armour & Co . ,  owne rship of  t he company pas sed 
completely into the hands of P .  D .  Armou r . �• The consol ida t ion o f  
cont rol of  the fo rme r interests of Armour and P lankinton unde r P .  D .  
Armour (except for  t he i r  Milwaukee slaughtering and packing f ac i l i t ie s )  
was completed when John P l ankinton ret i red f rom the Kansas C i t y  packing 
house in 1 8 8 2 ,  which short ly therea fter wa s renamed the Armour Packing 
Co . . g·, 
� Yeage r,  pp . 6 4 - 6 5 . 
9�Gra s ,  p .  6 2 7 . Armour qu ickly became a force t o  be reckoned with 
in the interstate dres sed beef indus t ry .  By 1 8 8 6  i t  was est ima t ed t ha t  
h e  cont rol led 2 4 %  o f  t h e  t o t a l  cat t le slaughtered in Ch icago--about 7 %  
less than Swi f t . See Yeager ,  pp . 6 4-65 . 
96Gra s ,  pp . 6 2 8 - 62 9 .  H .  0 .  Armour rema ined invo l ved in t he a f fa i rs 
o f  Armour & Co . a f ter 1 8 82  th rough his management o f  t he New York 
dist ribut ion faci lity establi shed by Armour and P lankinton in 1 8 6 9 . 
97Gra s ,  p .  62 9 .  Complete sepa ra t ion o f  t he Armour and P lankint on 
interes t s  wa s accomplished in 1 8 8 4 ,  when P .  D .  Armour ret i red f rom the 
Mi lwaukee house of P lank inton & Armour ,  which became John P lankinton & 
Co . .  
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In  1 8 8 4 ,  J .  Ogden Armour, the eldest son o f  P .  D .  Armou r ,  wa s 
admitted into pa rtne rship with his father in Armou r & Co, and in 1 8 8 9  
Phi l l ip D .  Armour J r . was admi tted t o  t he pa rtnership a s  wel l . 98 F rom 
1 8 8 4  unt i l  the incorporat ion of  Armour & Co . ( I l l inoi s )  in 1 9 0 0 ,  P .  D .  
Armour owned one-hal f  of  t he equity in the partnership o f  A rmour & Co . ,  
with t he rema in ing one-ha l f  owned solely by J .  Ogden Armour p r i o r  t o  
1 8 8 9 ,  and jointly b y  J .  Ogden and Phillip D .  Jr . f rom 1 8 8 9  unt i l  the 
company' s incorporat ion in 1 9 0 0 . 99 
Little spec i f ic informa t ion is  ava i lable on the compos i t i on of  
asset s and l iabi l i t ies for  Armour & Co . ,  or  t he othe r Armour a f f i l ia ted 
pa rt ne rships du ring 1 8 75- 1 8 9 0 . Some gene ral inferences , however ,  a re 
pos s ible rega rding the sources and uses of long t e rm funds on the bas is 
o f  the historical reco rd o f  ea rn ings and partne r ' s equity for  the 
pa rtne rship of Armour & Co . . l oo 
Armour & Co . ,  orga ni zed as a pa rtnership,  did not is sue bonds,  and 
because t hey we re not inco rporated, did not i s sue stoc k . The ref o re,  
they f ina nced the i r  expans ion with even less rel iance on long t e rm 
external finance than did Swi ft & Co . Table 8 shows the p ro f i t s ,  
dividends , and addit ions to net worth, or pa rtners equity,  f o r  Armour & 
Co . during 1 8 7 5 -1 8 9 0 . These f igures sugge st tha t  t he capit a l i za t ion of  
s urplus rese rves wa s a far  more important source o f  long t e rm c apital  
9"Gras ,  pp . 6 2 9 - 6 3 1 . By  the t ime of J .  Ogden A rmour ' s admi ss i on 
into pa rtnership with his fathe r ,  P .  D . ' s  business interests had come t o  
include t h e  Armour Bros . Bank ing Company of  Kansas C i t y ,  the Cont inent al 
Nat ional Bank o f  I l l inois,  which Armou r had established in pa rtnership 
with John C .  Black o f  Ch icago in 1 8 8 4 ,  and the Wah l  Glue Works of 
Ch icago . 
99Gra s ,  pp . 62 9 - 6 3 1 . 
: o oArmour & Co . (the Chicago branch o f  P lank inton & Armou r )  was 
rela t ively un important wh ile the f i rm' s bus iness rema ined centered on 
the slaughtering and pa cking of pork produc t s ,  but rapidly became t he 
dominant f i rm among t he va rious Armour a f f i l iated pa rtne rships once 
Armou r ' s re f rigerated bee f  sh ipments had gotten underway . 
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YEAR 
1 8 7 5  
1 8 7 6  
1 8 7 7  
1 8 7 8  
1 8 7 9  
1 8 8 0  
1 8 8 1  
1 8 8 2  
1 8 8 3  
1 8 8 4  
1 8 8 5  
1 8 8 6  
1 8 8 7  
1 8 8 8  
1 8 8 9  
1 8 9 0 
TABLE 8 
FINANC IAL H I STORY OF ARMOUR & CO . ,  
1 8 7 5- 1 8 90  
NET PROF IT D I V IDEND NET vJORTH RATE 
$ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 4 5 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 5 2 4 , 0 0 0  
$ 7 0 5 , 0 0 0  
$ 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 1 , 8 5 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 1 , 7 0 5 , 0 0 0  
$ 5 1 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 1 , 6 1 8 , 0 0 0  
$ 1 , 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 1 , 0 5 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 1 , 7 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 1 , 5 5 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 1 , 5 5 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 5 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 5 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0  
$2 4 , 0 0 0  
$2 0 5 , 0 0 0  
$ 2 50 , 0 0 0  
$ 6 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 7 0 5 , 0 0 0  
$ 2 6 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 8 6 8 , 0 0 0  
$ 6 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 8 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 7 0 0 , 000  
$ 1 , 0 5 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 1 , 0 5 0 , 0 0 0  
$50 0 , 0 0 0  
$75 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 1 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 1 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 2 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 4 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 5 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 6 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 6 , 7 5 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 7 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 8 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 8 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 9 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
$ 1 0 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
60 . 0 % 
6 6 . 7 % 
37 . 5 % 
3 4 . 9 % 
3 5 . 3 % 
8 0 . 0 % 
4 3 . 5 % 
3 1 . 0 % 
7 . 8 % 
2 4 . 0 % 
1 4 . 7 % 
1 3 . 1 % 
1 2 . 1 % 
1 8 . 9 % 
1 5 . 5 % 
1 4 . 8 % 
% RET 
8 3 . 3 % 
90 . 0 % 
6 6 . 7 % 
9 5 . 4 % 
7 0 . 9 % 
8 7 . 5 % 
67 . 6 % 
5 8 . 7 % 
4 9 . 0 % 
4 6 . 4 % 
4 5 . 5 % 
2 3 . 8 % 
7 5 . 0 % 
58 . 8 % 
3 2 . 3 % 
NOTE : " % RET" s hows the proportion of  the subsequent yea r ' s 
ea rnings t ha t  we re retu rned to the bus iness and added t o  net worth at 
the beginning of the following yea r .  " RATE"  shows the annual reported 
net rate of p ro fit on pa rtners equity . 
2 1 . 
SOURCE : FTC , Reoo rt on the Meat Packing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 5 ,  p .  
1 9 8  
for Armou r & Co . than funds drawn f rom outs ide sources ( such as  t he 
other partnerships with wh ich the Armour' s we re a f f i l j  :� ted) . 1 �1 
The pa rtnership of Armour & Co . commenced business at t he 
beginning of  1 8 6 9  with a pa id in cash capital o f  $ 1 6 0 , 0 0 0 . The f i rm' s 
init ial  capi t a l i zat ion was almost certainly de rived f rom the prior 
a ccumulat ions of  the Chicago f i rm' s partne rs ,  John P lankinton and P .  D .  
Armour,  f rom the i r  la rge Milwaukee packing and provis ioning bus iness . 
The Milwaukee f i rm' s prof its we re derived not only f rom its  suc ce s s fu l  
t rade in pork and provi s ions , but a l s o  f rom P .  D .  Armou r ' s succes s fu l  
specu lat ion i n  commodit ies . Armour ' s me rchandis ing acumen h a d  earlier 
net ted the f i rm a fort une , est imated at approx imately $1  mi l l ion,  when , 
guess ing that the end of t he Civil Wa r was imminent , he cont racted for 
fut u re de live ry o f  mess pork at high wart ime prices . As the wa r drew t o  
a c lose , Plank inton & Armour were able to make del ivery on the contracts 
a t  a much lowe r cost than they we re paid . 1 01 
As appea rs t o  have been t rue o f  Swift & Co . ,  net p ro f i t s  we re high 
and f l uctuated widely prior to 1 8 8 5 ,  a fter wh ich, measured as  a rate of  
return on net worth,  they stabili zed at a l ower,  though s t i l l  
impres sive,  level . � ;  During the f i rst six yea rs o f  the f i rm' s l i fe ,  
10 1 I n  1 8 7 8 ,  as  noted above , John P lankinton ret i red f rom Armour & 
Co . ,  a lthough P .  D .  Armou r wa s a f f i l iated with t he Mi l waukee house unt i l  
1 8 8 4 . Thus,  although it i s  poss ible that resou rces were t rans fer red 
f rom the Mi lwaukee to the Chicago pa rtnership and v ice-versa dur ing 
1 8 7 8 - 1 8 8 4 ,  this could only ha ve been accompli shed by way of  t he 
extens ion o f  short term c redi ts bet ween the two f i rms . An examinat ion 
of the annua l dif ference between net profits  and divic�nds , and the 
addit ions to equity for the subsequent ye ar (which for every yea r  during 
1 8 7 5 - 1 8 9 0  were ident i cal ) shows that all addit ions to equity ref lected 
ea rnings that were ret ained in the pa rtnership . 
1 02G ra s ,  p .  62 6 .  Wh ile no f igures a re ava i l able showing t he profits 
o f  P lank inton & Armour f o r  the Civil Wa r period ( or for  any other 
pe r iod) , the e s t imated profit  of Armou r ' s end of wa r dea l ings in pork 
futures amounted t o  ove r  e ight t imes t he repo rted net profit  of  A rmour & 
Co . ( t he Chicago branch of  Plankinton & Armour )  du r ing 1 8 6 9 . Thi s  was ,  
o f  course , prior t o  Armour & Co . undertaking yea r round beef shipment s ,  
a fter wh ich the pro f it s  o f  the Ch icago branch soared; the Chicago 
partne rship wa s ,  in 1 8 6 9 ,  s t i l l subs idiary to the Mi lwaukee f i rm . 
1 03FTC , Repo rt on the Mea t Packing Indust rv, 1 9 1 9 , Pt . 5, pp . 2 1 -22 . 
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t he annual rate o f  profit  on net worth averaged s l ight l y  ove r 4 0  percent 
while the pa rtners equity grew to $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  by 1 8 7 5 ,  an increase of 2 0 0  
percent over the init ia l inve stment . Du ring the ent i re s ix yea r period,  
total net prof its less dra wings and dividends amounted to $ 3 4 0 , 0 0 0 ,  
exactly  the amount by which net worth inc rea sed ove r t he same pe r i od .  
The growth o f  Armour & Co . ' s  capitalization du ring this early pe r iod 
was thus der ived solely f rom ea rnings retained in the bus iness . 
Cons istent payout s to the partners notwithstanding , i t  was neve r forced 
to c a l l  upon their pe rsonal resou rces fo r addit iona l capita l . 1 0� 
As Table 7 s hows , the t rend du ring 1 8 7 5 - 1 8 9 0  was ident ical t o  that 
which appears to have been t rue of  the earl ier pe riod . The growt h in 
total net worth e�:pe rienced by Armou r & Co . du r ing this pe riod i s  
s imilar  t o  that exper ienced by Swi ft & Co . ,  alt hough somewhat more 
rapid . 10 � H igh and r i s ing profits  during the yea rs s u rrounding Armour & 
Co . ' s  entry into the interstate dressed bee f t rade enabled both a high 
rate of  return on the pa rtner' s equit y ,  and the retu rn of  h igh volumes 
o f  ea rnings to the bus iness . Even when the net rate of profit  dec l ined 
during the late 1 8 8 0 s ,  the absolute volume of ea rnings was sufficient 
both to enable s i zable withdrawa ls f rom the bus iness , and a steady rate 
of  growth of the pa rtnersh ip ' s capit a l i zation . As column s ix s hows , t he 
2 2 . 
104FTC , Repo rt on t he Meat Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 5 ,  pp . 2 1 -
10�No annual  f igures a re ava i lable showing changes in net worth for 
Swift & Co . prior t o  1 8 9 6 . Therefore a l l  changes i n  Swift  & Co . ' s  
capit a l i zat ion c i ted above refer only t o  inc reases in capita l  stock,  
wh ich probably unde rstates the t rue rate of  change o f  the company ' s  
equit y . Alt hough Swift & Co . appears to have lagged behind Armour & Co . 
in growt h as  measured i n  te rms of  capita l i zation ( a fter 1 8 8 5  when Swift 
& Co . wa s inco rporated) , there i s  no way of knowing if this was actually 
the case . Othe r f igu res suggest that Swift & Co . wa s somewhat l a rge r 
than Armour & Co . du ring this pe riod . Swift & Co . ,  for  instance , 
cont rol led 3 1  percent of  the total cat t le s laughtered in Chicago during 
1 8 8 6  compa red to 24 pe rcent for Armour & Co . ,  while dur ing the s ame 
period Armour & Co . ' s  capit a l i z a t ion appears to have been great e r . This 
could have been a t t r ibutable to the fact t hat Armour was engaged in a 
wide r  variety o f  s laughtering operat ions than Swi f t , who was a lmost 
exclusively involved in ref r ige ra ted bee f  shipments dur ing this early  
pe riod . See Yeager ,  pp . 6 4 - 6 5  and FTC , Repo rt on t he Meat Pack ing 
I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  pt . 5 ,  pp . 2 0-25 . 
2 0 0  
proport ion o f  annual  ea rnings ret a ined in t he business only t wice fe l l  
below 4 0  percent dur ing 1 87 5 - 1 8 90 . 
I t  i s  c lear f rom t he f igures c ited above f o r  1 8 7 5 - 1 8 9 0  that , t o  an 
even g reater extent than Swift & Co . ,  Armou r & Co . was heavily rel iant 
on inte rna l ly gene rated funds for long term capita l .  Despite t he 
phenomena l g rowth in the vo lume of  interstate dressed beef shipment s  
during t he ea r ly per iod o f  the indust ry' s development , t he associated 
cos t s  of establ ishing a t ransportat ion and dis t r ibut ion net work to 
accommodate t he rapidly increasing output of Armour & Co . ' s  western 
s laughte ring faci l i t ies , and the expansion of  Armou r ' s s laughtering 
capacity i t se l f , the outs ide resources of t he pa rtners we re neve r taxed 
by t he bus ines s ,  nor wa s long term capital  f rom other sources solicited . 
Furthe rmore , rathe r  than expe rienc ing a widening c i rcle o f  ownership and 
access to the funds of  a la rge r group of  investors dur ing t he 1 8 8 0 s  and 
1 8 9 0 s ,  as  did Swi ft & Co . ,  the owne rship of  Armour & Co . actually became 
increasingly concent rated, as  Armou r ' s sole former partner withdrew f rom 
t he Chicago business in 1 8 7 8  to concent rate on the management o f  
Plankinton & Armour of  Milwau kee . By 1 8 9 0  owne rship o f  Armour & Co . and 
i t s  Kansa s City a f f i lia t e ,  t he Armour Packing Co . ,  wa s ves ted ent i rely 
in t he Armou r fami ly,  with cont rol of  the fo rme r rest ing ent i rely in t he 
hands of  P .  D .  Armou r .  : oa 
P .  D .  Armour ' s  borrowing policy reportedly involved t he extens i ve 
use o f  short term c redit t o  maintain his bus iness ' s  cash ba lances a t  a 
h ighe r  level " than t he most unl ikely contingency cou ld pos s ibly 
necessitate . " 107 He was t he re fore often in debt to banks t o  a degree 
not warranted pu rely by the work ing capita l demands o f  Armour & Co . ,  
despite the s i zable addi t ions that the company was regularly able t o  
make t o  cash reserves th rough the ret urn of ea rnings t o  the bus i ness . 
106Gra s ,  pp . 6 2 5- 6 2 9 .  
1 0 7G ra s ,  p .  6 3 3 . 
2 0 1  
As was t rue o f  G .  F .  Swift , Armour made use of a numbe r o f  sho rt t e rm 
f inancial  inst rument s ,  inc luding overdra ft l ines of c redit a t  l i vestock 
banks , loans f rom other commercial banks,  and the issue o f  commercial 
pape r . Armour' s abi lity  to  obtain suff ic ient short term c redit t o  
pursue t he f inanc i a l  po l icy noted above was a ided b y  his  c lose 
connect ions with a numbe r of banks . Armou r went so f a r  as to o rgani ze 
his own bank in Kansas City,  The Armour Brothers Banking Company , when 
local f inanc i a l  facilities proved unable o r  unwil l ing t o  accommodate the 
needs of P lankint on & Armou r of Kansas City . Lat e r ,  pa rt ly in o rde r t o  
a id in the f inancing of  his  Chicago operat ions , Armour establ ished t he 
powe rful Continent a l  Nat i ona l Bank of  Chicago a long with John C .  
Black . 1 08 
Morri s & Co . : Capi t a l i za t ion, Profi t s  and the Use of Credi t ,  1 8 75-1 8 9 0  
In format ion is vague concerning the st ructu res of owne rship, 
pro f it s ,  and sources of capital izat ion for Mor ris & Co . and Hammond & 
Co . dur ing 1 8 7 5- 1 8 9 0 ,  ne ithe r  of  which played as  impo rtant a role as  
Swift & Co . and Armour & Co . in the early deve lopment of the interstate 
dressed beef indust ry . Alt hough Ne lson Morris and P .  D .  Armour we re the 
f i rst of the la rge packers to  begin opera t ions in Chicago , unl ike 
Armour , Mor r is ' s energies throughout most of t he per i od of t he early 
devel opment of t he interstate dressed beef indust ry we re divided - ­
di rected both towa rds bui lding his meat packing bus ine�s and developing 
his extensive ranch and catt le interests . 1 09 
1 0 8Gra s ,  p .  6 2 4 . 
1 09 I t  appears tha t Morris ranch and ca t t le interest s rema ined 
roughly equal in impo rt ance to his packing interests t hrough 1 9 0 0 . 
Mor r i s ' s  f irst l a rge cont ract after establish ing h imsel f  in bus i ness  i n  
Chicago i n  1 8 5 9  ( s upplying cat t le to t he Un ion Army ' s western 
divis ions ) ,  his  la rge l i vestock export ing bus ines s  and his extensi ve 
involvement in the l ivestock " evener "  a rrangement s  with t he r a i l roads 
during the 1 8 7 0 s ,  suggests that this wa s the case during t he e a rl iest 
per iod o f  his  activity as  a packer as  we l l . Mor r i s  a lso a cqu i red a 
number o f  la rge cat t le ranches in Texas and t he Dakotas and was a catt le 
breeder and feede r as  we ll . For more on Morris ' s  act ivit ies as  a pork 
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Morris  bu ilt  his f i rst s laughtering and packing faci l i t y  in 
Chicago during 1 8 5 9  near where t he Union Stockya rds would later be 
located . Mor r i s ' s  f irst packing busines s ,  which he individually owned 
and managed, flourished du ring the Civil Wa r as Mor r i s  secured luc rat ive 
cont ract s t o  supply the Un ion Army with cattle and bee f . 1 1 0 Although no 
annual f igures a re avai lable showing the s i ze of t he init i a l  investment 
or p ro fits  of the propriet orship, by 1 8 7 3  Mor ri s ' s gross revenues we re 
reported to have been $ 1 1  mi l l ion, a f igure which eas i l y  places his 
bus iness  on the same footing as  that of P .  D .  Armour dur ing the early 
1 8 7 0 s  . 1 1 1 
In  1 8 7 4  Mo rris  entered into pa rt nership with I saac Wa ixel under 
the name of Mo rris & t-la i xel . This pa rtnership was later dissolved, and 
another pa rtne rship, Ne lson Morris & Co . ,  fo rmed bet ween Ne lson Morris , 
I ra Morris , and Edwa rd Morris to take ove r  the packing and s laughte ring 
interests o f  t he dissolved company . 1 12 
Morris ' s  l i vestock and pork pack ing interest s  were a l ready 
established on an extens ive sca le when he began regular,  yea r round 
ref rige rated dressed beef sh ipments du ring 1 8 83-1 8 8 4 . 1 : 3  Mor ris ' s  
ent ry into the interstate dressed bee f bu siness was undertaken wel l  
after Swift and Armour had establi shed themselves in t he indus t r y ;  i n  
1 8 8 4 ,  when Swift wa s slaughtering 4 0 0 , 0 0 0  head of catt le annu a l l y  for 
packer and l ivestock shippe r ,  see Clemen , pp . 1 5 7 - 1 5 8  and Yeage r ,  pp . 
3 8 - 4 3 . 
1 : °Clemen , pp . 1 5 6 - 1 5 8 . 
1 1 1Yeage r ,  p .  4 3 . 
1 1 2The pa rtne rship of Ne lson Mo rris & Co . ,  cons ist ing of the s ame 
three partners named above , rema ined in existence even a fter the 
incorporat ion o f  Morris & Co . and The Fa i rbanks Canning Co . ,  both of 
which later abso rbed and opera ted most of Mor ri s ' s s laughtering and 
packing facilit ies . Fo r more on the development o f the two Morris  
a f f i l ia ted corporat ions , see below, this chapte r .  
1 1 3Yeage r ,  p .  6 5 . Morris began shipping f rozen meat to Boston in 
regul a r  boxc a rs dur ing the winter of 1 8 7 4 . Th rough 1 8 8 3 ,  he cont inued 
to send a few ca rloads a week to the east du ring t he wint e r ,  but his 
dressed bee f bu s i ness rema ined small  scale and seasona l unt i l  1 8 8 3 .  
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the domest ic dressed beef t rade ,  Morris slaughte red only 3 6 , 0 0 0 . Morris 
was a ls o  late in undertak ing the establi shment of a mechan ism t o  p rovide 
for the t ransportat ion and dist ribut ion of his p roduct ; he did not begin 
const ruct ing his own re f rigerator cars unt i l  1 8 8 4  and establi shed his 
f i rst branch fac i l ity in 1 8 8 5 . ' 1 4 By 1 8 8 8 ,  howeve r,  Mo r r i s ' s 
ref r ige rated mea t  sh ipments were la rge enough to give him the t h i rd 
la rgest sha re o f  the domestic dressed bee f t rade in t he country,  
I t  i s  doubt ful that  Morris ' s  ent ry into  the ref r igerated beef 
t rade was de layed by an insuffic iency of capital  to fund the acquisit ion 
of re f rigerated t ransportat ion and dist ribut ion fac i l i c ies ; by 1 8 8 0  
Mo rris was we l l  known a s  one o f  the la rge st and wea lthiest l ives tock 
shippers in t he count ry . � : ' Fu rt he rmo re, by 1 8 80  Ne lson Morris  & Co . 
wa s in po ssess ion o f  a la rge , mode rn slaughtering fac i l i t y  which could 
easily  have been adapted to the methods of dress ing beef for distant 
consumpt ion . I t  is  more l ikely, as Mary Yeage r has s uggested,  t ha t  
Mor r is ' s  act ive pa rt icipa t i on as  " evene r"  in  t h e  ra i l road pool ing 
a r rangement s of t he pe riod and the s ize and scope o f  his  l ivestoc k  
s hipping bus iness ma y have discou raged a mo re act ive involvement in the 
dressed bee f t rade . : : 6 In any case, a lthough precise generalizat i ons 
are imposs ible , i t  is h ighly unl i kely that t he financ ial  resources of 
Nel son Morris & Co . ,  acqui red through the pa rtnership' ·3 wel l  establ ished 
l ivestock and export beef t rade , were s t rained to any s igni ficant degree 
in f inanc ing Mor ri s ' s rapid diversif icat ion into the ref rigerated beef 
t r ade a fter 1 8 8 4 . 
1 14Yeage r ,  p .  6 5 . 
1 1 5Yeage r ,  p .  6 5 . 
1 1 6Yeage r ,  p .  5 4 . 
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G. H .  Hammond & Co . :  Capi t a l i za t i on, Profi ts and the Use of Credi t ,  
1 8 75-1 8 9 0  
Det roit mea t  dealer and packer George H .  Hammond success fully 
t ransported 1 6 , 0 0 0  pounds o f  f resh beef f rom Det roit to Boston on  Apr i l  
2 ,  1 8 6 9 , in a primitive refrige rator car designed by Hammond' s ne ighbor,  
William Davis . : n Hammond viewed this rudimenta ry method of 
ref r ige rated t ranspo rtat ion as a means to expand his thriving wholesale 
and ret a i l  meat bus iness beyond t he envi rons o f  Det ro i t ,  and quickly 
took steps t o  develop his interest in it . The init i a l  f inancing for 
Hammond' s scheme to inc rea se the vo lume o f  his ref rigerated bee f 
s hipments carne f rom the resou rce s of Hammond' s Det roit bus iness , the 
private Det roit bank ing f i rm of C. A .  I ves , and two New England meat 
jobbe rs th rough whom he had dist ributed his init ial s h ipment . 1 1 8 
Hammond' s init i a l  inves tment in the pa rtne rship, the Geo rge H .  Hammond 
Co . ,  was $2 , 0 0 0  and that of his associates tot a l led $ 4 , 0 0 0 . P a rt of t he 
init ial investment went for the const ruction of a sma l l  Indiana packing 
facility,  just ac ross the I l l inois state line f rom Chicago , appa rently 
for t he purpose of securing access to ice and suppl ies . The rema inder 
probably went a lmost ent i rely for the const ruct ion of more of the Davis 
des igned re frigera tor ca rs rather than for acquisit ion of addit i onal 
s laughter ing capacity o r  di str ibut ion fac ilities . Due t o  imperfect ions 
in the des ign of the Davis car ,  sh ipments rema ined relat ively sma l l  
scale and we re restricted t o  the colder months , t hereby ma king it 
possible t o  re ly on the t radit ional network of wholesa lers and 
commiss ion merchants for the distribut ion of his product . : 1 9 
Although t he re is no way o f  knowing what propo rtion of the total 
revenues of t he G .  H .  Hammond company are ass ignable to its  d ressed beef 
bus iness ( it s  early bu si ness inc luded the process ing of p roduct s othe r  
1 1 7Yeager ,  p .  5 2 . 
1 1 8YeagE! r ,  p .  5 3 . 
1 19Yea ge r ,  p .  5 3 . 
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than dres sed meat ) ,  by 1 8 7 3  total sales o f  the pa rtnership rose above $ 1  
mi l l ion annua l l y ;  du ring 1 8 7 5  revenues total led a lmost S2  mi l lion . :20 
By 1 8 7 9 ,  th rough t he re investment of profits in  the bus ines s ,  the $ 6 , 0 0 0  
init ial  capit a l i zat ion o f  the pa rtnership had grown t o  approximately 
$ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 121 
For reasons that a re not perfect ly clear,  Hammond was neve r able 
to match the growt h of Swi ft & Co . or Armou r & Co . dur ing this  per iod, 
a lthough he did manage to acquire a new s laught ering fac i l ity  in Omaha 
dur ing the early 1 8 8 0 s . By 1 8 8 6 , the year of Hammond' s dea th,  G .  H .  
Hammond & Co . cont rol led only 1 4 %  of the total  Ch icago s laughter 
compa red t o  3 1 %  for Swift and 2 4 %  for Armour . During 1 8 8 6  the f i rm o f  
G .  H .  Hammond & Co . was taken ove r by a group o f  Engl ish investors , 
a ft e r  which its  share of the domestic refrigerated beef t rade decl ined 
to approximately 12 pe rcent . 1 n 
The growth o f  G .  H .  Hammond & Company was appa rent l y  f inanced in a 
ma nne r simi l a r  to t hat o f  A rmour & Co . and Ne l s on Mo rris  & Co . :  
prima ri ly through rel iance on ea rnings reta i ned in the business and 
short term bank bo r rowings . By 1 8 8 6 ,  short ly after t he death o f  
Hammond, the f i rm' s capit a l i zat ion was repo rted t o  have g rown t o  ove r  $ 3  
mill ion . I t s  phys ica l assets included over 8 0 0  ref r igerator cars , 3 
eastern branch di s t r ibuto rsh ips and s laughtering plants in Indiana and 
mYeage r ,  p .  5 3 . 
m Yeage r ,  p .  7 9n .  
1 22Yeage r ,  p .  6 5 . Hammond' s pe rsonality may have had s omething to 
do with his f i rm' s s low rate of growth compa red with that o f  Swift & Co . 
and Armour & Co . Unl i ke Swift and Armour,  Hammond was appa ren t l y  
cautious , unassuming and unagres s ive . Furthermo re , Hammond d i d  not 
fol low the lead of Swi ft and Armour in pursu ing an aggres s i ve s a les 
policy in the east . According t o  his biographer ,  "Hammond' s methods 
we re s imple . . .  there was no high pressure used, or threats . "  Following 
the takeove r of the f i rm by a Brit ish syndicate a f t e r  t he death of 
Hammond, much e f f o rt was expended in bui lding the f i rms expo rt bus iness , 
which was heavily dependent on the sale of po rk product s ,  leaving the 
company ' s domestic dres sed bee f business rathe r  neg lected . For more on 
Hammond, see Rudol ph A .  Clemen , Geo rge H .  Hammond ( 1 8 3 8 - 1 8 8 6 ) : P i oneer 
in Ref r ige rated Transportat ion (New York : The Rona ld P ress Company , 
1 9 4 6 )  . 
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Omaha . 123 The re is no reco rd o f  any s ignif icant external infus ions o f  
capi t a l  p r i o r  to the sa le o f  the company t o  B r i t i s h  investors in 1 8 8 6 . 
Whi le no pro f i t  o r  capit a l i z at ion f igures a re ava i l able for  the period 
1 8 8 0 - 1 8 8 6 ,  f igures for the subsequent three yea rs s uggest that prof i t s  
dur ing the e a r l ie r  pe r iod were of a suff ic ient magnit ude to enable the 
int e rnal financing of expans ion and the accumulat ion o f  a s i zable cash 
surplus . 
After the dea th of Hammond , the partnership of G .  H .  Hammond & Co . 
was conve rted t o  a l imited l iabi lity Brit ish corporat ion,  with the 
sha res he ld in the i r  ent i rety by the inves tment syndicate that pu rchased 
the company . Later ,  in 1 8 9 0 ,  the company ' s  sha res were o f fe red t o  t he 
public on the London ma rket . Figures relea sed in the prospectus by the 
London account ing f i rm of P ri ce ,  Wate rhouse & Co . showed the company' s 
equ i ty t o  have dwindled to $2 , 4 7 5 , 0 0 0 ( a lmost ce rtainly a result o f  
funds having been withdrawn f rom cash surplus by the inves tment 
syndicate ) .  P ro f i t s  f o r  1 8 8 7 ,  1 8 8 8  and 1 8 8 9  were reported, 
respect ively,  to have been $ 5 4 0 , 2 1 2 ,  $ 6 2 6 , 0 6 2  and $ 7 1 5 , 6 6 6 . 1 24 P rofits  
for  1 8 8 9  rep resent approximately a 2 9  pe rcent return on equ i t y ,  whi le 
the accompanying f igures , assuming the company ' s  equity to have been 
ident ical during the preceding two years,  repre sent rates of return of 
22 and 2 5  percent . These f igures a re much higher than those of Armour 
& Co . for  the same yea rs ( a l though measured as a propv�t ion of a sma l ler 
equity ba se ) , and are compa rable to the rate of ret urn on equity 
experienced by Armou r & Co . du ring the ea r l ier pe riod when the f i rm was 
extending i�s t ransportat ion and dis t r ibut ion network t hroughout the 
east . Furthe rmore , as  the G .  H .  Hammond Co . ' s  sha re o f  t he domest ic 
: 23Yeager ,  p .  65 . The 3 mi l l ion do lla r f igure inc ludes t he total 
net wo rth o f  t he pa rtne rship, inc luding cash s urplus . 
1 24U . S . ,  Congres s ,  Sena te, Report of the Select Commi t tee on t he 
Transportat ion and S a le of Meat P roducts,  1 8 8 9 - 1 8 9 0 . 5 1 st Congress ,  S .  
Rept . 8 2 9 ,  1 s t  Sess . ,  1 8 9 0 ,  p . 1 3  (he rea fter referred to as  the � 
Report ) .  
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dressed bee f t rade was s lowly declining t hroughout the 1 8 8 0 s ,  i t  i s  not 
implausible to suggest that the rate of pro f it on equity would have been 
at least as h igh during t he preceding ten yea rs . m S ince bot h A rmou r  
and Swift re l ied primarily o n  the reinvestment o f  earn ings generated by 
t he rapid tu rnove r o f  a pa rtly borrowed wo rking capital  to f inance 
growth du ring t he early pe riod of the indust ry' s deve l opment ,  and s ince 
Hammond' s rate o f  prof i t  was s imi lar to that of Armou r and Swi f t ,  it i s  
highly l i kely t h a t  the growth o f  t h e  G .  H .  Hammond Co . was f i nanced in 
the same manner as  the two la rger companies . 
Financing Vertical Integration In the Dres sed Beef Industry, 1 875-1 8 9 0 : 
Branch Houses , Refrigerator Cars and Stockyards 
Financing Forward In t egra t i on :  Overview 
The four ma j o r  dres sed bee f sh ippe rs vigorously pursued a st rategy 
o f  forward integra t ion into the dis t ribut ion and ma rket ing of 
ref r igerated bee f . Mary Yeager has summari zed the reasons why the 
pac kers  found it necessary to establish their own dist ribut ion and 
t ransportat ion networks as fol lows : 
The long dist ance dist ribut ion o f  a pe rishable product was a 
nove l undert a k ing . Init ially,  rules o f  t humb and a st rategy 
of expe riment a t ion cha racteri zed the bus iness . Only a f te r  
the rail roads ref used t o  bu i ld re f rigerator cars did [ t he 
pac kers ) decide t o  bu ild [ t he i r ]  own , and only a iter early 
expe riment s  had demonst rated the need for mo re e f f i c ient 
dist ribut ion networks did [ the packers ] dec ide to bui ld 
( thei r ]  own ( Yeager,  p .  5 0 ) . 
Vert ical  integra tion was thought to have c reated formidable 
barriers to ent ry in the developing industry,  as  potent i a l  ent rant s we re 
forced to undertake operat ions " on a la rge sca le a lmos t  f rom t he 
outset , "  and to have severe ly taxed the f inanc i a l  f a c i l i t ies o f  t he 
f i rms which actua l l y implemented the st rat egy . ' 2 6 I t  i s  clear t hat t he 
12�See Tables 6 and 7 above for an account of the rate of pro fit  for 
Swift & Co . and Armour & Co . du ring the 1 8 8 0s . 
1 26Yeage r ,  p .  6 4 . 
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establishment o f  an organi zed ma rket ing and dist ribut ion net work , and 
the bui lding up of the packers'  private re f r ige rator car  lines proceeded 
at a rapid rate . Un fortunately, no annual f igures a re avai lable showing 
increa ses in the numbe r of ref r igerator cars owned by t he la rge packers 
during 1 8 7 5-1 9 0 0 . It was reported, however ,  that by 1 9 0 4  Swift & Co . 
cont rolled approximately 5 , 4 7 3  ref r igerator cars while Armour & Co . 
cont rol led 12 , 02 9 . 1 27 Furthermore , during 1 8 8 4 - 1 8 9 0 ,  t he business of 
the la rge packe r s ,  as  measured by the total numbe r of cat t le s laughte red 
in Chicago , inc rea sed by over 85 pe rcent . 128 Since ref r igerator cars 
were necessary for  the long distance t ranspo rtat ion of  dressed bee f in 
di rect p ropo rt ion to the total quantity shipped, it is likely that 
inves tments in refrige rator cars grew by a s imi lar percentage . 
I t  may appea r that the necessity of acquiring la rge f leets o f  
re f r igerator c a r s  dramatically increased the f ixed capit a l  intensity 
and f ixed cos ts o f  the la rge dressed bee f shippe rs , and thus the s t ress 
placed on t he i r  fi nanc i a l  fac i l it ies , du ring the early pe riod of  the 
indust ry' s deve lopment . But the const ruction of  f leets of re f rigerator 
cars by the pa ckers did not technically represent an investment whose 
costs we re ass ignable to the dres sed bee f bus ines s ;  it thus merits  
sepa rate considerat ion f rom the f inancing of  the  other  forms o f  f ixed 
investment which they undertook during 1 8 75-1 9 0 5 .  More spec i f ically,  
the pa cke r s  revenues f rom the manufacture and sa le o f  dressed bee f did 
not have to be " spread ove r "  their private ca r line investments because 
ope rat ion of the private car l ines gene rated revenues of their own which 
were s u f f icient to fund t he growt h of the priva te ca r lines at a much 
more rapid rate t han they did, in fac t ,  expand . 
1 2 7Ga r f ield Reoo rt , p .  2 7 0 . The cars cont rol led by Swift & Co . and 
Armour & Co . in 1 9 0 4  we re actually owned by two subs idiary corporat ions : 
the Swi ft Re f r ige rator Transpo rtat ion Company and Armour Car  Lines . 
128Yeage r , pp . 2 5 6-2 57 . 
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The packers ' private car l ines were established during 1 8 7 9 - 1 8 8 5  
a fter the ra i l roads re f used to build ref rigerator c a rs i n  sufficient 
numbe r to provide adequate t ransporta t ion facilit ies for t he rapidly 
inc reasing volume of t rade that was be ing generated by t he interstate 
dres sed beef sh ippe rs . : 7" But the re frige rator  ca rs themselves proved 
to be an impo rtant source of revenue for the la rge packers due to t he 
mileage payments a l lowed by t he ra ilroads f o r  their use , and because of 
addit ional  payment s secu red by the packers for p roviding refrigerat ion 
se rvices in the t ransportat ion of other items . 1 30 
Th rough 1 9 0 5  lit tle informat ion was made public by the packers on 
their private car lines , with the except ion of pe riodic statements 
giving the numbe r of cars in ope rat ion . Lit t le informat i on is 
ava i lable , therefore ,  concerning prec isely how this aspect of the i r  
bus iness was financed . Several gene ral inferences , howeve r ,  a re 
pos s ible on the basis  of the gene ra l feat ures of the re lat ionship 
between t he railroads and t he dressed beef shippers noted above , and a 
det a i led est imate o f  t he annual rate o f  pro fit of  the private c a r  lines 
as compi led by t he U .  S .  Commi ssione r of Corpo rat ions in 1 9 0 5 . 1 3 :  
1 29For a good, t hough brie f ,  account of t he reasons why the 
rail roads we re reluctant to prov ide re f rige rator cars to the packers 
during the early st ages of the indust ry' s deve lopment ,  see Yeage r ,  pp . 
6 0 - 6 3  and Swi f t ,  pp . 1 8 5-1 92 . 
130After const ructed and put in service by t he packe r s ,  private 
refrigerator cars received a mileage a llowance f rom t he rail roads over 
whose lines t hey t ravel led . The packers received a spec i f ied and f ixed 
amount f rom t he rail roads for every mi le which the c a rs t ravelled, 
whether t he cars we re used for the t ransportat ion of ref r igerated beef ,  
used by some other shippe r ,  o r  in most cases , ope ra ted empt y .  
Appa rent ly t he ope rat ion of  private rail road ca r lines was not unique to 
the packing indus t ry . By 1 9 0 5  there we re reported t o  have been several 
hundred private car lines in existence , eviden t l y  paying a s a t i s fact ory 
return on inves tment , which had no other pu rpose whatever than the 
leas ing of  the i r  c a rs t o  rail roads or sh ippe rs of  va rious p roducts for 
which adequate t ransportat ion facilities had yet t o  be provided by the 
rail roads . See the Ga r f ield Repo rt , pp . 2 7 1-2 7 2 . 
13 1The informat ion upon which t he Commissioners report is based was 
gathe red f rom test imony presented be fore the Interstate Comme rce 
Commission and before va rious congress ional committee� du ring 1 9 0 4 -1 90 5 . 
See t he Ga r f ield Report , pp . 2 7 0-2 8 5  for det a i l s  as  to sou rces used and 
t he exact met hods that we re employed in est ima t ing revenues and rates of 
2 1 0  
Assuming an ave rage cost per refrigerator car of  $ 1 0 0 0 ,  a lowe r  
bound est imate o f  per mile rental cha rges o f  . 7 8 7 5  cent s ,  and a ccept ing 
the est imate o f  1 0 0  mi les pe r day as a fair  ave rage for  a l l  ref rigerator 
cars in service, t he Commissione r of Corpo rat ions est ima ted t he net 
profit on inves tment (gross profit minus depreciat ion and ope rat ing 
expenses)  in refrige rator ca rs to have been approximately 1 7 . 5  
percent . 1 32 This est imated net rate o f  return does not a l low f o r  
addit iona l mi leage payment s f o r  providing refr igerat ion services in the 
t ransportat ion o f  other items , a source of  revenue that  wa s relat ively 
unimportant to the dres sed beef shippers compared with the regu l a r  
mi leage cha rges pa id to them by the rail roads . The impo rtance of the 
h igh net rate o f  return rea lized on the packers ' investment in private 
ref rigerator cars is tha t once the init ia l investment was made , and 
assuming that the dema nd for re f rigerated bee f wa s sufficient t o  war rant 
their regula r movement , t he private car l ines became ' self-financing ' . 
In other words , t he revenues generated by the operat ion of the 
refrige rator cars , i f  even a po rt ion wa s regula rly reinvested in 
increas ing the numbe r of cars , would have been more than suf f icient to 
enable t he pri va te car l ines to expand at a far more rapid rate than the 
profit on the packers ' investment in re f rigerator c a rs . 
132Yeager est imates the cost per ref rigerat o r  car  du r ing the 1 8 8 0 s  
t o  have been app roximately $ 12 0 0 ,  but the U . S .  Commis s ione r o f  
Corporations states that the estimate of  $ 1 0 0 0  as  t he ave ra ge cost t a kes 
into account lowe r  prices on cars purchased in the past ( s uggest ing that 
Yeage r ' s estima te is too h igh ) and a contempora ry price of  approximately 
$ 1 1 0 0 .  Mi leage a l lowances f rom the ra ilroads were p robably reduced 
p ropor t i ona l l y  with the price of cars du ring the earlier pe riod . Du ring 
the ea rly pe riod o f  the indu st ry' s development , due to a short age of 
cars , each wa s probably used more intensively than a t  t he t ime of the 
report . An ave rage da i l y est ima te of 1 0 0  mi les t rave: led per car is 
thus probably not excess ive . Other contempo rary profit reports 
submi tted by the packe rs t o  the Commiss ione r  note t he actual rate of  
profit on individual priva te refrigerator car  l ine inve s tments to have 
been between 1 7 . 7  and 22 percent . The est imated rate of net profit of  
1 7 . 5  percent thus appears to represent a plausible l owe r bound est imate 
o f  the net =ate of  ret u rn on investment during a per iod when nume rous 
privat e  ref rigerated ca rs were in se rvice, and thus a lmost ce rtainly 
unders tates the net rate of return on the packe r ' s private car  
inves tment du ring 1 8 8 0 - 1 8 9 5 ,  when refrigerator c a rs were in less 
plent i fu l  supply . See the Ga rfield Repo rt , pp . 2 7 2 -2 8 2 . 
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actual ref r �gerated bee f bus iness of the packers , without i n  any way 
t axing the actua l revenues f rom the manufacture and sale of dressed 
bee f . 1 33 Therefore, t he neces sity of const ructing and ma intaining 
la rge fleet s of ref r igerator cars on the part of the packer ' s  did not 
technically cont ribute to an increase in fixed cha rges assignable to the 
packers ' dres sed bee f t rade ,  nor would it have t axed t hem financially,  
as ide , perhaps , f rom the init ial investment . G .  F .  Swift  & Co . ,  dur ing 
the early period of its  development ,  inco rporated a sepa rate f i rm, 
purportedly t o  raise capi tal  for the expansion o f  Swift ' s  sma l l  f leet of 
re f rigerator cars . With the pos sible except ion o f  this  act ion by Swift 
& Co . ,  there is no evidence to suggest t hat t he packe r s '  faced any 
difficulty in funding their initial inves tment in ref rigerator cars . 134 
1 3 3  The ref rige rated beef busines s ,  as measured by the sha re o f  t he 
total numbe r o f  cat t le slaughte red in Ch icago s laughte r mul t ip l ied by 
the s ha re of t he Chicago sl aughter control led by the la rge dressed beef 
shippers , increa sed by approximately 8 5  pe rcent during 1 8 8 4- 1 8 9 0 . I f  
a l l  revenues gene rated b y  the priva te c a r  l ines then in se rvice 
( assuming an ave rage net rate of return of 17 . 5  percent ) we re reinvested 
in t he bus iness , the pr ivate car l ines wou ld have expanded ove r t h ree 
hundred percent more rapidly t han the re fr ige rated bee f bus iness itsel f . 
I f  a 7 . 5  pe rcent dividend were "dec lared" yea rly by the private ca r 
l ines and the rest of revenues ret urned t o  the business , t he pr iva te car 
l ines would have grown at approximately the same rate as  t he dressed 
beef business . Cons ide red in a s l ightly different way, the tot a l  
est ima ted inves tment i n  ref rigerator cars by Armou r & Co . and S w i f t  & 
Co . in 1 9 0 5  t ot a l led $ 1 7 . 5  mi l l ion (Ga rfield Repo rt ,  p .  1 3 9 ) . I f  a 7 . 5  
percent annual dividend were decla red on the investment in p rivate cars 
and t he rema inder reinvested in the pu rcha se of ref r ige rator c a rs ,  an 
inves tment of $ 1 . 6 1 mi llion in 1 8 7 9  would have f inanced the total 
investment noted above by 1 90 5 .  I f  a l l  the pro f i t s  (given t he above 
est imate o f  ave rage net rate of return ) we re ret urned t o  the bus iness 
annua l l y ,  t he total investment in refrige rator cars i n  1 9 0 5  could have 
been financed by an initial investment of only $ 3 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 
1M informat ion is sca rce rega rding the sources and uses of funds for 
the packe r s '  private re f r igerator car li nes . The pac kers l i kely 
withheld such inf o rmat ion because of t he ext raordina ry profitabi l i t y  of 
the i r  inve stments in re f r igerator cars . Unlike many other compan ies of 
t his pe r iod, wh ich t ook great pa ins to inflate earnings t o  just i f y  
unrea l i s t ically  high capi ta l i zat ion figures,  the pa ckers t ook great 
pa ins t o  conceal o r  camou flage ea rnings in o rder to a l lay pub l ic 
opprobrium at what wa s widely pe rceived t o  be an inordinately 
p rofitable , highly monopo l i s t ic indust ry . S ince mos t  o f  t he early 
dres sed beef shipper s  we re pa rtnerships o r  closely he ld corporat ions , 
t he re was no incent i ve to inf late capit ali zation f igures o r  publicize 
h igh rates o f  ret u rn on invested capi ta l . See FTC , Report on t he Mea t  
Pack ing I ndus t ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 5 and the Garfield Report , pp . 2 5 - 5 1 . 
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A somewhat more de f inite picture eme rges rega rding t he 
estab l ishment o f  dist r ibut ion and ma rket ing fac i l i t ies among t he la rge 
ref r igerated bee f sh ippers . Bet ween 1 8 7 6  and 1 8 9 0 Armour & Co . opened 
42 branch houses . While no annual f igu res a re ava i lable for  Swift & Co . 
prior t o  1 8 9 9 ,  the company is  known to have est abl ished 1 9 3  branch 
hou ses between 1 8 7 8  and 1 9 0 0 ,  and to have preceded Armour by several 
yea rs in  establ i shing a dedicated wholesale dis t r ibut ion net work for 
ref r ige rated bee f in t he ea st . 13� Ne lson Morris  & Co . ,  whose 
re f r ige rated bee f bus ine ss grew somewhat less rapidly than that of Swift 
and Armour ,  opened 2 9  branch houses between 1 8 8 5- 1 8 9 0 . '36 
Although a t remendous business devel oped for the po rk product s  of 
t he western packers a fter the Civil Wa r ,  the dema nds irnposed on the 
exist ing dist ribut ion appa ratus by an increased volume o f  t rade in 
cu red, relat ive ly non-pe ri shable meat products we re not ext raordina ry . 
S ome packe r s ,  such as  Armour,  had establ ished dist r ibut ion agenc ies that 
worked in close coope rat ion with the ma in manu factu ring fac i l it y  to 
coordinat e  the act ivit ies of jobbe rs and cons ignees in distant ma rkets . 
P rior to the advent of the dressed beef t rade ,  howeve r ,  no attempt had 
been made to establish a network of producer control led dist r ibut ion 
faci l i t ies dedicated t o  the ma rketing of the packe rs ' product s  in  a reas 
that we re dist ant f rom the prima ry s laughtering fac i l ity . 137  
The establ ished j obbe r and consignee system proved inadequate to 
the la rge-scale ma rket ing and dist r ibut ion of a relat i�e ly unknown , 
1 3 �Clemen , The American Livestock and Mea t  I ndus t ry, pp . 3 8 8 - 3 9 0 . 
Armou r ' s eastern dist ribut ion network prior to 1 8 8 4  had been establis hed 
t o  faci l i tate t he coordinat ion of the network of j obbers which Armour 
used t o  dist r ibute h i s  pork products in  eastern ma rkets prior t o  his 
entry into t he refrige rated bee f t rade . F rom the out set , Swift ' s  
ma rket ing and dis t r ibut ion network was dedicated solely t o  t he 
dist r ibut ion o f  western dressed beef . 
: 36FTC , Reoo rt on the Meat Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  S umma ry and Pt . 
1 ,  p .  1 5 3 . 
1 3 7Gra s ,  p .  6 2 3 . The f i rm employed by Armour & Co . t o  coordinate 
t he east coast dist ribut ion of its pork product s  wa s P lank inton , Armour 
& Co . of New York, established in 1 8 6 5 . 
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perishable p roduct l ike dressed beef,  which demanded cl ose coordina t ion 
between supply and demand, spec ialized sto rage fac i l i t ies and t he 
establishment of a way t o  dea l with loca l pre judices aga ins t what was 
t hought to be an infe r i o r ,  unwholesome product . 1 38 The establi shment o f  
an ef fect ive mechanism to enable the ma rket ing and dist r ibut ion of  
wes te rn dressed beef in eastern ma rkets was t he refore mo re complex t han 
s impl y  cons t ruc t i ng and sta ffing new physica l s t ruc t u res to serve as 
local  storage facilit ies and wholesa le ma r kets . 139 
The fi nanc ial techn iques used by the pa cke r ' s in e s t ablishing 
t he i r  ma rket ing and dist r i but ion netwo rks re flected the complexity and 
scope of the undertaking . Swi f t  & Co . made extens ive use of t he 
pract ice o f  est abl ishing bus iness a l l iances with established eastern 
meat dea lers and wholesalers , pa rtly  to fores t a l l  opposit ion t o  the 
int roduct ion o f  t he i r  product by established loca l mea t  dea lers , and 
p a r t l y  t o  obviate t he need t o  fund the const ruct ion o f  new wholes a le 
out let s . A rmou r & Co . and Mo rris  & Co . ,  like Swift & Co . ,  a l s o  
attempted to coordinate the i r  exist ing dis t r ibut ion netwo rks w i t h  t he 
dressed bee f  t rade . The i r  task,  howeve r ,  wa s s imp l i fied somewhat by the 
fact that t hey had, for some t ime , made use of t he exist ing dist r ibut ion 
machinery to ma rket t he i r  cured pork product s  in the east . Only 
msuch pre judices on the pa rt of t he public we re in man y  cases 
active l y  cu l t i vated by local retail  meat dea lers and wholesa lers , who 
had much to lose f rom the int roduct ion of we stern dres sed bee f  into 
eastern ma rkets . For a deta iled discus sion of  the problems faced by the 
western packers in providing for the dist r ibut ion o f  dres sed bee f in 
eastern ma rket s ,  see The Insti tute of Ame r ican Meat Packe r s ,  The Packing 
Indust rv,  pp . 7 2 - 8 0  and C lemen, pp . 379-3 9 0 . 
mA l f red Chandle r has stated tha t ,  in the ea rly 1 8 8 0 s ,  Swift  "began 
to build branch houses in every ma jor t own or city  in t he East and in 
many othe r  pa r t s  of t he na t ion . A branch house included a refrige rated 
warehouse , a sa les o f f ice , and men and equipment t o  de l ive r mea t  t o  
reta i l  butcher s  and food stores . "  This and othe r s imi l a r  accounts 
suggest that fo rwa rd integrat ion in t he meat packing indust ry s impl y  
involved t he bui lding and s t a f f ing o f  new phys ical st ructures coupled 
with la rge and rapid f inancial out lays to  fund the cons t ruct ion o f  
additions to  the phys ica l plant o f  t he western dres sed bee f shippe rs 
( A l f red Chandle r ,  The Essent ial  Chandle r ed . McCraw, p .  2 3 0 ) . As will  
be suggested be low,  this \-las  not exactly t rue . 
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after  eastern ma rkets for western dressed bee f we re wel l  establi shed 
t hrough coordinat ion of t he exist ing network of j obbe rs and loca l 
who lesalers did the la rge packe rs se riously undertake t he establishment 
of dedica ted, subs idia ry branch houses for the wholesale dis t ribut ion of 
t he i r  product in eastern ma rkets . Eventually an ent i rely new market ing 
and dist ribut ion network wa s c reated; owned and opera ted by the packers 
o r  t he i r  subs idia r ies , and under close con t ro l  of salaried managers in 
the employment o f  the dressed bee f shippers . The f inancial  techniques 
used by the packe rs in establishing t he i r  ma rket ing and dist ribution 
fac i l i t ies t hus changed over t ime , f rom t hose used prima r i ly to 
coordinate t he " old" dist ribut ion system du r ing t he early phase o f  
forward integrat ion, t o  those used i n  actually absorbing and bui lding 
upon t he " o ld" dist ribut ion network during a s l ight ly later pe riod . The 
f inancial  pract ices employed by the packers whi le pursu ing t he i r  
st rategy o f  fo rwa rd integrat ion du ring t he early pe ricd o f  t he i r  
deve lopment t hus involved l i t t le funding o f  newly p roduced f i xed 
capi ta l ; t he i r  ea rly efforts we re di rected prima rily t owa rds us ing 
var ious fin�nc ial and bu si ness devices to coordinate t he exis t ing 
dis t ribut ion network with the imperat ives of dist ribut ing a nove l ,  
perishable product . Even during the later per iod, rather than engaging 
sole ly in t he const ruct ion of new, dedicated distribut ion f a c i l i t ies , 
cons iderable efforts  we re di rected towa rds establishing a greater degree 
of con t rol over exist ing dist ributorships t han was poss ible t hrough t he 
use of the financ ial techn iques employed du ring t he earlier pe r iod . 
Swi ft & Co . : Fi nancing Forward In t egra t i on 
The f inanc ial  s t rategy employed by t he pa rtnership o f  G .  F .  Swift 
& Co . in establishing a marketing and dist r ibut i on net work in the east 
involved t he c reat ion of pa rtnerships between Edwin Swi f t  and G .  F .  
Swift  ( often working t h rough the agency of Swift  Bros . & Co . ,  the 
eastern subs idiary partnership of G .  F .  Swift & Co . ) ,  and nume rous local 
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wholes alers , the la�ter o f  whom funct ioned as  cons ignees of G .  F .  Swift 
& Co . unde r  the loose control of  the Swift b rothers . The l oc a l  
wholesa le r  w i t h  whom t h e  pa rtnership w a s  formed t ypica l l y  owned t he 
phys ica l facil ity t hrough which G .  F .  Swift & Co . ' s  bee f was 
distr ibuted . The partnership was s imply a device to p rovide bot h  for  
the di spos it ion o f  the proceeds of  the cons ignee ' s total  bus iness t ha t  
was assignable to his l oca l dressed beef t rade ,  and t o  c reate a 
community of mutual f inanc ial interest between t he local wholes a le r  and 
the Swi f t s ,  whose interests otherwise would have con f l icted . 1 40 I n  each 
case, the "paid in" capi tal o f  the Swift brothers amounted to mea t  
granted o n  c redit t o  t h e  cons ignee and a gua rantee o f  loca l exc lus ivity, 
whi le the capital brought to the pa rtne rship by the loca l who lesaler 
cons isted of the goodwi l l  of his local t rade and the phys ical f a c i l ity 
in which the product wa s stored and t h rough which it was 
dis t r ibuted . : < Most o f  the early pa rtners hips thus formed by t he 
14 0The rna jor  compet it ion for the western dressed beef shippe rs came 
f rom eastern wholesalers and ret ail  meat dealers whose , p r ima ry t r ade 
was in t he p roduct of  local slaughte rs and butchers . The pa rtnership 
device used by Swift and Armour in establ i shing bus iness a l l i ances with 
a numbe r of these indi vidua ls wa s thus intended not onl y  t o  c reate local 
dist ribut ion and ma rket ing networks , but also to mi t igate the 
inevitable competit ion between western dressed bee f and t he loca lly 
s laughtered va r iet y .  See Clemen , Ame rican Livestock and Meat I ndustry, 
pp . 3 7 9 -3 9 0 . 
1 4 1Clemen , The Amer ican Livestock and Meat Indust ry, p .  2 3 5 ;  
Ga rfie ld Repo rt , p .  2 8 6 . This would have involved an exchange o f  equity 
not unl i ke t he " s tock swap s "  which accompan ied t he later me rge r 
movement .  The individua l with whom t he pa rtne rship wa s formed wa s 
granted a s ha re in the a l ready exist ing partnership of Swift  Bros . & Co . 
( th rough which G .  F .  Swift & Co . dis t ributed the i r  bee f t o  eastern 
wholesa lers ) in exchange for which G.  F .  and Edwin Swi ft would each 
recei ve a one-third interest in the individual dis t r ibut o rship operated 
by the i r  loca l agent . In other cases , in which partne rships were fo rmed 
on beha l f  of the Swifts  as  individua ls ( rather t han through the agency 
of Swift Bros . & Co . )  and the l oca l dist ribut o r ,  the latter individua l 
would have en j oyed an indi rect claim on the ea rn ings o f  bot h the wes te rn 
pack ing bu s ine ss of  the Swif t ' s ,  and the local dist ributo rship t hrough 
his share in the partnership . These methods are suggested, but not 
actua l ly stated,  by Louis F .  Swi ft in a section of his  biog raphy of G .  
F .  Swift whe re in he concludes that the method employed by t he Swifts  in 
establishing pa rtnersh ips with eastern who lesa lers " incermeshed so 
completely t he financial  interests of many important dist r ibut o rs with 
t he interest s o f  Swift & Co . t hat there was no quest ion but that we had 
adequate,  enthusia s t ic sales representat ion . "  See Swift , p .  7 8 . 
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Swift ' s  we re t h rough individuals with whom Swift had in some way been 
ass oc iated dur ing h is early days as a New England mea t  dea ler,  or as a 
catt le buye r for Hathaway & Swift . 1 42 In  most instances,  t hese 
pa rtnership a r rangements we re undert aken by local s laughtere rs and 
wholesale rs in addit ion to thei r regular busines ses , and provided solely 
for the coope rative overs ight of the di stributorship and the divi sion o f  
the proceeds of ref rigerated beef sales accounted f o r  b y  t he individual 
wholesaler . 
Swifts st rategy of 'cooperat ion rather than comba t '  with local 
slaughte rers and wholesa lers was both ext remely ef fect ive in defus ing 
local opposit ion to the int roduction of his product (much of which 
predictably came from those whose live lihoods we re thr�atened by the 
int roduct ion o f  dres sed beef in eastern ma rket s ) , and in est abl i shing an 
ef fect ive dist ribut ion system for G .  F .  Swift & Co . ' s  dre ssed bee f in 
t he east with a minima l  out lay of funds . 143 A series of reports by R .  
G .  Dun & Co . for the pe r iod 1 8 8 0 - 1 8 8 2  make several ment ions o f  Gustavus 
Swift and Swift Bros . & Co . as be ing involved " in a numbe r of other 
concerns in New England towns and elsewhere for the s a le of beef at 
wholesa le o r  ret ail , "  and as be ing "partners in other New England 
concerns to whom G . F .  Swift & Co . and Swi ft Bros . & Co . cons ign beef , "  
each o f  wh ich was said to be " independent . . .  and highly prof itable and 
remune rat ive for a l l  conce rned . " 1H During the f i rst seve ral years o f  
G .  F .  Swift & Co . ' s  activity in the dressed beef t rade , over one hundred 
1 4 2  Clemen,  The Ame r ican Livestock and Meat Indus t ry, p .  1 0 ;  
Ga rf ield Report , p .  2 8 6 ;  Goodspeed, p .  1 0 0 . In  this sense , a 
s ignificant port ion of the "cap it a l "  empl oyed by Swift in establish ing 
his eastern dist r ibut ion network wa s the reputat ion he had established 
during his early days in the meat industry . 
1 43Yeager ,  pp . 5 5- 6 5 ,  has a good account of Swift ' s s t rategy o f  
enl i st ing the coope rat ion o f  local  slaughterers in eastern market s ,  and 
the problems this  s t rategy was intended to s olve . 
144Ma s sachusset s ,  vol . 8 7 ,  p .  2 62 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Co llection . 
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o f  t hese pa rtnerships we re reported to have been formed, many o f  which 
lasted wel l  into t he 1 8 90s  . •u 
Swift ' s  st rategy of  gaining the coope rat ion o f  eastern who lesalers 
and slaughterers in the distribut ion o f  his product appea rs t o  have 
changed only sl ight ly du ring t he years immediately fol lowing t he 
incorpo rat ion o f  Swift & Co . P ract ica l ly the ent ire init i a l  issue of  
the company ' s  capit a l  s t ock that did not go to the Swi f t  family wa s 
dist r ibuted among the eastern dis t ributors with whom t he Swif t ' s  had 
earlie r  entered into partnership, thus s light ly changing the nature of 
the f inancial interdependence that existed under the var ious partnership 
a r rangement s . 1 � 6 Through 1 8 9 0 there is no record of Swi f t  & Co . ha ving 
acqu i red out r ight or having const ructed a single branch facil ity . This 
is  not so st range as  it  f i rst appea rs . Insofar as  Swi ft ' s st rategy was 
to expand his  dist ribution network into places in which the demand for 
his p roduct was expected to be the highest , t he a reas in which branches 
were establ ished were we l l  populated enough to a lready have t he i r  own 
local  s laughte ring and who lesale sa les facilities . 
Through the use o f  the f inancial techn iques described above , Swift 
wa s able t o  economi ze on t he funds o f  G .  F .  Swift & Co . by securing the 
use o f  the tangible capi t a l  t hat wa s embodied in the established 
dis t ribut i on system of  loca l meat wholesalers and dist ributors , rather 
1 4 5  Clemen ,  The Ame rican Livestock and Meat Indust ry, p .  1 0 ; 
Goodspeed, p .  1 0 5 . Many of  the partnerships were later bought out by 
Swift & Co . (Ma ine ) , the successor o f  Swift Bros . & Co . ,  the ent i re 
capi t a l  stock of  which was later purcha sed for cash by Swi f t  & Co . 
( I l l inois ) in 1 9 0 3 . On ly t hen did the ent i re dist r ibut ion system 
employed by Swift & Co . come under its di rect cont rol ( see below, this 
chapter )  . 
w'Yeage r ,  p .  8 3n . The init ial c i rcle of ownership of  Swi f t  & Co . ,  
not inc luding membe rs of t he Swi f t  fami ly, numbe red 1 0 3  individua ls . I t  
appears a lmost cert a in t h a t  t he sha res i n  Swift & Co . t h a t  we re 
dist r ibuted out s ide the Swift family were given to the dist ributors in 
exchange for or in  addit ion to the claims which t he individu a l  
dist ribut o rs had o n  t he ea rnings of  Swift Bros . & Co . or t he b roade r 
interests o f  the Swift ' s  as individua ls th rough t he va rious independent 
pa rtners hips th rough which the Swi fts dist ributed thei� product s .  Swi ft 
Bros . & Co . wa s appa rent ly dissolved short ly a f ter t he format ion of  
Swift & Co . .  
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than by bu i lding new st ructures at cons ide rable expense to the f i rm .  
Lat e r ,  as  the bus iness o f  Swi ft  & Co . expanded, and t he need f o r  c lose r 
cont rol of  an inc rea sed volume of  bus iness became mo re u rgent , Swift  & 
Co . gradually began pu rchas ing the interests of  the pa rtners in a number 
of the dist ributorsh ips in which the Swift brothers former ly had owned 
only a pa rt ial  interest . 1 47 These pu rchases were f unded through the use 
of reta ined ea rnings and the sale of s tock in unknown p roport ion s ,  and 
prima r i l y  represented the t ransfer of  owne rship and cont rol of exist ing 
bus inesses f rom t he pa rtne rships to Swift & Co . or i t s  subs idia ries,  
rather t han the establ ishment of  new bus ines ses . 1 4 8  
G .  F .  Swift & Co . ' s  fi rst re f rige rator  cars we re const ructed by 
t he Michigan C a r  Company somet ime during 1 8 7 7 - 1 8 7 8 .  Swi f t  f inanced the 
1 � 7Swi ft  & Co . a l so unde rt ook const ruct ion of  t he i r  own branch 
fac i l i t ies a fter  1 8 9 0 , but it is  not cert ain what port ion of the i r  
inve stment s i n  branch distributorships took this form as  opposed to the 
acquisit ion of part ia l or  complete cont rol ove r exist ing 
dist r ibutorsh ips . S i nce Swift was the f i rst t o  establ ish a network t o  
provide f o r  the dist ri but ion of  re frige rated bee f ,  and s ince t h e  prima ry 
method he emp loyed during the early st ages of  his f i rm' s development was 
the partnership device de scribed above , it is l ikely that a ma j o r  
port ion of  the investment was of  the latter form .  
14 8Gar f ield Repo rt , pp . 2 8 6- 2 8 7 . The acquisit ion o f  cont rol ove r  
the va rious dis t r ibut ion facilities in which the Swift ' s  were interested 
began in approximately 1 8 9 0 and wa s pract ica lly completed by 1 9 0 5 . It  
was reported that Swift & Co . "owned" 1 9 3 branch faci l i t ies i n  1 9 0 0  by 
the Federal Trade Commi ss ion, but it is not clea r how this ownership was 
actua l ly s t ructured . The f i rst ba lance sheet publ icly released by Swift 
& Co . in 1 8 9 8  shows branches l i sted as " investment s "  ( t he category in 
which packing related int e rests in other compa nie s ,  rathe r  t han 
unre lated f i nanc ial  investment s ,  such as mun icipa l bor,ds , were placed) 
rather t han as " real est a t e ,  et c . , "  ( t he category in which the company ' s  
fixed capit a l  wa s placed) . Alt hough it was i l lega l  for I l linois 
Corpora t ions t o  own stock in other co rporations,  it  does not appear to 
have been il legal for them to own equity in other busines ses o r  
investment t rusts , providing they we re not corporat ions . Many b ranches 
might thus have been " owned" in the sense that Swift  & Co . had pa r t i a l  
o r  complete cont rol over t he partnership through which t h e  branches 
pro f i t s  were dist r ibuted . Most of  the subsidia ry corpo rat ions 
cont rolled by Swift & Co . du ring this early pe riod were actua l ly owned 
by t rustees for the bene fit of Swift & Co . ,  which in t urn con t rol led the 
t rust which owned t he st ock . Swift & Co . of  Ma ine ,  which was o rgani zed 
in 1 9 0 2  to acqu i re out right a numbe r of New Eng land branch house s ,  and 
wh ich wa s later a cqu i red by Swift & Co . of  I l linois,  wa s " owned "  by the 
latter company in this  fa shion . For mo re on the chang ing f inancial  
relat ionships bet ween Swi f t  & Co . and its dist r ibut ion subsidiar ie s ,  see 
below, t h i s  chapt e r ,  the Ga rfield Repo rt ,  pp . 4 0 - 4 3  and FTC , Repo rt on 
the Mea t  Pack ing Indust rv, 1 9 1 9 ,  Summa ry and Pt . 1 , pp . 1 5 2 -1 5 4 . 
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purchase by signing a mo rtgage on his busines s ,  paying 1 5  percent of  t he 
f ina l purchase price in cash, and promis ing t o  amo rt i z �  t he rema inder o f  
t he pu rcha se price in regular monthly installments . 1 49 Poss ibly due t o  
a lack o f  capita l  t o  supplement his early init ial inves tment in 
re f rigerator c a rs , Swi ft incorporated a sepa rate company ( o f  unknown 
capi t a l i zat ion at the t ime of incorporation ) : the Swift Re f r ige rator 
Transportat ion Company (Ma ine) . 1 H Although the exact date o f  
incorporat ion i s  unknown , i t  appears t o  have been short ly a fter t he 
incorporat ion of  Swi ft  & Co . in 1 8 8 5 ,  as many o f  t he sma l l  c i rcle of  
stockholde rs in t he latter company were noted t o  have been stockholders 
in t he forme r company as  we ll . ' 5 1  The company was later reported t o  
have been capitalized at  $2 mi ll ion in 1 9 0 5 ,  o f  which only f o r t y  pe rcent 
had been paid for in cash,  with bonded indebtedness of $ 1 . 5 7 
mi llion . : :.2 
As suggested by the genera l ea rnings est imates made above for the 
packe rs ' private car l ines , t he Swi ft Re fr igerator Transportat ion 
Company , once established, appears to have been h ighly profit able . 
Somet ime du ring 1 9 02 the ent i re capital stock of  t he private car company 
: 49Swi f t , p .  1 8 8 . Appa rent ly this debt wa s ret i red in a t ime ly 
fashion by Swi ft , as  i n  Decembe r ,  1 8 8 4  i t  was noted that there we re " no 
encumbrance [ s )  on [ real estate)  or wa rehouse rece ipts o r  upon any of  his 
persona l prope rt y . "  Ma ssachussets,  vol . 8 7 ,  p .  2 6 3 ,  R. G .  Dun & Co . 
Col lec t ion . 
mThe company' capital izat ion was lis ted as  $ 2  mi l l ion in 1 9 0 5 ,  
wit h  bonded indebtedness of  $ 1 , 5 7 0 , 4 0 0 . Only forty percent o f  t he stock 
had been pa id in at  t hat t ime , suggest ing that t he f i r.n' s capital  stock 
had been increa sed as a result of  t he capit a l i za t ion o f  s u rplus reserves 
t hrough t he dec la ra t ion of dividends payable in stock . Although 
ostens ibly incorpo rated sepa rately in o rder to raise c ap i t a l  for t he 
expans ion o f  Swi ft ' s  early f leet of  re frige ra tor c a rs , i t  is pos s ible 
tha t  t he rea l reason for t he existence of the sepa rate corpo rat ion was 
to secure t he not incons ide rable prof its f rom t he operat ions of the 
private c a r  li nes t o  a more na rrow c i rcle o f  sha reholders t han held 
stock in Swi ft & Co . .  The sepa rate corporat ion may a l so have se rved t o  
conceal a port ion of  the f i rm' s profits f rom the publ ic . See t he 
Ga r f ield Repo rt , p .  2 9 . 
H1Ga r f ield Reoo rt , p .  2 8 7 . 
1 $2Ga rf ield Reoo rt , p .  2 9 . 
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wa s purchased by Swi ft  & Co . and held by t rus tees for t he sole bene f i t  
of  S w i f t  & Co . o f  I l l inois i n  o rde r to " secure t o  t he stockho lde rs o f  
t hat company t he ent i re pro f it connected with t he t ransportation of  i t s  
product . " 153 The p rof itabi lity of  t he S w i f t  Ref r igerat o r  
Transportat ion Company is suggested b y  t he price of  i t �  shares as  quoted 
in t he unlisted department of the Boston Stock Exchange during 1 9 0 0 -
1 9 0 2 , when t he price of  the $ 1 0 0  pa r va lue sha res f luctua ted bet ween 
$ 1 7 5  and $ 1 4 0 . 1 �4 
Armour & Co . :  Financing Forward Int egra t i on 
Whi le G .  F .  Swi f t  & Co . wa s forced t o  devise a new mechanism t o  
provide for  the cont rol and coo rdinat ion of  t h e  dist ribut ion o f  i t s  
p roducts in t he ea s t ,  Armou r & Co . had a dist ribut ion s ystem a l ready 
we l l  in place by 1 8 8 0  to provide for the dist r ibut ion of  i t s  cured pork 
product s .  Furt hermore,  "Armour & Co . "  was an established and we l l  known 
brand upon which the compa ny could est abl ish a ma rket for i t s  new 
p roduct . 1 55  Alt hough not of the t ype and scope requi red to dis t r ibute 
pe rishable products in large volume , Armour t hought that  his exist ing 
dist r ibut ion machinery could be used to bet ter advantage by diversi fying 
into t he ma rket ing of  dres sed bee f ;  indeed, it has been suggested that 
this  wa s one of  the ma jor reasons for Armour beginn ing west t o  east 
shipment s o f  re frigera ted bee f when he did . 1 �6 
: 5 3Ga rf ield Repor t ,  p .  2 8 7 . See be low, t h i s  chapte r ,  for  more on 
t he acqu i s i t ion of cont ro l over its subs idia ry companies by Swift & Co • .  
1 54Ga r f ield Repo rt , pp . 2 9 , 4 3 . In o rder t o  have been sold t o  the 
stockholde rs of  Swift & Co . ,  t he sha res of  the Swift re f r ige rator 
Transportat ion Company we re probably at  least as  remune rat i ve t o  t he i r  
owners du ring t he earlier pe riod of  t h e  company ' s  deve lopment as  were 
sha res in Swi f t  & Co . ,  which be tween Novembe r ,  1 8 8 6  and Apri l ,  1 8 9 3 paid 
an annua l div idend that ranged bet ween 38 and 8 percent . See Unfer, p .  
1 1 7 . 
1 55Gra s ,  p .  6 2 8 . 
1 56Clemen , The Ame rican Livestock and Meat I ndust rv,  p .  2 3 6 . 
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During the early 1 8 8 0 s ,  Armour & Co . and its  a f f i l ia ted 
partnersh ips di sposed o f  most of their mea t s  t h rough local independent 
j obbers , coordinated in t he east by P lankinton & Armour ;  t he j obbers in 
t urn dea l t  directly with local butchers and other reta i lers . Whi le 
adequate for the task o f  distribut ing cured and canned meat products for  
wh ich there was  a we l l  establi shed ma rke t ,  t he establi shed syst em proved 
inadequate to the task  of moving a nove l ,  pe rishable product in 
s u f f i c ient volume t o  enable Armou r & Co . to e f fect ively compete wit h  G .  
F .  Swi f t  & Co . . u' 
Armour & Co . ' s  solut ion to the problem was t o  establ ish  branch 
o f f ices in ma j o r  ma rkets under the direct control of Armour & Co . ' s  
Chicago o f f ice . Most of t he branches o f  Armour & Co . ,  unl i ke t hose o f  
G .  F .  Swi f t & Co . ,  we re owned direc t ly by t he company and operated under 
close,  cent ra l i zed cont rol rather t han t h rough t he agency of nominally 
independent pa rtnersh ips . ' '  .n.s with all  Armou r & Co . ' s  f ixed capital  
expenditures , the f inancing o f  forward integra t ion into dist ribu t ion and 
ma rke t ing wa s undertaken out of earnings ret a ined in t he bus iness 
supplemented by short term borrowings , a task that was probably made 
easier by the rat her gradua l t rans it ion made by Armour in s h i f t ing h i s  
re l iance on t he exist ing dist ribu t ion system to one o f  his  own 
const ruct ion . 
Armour & Co . ' s  f i rst company owned branch houses,  one o f  which was 
estab l i s hed in 1 8 8 4  in New Yo rk City and t he other in 1 8 8 5  in Albany, 
funct ioned prima r i l y  in the capac ity of  dist ribut ing Armou r ' s cured 
' �'Gra s ,  pp . 6 2 8 - 6 2 9 .  
: ; 8Gras , p .  62 8 ;  C lemen,  The American Livestock and Meat Indus t ry, 
p .  2 3 6 . The re is evider;ce that Armou r & Co . occas iona lly employed the 
same tact ics used by Swi f t  in ma rket ing his product in the east . R. G .  
Dun & Co . in Ap r i l ,  1 8 8 3 ,  repo rt that  Armou r had formed an a l li ance with 
a Boston wholes a ler who had forme rly been associated with Swift . The 
use of the pa rtnership device seems to have been t he except ion rather 
t han t he rule for Armour & Co . ,  as most of  that company' s branch 
fac i l i t ies were , f rom the outset , unde r the complete cont rol o f  t he 
manufacturer . See Ma s sachusset s ,  vol . 8 7 , p .  2 62 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . 
Collec t i on . 
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products in la rge loca l ma rkets . Appa rent ly,  the extension o f  Armou r ' s 
company owned di s t r ibut ion network  to  the ma rket ing o f  dressed beef did 
not begin unt il 1 8 8 6 ,  the earlier system of local j obbe rs and consignees 
being employed up unt il then . once begun ,  howeve r ,  the e s t ablishment o f  
Armou r & Co . ' s  dis t r ibut ion network proceeded rapidly; b y  1 8 8 9  t he 
company owned 2 8  branch houses dedicated to t he dist r ibut ion o f  western 
dressed bee f in eastern and midwestern ma rkets ,  each o f  which was under 
the cont rol o f  a branch house account ing depa rtment establ ished in t he 
company' s Ch icago o f f ice du ring that same yea r  . 1 �9 
P r ior to the inco rpo rat ion of Armour & Co . ( I l l inois ) in 1 9 0 0 ,  the 
private re f r igerator cars i n  which the part nership o f  Armour & Co . 
t ransported i t s  product were carried on the books of t he latter company , 
and f inanced in t he same way as  t he company ' s  other capit a l  
expenditures : b y  way of  earnings reta ined in the business a n d  short term 
borrowings , inc luding ea rnings that we re correct ly ass ignable to the 
ope rat ion of  the private ca rs themselves . 1 �  Shortly after t he 
incorpora t ion o f  Armour & Co . in 1 9 0 0 ,  a subs idia ry company wa s formed, 
the Armou r Ca r Lines , al legedly for the sake of "convenience " ,  wh ich 
acqui red and operated the re f rigerator cars formerly owned by the 
pa rtne rship of Armour & Co . 161 Whi le the Armour Car Lines lega lly t ook 
1 �9FTC , Report on the Meat Pack ing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 , Summa ry and P t . 
1 , pp . 1 52 - 1 5 3 ;  Gras,  p .  6 2 8 . In  addit ion to establ ishing branch 
out let s in t he ea st , Armou r  was probably the f i rst to establish a market 
for dres sed bee f in the west and northwest . Much o f  the suppl y  for this 
a rea came f rom Armou r ' s pl ant in Ka nsas City, wh ich had been established 
in 1 8  6 9 . Appa rent ly,  most of Armour' s weste rn sa les \o:.� re conducted on a 
sma l l  enough sca le t o  enable dist ribut ion di rectly f rom t he ref rigerator 
cars in which t he product was sh ipped . See Yeage r ,  pp . 6 4 - 6 5 ,  for a 
good account of Armou r ' s ma rket ing e f forts in t he west and midwest . 
1 60Ga r f ield Report , p .  3 3 . Since t he private c a r  l ine of Armour & 
Co . was ope=ated as  pa rt of that company, it is unlikely t hat any 
attempt was made t o  ass ign earnings to that branch o f  the bus iness as 
dist inct f rom the manufacture and sale of dres sed bee f . The ea rnings 
f rom t he company ' s  ent i re operations const ituted a common fund out of 
which dividends on t he pa rtners ' equity we re dec lared, and funds 
app ropr ia ted for improvements and expans ion of t he operat ions as a 
whole . 
1 6 1 Ga r f ield Repo rt , pp . 3 3 - 3 4 . 
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t it le t o  t he property represented by the private ca rs ,  icing stat ions , 
etc . ,  t hose propert ies rema ined "hidden" on the books of  Armour & Co . in 
the form o f  a s i zable debt extended to t he Armour Ca r Line s ,  which was 
capi t a l i zed at only $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 1 62 Through 1 9 0 5  the Amour Ca r Lines 
funded the ent ire expans ion of  i t s  f leet with earnings gene rated f rom 
mileage payments allowed by the rail roads for the use o f  the 
ref r ige rator cars , and payments received for the t ransportat ion o f  the 
perishable product s of  other f i rms . 
Morris & Co . : Financing Forward In tegra t i on 
Informa tion rega rding the est abl ishment and f inanc ing o f  branch 
distr ibut i on faci l i t ies for Nelson Mo rris & Co . and t he G .  H .  Hammond 
Co . is even mo re sca rce than that wh ich is avai lable for Armour & Co . 
and Swift & Co . Ne lson Morris,  for reasons descr ibed above , was a late 
ent rant into the yea r  round interstate dressed beef t rade ,  despite his 
early successes with sma l l  scale seasonal dressed bee f shipment s .  H i s  
company estab l ished its  f i rst branch fac i l ity in 1 8 8 5 ,  at whi ch t ime an 
individual was employed whose speci fic respons ibil i t y  it was to expand 
the f i rm' s dres sed bee f t rade and manage the company' s growing f leet o f  
ref rige rator cars . By the beginning of 1 8 8 9  t he f i rm cont rol led nine 
branch distr ibut o rsh ips in t he ea st , a l l  of which were owned out r ight 
and managed directly by Nelson Morris & Co . 163 As wa s t rue of t he 
f inanc ing o f  a l l  t he capital  expenditures unde rtaken by the partnership 
o f  Nel son Mo rris & Co . ,  pro f i t s  retu rned to t he business by the pa rtners 
1wThe Armour Car Lines was capit al ized at $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  and cont rol led 
ref r ige rator cars valued at between $ 1 0  and $ 12 mi l lion . The "debt " 
as sumed by t he Armour Car Lines vis a vi s Armou r & Co . was t hu s  in the 
form of the re f rigerator cars themselves , which cont i nued to be carried 
on t he books of Armou r & Co . as a cash inve stment in t he subs idia ry 
corpora t ion . See t he Garfield Repo rt , pp . 4 5 -4 6 .  
1�Yeage r ,  p .  6 5 ; FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Packing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  
S umma ry and Pt . 1 ,  pp . 1 52-1 5 3 . 
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o r  t rans fe rred f rom t he i r  other bee f  related bus inesses served a s  the 
ma j o r  sources of  funds . 
Both Ne lson Morris & Co . and the G .  H .  Hammond Co . ope rated t he i r  
private car l ines as  a pa rt of  the i r  dressed bee f t rade and never 
at tempted to seve r the connect ion between the two l ines of business . 164 
Both companies we re pa rtnerships , ent i rely free of long t e rm 
indebtedness or  encumbrances upon t heir  property,  suggest ing,  as  with 
all their cap i t a l  investment s ,  that the building up of  t he i r  private car 
l ines was f inanced by app ropriat ion f rom a common pool o f  earnings f rom 
a l l  phases o f  their dressed beef bus iness . 
G .  H Hammond & Co . : Fi nancing Forward Int egra t i on 
G .  H .  Hammond & Co . had established branch dist ribut orships for 
its western dressed bee f i n  New York , Bos ton and Connect icut by 1 8 8 6 ,  
along with seve ra l  outlets i n  Great Brita in and Scot land . Hammond' s 
bus iness neve r came to be est abl ished on the same scale as  that of  Swift 
and Armour ,  and he appa rently had l it t le diff iculty in f inancing the 
establi shment o f  his modest di s t ribution netwo r k  out o f  t he est imat ed $ 3  
mi l l ion dol la rs partne rs '  equity ( inc luding surplus reserve s )  t ha t  the 
f i rm wa s repo rted to have accumula ted th rough 1 8 8 6 .  No informat ion is 
ava i l able rega rding the forwa rd integrat ion of t he f i rm fol lowing the 
death of  Harr�ond and the purchase of the f i rm by a Brit ish investment 
syndicate . 1 6 �  
The Cudahy Pa cking Co . and the Schwarzch i l d  & Sul zberger Co . :  Financing 
Forward In t egra t i on 
Two luter ent rant s into t he interstate re f rige rated beef business ,  
both o f  which grew in impo rtance after 1 8 9 0  and whose overall  f inancial 
histories ( i nc luding the establishment o f  branch dist r ibut o rships ) will  
164Ga r f  ield Repo rt , pp . 3 2 - 3 7 ; Yeage r ,  p .  6 5 . 
1�Massachusset s ,  vo l .  8 7 ,  p .  5 0 ,  R .  G .  Dun & Co . Collection ;  
Yeage r ,  pp . 6 5 - 6 6 . 
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be out l ined in greater detail below, financed t he i r  private c a r  l ines 
using simi lar  methods to t hose employed by Armour & Co and Swift & Co . 
The Cudahy Packing Company, formed in 1 8 9 0  f rom the Armour-Cudahy 
Pack ing Co . ,  was a cl ose l y  held corporation,  pra ct ically t he entire 
capital  stock of which was owned by t he Cudahy family . 1 � From i t s  
incept ion, the Cudahy Packing Co . operated its p rivate re frigerator c a r  
line under the name of the Cudahy Refrigerator Line a s  part o f  the 
Cudahy Packing Co . ;  the ca r l ine was not separately incorporated . The 
initial  investment in re f rigerator cars wa s financed f rom the company ' s 
initial  pa id in capit al i zat ion of  $ 7 5 0 , 0 0 0 . While the company' s 
capi t a l i zat ion had increa sed to $5 mil l ion do llars by 1 9 0 5 ,  this  
cons isted ent i rely of  the capit a l i zat ion o f  surplus rese rves through t he 
dec lara t ion of  dividends payable in stock . : t .  The expansion of the 
Cudahy Re f r igera tor Line , as with a l l  capital investments o f  the Cudahy 
Packing Co . ,  must t herefore have been funded with ret a ined earnings 
supplemented by short term borrowings . 
The Schwa rzch i ld & Sulzbe rge r Company o f  New Yo rk expanded its 
operat ions into the interstate dressed beef busi ness in 1 8 9 3  when it 
purcha sed the Phoenix Packing Co . of  Ka nsas City,  a long with the modest 
ref r igera tor ca r interest s of that f i rm, the Cold Blast Transporta t i on 
Company . 1 68 The Cold Blast Transporta t ion Company, capit a l i zed a t  
$ 7 5 0 , 0 0 0 ,  was separately incorporated at t h e  s ame t ime that  S chwa rzchild 
& Sul zberger Company was inco rporated in 1 8 9 3 ,  alt hough only $ 2 5 0 , 7 0 0  of 
1 66At the t ime of its forma t ion i n  1 8 8 7 ,  P .  D .  Armour owned one­
t h i rd o f  the capital  stock of  the Armou r-Cudahy Pack ing Co . The 
Cudahy' s had for some time been emp loyed by Armour & Co . prior t o  
sta rt ing the i r  own business in  con junction w i t h  P .  D .  Armour . I n  1 8 9 0 
the Cudahy' s pu rcha sed Armour' s ent i re interest in t he bus ines s ,  at 
which t ime its name wa s changed to the Cudahy Packing Co . See t he 
Garfield Report , p .  3 7 . 
1 67FTC, Report on the Meat Packing Industry, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 5, pp . 3 2 -3 3 ;  
Ga rfield Reoo rt , p .  3 7 . For mo re on changes in  the capit a lizat ion of t he 
Cudahy Packing Company, see below, this chapter . 
1 68Ga rf ield Report , p .  3 8 . 
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the forme r company ' s  stock had been issued by 1 9 0 5 . 1 69 All  t he shares 
o f  the subs idia ry t ranspo rtat ion company were , f rom t he t ime of  its 
inco rpo rat ion, owned in t he interest of Schwa rzchild & Sul zbe rger 
Company by a sma l l  group of the latter company' s  sha reholders . The 
total  inves tment of the Cold Blast Transportat ion Company in 
ref r igerator cars wa s est imated to have been app roximately $1 mi l l ion by 
1 9 0 4 ,  about four t imes the va lue of the sha res which the company 
i ssued . 110 Although informat ion is unavai lable conce rning t he profits 
of  the Schwa rzch i ld & S�lzberger Company during this t ime ,  a compa rison 
o f  the capitalizat ion o f  the re frigerator car subs idia ry with its  actual 
investment in re f r igerator cars suggests that the company rel ied 
prima r ily ou ea rn i ngs genera ted by the ope rat ions of its  refrigerator 
cars , pe rhaps supp lemented with ea rn ings t rans ferred f rom t he pa rent 
company, in orde r to finance expans ion and ongoing ope rat ions . 
1 69Ga r f ield Report , p .  2 97 . 
1 70Ga rf ield Repo rt , p .  3 8 . 
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CHAPTER V 
THE FINANC IAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEAT PACKING 
INDUSTRY , 1 8 9 0 - 1 9 0 5  
General Features of the Financial History o f  the Meat Packing 
Industry, 1 8 90-1905 
Excess Capacity and Coopera t i on 
The problems faced by t he la rge dressed beef shippers dur ing 1 8 7 5-
1 8 9 0 were re lated prima r i ly t o  the establi shment of  an e f fect i ve means 
of  yea r  round refrige rated t ransportat ion , the extens ion of t he i r  
ma rket ing a nd dist r ibut i on netwo rks into ma rket s a long the eastern 
seaboard, and t he coordinat ion and financ ing of  inc re a s ing volumes of  
throughput . During 1 8 9 0 - 1 9 0 5 , after t he i r  integrat ion into ma rket ing , 
t ranspo rtat ion and dist ribution was wel l  unde rway,  the la rge dressed 
bee f  shippe rs were fo rced to con f ront new problems t ha t  a rose as  a 
result of  t he i r  earlier expans ion , and inc rea sed compet it ion in ma rkets 
that had come to be se rved by more than one pac ke r . : 
Wh ile t he indus t ry expe rienced ext raordina ry growth during 1 8 7 5 -
1 8 8 9 , the decades 1 8 8 8 - 1 8 9 7 and 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 7  s a w  the la rge dressed beef 
shippers expand the i r  s laughtering capacity more rapidly t han dur ing any 
t en yea r  pe riod be fore or s ince , in addit ion to dive r s i fying into a 
number o f  othe r related indust r ies . 2 Furthermore , by 1 8 9 3 ,  two new 
1 See Yeage r ,  pp . 6 7 -7 2  and pp . 1 1 0 - 1 1 2  for a more det a i led 
desc r ipt ion of the va rious st age s of  development of  t he dressed beef 
indus t ry .  
2FTC , Report on t he Mea t  Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  S umma ry and Pt . 1 ,  
pp . 1 2 6 - 1 2 7 . The rate o f  increase i n  t he number o f  plants bui l t  o r  
acqui red dur ing 1 8 8 8 - 1 8 9 7  and 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 7  ( compa red t o  each p receding 
decade ) was 1 8 5  percent and 1 8 6  pe rcent , respect ively, in con t rast to a 
4 0  percent rate o f  g rowth dur ing 1 8 7 8 - 1 8 8 7  and a 6 0  percent growth rate 
dur i ng 1 9 0 8 - 1 9 1 7 . Due t o  t he widely varying capacity of  plants built or 
acqu i red, the f i gu res noted above provide only a very rough est imate o f  
t he compa rat ive rate of  g rowt h of  the industry du ring the f i rst four 
decades o f  its  deve lopment . Furt he rmo re , s ince a s igni f icant p roport ion 
o f  this capacity was acqu i red f rom sma l ler packers rat her than 
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f i rms had entered the indust ry :  the Cudahy Packing Company and 
Schwa rzchild & Sul zberge r, both of wh ich quickly came to be established 
on a scale approaching that of the three largest dressed bee f sh ippers . 
The packer ' s  f i rst attempt s  t o  remedy the problems associated with 
t he ent ry o f  new f i rms , excess capacity,  and increa sed compe t i t ion took 
t he f o rm of  a series o f  "dressed meat pools"  . 3  Meanwhile,  t he packers'  
s t rategy of  " c ompet i t ive const ruct ion" o f  new plant s in t he c lose 
proximit y  t o  one another gradua lly gave way t o  new compe t i t ive pract ices 
in which t he acquisit ion of sma l ler compet ing plants played a ma j o r  
part . Finally,  a fter an abortive me rger attempt , t he la rge packers 
collaborated in the c reat ion of a jointly owned conso l idat i on of  a 
numbe r o f  sma l le r  packing f i rms , the Nat iona l Pack ing Company . This 
j o in t ly owned s ubsidi a ry holding company, wh ich was fo rmed a fter  the 
packers f a i led t o  secure sufficient f inanc ial back ing t o  consummate 
t he i r  planned indus t ry-w ide consol idat ion , provided a mechanism t hrough 
wh ich t he pric ing and inves tment decis ions of t he t h ree l a rges t  dressed 
bee f sh ippers could be coordinated in a far more ef fect i ve manner t han 
t hrough t he unenforceable pooling a rrangement s o f  t he earlier period . 
Wh ile the culminat ion o f  the f i rst pe riod o f  t he indust ry' s development 
wa s t he concent rat ion of  the western dressed beef t rade in t he hands of 
a few l a rge , vert ically integrated f i rms , the culmina t ion of t he second 
period was the establi shment of a community of mut u a l  f inanc i a l  interest 
among the th ree la rgest dres sed beef sh ippe rs , wh ich enabled t hem t o  
better  cope with the compet it ive pressures that result �d f rom t he i r  
earlier,  rapid expa ns ion into the ma rkets o f  t he e a s t  and midwest .  
const ructed by t he five la rge packer s ,  these measures should not be 
t a ken t o  represent the rate of growth o f  t he i ndust ry as a whole during 
t he period . 
3The f i rst dressed meat poo l ,  the Alle rton Poo l ,  ope rated bet ween 
1 8 8 6- 1 8 9 3 . Dur ing 1 8 9 3- 1 9 0 1  the f i rst and second Veede r dressed meat 
pools we re used to st abi l i ze (with va ry ing degrees of succes s )  dressed 
meat shipments into the northeast . Fo r a det a i led account o f  t he 
va rious dres sed meat pools ,  see Yeage r, pp . 1 1 1 -12 8 . 
2 2 9  
In creases i n  Fixed Capi t a l ,  1 890-1 905 
The four wes tern dressed bee f  shippe rs owned f ive s laughte ring 
plants i n  1 87 7 ; by 1 9 0 7  t he f ive largest dressed beef shippers had 
const ructed o r  acqu i red 5 7  s laughtering faci l i t ies . Mos t  of  t he 
physical expa ns ion of  the industry took place during 1 8 8 8 - 1 9 0 7 ; between 
1 8 7 8 - 1 8 8 7  only t wo new s laughte ring faci l it ies£ we re acqu i red or  
bui l t . 4 Table 9 shows the ma j or slaughtering fac i l i t ies const ructed o r  
acqui red b y  t he ma j o r  dres sed beef shippe rs du ring 1 8 9 0- 1 9 0 5 . Many more 
sma l le r s laughte ring facilities , not menti oned in t he t able , we re 
acqui red by t he f i ve la rge st packers ( herafter refe r red to as  t he big 
f ive ) during this pe riod . Although the numbe r of plants bu i l t  or 
acqui red by the big five increa sed by a lmost 2 0 0  pe rcent bet ween 1 8 97-
1 9 07 , the percentage inc rea se in numbe r of  cat t le s laughte red by t hem 
ove r t he same period inc reased by only around 50 pe rcent . �  This 
suggests that many of  the p lants brought unde r t he i r  cont rol during this 
period were eithe r  much sma l ler t han those wh ich had been brought on 
l ine be fore ,  o r  t hat the pac kers were acquir ing plants of  more or less 
s imi la r s i ze to t hose bui l t  du ring the earlier per iod, but for some 
reason ope rat ing them at less than full  capacity . I t  Ls h ighly l ikely 
that both factors were at wo rk,  pa rt icula rly as  t he packers attempted to 
mitigate compe t i t ive pressure by purchas ing the plant s of  sma l ler 
competitors , and by rest rict ing output f rom exist ing s laughtering 
facilit ies . 
4FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Summary and P t . 1 ,  
pp . 1 2 6- 1 2 7 . 
'See t he Ga rfield Reoort , pp . 1 7 - 1 9  for a de sc ript ion of  t he 
appu rtenances o f  a contempo ra ry packing plant c i rca 1 9 0 5 . The t ypical 
s laughtering plant du ring this t ime was a sprawling, t echnologica l ly 
advanced facility,  which made use of  sophi st icated mass-product ion 
techn ique s ,  and usua l ly cont a ined its own powe r generat ing equ ipment and 
extensi ve a rt i ficial  re f rigera t ion machine ry . Each en�loyed hundreds o r  
t housands o f  workmen i n  con t rast t o  the old-fashioned, sma l l  
s laughte rhouse in which one or  several men performed a l l  t he t a s ks o f  
s laughtering and butche r ing . 
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FIRM 
Armou r & Co . 
TABLE 9 
SLAUGHTERING FACI LITIES CONSTRUCTED BY 
THE FIVE LARGE DRESSED BEEF 
SHIPPERS , 1 8 9 0- 1 9 0 5  
1 8 9 3 ,  
1 9 0 2 ,  
1 9 0 3 ,  




East St . Louis 
S ioux City,  I owa 
Cudahy Pack ing Co . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 8 7 , East Omaha* 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 8 92 ,  Los Ange les 
.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 9 3 ,  S ioux C i t y ,  I owa 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 0 0 ,  Kansas City 
Nel son Morris  & Co . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 8 8 9 ,  East St . Louis 
Schwa rzch i ld & 
Sul zbe rge r Co . 
Swift & Co . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 8 9 8 ,  St . Joseph 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 9 0 5 ,  Kansas City 
1 8 9 3 ,  Kansas City* 
1 9 0 1 ,  Ch icago 
1 8 8 8 ,  Kansas City 
1 8 9 0 ,  Omaha 
1 8 9 2 ,  East � c . Lou is 
1 8 9 7 , St . Joseph 
1 8 9 7 ,  St . Paul 
1 902 , Fort Worth 
NOTE : Ent ries des ignated ( * )  indicate ma jor  s laughtering 
f acilit ies acqu i red f rom other compan ies . Al l othe r fac i l i t ies were 
const ructed by the f i rm to which they be longed . S ome plants were built 
o r  ope ra ted by subs idiary companies t hat we re completely under the 
control of  the f i rms l isted above . 
SOURCE : FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Pack ing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Summa ry 
and Pt . 1 ,  pp . 2 3 7 -2 5 4  
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The pa ckers a lso cont inued to expand the i r  ma rket ing, distribut ion 
and t ransportat ion netwo � k s . Table 1 0  shows the growth in t he number of  
branch houses of  the f i ve la rge dres sed beef s hippers . These f igures 
show the dressed bee f  shippers to have cont inued to pursue t he i r  
st rategy o f  forwa rd integrat ion wel l  into t h e  1 8 9 0s  and e a r ly 1 9 0 0 s . 
Although t he data a re incomplete due to the omiss ion o f  annua l f i gu res 
for Swift & Co . prior  to 1 8 9 9 ,  it does not appear that there was any 
systema t i c  diminut ion in the numbe r of  branches establi shed prior to the 
forma t ion of  the Nat iona l Packing Company in 1 902 , a fter which the rate 
of g rowth of  the packers ' dedicated dressed beef distr ibut ion sys tem 
s lowed not iceably . 
Whi le no f igures a re ava ilable showing annu a l  increases in the 
numbe r of ref r igera tor ca rs control led by t he dres sed bee f  s hippers , by 
1 9 0 4  t he number of cars controlled by each was as f o l lows : Swift  & Co . ,  
5 , 4 7 3 ; Armour & Co . ,  1 2 , 02 9 ;  Nelson Morris & Co . ,  1 , 4 0 9 ;  Schwa rzch i ld & 
Sul zbe rge r ,  1 , 0 0 0  and t he Cudahy Packing Co . ,  B O O . b  In addit ion t o  
t he i r  substant ial  i nve s t ment in ref rigerator cars , the packers a l so 
owned a subs tant i a l  numbe r of l ivestock and ref r ige rator c a rs t ha t  were 
used to t ransport products other than re f r ige rated bee f . 
The backwa rd integration of  the packers into stockyard companies , 
which became an important aspect of  the i r  f inanc i a l  growth dur ing 1 8 90-
1 9 0 5 ,  is  a more prob l ema t i c  aspect of  the i r  ve rtical expans ion int o 
related indust ries . Ra the r  t han me re ly invest ing in stockya rds a s  a way 
of ma inta ining cont rol ove r the supply of cat t le for their s laughter ing 
faci l i t ies,  it a ppe a r s t h a t  muc h  of the investment in :J t ockya rds and 
related f ac i li t ies resulted f rom "gi f t s "  that were granted t o  t he 
packers by t he s t ockya rd companies as inducements t o  locate packing 
6FTC , Repo rt on t he Meat Pack ing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Summa ry and Pt . 1 ,  
p .  1 3 9 . The re f r ige ra t o r  c a rs c on t rol led by Swi f t  & Co . ,  Armour & Co . ,  
and Sc hwa rzchild & S u l zbe rge r were a c t ua l ly owned by separately 
inco rpo rated p rivate c a r subsidi aries . The est imated replacement cost 
per re f rige ra t o r  car in 1 9 0 4  was approximately $ 1 , 0 0 0 . 
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TABLE 1 0  
NEW BRANCH HOUSES BUILT OR ACQUI RED 
BY THE BIG F IVE , 1 8 9 0-1 9 0 5  
YEAR Armour Swift Mo rris Schwa r zch i ld & Cudahy Tot a l * *  
Sulzbe rger 
1 8 9 0  1 2  1 3  2 77 
1 8 9 1  1 4  4 2 2 9 9  
1 8 9 2 1 6  1 1  8 1 3 4  
1 8 9 3 1 7 8 1 2  2 1 7 3  
1 8 9 4  2 0  6 7 5 2 1 1  
1 8 9 5  1 6  3 1 0  5 2 4 5  
1 8 9 6  8 2 1 6 2 62 
1 8 9 7  1 6  7 4 7 2 9 6  
1 8 9 8  1 3  9 5 6 3 2 9  
1 8 9 9  1 2  1 9 3 *  9 1 5 4 4  
1 90 0  2 6  9 2 1 0  5 9 1  
1 90 1  1 8  3 3 3 6 1 8  
1 9 02  1 8  3 0  6 9 4 6 8 5  
1 9 0 3  8 2 1  2 5 3 7 2 4  
1 90 4  1 0  1 6 2 7 4 3  
1 9 0 5  6 1 1 3 3 7 5 7  
NOTE : 
• N o  f i gures ava i lable for  Swift & Co . p r i o r  t o  t h i s  date . 
* *  Cumulat i?e , including a l l  branch houses acqu i red before 1 8 9 0 . These 
figu res include branch di stribut orships wh ich we re owned by subs idia ries 
of t he f ive l a rge companies listed above . The f igu res for Swift & Co . 
do not include partnerships fo rmed by the Swifts or  Swift  Bros . & Co . 
with loca l who lesalers that had yet to be acqui red by Swift & Co . or  its  
subs idia r ies . 
SOURCE : FTC , Repo rt on the Meatpacking Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Summa ry and 
l?t . 1 ,  p .  1 5 3-1 5 2  
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plants in t he vicinity o f  the ya rds . 7 The dre ssed bee f sh ippers ' 
stockya rd company inves tments s imply represented "g i f t :; "  which 
subs idized t he establ ishment of  new s laughtering faci l i t ies and other 
fixed capi t a l  expendit u res , rather than an investment s t ra tegy intended 
to yield speci f ic ope rat ional advantages . 
The big f i ve a lso pursued a vigorous st rategy of  dive r s i f icat ion 
into re la ted industries,  pa rt icula rly those connected with t he 
e labo rat ion of  the inedible by-products of  beef s la ughte ring . 8 Whi le 
the packers occas iona lly const ructed their own faci l i t ies for t he 
manufacture o f  items such as leat her,  soap and fert i l i ze r ,  a more common 
means of dive rsi fying into by-products manufact u ring was t o  secure 
cont rol o f  independent establi shments t hrough d i rect o r  indi rect stock 
ownership . Often , f i rms that we re at first brought under the cont rol o f  
a pa rent company t h rough stock owne rship we re later dissolved, and their 
prope rty abso rbed by the pa rent . • 
7Yeage r notes t hat during the 1 8 9 0s " the packers cont inued t o  
integrate backwa rds , bu i lding more plants and invest i ng in stockya rds " 
( Yeage r ,  p .  1 2 1 ) . An extens ive invest igat ion by the Federal Trade 
Commis s ion on packer involvement in stockya rd companies , however ,  shows 
that most o f  t he dressed beef shippers ' inves tment in s tockya rd 
companies resulted f rom gifts  of stock,  cash,  and land given to t he 
former by t he latter as  an inducement for locat ing packing plants  near 
t he p ropert ies owned by the stockyard compan ies . The dressed bee f 
sh ippers ' st ockya rd company inte rests later inc reased as  a result o f  
stock dividends and bonuses . FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Pack ing Industry, 
1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 3 .  This  aspect o f  the packe rs'  f i nancial a f fa i rs w i l l  be 
dealt  with in more det a i l  be low . 
8The packe rs ' va rious by-product s bus inesses became a n  ext remel y  
impor t ant s ou rce o f  earnings to their t o t a l  operat ions during t he 1 8 9 0s ; 
so much so ,  that it  wa s est imated in 1 9 0 4  by the U .  S .  Commiss ioner o f  
Co rporat ions that t he earn ings f rom t he s a le of  dressed bee f per-head o f  
catt le s laughte red, net of  ea rnings derived f rom t he s a le o f  by-product s 
and other related items , were negat ive . See the Ga r f i e ld Report , pp . 
1 9 7 -2 6 9 . For mo re on t he cont ribut ion of  the packers ' by-products 
subs idia ries to tot a l  ea rnings , see below, this chapte r .  
9Garf ie ld Report , pp . 22-2 3 ;  Yeage r,  p .  1 2 7 . For a complete 
account of t he subs idiary companies controlled by t he la rge dressed bee f 
sh ippe rs in 1 9 0 5  ( inc luding the Nat iona l Pack ing Co . )  see t he Ga r f ie ld 
Report , pp . 2 8 -39  and pp . 2 8 6-2 97 . Fo r a detai led summa ry o f  annua l 
acquisit ions o f  subs idia ry plants ( by industry ) , see FTC , Repo rt on the 
Meat Pack ing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 , Summa ry and Pt . 1 ,  pp . 2 5 8 -2 5 9 . Also,  see 
be low, this  chapte r ,  for an account of t he f inancing of  t he acquisit ion 
of subs idia ries , and t he st ructures of ownership and cont rol that 
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Capi t a l i z a t i on ,  Profi t s  and the Use of Credi t :  Overvi e w  
I n  f inancing addi t ions to the i r  slaughte ring capacity,  t he ongoing 
extens ion of the i r  ma rket ing , distribut ion and t ransportation netwo rks,  
and divers i f icat ion into complement ary indus t ries,  the la rge dressed 
beef shippe rs cont inued to employ the techn iques they had u sed during 
the earliest pe riod of the i r  development . With t he except ion o f  Swift & 
Co . ,  who cont inued t o  rely t o  a l imited extent on t he is sue of  s tock to 
a widen ing circle of  sha reholders , t he la rge dressed beef s hippers 
rema ined dependent a lmost solely on reta ined earnings for inc reases in 
t he i r  capit a l i zat ions . 1 0 The rate of  profit of t he la rge packe r s ,  
though diminished somewhat compa red t o  that which prevai led during the 
1 8 8 0 s ,  was high enough to enable the financing of mos t  addit ions t o  
capi tal stock and t he accumulat ion and ma intenance o f  addit ional 
product ive capacity;  the big five were se ldom forced to seek long term 
funds f rom out s ide sources . n 
The norma l course pursued by t he incorporated dres sed beef 
sh ippe rs in funding their long term capital needs was t o  capita l i ze 
surplus rese rves th rough the issue of  addi t ional sha res o f  stock t o  
existed bet ween t h e  packers and their a f f i l iates . 
1 0Swift & Co . cont inued to rely heav i ly on the capit a l izat ion of  
surplus rese rves to f inance addit ions to the i r  c apital  s t oc k ,  but not to 
the same extent as  the other la rge dressed bee f  shippers . For more on 
thi s ,  see be low, t h is chapter . 
1 1 Even though ea rnings f igures a re generally a va i l able for the 
la rge packers du ring most o f  the early pe riod of the i r  deve lopment ,  it 
is doubt ful that t hey accurately re flect the t ot a l  ea rnings o f  t he 
packers f rom the i r  h ighly divers if ied bus inesses . It  a ppears that the 
re f rigerated beef shippe rs took great pains to h ide the i r  ea rnings , 
probably t o  a l lay the publ ic' s suspic ion rega rding t he financial power 
of the so cal led "bee f t rust . "  Ea rnings f rom t he operation of  the 
packe rs ' private car l ines ,  branch dist ribut ion facil i t ie s ,  and by­
products subs idia r ies became an increas ingly important item in t he total 
ret urns of  the ref rigerated beef shippers du ring 1 8 9 5 -1 9 0 5 ,  none of 
which appea red in a regu la r and systema t ic fashion in t he e a rn ings 
statement of t he packers . For this and other reasons relat ing t o  the 
anoma l ies of  early capita l account ing methods ( see be low ) , a l l  p rofit 
f igu res cont ained here a lmost certainly unde rstate the t rue ea rnings o f  
t h e  dressed bee f shippers . See Commercial and Financ i a l  Chronicle 8 0  
(March 1 1 ,  1 9 0 5 ) : 1 1 2 4 - 1 1 2 6  and the Ga rf ield Repo rt , pp . 1 9 7 -2 8 5 . 
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stockholde r s  in l ieu o f  cash dividend payment s ,  and use t he funds t hus 
released f rom surplus to fi nance f ixed capit al expendi t u res or  addit ions 
to wo rking capi t a l . In  the case of  Mo rris  & Co . and Armour & Co . (prior 
to their inco rporat ion in 1 9 0 0 )  accumulated pro f i t s  were s imply added to 
the s u rplus accoun t ,  at wh ich t ime such earnings became part of  t he 
owne rs ' equit y .  When Armour & Co . incorporated i n  1 9 0 0  t he i r  ent i re 
paid i n  capit a l i z a t ion consisted o f  the accumulated surplus o f  the 
partnership of Armou r & Co . Between 1 9 0 0  and 1 9 0 5 ,  with  t he except ion 
of  a $1 mi l l i on dividend dec la red in  1 9 0 1 ,  a l l  of the reported net 
earnings of Armour & Co . was reinvested in  t he bus iness : no addit ional 
s tock was is sued . Cudahy & Co . ' s  initial  capita l i z a t ion was obt a ined 
ent i rely f rom P .  D .  Armour,  Michael Cudahy and other members o f  the 
Cudahy f ami ly . The Company' s capitali zat ion p r i o r  t o  1 9 0 5  inc reased 
solely t h rough the cap i t a li zat ion of  surplus rese rves t hrough the issue 
of  dividends payable in  stock . Swift & Co . di scont inued t he pract ice of  
paying out ext ra cash div idends prior to each new s t ock o f fe ring, but 
th rough t he ma intenance of regular dividend payments they we re able to 
provide sha reho lders with enough funds to pa rtially o f fset t he purchase 
of each new issue in  p ract ically the same proport ion as  dur ing 1 8 8 5-
1 8 93 . Although t he company issued no s tock aga inst  i t s  accumulated 
surplus , t he t ime ly ret u rn of all cash dividends to t he bus iness by the 
sha reholder s  in  exchange f o r  new is sues of  stock accomplished roughly 
t he same thing : the capital izat ion o f  earnings and t he i r  reinvestment 
in t he bus iness . The company further added t o  t he i r  net worth by 
sett ing as ide approximately fort y percent of net ea rnings a nnua l ly i n  
cash reserves . Only about seventeen pe rcent o f  t h e  t o t a l  g rowt h i n  
S w i f t  & Co . ' s  net worth du ring t he per i od came about as  a result o f  net 
i nfus ions of cash f rom sha reholde rs . 
The stock o f  the big f ive , with the except ion o f  Swift & Co . and 
Schwa rzch i ld & Sulzbe rger,  continued t o  be ve ry c losely held . Even i n  
t he case o f  these t wo compa n ie s ,  a suff icient interest t o  ma i n t a i n  
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cont ro l over t he se lect ion of corpo rate officers and t he format ion o f  
pol icy was rese rved to t hose who had owned t he fi rms prior t o  their 
incorporat ion . Due t o  the narrow dist r ibut ion of s tockholdings , 
inte rowne rship among the ma jor packers was not a s ign i f icant facto r  in 
their daily opera t ions . The Nat iona l Packing Co . ,  fo rmed in 1 9 0 2  to 
t ake over cont rol of propert ies purchased by the ma j o r  packers in 
prepa rat ion for a pla nned gene ral consol idat ion , wa s j o intly owned by 
the ma j o r  pa ckers and se rved a s imilar funct ion to interlock ing 
s tockholdings in creat ing a community of mutua l financ i a l  inte rest 
within t he indus t ry .  
The increased use of  subs idia ry companies t o  enable the e fficient 
management of the increas ingly far-flung , mu lti -funct ion enterprises of 
t he dres sed bee f  sh ippers , and the problems of coo rdinat ing and ensuring 
t he cont inued existence of the la rge packing f i rms as t he i r  founders 
grew o lde r and less able to ove rsee a l l  aspec t s  of their day-t o-day 
operations,  provided st rong impetus for the widespread adopt ion within 
t he indust ry o f  t he corporate form of  bus iness o rgani zat ion . 1 2  In o rde r 
t o  facil i t ate t he apport ionment of  cont rol among subs idiary and parent 
corporat ions , a numbe r of  new agency devices , such as  " owne rship 
t rust s , " we re dev ised . ; 3  
Few indust ry-wide gene ra li zat ions are pos s ible rega rding t he 
financing of divers i f i cat ion into new indust r ies and t he relat ionships 
1 2The corporate device carne into general use in t he indus t ry a round 
1 9 0 0 . The use of subs idiary corporat ions was assoc iated prima ri l y  with 
the consol idat ion of  cont rol ove r t he packers '  branch dis t r ibut ion 
systems , and t he increas ing importance of ret urns f rom t he e laborat ion 
of by-product s  i n  t he total earnings of  the packers . For a det a iled 
account o f  t he pro l i fe ra t ion of  subs idiary company ' s  among t he five 
l a rge dres sed bee f shippers,  see be low, this chapter . With t he notable 
except ion of Swift & Co . ,  the la rge dressed bee f  sh ippers rema i ned very 
c losely held despite their increa sed re sort to incorporat ion as  a means 
of organiz ing t he i r  bus inesses . For firms such as  Armou r & Co . ,  Morris 
& Co . and Cudahy & Co . ,  corpo rate st ock functioned a lmost solely as  an 
admin i s t rat i ve device, rather than as  a means of  securing addit ional 
f inance f rom outs ide sou rces . 
1 3For more on " owne rship t rusts , " see notes 1 4 ,  2 9  and FTC , Report 
on t he Meat Packing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 3 ,  pp . 1 9 1 - 1 9 3 . 
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bet ween the dressed bee f shippers and their  s ubsidia ries . 
Diversificat ion into complementary enterprises t oo k  t h� form either o f  
con s t ruct ion of  s ubs idiary plant s ,  the establi shment of  cont rol over 
subsidia r ies t hrough the acquisit ion of  stoc k ,  o r  t he establi shment of  
new subs idia ry companies control led by the pa rent compa ny either t h rough 
stock owne rship and\or t he appointment of di rectors and other impo rtant 
corporate o f f icers . In  many cases , the pa rent f i rm purchased a 
cont roll ing interest in a previ ous ly independent subs idiary company , 
whi le in a few other ca ses a funct iona l ent ity within t he pa rent company 
wa s " spun o f f "  into a nominally independent subs idia ry,  which i n  
pract ica l l y  a l l  such inst ances cont inued to be owned in f u l l  b y  o r  in 
t he inte rest o f  t he pa rent company . 1 4 In other cases a subs idia ry plant 
was bu ilt and a sepa rate corporat ion establi shed t o  ope rate it,  while in 
some instances "holding subsidia ries " we re establ ished, pa rt icula rly 
out s ide the regi on i n  which  the pa rent company was located, to 
consol idate and cont rol re la ted prope rt ies ( such as  branch faci l it ies ) 
in the interest o f  the pa rent company . Fina l ly,  in a number of  
instances , pa rent companies changed their  relat ionships with subs idia ry 
companies , pa rticularly by purchasing a l l  or pa rt o f  the stock o f  
companies t hat formerly had been nomina lly  independent , but ope rated " in 
t he interest " of  t he pa rent compa ny . 
Dur ing 1 8 9 0 - 1 9 0 5  much of t he financ ial rest ructuring that t oo k  
place between pa rent and subs idiary compa nies w a s  intended to cent ralize 
the coordinat ion and cont rol of re lated business p rope rt ies , and to 
bring the i r  ea rnings unde r the complete cont rol of the pa rent company , 
rather t han t o  fund the accumulat ion o f  new phys ical capi t a l  in 
businesses tha t  we re funct ionally  related t o  t he acqu i ring company . 
1�Ga rf ield Report , pp . 2 8 6-2 97 . In many cases , I l l inois law 
prohibiting the owne rship by one corporat ion o f  stock in another 
necessit ated the use of owne rship t rust arrangements as  des c ribed above , 
t he private agency o f  the parent corpo ra t ion ' s sha reholders , and other 
such devices to enable the indi rect owne rship ( but direct cont rol ) o f  
s ubsidia ries b y  pa rent corporations . 
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Jus t  as much o f  the f inanc ial activity that accompanied hori zont a l  
integrat ion du ring this period was intended to better enable 
coordinat ion and t he cent ralizat ion of  dec is ionmak ing power among f i rms 
within a pa rt icula r indust ry, so too did much o f  the c rea t ion and 
exchange o f  securit ies wh ich accompanied the ve rtical integration o f  
individual f i rms have a s  its prima ry purpose t he cent ra l i zat ion o f  
coordinat ion,  cont rol and earning power within an individual f i rm .  
An examination o f  what little informat ion i s  ava i lable conce rning 
the f inanc ial s t ructures o f  the big f ive indicates t hat the i r  
capit a l i zat ions we re not excessive ,  and that the ent i re capital stock of  
each company, insofa r as it is  poss ible to dete rmine , was at t he very 
least ent i rely o f fset by t he repla cement cost of t he i r  t angible assets . 
The act ivit ies of the big five became more capital intensive in t he 
manner s uggested in the previous chapte r :  increas ingly rel iant on l arge 
volumes o f  working capital to f ina nce the purchase of raw materials and 
carrying cha rges on items in an increas ingly lengthy p roces s o f  
p roduct ion . Fixed assets as a proport ion of  tot a l  asset s dec l ined as 
quick assets  became a re latively more impo rtant balance sheet item . 
Financial investments in other f i rms (th rough secu rity ownership ) ,  
pa rt icula rly t ight ly cont ro l led subs idiary compa nies and various 
stockyard companie s ,  a lso grew in importance as an overall  balance sheet 
item and in propo r t i on to t otal capitalizat ion . 
Whi le the f ive la rge dressed beef shippe rs made a lmos t  exclusive 
use o f  the capital izat ion of  ea rnings ret urned to their bus inesses t o  
f inance increases i n  the i r  net wo rth du ring 1 8 9 0 - 1 9 0 5 ,  they cont inued to 
re ly heavily on short term bo rrowings for wo rk ing capital  and in t he 
fi nancing o f  other aspec t s  of their day-t o-day ope rat ions . The two 
la rgest dressed beef sh ippers , Swift & Co . and Armour & Co . ,  howeve r ,  
increasingly we re able to subst itute new issues o f  s tock a n d  surplus 
reserves for short term borrowings in  funding the i r  working capital 
needs . 
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Financial Histories of the "Big Five " After 1 8 9 0  
Swi ft & Co . : Capi t a l i za t i on and Profi t s, 1 8 90-1 9 0 5  
The out standing capit a l  stock of  Swift  & Co . grew f rom $7 . 5  
mi l lion in Janua ry, 1 8 9 3 ,  t o  $35  mil lion by Janua ry 1 ,  1 9 0 5 . Swi f t  & 
Co . was a lone among t he la rge dressed bee f shippers i n  t he i r  use o f  
bonds as  a sou rce of  long-term capital . The company issued $2 . 5  mi l l ion 
in s i x-percent f i rst mo rtgage bonds during 1 8 9 0 ,  wh ich were later 
re funded when the company issued S S  mi ll ion in five-percent first 
mo rtgage gold bonds in 1 9 0 0 . The company engaged in no more long-term 
bor rowing du ring this pe r iod, nor we re the five-percent bonds cal led; 
the ent i re bond issue of  1 9 0 0  rema ined on their  books t h rough 1 9 0 5 . 1s 
Table 1 1  shows the dates on wh ich Swift & Co . ' s  capi t a l  stock was 
increa sed, and the total outstanding capital stock following each 
increase . Table 1 2  shows the numbe r of Swi ft & Co . ' s  s t ockholders  that 
were recorded a fter each new stock is sue du ring 1 8 9 3- 1 9 0 5 . 
As wa s t rue of the the period 1 8 8 5-1 8 9 2 ,  a l l  t he s t ock is sued by 
Swift & Co . du ring 1 8 9 3-1 9 0 5  was common stock . Each i ssue , a s  we l l  as  
the f ive-pe rcent bonds of 1 9 0 0 ,  was taken up at par f o r  cash by exist ing 
sha reholders . 1 6 The issues of 1 8 9 9 ,  1 9 02 and 1 9 0 4  were a l l  readi ly 
subscribed to by exist ing sha reholders . Due t o  t he onset of s t ringency 
in t he money ma rket s that a ccompanied the beginn ings of financial  pan ic 
in 1 8 9 3 ,  a port ion of  the 1 8 9 3 issue ( $ 1 , 2 3 3 , 0 0 0 )  t ha t  wa s not purchased 
immediately fol lowing i t s  is sue langu ished in the company ' s  t reasury 
unt i l  Augus t ,  1 8 9 8 ,  when i t  was once aga in o f fered and readily t a ken up 
by exist ing shareho lde rs . 1 7  The company a lso expe r ienced d i fficulty in 
1�Commercial and Financ ial  Chron ic le 70 (May 5 ,  1 9 0 0 ) : 8 9 8 . 
: 6Ga r f ield Report , p .  4 0 . 
1 7Commerc i a l  and Fi nanc ial Chron icle 67 (August 1 � .  1 8 9 8 ) : 32 1 ;  
Swi f t , p .  4 5 . 
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TABLE 1 1  
I NCREASES I N  SWIFT & CO . ' S  CAP ITAL I ZATI ON 
DATE OF INCREASE AMOUNT 
March 2 8 ,  1 8 9 3 ,  to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
Janua ry 5 ,  1 8 9 9 ,  t o  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 ,  0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
January 2 ,  1 9 0 2 ,  t o  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
January 7 ,  1 9 0 4 ,  t o  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
YEAR 
SOURCE : Garf ield Repo rt ,  p .  2 8 6 .  
TABLE 12  
THE D I STRIBUT ION OF SWIFT & CO . ' S  
STOCK, 1 8 9 0-1 9 0 5  
NUMBER O F  STOCKHOLDERS 
1 8 9 0 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9 5  
1 8 9 3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 60 4  
1 8 9 9  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 537  
1 9 02  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (no f igures ava i lable ) 
1 9 0 5  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . > 6 0 0 0  
SOURCE : Unfer,  p .  5 6  
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dispos ing o f  the bond issue o f  1 9 00 . Five months a ft e r  t hey were 
offered to exist ing sha reholders,  only one-ha l f  of the bonds had been 
sold ( enough to ret i re the $2 . 5  mi l l ion issue of 1 8 9 0 ) ; t he remai nde r 
we re o f fe red for publ ic subscr ipt ion in Septembe r ,  1 9 0 0 ,  by the 
investment syndicate that unde rwrote the is sue . 1 8 
Swi f t  & Co . and the latecomer t o  t he indu s t ry ,  t he Schwa rzch i ld & 
Sul zbe rge r Co . ,  were t he only la rge dres sed beef shippe rs t o  h ave t he i r  
stock widely dis t r ibuted beyond a narrow c i rcle o f  owne rs . P r i o r  t o  
January, 1 8 9 9 ,  when S w i f t  & Co . stock wa s admitted t o  t rading o n  the 
unl isted department of  t he Boston Stock Exchange , its ma rket was l imited 
to indiv idua ls who we re fami l i a r  with Swift & Co . a nd i t s  head, G .  F .  
Swi f t ; a l l  exchanges of the company ' s  st ock we re conducted on an 
informa l ba sis . 1 9 The company ' s  original 1 0 9  sha reholde rs con s i sted 
ent i rely o f  f riends and bus i ness acquaintances o f  G .  F .  Swif t , most of 
whom e i t he r  knew h im f rom his days as a local New England meat dealer,  
o r  had earl �er ent ered into pa rtnership with him as  pa rt of  Swi f t  & 
Co . ' s  who lesa le east ern d i s t r ibu tion net work . Despi t e  t he lack of  a 
forma l context i n  wh ich the stock could be t raded, its dis t ribut ion 
widened yea rly, pa rt icularly after the company had become wel l  
estab li shed as  a sound, rapidly expanding, going conce rn . The company' s 
sha reholde rs did not inc rease in numbe r beyond 6 , 0 0 0  unt i l  a fter the $ 1 0  
mi l l i on stock issue o f  1 9 0 4 ; this appa rent l y  was the f i rs t  issue that 
1 6Commercial a nd Financial  Ch ron icle 70  ( June 9 ,  � 9 0 0 ) : 1 1 5 1 . No 
rea son is cited for the di ffi culty expe r ienced by t he f i rm i n  plac ing 
t he $5 mi l l ion bond issue of 1 9 00 . I t  is highly l i kely,  however,  that 
exist ing sha reho lders viewed these securit ies as  less des i rable than 
t he i r  common sha res , upon wh ich they had a lways received an annual 
ret u rn of  at  least seven percent . This is  suggested by the fact that 
the company ' s  common stock is sues of  1 8 9 9  and 1 9 02  found a ready sa le 
among t he compa ny' s exist ing sha reholders,  whi le t he bond is sue of 1 9 0 0  
( which was theoret ically less risky than the stoc k  due t o  i t s  being 
secu red by a f i rst  mo rtgage on the company ' s  property)  was not so 
readily t a ken up . 
1 9Comme rcial a nd Financial Ch ronicle 68 ( Ja nuary 1 4 ,  1 8 9 9 ) : 8 7 . 
Swi ft & Co . stock wa s later l i sted on the Chicago Stock Exchange 
somet ime du r ing 1 9 0 1 - 1 902 . It wa s not t r aded on the New York Stock 
Exchange prior t o  1 9 0 6  ( Unfe r ,  p . 122 ) . 
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was wide l y  distributed immediately upon i t s  i ssue . 20 Despite the 
increased dispersion of t he company' s  stock du ring 1 8 8 � - 1 9 0 5 ,  the Swift 
fami ly managed to maint ai n a sufficient degree o f  cont rol to secure t o  
itse l f  a ma j ority o n  t h e  boa rd of  directors ( incl uding the posit ion o f  
cha i rman )  and both t he pres idency and vice-presidency of t he f i rm . 21  
Swift & Co . rema ined re l iant on reta ined earnings as a source of  
long term capi t a l  t o  a greater extent than the i r  issues of  addi t iona l 
stock wou ld indicate . Table 1 3  shows the earn ings , dividends , changes 
in capital stock and changes in total net worth for Swift & Co . during 
1 8 9 6 -1 9 0 5 . 11 Of the total increa se in Swift & Co . ' s  net worth 
t hroughout the pe riod, s l ight ly less than seventy percent resulted f rom 
infus ions of " new" cash capital from sha reholders ; p ro f i t s  reta ined in 
t he bus iness amounted t o  $ 9 , 3 8 7 , 0 0 0 ,  or less than one-th i rd of t he total 
increase in t he company ' s  capita lizat ion between 1 8 9 6  and 1 9 0 5 . 23 But 
as wa s t rue of the f i rst  e leven yea rs of the company ' s his tory,  the bul k  
of  the new cash capi tal  inve sted i n  the bu si ness by s ha reholders s imply 
rep resented prof i t s  that were ret urned to the bus ines s .  
During t he ten yea r period covered in Table 1 3 ,  dividend payments 
tota led $ 1 4 , 5 1 8 , 0 0 0 ,  or s l ight ly ove r 6 8  pe rcent of  cash paid into t he 
1°Commercial and Financ ia l Chronicle 7 8  ( April  2 ,  1 9 0 4 ) : 1 2 7 9 . 
2 1Ga rf ield Reoo rt , p .  2 8 6 . 
22No f igures a re avai lable showing profits , surplus or net worth 
for Swift & Co . for 1 8 8 5 - 1 8 9 5 . See Table 6 above for the company' s  
ea rnings , dividends and changes in capital stock duri�g that eleven yea r  
per iod . 
23These figures p robably unde rstate t he prof i t s  o f  Swift  & Co . due 
to t he usua l pract ice of t reat ing depreciat ion cha rges as an ope rat ing 
expense and the fact that t he f i rm reportedly unde rt ook new const ruct ion 
occasiona lly  while faili ng to capita l i ze such const ruct ion on i t s  books 
unt i l  a later  pe riod . Approximately $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  wa s added t o  t he 
surplus account du ring 1 9 1 8  a s  a result of a reappra i s a l  of p roperty  
va lues . Th is adju stment was des igned to offset the cumulat ive e f fects 
of earlier account ing me t hods which t reated many ma intenance and 
const ruct ion expenditures as ope rat ing expenses . I t  is a l s o  unclear 
whether the prof i t s  of Swift & Co . ' s  subs idi arie s  a re included in the 
above f igures . FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Packing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 , Pt . 5 ,  
pp . 2 6-27 . 
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YEAR 
1 8 9 6  
1 8 9 7 
1 8 9 8  
1 8 9 9  
1 9 0 0  
1 9 0 1  
1 9 0 2  
1 9 0 3  
1 9 0 4 
1 9 0 5  
TOTAL 
2 4 -2 5  
DIVIDENDS 
$ 8 2 6  
8 2 6  
8 8 2 
1 , 2 3 6  
1 , 3 3 4  
1 , 3 7 6  
1 , 5 6 3  
1 , 7 5 0  
2 , 2 7 5  
2 , 4 5 0  
1 4 , 5 1 8  
TABLE 1 3  
FINANC IAL H I STORY OF SWIFT & CO . ,  
1 8 9 6 - 1 9 0 5  
( a l l  f igures i n  t housands ) 
NET PROF IT STOCK SURPLUS 
$ 1 , 1 9 8 $ 1 3 , 7 6 7 $ 2 3 8  
977 1 3 , 7 6 7  6 0 9  
1 ,  1 9 9  1 3 , 7 6 7  7 6 0 
2 , 0 8 5  1 5 , 0 0 0  1 , 0 7 7  
1 , 8 5 4  2 0 , 0 0 0  1 ,  92 6 
2 , 6 7 6  2 0 , 0 0 0  2 , 4 4 6  
3 , 0 6 3 2 0 , 0 0 0  3 , 7 4 6  
3 , 0 0 0  2 5 , 0 0 0  5 , 2 4 6  
4 , 0 2 5  2 5 , 0 0 0  6 , 4 9 6  
4 , 2 0 0  3 5 , 0 0 0  8 , 2 4 6  
2 4 , 2 7 7  2 1 , 2 3 3 *  
NOTE : * = t ot a l  cha nge bet ween 1 8 9 6  and 1 9 0 5 . 
SOURCE : FTC , Reoo rt on the Meat Packing Indust rv1 
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NET �lORTH 
$ 1 4 , 0 0 5  
1 4 , 37 6 
1 4 , 5 2 7  
1 6 , 0 7 7  
2 1 , 92 6 
2 2 , 4 4 6  
2 3 , 7 4 6  
3 0 , 2 4 6  
3 1 , 4 9 6  
4 3 , 2 4 6  
2 9 , 2 4 1 *  
1 9 1 9 , Pt . 5 ,  pp . 
bus iness , despite the fact t hat Swift & Co . pursued a mo re conse rvat i ve 
dividend policy than du ring 1 8 8 5- 1 8 9 5 ,  when extra cash dividends we re 
periodica l ly dec l a red . 24 Therefore, over two-thi rds of the tot a l  
increase in Swift & Co . ' s  capital stock during the latter per iod , as  
dur ing the earlier pe ri od, was rough ly equivalent to the pe riodic 
capita l i zation of surplus rese rves through the dec larat ion o f  dividends 
payable in s tock . 2� P rofits retu rned to the business in one form o r  
another ( tot a l  dividends plus reta ined earnings ) , which i n  this  case 
amounted to total net profits , thus accounted for over 8 2  percent of  the 
tot a l  increase in the company ' s  net wo rth during the pe riod . Despite a 
widening c i rc le of owne rship and the admission of  Swift & Co . ' s  stock t o  
t rading o n  t h e  Bos t on and Chicago stock exchanges during 1 8 9 9- 1 9 0 1 ,  the 
company cont inued to re ly heavily on its own resources , a lbe it in a 
rather roundabout wa y, to fund its long term capit a l  needs . 26 
The subs idia ry companies owned di rectly or indirectly by Swift & 
Co . ,  cont rol led th rough the use of inte rlock ing directorates o r  by the 
latter company' s st ockho lde rs in the interest of Swift & Co . ,  o r  in 
wh ich Swift & Co . owned some , but not a l l ,  of the out standing stoc k ,  
24During the pe riod 1 8 8 5- 1 8 9 5  shareholders were suppl ied with 6 6  
percent o f  the cash t o  purchase a l l  new stock issues th rough the 
repeated dec l a rat ion of  "ext ra" dividends immediately preceding a new 
i ss ue of stock . 
2� I t  could be a rgued that a business (as  dist inct f rom its 
stoc kholders ) has no c laim on ea rn ings that amount t o  a " reasonable" 
rate of ret u rn on capital invested . Following this l ine of a rgument , 
most o f  the infus ions of  capital from sha reholders en j oyed by Swift & 
Co . du ring the first twenty years of  its exis tence s hould prope rl y · be 
cons ide red as externa l funds . During the indust ry' s early yea rs , 
howeve r,  when Swi ft & Co . was ope rated as  a partnership,  pract ica l ly a l l  
t h e  company' s ea rnings we re retu rned to the bus iness . The partners 
withdrew l it t le from the busi ness (with the except ion of the i r  salaries,  
the amount of which is not known ) , but benef i tted f rom increases in the 
va lue of the i r  equity when profits were retu rned t o  the bus iness and 
added to surplus reserves . My argument ma inta ins t hat Swi ft & Co . ' s  
rel iance on interna lly gene rated funds did not change �ubstantively 
a fter the company wa s inco rporated in 1 8 9 5 ;  the bus iness cont inued to 
experience l it t l e  in t he way of  net cash inf lows f rom sha reholders or 
out f lows during 1 8 8 5 - 1 8 9 2 and 1 8 9 3 - 1 9 0 5 . 
26See be low, this  chapter , for more on the t rading of Swift & Co . ' s  
stock on th� o rga ni zed exchanges . 
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were engaged in a wide variety of act ivit ies . These included : t he 
t ransportation,  ma rket ing and dis t ribut i on ( both domes t ic a l ly and 
abroad ) of  Swift & Co . ' s  re f r igera ted beef,  t he manufacture o f  i t ems 
f rom beef by-p roduct s ,  the packing and canning of va rious mea t  p roduct s ,  
and t he opera t ion o f  stockya rds . 27 
Swift & Co . ' s  relat ions with its  subs idi a r ies were more 
comp l icated than t hose of the other dressed beef sh ippers because of 
the i r  va riety, and because such re lat ions con t inued to change t h roughout 
t he period, tending t owa rds an ever greater degree of cent rali zat ion of  
cont rol ove r t he subs idi ar ies by Swift  & Co . Swift & Co . ' s  subs idiaries 
may be clas s i f ied as follows : 28 
1 }  Those compa nies wh ich we re wholly owned by o r  on beha l f  o f  Swif t  & 
Co . of I l l ino is . 
2 }  Those companies with which Swift & Co . wa s closely a f f i l iated, but in 
wh ich Swi ft & Co . owned no stock . 
3 )  St oc kyard companies in which Swift & Co . owned stock . 
The companies in the f i rst group cons isted prima r i ly of  t hose 
o rgani zed to consol ida te and coordinate the var ious businesses that were 
engaged in the t ransportat ion and dist r ibution of Swift & Co . ' s  products 
in domest ic and fore ign ma rket s .  Due to provis ions in t he I l l inois 
corpo rate statutes that prohibited one corporat ion f rom owning stock in 
another, a l l  subs idi a r ies o f  the f i rst t ype we re owned in t he interest 
of  Swift & Co . ( I l l inois ) by a group of  t rustees . 29 
27Ga r f ield Repo rt , p .  2 9 . For a complete l i s t ing o f  Swift & Co . ' s  
s ubsidia ries in 1 9 0 4 ,  see the Ga rfie ld Report , pp . 2 8 6-2 9 0 . 
28This s imple t axonomy is  identical to t hat used by t he U .  S .  
Commiss ioner of Co rpo rat ions in the Garf ield Repo rt o f  1 9 0 5 . This 
classi f icato ry scheme relates t o  t he relat ionship between Swif t  & Co . 
and i t s  subs idia ries in 1 9 0 4  unless ot herwise noted . Considerat ion of  
subs idia ry compa nies here should in no way be cons ide red t o  be 
exhaus t ive . 
29The use of t rustees as  a means of cont ro l l ing s t ock wa s des igned 
both to c i rcumvent va rious st ate laws that fo rbade one corporat ion from 
owning s t oc k  in another and t o concea l t he names o f  t be t rue owners o f  
va rious bus iness prope rt ies . P rovi s ions we re norma l ly made in t he by-
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The only company in the first category o rganized for  purposes 
other t han t hose connected with the t ransportat ion and dist ribut ion o f  
Swift & Co . ' s  dressed bee f was the Swift Fert i l i ze r  Wo rks,  which was 
engaged in the manu facture of commercial fert i l i zers in Georgia . The 
p roduct produced by the company was sold only in the s outhern st ates , 
and cons isted o f  anima l fert i l izer shipped f rom the north mixed with 
phosphate rock f rom t he south . The organizat ion o f  the company i n  
Georgia was appa rent ly intended to avoid expenses associated w i t h  the 
t ransportat ion of phosphate rock t o  the north and back again in t he form 
o f  fert il i ze r . 30 The rema inde r  of  Swi f t  & Co . ' s  divers i f icat ion into 
t he manufacture of items from inedible bee f by-products appa rent ly 
consi sted either o f  t he ac tual acquisit ion of exis t ing manufacturing 
propert ies ( rather t han stoc k ) , or t he cons t ruct ion of new plant s . 3 1 
Unfortunately,  no in forma t i on i s  avai lable on a f i rm by f i rm bas i s  
rega rding act ivity of t h i s  type prior t o  1 90 5 . 
Swift & Co . ( New York) , Swift & Co . ( West Vi rginia ) and Swift & 
Co . (Maine ) , incorpo rated in 1 8 9 3 ,  1 9 0 3  and 1 9 02  respect ive l y ,  and t he 
Swi ft Bee f Company, Limi ted, a Brit ish corporation ,  we re o rgani zed for 
laws of  t he company which wa s to be owned by way of  this  device for the 
naming o f  t rustee s ,  who would receive the stock of  the subs idiary 
company in exchange for bea rer wa rrant s ,  wh ich would be is sued to the 
individual  or f i rm for whom t he stock of the subsidi a ry company was 
being held in t rust . These cert i f icates of  stock,  upon deposit  with the 
t rustee s ,  ceased t o  be necessary for the exe rc ise of vot ing privileges 
or the acquisit ion of dividends . The bea rer wa r rant s subsequently 
became a n  as set of  the parent company and appea red on i t s  books in 
identical amount to the va lue o f  the stock depos ited with the t rustees . 
See FTC , Reoort on the Meat Pack ing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 , P t . 3 ,  pp . 1 9 1- 1 92 . 
j0Ga rfield Reoort , p .  2 8 7 . 
3 1 It  is unquest ionably t rue that the elaboration o f  by-products wa s 
an important s ide line for Swi ft & Co . ,  as we l l  a s  the other la rge 
dressed bee f  sh ippers . S i nce diversificat ion into this  i ndustry was not 
accomplished by way of stock owne rship in the case of Swift & Co . ,  it 
must have been achieved th rough the direct acquis i t ion of propert ies or 
t he con s t ruction of new ma nufacturing facilit ies . See t he Commercial 
and Financ ial  Chronicle 80 (Ma rch, 1 1 ,  1 9 0 5 ) : 1 12 4 - 1 1 2 6 ,  for a 
desc r iption o f  the important role that the sale o f  items manufactured 
f rom by-products played in t he total profits o f  the la rge packers prior 
t o  1 9 0 5 . 
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the purpose o f  acqu i r ing the ent i re interest t hat membe rs o f  the Swift 
f ami ly and the s tockholders o f  Swift & Co . had forme rly held in t he 
branch houses t hat dis t r ibuted Swift & Co . ' s  products in va r ious foreign 
and domestic ma rket s . Appa rent ly,  the incorporated subs idiaries "bought 
out " the pa rtners in a number of the dist ribut orsh ips formed by G .  F .  
and Edwin Swift ( inc lud ing the interest o f  the latter two individuals ) 
during the company' s  early days by exchanging t he subsidiary company 
stock f o r  t he int e rest of the partne rs ,  at which t ime t he subs idiary 
became owne r of  t he dist ributorship and its p roperty . Since the Swift ' s  
were membe rs of  virtua l l y  a l l  t he pa rtnersh ips t hus formed, t hey 
subsequently became ma j o r i t y  stockholders in the subs idiary corpora t ions 
listed above . "  In the case o f  the British f i rm,  i t s  prima ry function 
was t he establi shment of new dist ributorsh ips , rather than t he 
conso l idat ion of exist ing ones . Each dist ribut ion subs idiary, with t he 
exception of  the Brit ish co rporation, was thus origina l ly " owned" by the 
forme r partners in the va rious local dist ributorships . The 
dist r ibutorsh ips were subsequently ope rated on a commiss ion bas i s ,  with 
the p ro f i t s  di rect ly acc ruing f rom their ope rat ion going to t he 
sha reholders of the subs id i a ry . 
I t  is not ce rtain prec isely when the subs idia ries were brought 
unde r t he di rect cont rol of Swi ft & Co . ( I l l inoi s )  by way of t he t rustee 
device described above , alt hough it must have occur red somet ime be fore 
or  dur ing 1 9 0 5 . 33 I t  is known , however ,  that Swift & Co . ' s  $ 1 0  mi l l ion 
stock i ssue of Janua ry, 1 9 0 4 ,  was intended t o  facil itate " t he purchase 
[ of )  the who lesale di st ribut ing ma rkets in the New England States and in 
the States of New Yo rk and New Je rsey be longing to Swi ft & Co . ,  a 
32Ga r f ield Report , p .  2 87 . 
33The Ga r f ield Report , p .  2 8 7 ,  relea sed in 1 9 0 5 ,  l i s t s  these 
subs idi a r ies as  be ing " wholly owned by t rus tees ( wi t h  the except ion o f  
di rectors s ha res ) f o r  the bene fit o f  Swift & Co . o f  I l l inois . "  It i s  
not known p recisely when the shares were acqui red for S w i f t  & Co . b y  the 
t rustee s ,  alt hough t he acquisit ion of Swi f t  & Co . ( Ma ine ) in t he manner 
desc r ibed above appears t o  have occu rred some t ime in 1 9 0 4  ( see be low) . 
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corporation of the state of Ma ine ; and in Great Brit a i n ,  be longing t o  
Swift Beef Co . ,  Limited, a corporation of England . " 34 T h i s  course o f  
act ion w a s  repo rtedly pu rsued i n  order t o  bet t e r  enable t he coordinat ion 
o f  Swift & Co . ' s  di stribution network, and to bring t he e a rn ings f rom 
the dist r ibut ion of t he company ' s  product into "a common t reasury . " 35 
P a rt of the proceeds f rom the $ 1 0  mil l ion stock issue of January,  
1 9 0 4 ,  were intended t o  fund the purchase of t he stock of another two 
previously independent subsidiaries , the Swift Re f r igerator 
Transportat ion Company and the Swift Live-stock Transport a t ion Company, 
both of wh ich earlier had been cont rolled by t he s tockholders  o f  Swift & 
Co . in the company' s interest . 36 Both companies repo rtedly had been 
formed earlier by G .  F .  Swift in orde r to secu re adequate capita l  t o  
f inance the const ruct ion o f  Swift ' s  fleet of re f r ige rator and l ivestock 
c a rs . As noted above , the private car l ines o f  Swift & Co . ,  once 
establ ished , appear to have been highly prof it able and sel f-financ ing ; 
by 1 9 0 4 ,  the est imated inves tment of the forme r company in ref rigerator 
cars was approximately tw ice the va lue of its  paid in capita l i z a t ion and 
bonded indebtedness . 3 .1 As was t rue of the purchase of the subsidia ry 
companies which had been organi zed to assume con t rol ove r Swift & Co . ' s  
branch distributorships in the northeast , the acqu i s it ion o f  the stock 
o f  t he nomina l ly independent Swift a f f i l iated private car l ines was 
intended to secure t o  the pa rent company the ea rn ings that resulted f rom 
the t ransportat ion and dist ribut ion of its  product ; in this case in the 
34Commercial and Financial Chronicle 7 7  ( December 12 , 1 9 0 3 ) : 2287 . 
3�Commercial and Financial Ch ron icle 7 7  ( Decembe r 1 2 ,  1 9 0 3 ) : 2 2 8 7 . 
36Commercial and Financ ia l Ch ronicle 7 7  (Decembe r 1 2 ,  1 9 0 3 ) : 2 2 8 7 . 
3 7The Swift Re f r igerator Transport at ion Company had a pa id in 
capita l o f  $ 8 0 0 , 0 0 0  in  1 9 0 4  and bonded indebtedness o f  $ 1 , 5 7 0 , 4 0 0 . It 
owned an est imated 5 , 4 7 3  refrigerator cars . Prior t o  the acqu i s i t ion of 
the ent i re cap i t a l  stock of the subs idia ry f i rm by Swift & Co . ,  its $ 1 0 0  
par va lue stock was repeatedly quoted a t  bet ween $ 1 5 0-$ 1 4 0  i n  t he Bost on 
ma rket . See t he Ga r f ield Report , p .  2 9 ,  p .  4 3 .  
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form of  t he mi leage paymen ts al lowed by the ra i l roads on the private 
cars . 3 8  
By 1 9 0 4  all of  t he subs idi a ry companies that earlier had been 
o rgan i zed to consolidate Swi ft & Co . ' s  dist ribut ion network in the 
northeast had been acqu i red by t he parent company, which had purchased 
a l l  of  t he i r  capi t a l  stock and depos ited it in  t rust . Each, in  i t s  
t u rn ,  had earlier acqu i red almost a l l  t h e  former pa rt ne rsh ip agenc ies 
that comprised Swift & Co . ' s  early market ing and dis t r ibut ion system in 
New England, New York and West Virginia . 39 The compan ies t hat had been 
organized to establ ish Swi ft  & Co . ' s  ma rket ing and dist ribution networks 
in England and Ge rmany had also been purchased by Swift & Co . ,  as  had 
both of t he formerly " independent " companies under which Swift & Co . ' s  
t ransport at ion ne twork had earlier been organ i zed . 
Companies of the second type , those with which Swi ft  & Co . was 
a f f i l ia ted but in wh i c h  t he y  held no stoc k ,  consisted large ly of f i rms 
engaged in t he pac king, process ing and di s t r ibut ion of  meat p roducts of  
one sort o r  another . In t he case of  the t wo most important companies of  
this t ype , L ibby , McNeill  & Libby ( I ll ino is,  Maine )  and John P .  Squ i re & 
Co . (New Jersey) , t he Swift fami ly ( a s  dist inct f rom Swi ft  & Co . )  had 
either establ ished complete cont rol ove r  the f i rm t h rough the pu rchase 
of  stock or had the i r  interests we ll rep resented on t he boa rd o f  
di rect o rs . � �  The interests of Swi ft & Co . we re represented in other 
a f f i l iated companies either through t he ho lding o f  directorships by 
important sha reholders in Swift & Co . or by involvement in management by 
38Commercial and Financ ial Chron icle 7 7  ( December 1 2 ,  1 9 0 3 ) : 2 2 87 . 
39Ga r f ield Report , p .  2 8 7 . As of 1 9 0 4  only f i ve o f  t he New England 
pa rtnership agenc ies had not been acqu i red in full  by Swi ft  & Co . 
( Ma ine ) , a l t hough the Ma i ne corporat ion had secured a cont ro l l ing 
inte rest in each . 
40Ga r f ield Repo rt , pp . 2 8 9-2 90 . Seven compan ies with which Swift & 
co . we re connected, but in which they held no stock , including the two 
mentioned above , we re cited by the u .  S .  Commis s ioner o f  Corporat ions in 
the a fo rement ioned report . 
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such individua ls . In  each case, unl i ke subs idi aries o f  the f i rs t  t ype , 
t he f inanc ial  ope rat ions o f  the a f fi l iated company were sepa rate and 
dis t inct f rom those of  Swift & Co . . 4 1  
Although investments in stockyard companies we re a ccomplished by 
way of  the same device used in acquiring cont rol ove r other functionally 
related subs idi a r ies ( t he stock ownership t rust ) ,  it should be 
cons ide red sepa rately due to the unique way it came about . Whe reas 
forwa rd integrat ion by the packers into ma rket ing, t ransportation and 
distribut ion was intended to address pa rticular problems associated with 
the use of  the ma rket and outs ide agents t o  coo rdinate those act ivi t ies , 
bac kwa rd integrat ion into stockyards by the large packers came about 
a lmos t  solely as a result of stock bonu ses of fered to the la rge packers 
by stockya rd compa nies as inducement to locate a pa cking plant in t he 
vicinity o f  a pa rt icular stoc kya rd . 41 
By 1 9 0 4  Swi ft & Co . was affi liated with f ive stockya rd compan ies 
in Omaha , Kansas City, Fo rt Worth, St  Joseph and S t . Paul by way of  the 
t rust device described above . In each instance the investment came 
about as  a result of  stock granted in con siderat ion for  t he 
establi shment o f  a pac k i ng plant in a pa rticular locat ion . Swi f t  & 
Co . ' s  investment in st ockya rd companies later inc rea sed a s  the companies 
i ssued addit iona l stock i n  l ieu of cash dividend pa yments . 4 3 Although 
Swi f t  & Co . also  s t ruck a favorable deal with t he Union S tockya rd 
Company of New Je rsey, owner of  the Union Stockyards in Chicago , no 
4 1Ga rf ield Report , p .  2 8 9 . 
41 It is not c lear whether the dressed bee f sh ippe rs rea l i zed any 
operat ional adva ntages f rom their holdings in t he stockyard companies . 
I t  has been suggested that the packers extended the i r  cont rol over the 
stockya rds and part icipated in the establi shment o f  new l ivestock 
fac i l i t ies a f ter 1 9 0 5  in o rder to secure adequate faci l i t ies t o  ensure 
regu lar s upplies o f  their raw ma terial ,  but this leve l o f  involvement 
wa s not evident be fore 1 9 0 5 . For a h ighly det a i led account of  the 
packers ' involvement in the stockya rd companies,  see FTC , Report on t he 
Meat Packing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 , Pt . 3 .  
43Ga r f ield Report , p .  2 8 8 . 
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stock wa s granted as  a bonus ; the company was granted conces s ions t hat 
included a cash bonus ( pa id in 1 8 9 1 )  in exchange f o r  a promise t o  
ma intain the plant adjacent to the Union Stockya rds and not t o  build 
another pack ing plant within a two hundred mile radius f o r  f ifteen 
yea rs . 44 
Swift & Co . was one of  t he only la rge dressed bee f s hi ppe r t o  
re lease informat ion t o  the public rega rding i t s  f inancial  st ruct u re 
dur ing 1 8 9 0 - 1 9 0 5 ,  and t h i s  only during t he last nine yea rs o f  the 
pe riod . Table 1 4  shows t he yea rly condensed ba lance sheets f o r  Swift  & 
Co . for  t he seven yea rs for which commensurable informat ion i s  
available . 4� Table 1 5  shows the annua l and average percentage changes 
in the va riables indicated dur ing the same pe riod . These f igures 
con f i rm many of t he t rends noted a t  the beginning of the chapt e r . The 
asset category that unde rwent the second highest a ve rage a nnual rate o f  
g rowth was stocks and bonds , or purely f inanc ial investments in  other 
companies . (b P l ant and equi pment grew steadily du ring the pe r iod, 
although on ave rage investment s in other propert ies gr�w more rapidly . 
F inanc ial i nves tments in other companies a ls o  g rew by more in absolute 
amount t han investments in p rope rty during this period, a nd by 
44Ga r f ie ld Reoo rt , p .  2 9 3 . Swi ft & Co . ' s  interests we re a l so 
represented on t he boa rd of d i rectors of the Union Stoc kya rds Company 
for a t ime by A .  H .  Veede r ,  attorney for Swift  & Co . .  
4 �Commercial and Financial Ch ron icle 6 6  ( Apri l  2 3 ,  1 8 9 8 ) : 8 0 9 . 
I n forma t ion f o r  1 8 97 is ava i l able , but omits many o f  the cat ego ries 
l isted in the t able . Compa r isons between that year a nd subsequent years 
a re t herefore imposs ible . 
46Ga r f ield Report , pp . 4 0 -4 5 . Though carried on t he ba lance sheet 
of Swift  & Co . as " stocks and bonds " ,  f inanc ial  i nvestments in other 
companies were a lways accomplished by way o f  the t rust device noted 
above . Therefore ,  Swift  & Co . not actually in possession o f  t he s t ocks 
and bonds c a r r ied on the i r ba lance sheet , but ra the r o f  the bea re r  
wa r rants issued aga inst t he stoc k  by the t rus tees with whom t he stock 
was deposited . The ba la nce sheet item " i nvestment s "  includes branch 
fac i l i t ies and othe r  phys ica l prope rties not direct ly connected with the 




P l an t  
Horses , etc . 
I n vestment s  
Stocks & Bonds 
Current As set s 
Cash 
Receivables 
I nvent o ries 
LIAB I L IT I ES 




Cur rent Liabs . 
Loan s  
P ayables 
TABLE 1 4  
CONDENSED BALANCE SHEETS OF SWI FT & CO . ,  
1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 4  
( a l l  f igures in thous ands ) 
1 8 9 8 
$ 8 , 6 8 0  
7 1  
4 ,  1 1 1  
1 ,  9 67 
1 4 , 9 4 4  
9 9 0  
5 , 6 4 0  
8 , 3 1 4  
1 8 9 8  
1 8 9 9  
$ 9 , 8 5 6  
8 2  
4 , 4 1 3 
2 , 0 8 7  
1 1 , 5 8 2  
1 , 1 7 3  
8 , 6 7 4  
1 , 7 3 5  
1 8 9 9  
1 9 0 0  
$ 1 1 , 6 8 0  
1 0 1  
3 , 9 62 
1 , 8 1 5  
1 9 , 1 63 
1 , 3 6 2  
8 , 6 1 6  
9 , 1 8 5  
1 9 00 
$ 1 5 , 0 0 0  $2 0 , 0 0 0  $2 0 , 0 0 0 
2 , 5 0 0  2 , 5 0 0  2 , 5 0 0  
1 , 0 7 7  1 , 9 2 6  2 , 4 4 6  
1 1 , 1 9 6 
9 , 8 8 0  
1 , 3 1 6  
9 , 6 6 0  
6 ,  6 8 0  
2 , 980  
1 1 , 7 7 5  
9 , 272 
2 , 5 0 3  
1 9 0 1  
$ 1 2 , 1 6 8 
1 0 6  
3 , 5 7 5  
1 , 622 
2 5 , 1 3 5  
1 , 3 32 
1 0 , 8 8 3  
12 , 920  
1 9 0 1  
$2 0 , 0 0 0  
3 , 5 0 0  
3 , 7 4 6  
63 
1 5 , 2 9 5  
1 0 , 7 97 
4 ,  4 9 8  
1 9 02  
$ 1 3 , 7 1 9  
1 1 4  
5 , 4 1 8  
2 , 1 67 
2 8 , 5 9 5  
1 , 6 60 
1 4 , 2 4 4  
1 2 , 692  
1 9 02 
$2 5 , 0 0 0  
5 , 0 0 0  
5 , 2 4 6  
3 8 6  
1 4 , 3 8 1  
1 2 , 5 3 9  
1 , 8 42 
1 9 0 3  
$ 1 4 , 1 1 3  
1 2 1  
6 , 3 62 
2 , 6 9 4  
3 0 ,  9 1 1  
1 , 7 2 5  
1 3 , 8 7 1  
1 5 , 3 1 4  
1 9 0 3  
$ 2 5 , 0 0 0  
5 , 0 0 0  
6 , 4 9 6  
627  
1 7 1  0 7 8  
1 4 , 3 9 8  
2 , 6 8 0  
1 9 0 4  
$ 1 4 , 7 0 0  
1 0 6  
7 , 6 5 3  
7 , 8 9 0  
3 4 , 3 0 8  
2 , 4 8 6  
1 6 , 2 9 1  
1 5 , 5 3 1  
1 9 0 4  
$ 3 5 , 0 0 0  
5 , 0 0 0  
8 , 2 4 6  
6 0 0  
1 5 ,  8 1 1  
1 3 , 3 3 5  
2 , 4 7 6  
NOTE : Payables (a ccount s  payable)  includes a l l  f unds due Swift & 
Co . ' s  connec t ions ; Investments includes branches and unexpi red 
insurance ; Receivables ( accounts receivable) inc ludes equity over amount 
drawn on cons ignments ; Loans includes all  short term bank c redit and 
pape r  outstand ing . Assets and l iabi lit ies ma y not equal due t o  
rounding . 
SOURCE : Commercia l and Financial Chron icle,  1 8 9 8- 1 9 0 5  
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TABLE 1 5  
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN SELECTED BALANCE SHEET ITEMS : 
ASSETS 
P lant 
Horses , etc . 
Investment s 
Stocks & Bonds 
Cu r rent As sets 
Cash 
Receivables 
I nvento ries 
LIAB ILITIES 
Capit a l  St ock 
Bonds 
Rese rve s 
Surplus 
Current Liabs . 
B i l l s  Payable 
Payables 
MI SCELLANEOUS 
Wkg . Cap . ,  Net 
Fixed/Cu r . 
1 8 9 9  
1 4 %  
1 5 %  
7 %  
6 % 
-22 % 
1 8 %  
5 4 %  
- 7 9 %  
1 8 9 9  
3 3 'i  
0 �  
7 9 �  
- 1 4'1  
-32 \� 
1 2 6 %  
1 8 9 9  
-4 8 %  
4 6 %  
SWIFT & CO . ,  1 8 9 9- 1 9 0 5  
1 9 0 0  
1 9 'i: 
2 3 '1,  
- 1 0 %  
- 1 3 't, 
65%  
1 6 % 
- 1 %  
4 2 9 %  
1 9 0 0  
2 7 1  
2 2 '1 
3 9 'l 
-1 6 't  
1 9 0 0  
2 8 4 %  
-2 8 %  
1 9 0 1  
4 %  
5 %  
- 1 0 %  
- 1 1 %  
3 1 %  
-2% 
2 6 %  
4 1 %  
1 9 0 1  
0 %  
4 0 %  
5 3 �, 
3 0 %  
1 6 %  
8 0 %  
1 9 0 1  
33%  
-2 1 %  
1 9 02  
1 3 %  
8 %  
5 2 %  
3 4 %  
1 4 %  
2 5 %  
3 1 %  
-2 % 
1 9 02  
25�  
4 3 1t  
5 1 3 l, 
4 0 1. 
- 6 %  
1 6 'i: 
-59%  
1 9 02 
4 4 %  
0 %  
1 9 0 3  
3 r� 
6 %  
1 7 %  
2 4 %  
8 %  
4 %  
- 3 %  
2 1 %  
1 9 0 3  
O !f, 
0 �  
62 �, 
2 4 %  
1 9 %  
1 5 %  
4 5 %  
1 9 0 3  
-2 % 
- 4 %  
1 9 0 4  
4 %  
- 1 2 %  
2 0 %  
1 9 3 %  
1 1 %  
4 4 %  
1 7 %  
1 %  
1 9 0 4  
4 0 %  
0 %  
- 4 %  
2 7 %  
-7 % 
-7 % 
- 8 %  
1 9 0 4  
3 4 %  
-7 % 
1 9 0 5  
1 1 %  
7 %  
4 %  
2 %  
1 8 %  
1 0 %  
2 9 %  
1 6 %  
1 9 0 5  
0 %  
0 %  
2 6 %  
2 1 %  
4 8 %  
5 4 %  
1 7 %  
1 9 0 5  
0 %  
- 51 %  
Avg . 
1 0 %  
7 %  
1 2 %  
3 4 %  
1 8 %  
1 6 % 
2 2 %  
6 1 %  
Avg . 
1 4 %  
1 2 %  
1 4 9 % 
3 9 %  
1 3 %  
1 4 %  
2 7 %  
Avg . 
5 7 %  
- 2 %  
NOTE : Each row shows the annual percentage change i n  the 
indicated va riable . "Wkg . Cap . ,  Net "  displ ays t he annua l percentage 
change in the difference be tween current as set s and current l iabi lit ies . 
" Fixed/Cur . '' d i splays the annual pe rcent age change i n  t he rat io o f  plant 
and equipment to cu r rent a s sets as  computed in Table 1 1 . The last 
column displays the avera ge annual pe rcent age cha nge in the indicated 
va riable , and has been computed by ave raging the f igures in the 
preceeding seven columns . Figures for 1 9 0 5  we re de rived using a 
s l ight ly different account ing method, and a re the re fore not st rictly 
compa rable to the f igu res de rived for 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 4 . 
SOURCE : Commercial a nd Financ ial  Chron icle,  1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 5  
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practically t he same absol ute amount as investment in  .-:> laughte ring 
capacity . 
I t  is i nterest ing t o  cons ider t he figures in  Tables 1 4  and 1 5  in 
light of t he informa t ion conta ined in Table 9, wh ich suggests the ways 
by which Swift  & Co . increased the i r  capi t a l i za t ion du ring 1 8 9 6- 1 9 0 5 .  
Earnings ret u rned t o  surplus rese rves dur ing the per iod amounted t o  
$ 9 , 3 8 7 , 0 0 0 ,  less t han $20 0 , 0 0 0  below t h e  t ot a l  increase i n  t he company' s 
stated investment in product ive capacity ( including t he balance s heet 
ent ry unde r  " inve stment s " )  ove r the 7 yea r pe riod examined above . Total  
pro f i t s  ret urned to t he bus i ness bet ween 1 8 9 6  and 1 9 0 5 ,  inc luding those 
paid out as  dividends and subsequent ly retu rned to t he company ' s 
t reasury in exchange for new is sues of  stock,  we re t he �efore mo re than 
suff icient to double Swift & Co . ' s  total investment in  product ive 
capacity du ring 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 5 . 
Along with the inc rease in total pa id in capi t a l i zat ion 
expe rienced by Swi ft & Co . du ring 1 8 98 - 1 9 0 5 ,  which amounted to $22 . 5  
mi l l ion (exc ludi ng addit ions to surplus ) , the f i rm al so exper ienced 
s igni f icant changes in i t s  as se t and l iabi li ty s t ruct u re s ,  in addit ion 
t o  t he g rowing relat ive impo rtance of financial  investments i n  other 
companies noted above . During 1 8 98-1 9 0 5  t he rat io of  long t e rm t o  
current liabilit ies increased f rom 1 . 5 6 to ove r 2 . 5 .  Furt he rmo re , the 
s teady a nnua l rate o f  dec line of the f ixed t o  qu ick asset ratio,  t he 
regu lar annua l increases in the volume o f  net wo rking capital  a nd quick 
assets that t he company employed, and an increas ing current asset t o  
current liabi lit ies ra t i o ,  suggest s  that the company was growing 
increas ingly wo rk ing capi tal intensive during this pe riod, a nd less 
reliant on short term bo rrowing to fund the i r  working capital  needs . 
I nf o rmat ion conta ined in Table 1 6 , though not conc lusive ,  appe a rs t o  
con f i rm this . 
Combin ing these f igu res with t hose conta ined in Table 1 5  suggests 
that t he compa ny was rest ructu ring its  capi t a l i za t ion � awa rds long term 
255  
TABLE 1 6  
SELECTED FINANCIAL RATIOS FOR 
SWI FT & CO . ,  1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 5  
RATIO 
Plant+Investment s / As set s 
Current Asset s / As set s 
Cur . As set s /Cur . Liabs 
1 8 9 8 1 8 9 9  1 9 0 0  1 9 0 1  1 9 0 2  1 9 0 3  1 9 0 4  1 9 0 5  
. 4 3 . 5 1 . 4 2 . 3 7 . 3 8 . 3 8 . 3 5 . 3 3 
. 5 0 . 4 1 . 52 . 5 9 . 57 . 57 . 5 3 . 6 7 
1 . 33 1 . 2 0  1 . 62 1 . 6 4 1 . 9 8 1 . 8 1  2 . 1 7 2 . 1 7 
NOTE : These ra t ios we re ca lculated us ing f igures t a ken f rom Table 
1 1  above , and addit ional informat ion f rom the sou rce c ited below for 
1 9 0 5 . Figures for 1 9 0 5  we re de rived using a s l ight l y  different 
account ing method, and a re therefore not perfect ly compa rable to the 
figures derived for 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 4 . P lant+Investment s  does not include 
S tocks and Bonds . 
SOURCE : Commercial and Financial Ch ronicle,  1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 5 . 
2 5 6  
l i ab i l it ies , pa rt ly in orde r to finance its  increa s ing working cap it a l  
needs , rather than t o  enable increases i n  i t s  p roduct ive capac ity . 
The dec l ining importance of f ixed rela t i ve t o  total  assets further 
i l lust rates the g rowing work ing capital inten s i t y  of the company . The 
growing working capi tal  requi rements of t he f i rm, coupled with t he 
increased importance o f  pu rely f inancial investments in other companies,  
s uggests tha t  its  increased rel iance on the i ssuce o f  stock ( though not 
necessarily on out s ide funds ) went not only to facil itate an increased 
volume of bus iness ( and the more intens ive ut i l i zat ion o f  a more slowly 
g rowing productive capac ity ) ;  but a lso the inc reased coo rdinat ion and 
cont rol (th rough security owne rship in subsidiary compan ies ) ove r  t he 
resources of an increas ingly far flung , mul t i  funct ion bus i ness . 
Despite the fai lure of the growth of the company ' s  p roduct i ve 
capacity (as  va lued on its  books ) to  match increases in its  cap i t a l  
stock dur ing 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 5 ,  there a re no indications t h a t  t h e  company was 
ove rcapit a l i zed . �. '  All stock and bonds were pa id for in cash at pa r ;  
none we re is sued di rect ly for property . 4e S i nce the bulk o f  the 
secur i t ies owned by Sw i f t  & Co . we re backed by the phys ical propert ies 
of their private ca r l ines and their  eastern branch dist r ibutorships , 
t he ma in items on the balance sheet suggest ive of ove rcapi t a l i za t ion a re 
those o f  account s  recei vable and inventories . S ince these, t a ken 
together in 1 9 0 5 ,  howeve r ,  summed to s l ight ly more than f ifteen percent 
of the company' s total  est imated volume of business du r ing that yea r ,  
47Swift & Co . would have been the only l a rge dressed beef sh ippe r 
likely t o  have attempted to inflate the i r  capi t a l izat ion during this  
pe riod, s ince a s igni f icant port ion of the i r  stock was  owned by 
individuals out s ide the sma l l  circle of family member� and company 
officials  who typica lly he ld the ent ire capit a l  o f  the other l arge 
dressed bee f sh ippe rs . 
4 8Ga r f ie ld Repo rt , p .  4 0 . 
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much of which requi red the extens ion o f  credit to l arge purcha sers,  the 
book va luat ions of t hose items were p robably not excess ive . 49 
Armour & Co . : Capi t a l i z a t ion and Profi ts,  1 890-1 9 0 5  
Armour & Co . cont inued to operate as  a pa rtnership th rough Ma rch , 
1 9 0 0 . On April 2 4 ,  1 9 0 0 ,  Armour & Co . ( I l l inois ) was i ncorporated a nd 
a l l  the propert ies cont rol led by the partnership we re a cqui red by t he 
newly formed co rporat ion . �0 Doubts concerning the long term stability 
o f  the bus ines s ,  given the cont inued ill health  o f  P .  D .  A rmour,  and the 
recent death o f  Phill ip D .  Armour Jr . ,  who had been groomed by his 
fathe r  to assume respons ibil ity for  the management of the company upon 
P .  D . ' s  dea th or ret i rement ,  we re the ma jor rea sons given at the t ime 
for the change in o rga n i z a t i on . �1 Although s ign i f icant o rgani zat ional 
changes accompanied the incorporat ion of  Armour & Co . ,  its  f inancial 
pract ices a fter incorporat ion exh ibited no s ignif icant differences f rom 
those used during t he earlie r  pe riod . 
Table 1 7  summa r i zes the financ ial history o f  Arn1ou r & Co . during 
1 8 9 0 - 1 9 0 5  us ing what l i t t le informat ion the f i rm made public throughout 
the pe riod . �2 Armour & Co . ( I ll ino i s )  was i ncorporated a nd capita l i zed 
at $20  mi ll 1on i n  1 9 0 0 ,  a l l  o f  wh ich was common stock ; the company had 
49Ga r f ie ld Reoo rt , p .  4 2 . Swift & Co . ' s  total volume o f  sales 
dur ing 1 90 5  was est imated to be over $200 mi l l ion . I nventories and 
a ccount s rece ivable summed to approximately $ 3 1 . 9  mi l l ion du ring t hat 
yea r . 
�°Cornme rcial and Financial Chron icle 70 (Ma rch 1 7 , 1 9 0 0 ) : 5 3 3 ;  FTC, 
Report on the Meat Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 5 ,  p .  2 1 . The propert ies 
acqui red by the newly fo rmed corporat ion included t he pa rtnership ' s  
Chicago and Omaha packing houses , i t s  branch dist ributo rs hips and 
ref rigerator cars,  and its  by-products manu fact uring facilit ies . 
> :commercial a nd Fin ancial Ch ron icle 7 0  (Ma rch 1 7 ,  1 9 0 0 ) : 5 3 3 . 
'2A rmour & Co . rema i ned ve ry c losely held f rom the dat e  o f  its  
incorporat ion t h rough 1 9 0 5 . There fore ,  there was no compel l ing reason 
for the f i rm to re lease f inancial informat ion t o  the public . The only 
in forma t ion that was made public concerning the f i rm' s financia l a f f a i rs 
was that wh ich was made ava i l able to the var ious State and Fede ral 
Gove rnment agenc ies that inqu i red into the firm' s a f f a irs . Ga r f ield 
Report , p .  2 9 1 . 
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YEAR 
1 8 9 1 
1 8 92 
1 8 9 3 
1 8 9 4  
1 8 95 
1 8 9 6  
1 8 97 
1 8 9 8 
1 8 9 9 
1 9 0 0  
1 9 0 1  
1 9 0 2  
1 9 0 3  
1 9 0 4  
1 9 0 5  
TOTAL 
PROF IT 
$ 1 , 1 0 0  
1 , 8 8 6  
2 , 0 0 0  
7 2 9  
1 ,  4 0 0  
2 , 0 7 0  
8 , 8 3 0  
5 , 7 3 6  
2 , 5 0 0  
2 , 2 5 0  
1 , 8 5 0  
2 , 8 0 0  
3 3 , 1 5 1  
TABLE 1 7  
FINANC IAL HI STORY OF ARMOUR & CO . ,  
1 8 91-1 9 0 5  
( a l l  f igures i n  thousands ) 
DIVIDENDS STOCK SURPLUS NET WORTH 
$ 8 5 0  $ 1 1 , 0 0 0  
1 ,  1 3 6  1 1 , 2 5 0  
1 , 0 0 0  1 2 , 0 0 0  
4 7 9  1 3 ,  0 0 0  
650  1 3 , 2 5 0  
7 0  1 4 , 0 0 0  
7 9 1  $2 0 , 0 0 0  $ 1 3 , 4 3 9  3 3 , 4 3 9  
2 0 , 0 0 0  1 4 , 1 6 4  3 4 , 1 6 4  
1 , 0 0 0  2 0 , 0 0 0  1 8 , 9 0 0  3 8 , 9 0 0  
2 0 , 0 0 0  2 1 , 4 0 0  4 1 , 4 0 0  
2 0 , 0 0 0  2 3 , 6 5 0  4 3 , 6 5 0  
2 0 , 0 0 0  2 5 , 5 0 0  4 5 , 5 0 0  
5 , 9 7 6  3 4 , 5 0 0 *  
NOTE : The change i n  net wort h bet ween 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 0 1  represents 
$ 7 2 5 , 0 0 0  reported net pro f i ts  ea rned by Armour & Co . du ring the last s ix 
months o f  1 9 0 0  f o l lowing i t s  i ncorporat ion . The change in net worth 
during 1 8 9 6- 1 9 0 1  represents accumulated surplus + prope rties acqu i red by 
way of t he d i rect excha nge of stock immediately fol lowing t he company' s 
incorporat ion . The repo rted net pro f i t  f igure for  1 9 0 0  includes profits  
for  the  ent i re pe riod 1 8 9 7 : 1 - 1 9 0 0 : 4 .  The dividend f ig � re f o r  1 9 0 0  shows 
dividends that we re paid out du ring the four yea rs preceding the 
company' s incorpo rat ion . I t  is not cert a i n  how t he rema inde r  o f  t he 
p rofits  ea rned du ring 1 8 97 - 1 9 0 0  we re disposed o f . * I ndicates the total 
change i n  net worth du ring 1 8 9 1- 1 9 0 5 . 
SOURCE : FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Packing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 , P t . 5 ,  pp . 
2 0 -2 1 .  
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no bonded indebtedness . The ent i re $20  mi l l ion capi t a l  stock of  the new 
corpo ra t ion was is sued to the pa rtners of Armour & Co . in exchange for  
the assets  of  the partnership . The accumula ted cash surplus of  the 
partnership represented the paid in capi tal  of  the new corpo ra t ion ; no 
addit ional cash was pa id in at the t ime of  incorporat ion . The net worth 
of the pa rt ne rship at the t ime of  the incorpo rat ion of Armour & Co . was 
est imated to be $ 2 3 , 3 1 4 , 0 0 0 ,  although it is  not certain which p roport ion 
represented an excess of as set s over l iabi l i t ies and which consisted o f  
the pa rtne rship' s accumu l ated cash surplus . �3 
Short l y  a f ter the incorporat ion of  Armour & Co . ( I l l inois ) , the 
stockholders excha nged a port ion of the i r  capital stoc k  for the ent i re 
capital  stock of  the Armour Pack ing Co . (New Je rsey) . The latter 
company owned a Kansas City pack ing plant , bui l t  in  1 8 9 3 ,  which unt i l  
1 9 0 0  had been ope rated i n  the interest of  Armour & Co . b y  P .  D .  Armou r ' s 
brothers , though its  stock was held ch iefly by t hat branch of  t he Armour 
fami ly that resided in Kansas City . �4 P .  D .  Armou r and his son , J .  
Ogden Armour,  who wa s soon to assume management of  Armour & Co . ,  then 
e f fected the t rans fer of  the ent ire prope rty of  the New Jersey 
corpo ra t i on to Armour & Co . ,  increas ing the va lue of t he new 
corpo rat ions assets ( and surplus ) by $ 9 , 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 . After a l lowing for the 
va lue o f  the company' s ent i re init ial  is sue of  stock a t  pa r and ea rnings 
added to rese rves during the last ha l f  of  1 9 0 0 ,  its  net wo rth and 
surplus st ood at $ 1 3 , 4 3 9 , 0 0 0  and $3 3 , 4 3 9 , 0 0 0  by the end of 1 9 0 0 . ��  
The most s t r i k ing feature of  the f inancial devel opment o f  Armour & 
Co . ,  both du ring its  yea rs as a pa rtne rship and those during which it 
ope rated as  a corporation,  wa s the extent to which i t  rel ied di rectly on 
reta ined ea rnings to f i nance its expansion . Beginning with an original 
�3FTC , Reoo rt on the Meat Packing: Indust r:l!;, P t . 5 ,  p .  1 8 . 
�4FTC , Reeo rt on the Meat Pack ing: Indust r:l1;1 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 5 ,  p .  2 3 ;  
Ga r f ield Reeo rt , p .  2 9 1 . 
��FTC , Reeo rt on the Meat Packing Indust r:l!;, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 5 ,  p .  2 3 . 
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i nvestment o f  $ 1 6 0 , 0 0 0  in 1 8 6 9 ,  the owne rs equity in t he bus iness grew 
to $ 4 5 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  by 1 9 0 5 ;  during the ent ire per iod, the total  cont ribut ion 
of t he s tockholders amounted to less t han $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . Even this sum 
resulted primar ily f rom the "payment " company received by t he company in 
the form of the Kansas City slaughtering faci l it y  following t he 
acquisit ion of t he Kansas City company ' s  ent i re capita l  s t ock . �6 
Rat he r  tha n  inc reas ing its rel iance on t he means of its  sma l l  
c irc le of owners fol lowing i t s  incorporat ion , o r  dec reasing t he s hare o f  
t ot a l  earnings reta ined i n  t he bus iness at  t he expense o f  regular  
dividend payment s ,  Armour & Co . ( I l linoi s )  actua l ly expe rienced a 
drama t i c  increase in the share of earn ings retu rned t o  t he f i rm 
fol lowing i t s  incorpo ra t ion ,  and is sued no more stock unt i l  1 9 1 7 . �' 
Du ring t he pe riod 1 8 7 5 - 1 8 9 0  s l ightly less tha n  5 8 %  of t o t a l  reported net 
earn ings we re ret a ined in the busines s . �8 Meanwhile,  t he ent i re 
increase o f  $ 9 . 5  mil l ion in the partner' s equity during this pe riod 
consisted o f  ea rnings that we re ret urned to the bus iness .  During the 
later period a s tagge ring 8 2 %  of total repo rted earnings , o r  $27 , 1 7 5 , 0 0 0  
was re invested in t he bus iness ; a lmost ha lf  o f  this wa s ea rned during 
16FTC, Report on the Meat Pack ing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 5 ,  p .  2 3 . 
The Kansas City prope rty is  prope rly cons idered t o  represent a 
con t r ibut ion t o  t he bus ine ss by the stockholders s ince it  represents 
p roperty that was indi rect ly acqui red from outs ide t he pa rtne rship by 
t he new corpora t ion in exchange for a port ion of t he latter compa ny ' s 
capita l  s tock . The rema inder o f  the corpo ra t ion ' s capit a l  s t ock wa s 
s impl y  given in exchange for the accumula ted surplus o f  the partne rship . 
17The capital  st ock o f  the corporat ion rema ined a t  $20  mi l l ion 
unt i l  1 9 1 7  when an $ 8 0  mi ll ion st ock dividend was decla red out of 
surplus . As was t rue of the co rporat ion ' s f i rst stock i ssue in 1 9 0 0 ,  no 
cash was pa id in by t he sha reho lders in exchange for the 8 0 0 , 0 0 0  sha res 
i ssued in 1 9 1 7 . See FTC , Report on t he Mea t Packing I ndus t ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 
5 ,  p .  2 3 . 
� 8Throughout both periods , repo rted net earnings , and hence t he 
reported net worth for Armour & Co . ,  a re probably understated due t o  
Armou r ' s repo rted p ract ice of charging o f f  new cons t ruct ion aga inst 
ea rnings in la rge amounts at  the t ime of its complet ion . Furthermore, 
in  1 9 1 1  $ 1 9 , 7 8 3 , 0 0 0  was added t o  the surplus account for appraisal of 
physical p ropert ies t hat we re t oo rapidly depreciated in  t he past . 
Armour & Co . ' s  interna lly f inanced g rowth was t here fore probably more 
rapid than t he f igures above wou ld indica te . FTC , Repo rt on t he Meat 
Packing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 5 ,  pp . 2 3-2 4 . 
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the four yea rs fol lowing the incorpo rat ion of the pa rtne rship, dur i ng 
which only one five pe rcent dividend wa s dec l a red . �q The only port ion 
o f  the inc rea se in the owne r ' s equity du ring the second pe riod that can 
be a t t r ibuted to the sha reholders was the p rope rty which the company 
rece ived f rom the Armour Packing Co . ( New Je rsey) in 1 90 0 . 
The c i rcle of  owne rship of Armour & Co . did not widen du ring the 
f i rs t  f i ve yea rs fol lowing its incorpo rat ion . Unt i l  1 9 0 0 ,  a s  des c ribed 
above , the f i rm was operated as a pa rtne rship consist ing of various 
membe rs of  the Armour family;  after the ret i rement o f  John P lankinton 
f rom the bus ines s ,  no non-fami ly membe rs were represented among the 
f i rm' s owners . 60 The original subsc ribers to the newly formed 
corporat ion ' s  capi t a l  stock numbe red only t hree : P . O .  Armour ( 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  
sha res ) ,  and Armour ' s sons , J .  Ogden ( 5 0 , 0 0 0  sha res ) and P .  D .  A rmou r 
Jr . ( 5 0 , 0 0 0  sha res ) . By 1 9 0 4  the circle of ownership had widened only 
s l ight ly to include the wife and sons of the decea sed P .  D .  Armour J r . ,  
and the fami ly membe rs and est ates of decea sed fami ly members who had 
rece ived the company' s stock in exchange for the capital  stock of the 
Armour Pack ing Co . ( New Je rsey) . 6 1  
The inc o rporat ion of  Armour & Co . gave r i se to a series of changes 
in t he re lationship bet ween the new f i rm and a g roup of companies with 
wh ich it had a lways worked in c lose coope rat ion . Meanwh i l e ,  the 
co rpo rat ion' s rel a t i onsh ips with its subs idia ries were rest ruct u red, 
many of which had ea r l ier been ope ra ted as an integr a l  pa rt of  the 
pa rtnership . About the t ime of its inco rpo rat ion,  seve r a l  nomina l ly 
s9The expe r ience o f  Armour & Co . during the yea r s  fol lowing i t s  
inco rporat ion w a s  n o t  s ubstant i a l ly di f ferent f rom t h a t  o f  Swift & Co . 
dur ing the f i rst 2 0  yea rs following its incorpo ration . Howeve r ,  Armour 
& Co . s imply a ccumulated a la rge surplus at ra the r  than pay dividends 
and issued no new capital stock,  whe reas Swift & Co . cons istently paid 
dividends but is sued new stock in  roughly the same amount as  the 
dividends it pa id . The result for both compa nies was the same : the 
retu rn of the bu lk of  tota l net ea rnings to the respect ive bus inesses . 
"0Ga rf ield Reoo rt , p .  3 3 . 
6 ;Ga r f ie ld Repo rt , p .  2 9 1 . 
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independent subs idia ry companies were formed by Armour & Co . " fo r  the 
sake o f  conven ience, " each of wh ich was engaged in an act ivity that had 
earlie r  been conduct ed by the pa rtnership itsel f . 62 The most important 
of t hese were : the Armour Grain Co . (New Je rsey ) , capit a l i zed at $ 1  
mil lion , wh ich took over the elevator and gra in interes t s  o f  A rmour & 
Co . ;  Armou r & Co . (New Jersey ) , capitali zed at $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  which acqui red 
Armour & Co . ' s  dist ribution and ma rket ing network in the east and later 
acqui red the I l l inois corporation ' s newly const ructed Fort Worth and 
Sioux City slaughtering facilities ; and, the Armour Car Lines (New 
Jersey ) , capit a l i zed at $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  which acqu ired the partnership ' s 
ent i re re f r ige rator car fleet . 63 Ot her impo rtant s ubsidi a ries which 
cont inued to be owned and ope rated di rectly by Armour & Co . were the 
Armour Fe rtil izer Wo rks ,  t he Armour Soap Wo rks , the Armour Glue Wo rks 
and t he A rmour Cur led Hair and Felt Works . 6� 
The s ubsidia ry companies in the fo rme r g roup which were " spun o f f "  
f rom t h e  pa rtne rship came to be owned and cont rolled th rough the agency 
of the individual sha reholders of Armour & Co . ( I l l inois ) , each of whom 
assumed a propo rt ionate sha re of owne rship in t he s ubsidi a ry that was 
ident ica l to the propo rt ion of his ho ldings in Armour & Co . 
( I l l inoi s )  . 6 ' Despite the i r  lega l sepa rateness,  the a ccount s o f  the 
subs idiaries cont inued to be carr ied on the books o f  Armour & Co . 
( Il l inoi s )  and their annual earnings added to the prof its o f  the pa rent 
62Ga rf ield Repo rt , p .  3 3 . 
63Ga rfield Repo rt , pp . 2 7-35 . The prope rty o f  t he Armou r Car Lines 
and Armour & Co . ( New Jersey) g reat ly exceeded in value the stated va lue 
of their respect i ve capital izat ions . In each case,  t he t ransfer o f  
property between Armour & Co . and t h e  subs idia ry seems to have been 
accomplished by way of a " loan" from Armour & Co . ( I l l inois ) . Whi le 
t itle  t o  t he prope rty wa s t ransferred to the s ubsidiary,  a c redit to the 
subsidiary for the full  value of the cars and dis t r ib��o rs hips was 
c reated by Armour & Co ( I l l inois ) , which took t he place o f  the 
t ransferred p rope rty on the books of  the pa rent company . 
�Ga r field Report ,  p .  2 8 . 
6�Ga r f i..:!ld Report , p .  3 3 . 
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company . Compan ies in t he latter group, a l l  o f  which we re engaged in 
t he manufacture o f  i tems f rom the by-products o f  beef slaughtering ,  were 
independent in name only, and were not separately incorpora ted ; the 
company names were me rely product t rade names . 66 
The Armour P acking Co . (New Jersey) , which became a subs idia ry of 
Armou r & Co . ( I l l inoi s )  sho rt ly after t he latte r ' s incorporat ion,  had 
conducted bus iness as  an independent corporate organi z a t ion s ince its  
format ion in 1 8 9 3 . Although owned and ope ra ted by t he branch o f  the 
Armour fami ly that res ided in Kansas City, the Armour Packing Co . 
usua lly worked in close cooperat ion with Armour & Co . E>l The informa l 
community of inte rest that existed bet ween t he t wo companies before 
1 9 0 0 ,  ba sed ent i rely on fami ly t ies , was forma l i zed du ring the months 
fol lowing the inco rpo rat i on of Armour & Co . ( I l l inois ) in a ma nne r 
s imi l a r  t o  t hat used in ef fect ing other me rge rs du ring the pe riod . 
A port ion of the stock received by the pa rtners in Armour & Co . in  
exchange for t he pa rtne rship ' s  assets wa s exchanged f o r  t he ent i re 
capital  stock o f  t he New Jersey corpo rat ion , which was held in i t s  
ent i rety by t h e  Ka nsas City branch o f  the Armour fami l y . The former 
stockho lders o f  t he New Jersey corporat ion we re assured by P .  D .  Armour 
that the lat t e r  company wou ld cont inue to ope rate as be fore ,  though 
unde r the di rect auspices of both sides of the Armour tami ly . 68 The 
owne rs of t he stock of the Armour Packing Co . t hus surrende red t he i r  
stock in i t s  ent i rety to P .  D . ,  J .  Ogden and P h i l l ip D .  Armour J r  . .  
Those indiv�duals t hen t ransfe r red t i t le t o  the prope rty be longing t o  
t he New Jersey corporation t o  the I l linois corporat ion wh i le leaving t he 
66Ga rfield Reoort , p .  2 9 2 . 
67Gar f ield ReEo rt , p .  2 9 1 . 
68Gar f ield Repor t , p .  3 3 . 
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former company lega l ly intact . 69 No cash changed hands du ring t he 
consol idat ion of the two concerns . 
Armour & Co . ' s  i nves tments in stockya rds appears t o  have been more 
l imited than those of Swift & Co . While a l l  t he company' s stockya rd 
interest s  appear  to have been acquired in the f o rm of "gi f t s "  f rom the 
stockyard companie s ,  t he re was no regula rity in how t he company ' s  
s t ockyard investments we re owned and managed . The f i rm' s investment in  
the Union Stockya rds o f  Oma ha was held by Armour & Co . ' s  s t ockholders as 
individua l s ,  wh i le sha res in the Fort Worth St ockya rds Company we re held 
by Armour & Co (New Jersey) . Some stockya rd investment s were j ointly 
he ld;  t he company ' s  investment in t he Kansas City S t ockya rds Company was 
con t ro lled by bot h  the Armour Packing Co . and several membe rs of t he 
Armour fami ly as  i ndividuals . 70 As was t rue o f  Swift & Co . ,  a l l  of 
Armou r & Co . ' s  inves tment in stockya rd compan ies appears t o  have been 
pu re ly f inanci a l  in nature , acqui red as a result of s t ock bonuses and 
gift s ;  no operationa l advant age appears t o  have acc rued to Armour & Co . 
du ring this  pe riod as a result of the i r  backwa rd integrat i on into 
l ivestock ma rkets . 
Unfo rtunately,  Armour & Co . relea sed no info rma t ion to t he public 
rega rding the i r  f inanc i a l  st ructure prior t o  1 9 0 5 . 7 1 Several  gene ral 
inferences , howeve r ,  a re poss ible . As  wa s t rue of Swift & Co . ,  Armour & 
Co . appears t o  have grown more work ing capital intens ive as  t he i r  
ref r igerated bee f bus i ness inc reased in volume a n d  t he i r  by-products 
bus iness increased in scope and import ance . Whi le t he company' s net 
worth inc rea sed by a lmost four t imes bet ween 1 8 9 3-1 9 0 5 ,  t he numbe r of 
69Ga r f ield Report , p .  33 . 
70Ga rf ield Repo rt , p .  2 92 . For a detailed account o f  Armou r  & 
Co . ' s  v a r ious stockya rd investments see FTC , Repo rt on t he Meat Pack ing 
Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 3 .  
' 1The only quant i t at ive da ta which exists for t he company du ring 
t he period i s  t hat presented i n  Table 1 4  above rega rding e a rn i ngs , 
dividends and net worth . 
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s laughter ing plants acqu i red or const ructed me re ly doubled ove r t hat of  
t he ea r l ie r  pe riod . ' 7 This suggests t hat the volume of t he company ' s  
business , and hence its  reliance on la rge amounts of  working capi t a l ,  
w a s  expanding faster  than i t s  investment in plant a n d  equ ipment . 
Although , l i ke Swift & Co . ,  Armour & Co . undoubtedly made extensive use 
of short t e rm borrowings throughout the pe riod, its f i xed obligat ions do 
not appe a r  to have eve r become a burden, as suggested by the rapid rate 
o f  growth o f  t he company ' s  surplus . The company' s  capit a l i zat ion 
t he refore p robably conta ined a fai rly e f f icient mix of short t e rm and 
long t e rm liab i l it ies . 
There a re no indicat ions that Armour & Co . ' s  capita l i zat ion was 
excess ive ; i t s  t o t a l  capi tal  st ock of $ 2 0  mi l l ion reportedly wa s "a very 
conservative indica t ion of the actual resources of [ the ) 
corpo ra t ion . " ' 1 The c ompany ' s  secu rities we re backed not only by its 
substant i a l  s laughter ing c a pa c i t y ,  wh ich f rom 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 0 5  wa s repo rted t o  
have rema ined "among the la rge st i n  the world , " but a lso b y  its  la rge 
accumula ted surplus , and the ' 'debt " of its p rivate c a r  and dist ribut ion 
s ubs idia ries . 1� 
Morri s & Co . :  Profi t s  and Capi t a l i za t i on ,  1 8 90-1 9 0 5  
The dres sed bee f interests of the pa rtnership o f  Nel son Mo r ris & 
Co . we re acqu i red i n  1 9 0 3  by two newly fo rmed corporat ions : Mor r i s  & Co . 
(Ma i ne ) and the Fai rba nks Canning Co . ( I l l inoi s ) . Each was capitalized 
at S 3  mi l l ion at t he t ime of incorporat ion ; neithe r  had any bonded 
72FTC , Repor t  o n  the Meat Pack ing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Summa ry and Pt . 
1 ,  pp . 2 3 7  2 4 5 . 
73Ga r f ield Repo r t ,  p .  4 5 .  
74The obligation ca r r ied on the books o f  Armour & Co . in 
of t he Armour Ca r Lines a lone wa s " conse rva t ively" va lued by 
Commi s s ione r of Corpo rat ions at $ 1 0  mi l l ion dol l a r s  in 1 9 0 4 . 
Ga rfield Repor t ,  p .  4 5 . 
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t he name 
t he u .  S .  
See the 
indebtednes s . 7 ' The Ma ine corporat ion ope rated primarily as  a holding 
compa ny, while the Fa irbanks Canning Co . acqui red a l l  the packing house 
properties that had formerly belonged to Nelson Morris  & Co . and those 
that Morris bui l t  or acqui red a fter 1 9 0 3 . 16 The Maine corpora t ion held 
the ent i re capi t a l  stock of the Fai rbanks Canning Co . ,  a long with the 
capita l  stock o f  mos t  of the bus i nesses t hat we re f o rmerly a f f i l iated 
with Nel son Morris  & Co . The pa rtnership o f  Nelson Mo rris & Co . 
con t inued i n  exist ence through 1 9 0 5  largely as a matter  o f  convenience 
t o  the pa rtne r s ;  f rom 1 9 0 3  on it did not operate for profit a nd owned no 
p rope rty on its  own account . The only propert ies that appea red in its  
name we re those held in t rust for Morris & Co . (Ma ine ) and t he Fa i rbanks 
Canni ng Co . .  ' 7  
The consol idat ion o f  the dressed beef interests o f  t he Morris 
pa rtnerships unde r  the Fai rbanks Canning Co . and Mo rris & Co . in i t ia lly 
involved the t ransfer of t he assets of the pa rtnership t o  Morris & Co . 
The Fai rbanks Canning Co . was then formed t o  acqu i re t ae fixed a nd cash 
assets o f  Mo rris & Co . in exchange for the I l l inois corpo ra t ion ' s  ent i re 
$ 3  mil li on capi t a l  stock . The prope rt ies forme r ly owned by the 
partnership we re thus opera ted by the Fairbanks Canning Co . ,  which , 
th rough the owne rship o f  stock, was ent i rely under the cont rol of Morris 
& Co . The s t ock o f  Mo rris  & Co . ( with the except ion o f  severa l 
d i rectors sha res ) wa s he ld ent i rely by the members o f  t he pa rtnership o f  
Nelson Mo rris & Co . :  Ne l s on Mor r i s ,  Edwa rd Mo rris a nd I ra N .  Mo rris . 
Th rough 1 9 0 5 ,  the ci rcle of owne rship of  Morris & Co . cont inued t o  be 
7�FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 5 ,  p .  27 . 
76Ga rf ield Report , p .  3 0 6 . 
71Ga rfield Report , p .  3 0 6 . 
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l imited t o  t he Morris  fami ly members who belonged to the pa rtnership o f  
Nel son Morris & Co . 78 
No cash was paid in to ei ther of the incorporated busines ses by 
the stockholders at the t ime of the i r  forma t ion ; the ent i re paid in 
capi t a l i za t ion of The Fa i rbanks Canning Co . ( t he ope rat ing company) 
cons isted of t he accumulated surplus of t he Nel son Mo rris & Co . I t  i s  
not cert ain whether Morris & Co . ' s  ( the holding company ) $ 3  mil l ion 
capit a l izat ion was backed by anything other t han the capita l stock of 
t he Fairbanks Canning Co . ,  which i t  had acqu i red in excha nge for the 
assets of Ne lson Mor ris & Co . Like Armour & Co . ,  Mo rris & Co . issued no 
addit iona l stock f rom the t ime of i t s  incorporat ion th rough 1 9 0 5 ,  either 
in the form of stock div idends or in exchange f o r  addit ional funds f rom 
i t s  s t ockholders ; it was re l iant for increases in i t s  capit a l i zat ion 
solely on reta i ned ea rnings . 79 S ince its  stock was very closely he ld, 
Morris  & Co . merely accumu la ted a la rge surplus , and made no attempt to 
capi t a l i ze it  through further issues of stock . 80 
' "FTC , Reoo rt on the Meat Pack ing Indust rv, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 5, p .  2 7 . 
According to t his report , ne ither of the Mo rris owned corporat ions 
ma inta ined ba lance sheet s for the yea rs 1 9 03-1 9 0 8 . Mos t of the 
informat ion given above rega rding the init ial capi t a l i zat ion of t he 
companies and t he dist ribut ion of the stock o f  t he twc· co rpo rat ions 
dur ing t he t ransfer o f  the prope rty o f  the partnership to t he 
corporat i ons is de ri ved f rom informat ion contained i n  the FTC Repo rt 
c ited above . Unfortunately, that pa rt of the report which dea ls with 
the f inanc i a l  hist o ry of Mo rris & Co . ,  unl ike much o f  the rest of t he 
Repo rt , i s  not based on ve rified fact s ,  but rather on the supposit ions 
of the government officials  who worked to untangle t he financial  a f f a i rs 
o f  Morris  & Co . while the report was be ing compiled . 
'9All of Mo rris & Co . ' s  earnings were de rived f rom div idends payed 
on the capital stock of the Fa i rbanks Canning Co . and other subs idiary 
compa nies in which Mo r r i s  & Co . he ld a d i rect o r  indi rect interest . 
FTC , Repo rt on t he Meat Pack ino Industrv,  1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 5 ,  p .  27 . 
80No in forma t i on is avai lable rega rding the s i ze of the company' s  
a ccumula t ed surplus during 1 9 0 3- 1 9 0 5 ,  o r  for the yea rs prior t o  1 9 0 3  
when Mor ri s ' s ref rige rated bee f business was operated as  a partnership . 
I n  1 90 9 ,  however ,  the company ' s  surplus was repo rted to have been 
$2 0 , 22 9 , 0 0 0 ; by 1 9 1 8  it had grown to $ 52 , 822 , 0 0 0 . The reported surplus 
during this pe r iod probably understates t he t rue net worth o f  t he 
corporat ion due t o  ove rly conservat ive depreciat ion practices ; in  1 9 1 8  
i t  was w r i t ten up by $ 1 1 , 6 1 2 , 0 0 0 a s  a result o f  the reapp ra i s a l  of 
prope rty that had been pa id for without being t a ken ur-· on the company' s  
books as  a capita l expe nse . FTC,  Repo rt on the Meat P ack ing Indust ry, 
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The cont rol of  the Morris ' s  subs idiary businesses ( with  t he 
except ion o f  the i r  livestock and stockya rd interes t s )  was accompl ished 
th rough the agency of Mo rris  & Co . ,  which owned the ent i re capital stock 
of  the a f f i l i ated companies . In  this sense , t he Fairbanks Canning Co . 
may be t hought of  as  the pac king and slaughtering " subs idia ry"  o f  Morris 
& Co . Morris & Co . (New Jersey) , o rigina l ly capi t a l ized at $ 3  mi l l ion 
but reduced to $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  in 1 90 3 ,  operated most of the Mo r r i s '  1 1 3  
eastern branch dist ributorships ; its ent i re capit a l  stock was held by 
Morris & Co . (Ma ine ) . & l  The Morris Pack ing Co . ( I l l inois ) , which was 
s imi la rly cont rol led th rough Mo rris & Co . (New Je rsey ) , was incorporated 
to t ransact the Ge rman busi ness of  Mo rris & Co . The Morris  Car  Line s ,  
which ope rated the private re frigerator and livestoc k  cars of  Nel son 
Mor ris & Co . ,  was not sepa rately incorporated . 82 The stockya rd and 
l ivestock interests of  t he Morris ' s  were held by the Morris  fami l y  
membe rs as  individua ls . The Morris ' s  stockyard investments were 
reportedly acqu i red di rect l y  for cash by the fami ly,  rathe r t han being 
given as compensat ion for the establ ishment of s laught � ring facilit ies 
in t he vicinity of a pa rt icular  stockya rd . � � 
The Cudahy Packing Co . and the Schwa rzch i l d  & Sul zberger Co . : 
Capi t a l i za t i on and Profi ts, 1 890-1 905 
The f inancial  histo ries of  the two packing fi rms that j oined the 
ranks of  la rge dres sed bee f  shippe rs du ring the 1 8 9 0 s  are s imi l a r  to 
those of  Armour & Co . ,  Mo rris & Co . and Swift & Co . The initial  
1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 5 ,  pp . 27- 3 0 . 
8 'Ga rfield Reoort , p .  3 7 ,  p .  307 . 
82Ga r f ield Reoo rt , p .  307 . 
8 3The Mor r i s  fami l y ' s only known stockyard company investments as  
of 1 9 0 4  cons is ted of  Edwa rd Morri s ' s pe rsona l holdings in t he St . Louis 
National Stoc kya rds and t he fami ly' s investment in the St . Joseph 
Stoc k ya rd Co . As was t rue of Armour and Swift , these re lat ive ly l imited 
holdings in stoc kya rd compan ies appear to have been unde r t a ken for the i r  
f inanci a l  rewa rds , rather than t o  secu re a n  operat iona l advantage 
t hrough cont rol of a raw mate rial source . Ga r f ield Report , p .  307 . 
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capita l i za t ions of  t he Cudahy Packing Co . and t he Schwa r zchi ld & 
S u l zbe rge r Co . grew du ring the course of  a few years to enable the 
acquisit ion or const ruct ion of several la rge midwestern s laughtering 
f ac i l ities ,  f leets of  private re f r igerator cars , and a cons iderable 
numbe r of branch dis t ributo rships in the east and midwest . Both 
companies were reliant a lmost solely on ret a ined earn ings and sho rt term 
borrowings t o  finance their growth during the early pe riod of  the i r  
development ; neither made signi f icant use of  cash cont ribut ions f rom 
stockholders . As t he vo l ume of thei r bus iness increased, bot h companies 
became increas ingly work ing-capital intens ive . A greater proport ion o f  
the long t e rm funds that were reinvested i n  the bus inesses thus were 
capit a l i zed in the form of  quick,  rather than f ixed , asset s . 
The pa rtne rship of Schwa r zchild & Sul zberge r was founded in 1 8 5 3 ,  
and ope rated a medium-si zed s laughtering fac i l ity i n  New York unt i l  
1 8 9 3 . The Schwa rzchi ld & Sul zbe rge r Co . was incorporated in 1 8 93 i n  New 
Yor k ,  when it acqu ired a l l  the assets of the pa rt nership . The new 
corpo ra t i on had an authori zed capital stock of $5 mil l ion,  of  which 
$ 4 , 3 7 3 , 0 0 0  had been issued by 1 9 0 4 . 84 P rior to 1 8 9 3 the company had 
conducted all its bus ine ss f rom its New York s laughtering fa c i l it y . 
Short l y  a fter  its incorpo rat ion , the company acqui red t he plant of  the 
Phoenix Packing Co . in Ka nsas City,  along with its f leet o f  
approxima tely 1 , 0 0 0  ref rige rat or ca rs,  which it  cont inued to operate 
under the name o f  the Cold Blast Transportat ion Compan y . I n  1 9 0 1  the 
company bu ilt a second plant in Chicago . 8 � By 1 9 0 5 ,  t l :e Schwa rzchild & 
Sulzberger Co . cont rol led at least 67 branch dist ribution f ac i l i t ies , o r  
sl i ghtly  l e s s  t h a n  t en pe rcent of t h e  total  number of  branch houses that 
u FTC , Reoo rt on the Meat Pack ing Indus t ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 5 ,  p .  2 9 .  
Schwa rzch i ld & S u l zbe rge r Co . became Sul zbe rge r & Sons Co . in  1 9 1 0 ,  and 
wa s reorgani zed a s  Wi lson & Co . ,  Inc . in 1 9 1 6 . 
85Ga r f ield Repo rt , p .  3 8 . 
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we re reported t o  have been owned by the big five a t  the t ime . 86 Table 
1 8  summa rizes the f inancial hist ory of  the company dur ing the f i rst 
twelve yea rs o f  its  l i fe . 
The Company ' s  init ial cash inves tment was a lmost ce rtainly derived 
f rom the pa rtnership' s cash surplus,  and it was reported as "doubt f u l "  
t h a t  any new c a s h  was pa id i n  to t h e  company at t h e  t ime o f  
incorpo ra t ion . 81 Most of  the company' s in itial  pa id in cap i t a l  was used 
t o  acqu i re the Kansas City packing plant and re f r igerator cars o f  t he 
Phoeni x  Packing Co . The ent i re growth in the company ' s  net worth during 
1 8 9 3-1 9 0 5  resulted f rom profits t hat we re retu rned t o  the bus iness and 
added t o  surplus reserves ; th roughout the pe riod, an annual ave rage o f  
e ighty percent o f  total  reported profits we re ret u rned to the bus iness 
by its owne rs . Of  the total volume of  profits ea rned during the period, 
ove r 5 7 %  we re reportedly added to the f i rm' s surplus account . 88 By 
1 90 5 ,  Schwa rzchild & Sul zberger' s surplus had grown f rom less than s ix 
percent o f  its  total paid in capitalizat ion to a sum a lmost $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0  
greater than i t s  total capital stock . 
The company' s  abi lit y  to withhold regu lar dividend payments was 
a ided by the s i zable ma jor ity of stock t hat wa s held by leading o f ficers 
and di rect ors . Although Schwa rzchild & Sul zbe rge r Co . stoc k  was more 
widely held t han that of any ma jor dressed beef dist ributo r  with the 
exception o f  Swift & Co . ,  by 1 9 02 only 1 8 . 2 % of  t he company' s  shares had 
8&FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Pack ing Indust rv, 1 9 1 9 ,  Summary and P t . 
1 ,  p .  1 5 3 . It i s  not clear to what extent t he pa rtne rship of  
Schwa rzchild & Sul zbe rge r engaged in the establ ishment of  branch 
dist ributorships prior to 1 8 9 0 . Between 1 8 90-1 9 0 5  t he company 
establ ished 67 new branch distribut orsh ips . 
8'FTC ,  Report on t he Mea t Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 5 ,  p .  2 9 .  
8 8 I t  is not certain prec isely how to account f o r  t he rema inde r o f  
the f i rm' s p ro f i t s  during the pe riod . The company pa id out s l ight ly 
less t han ten pe rcent of  total reported earinings a s  dividends during 
t he period,  yet only 5 7 %  of  total repo rted ea rnings we re added to the 
f i rms surplus account . Th is leaves the disposit ion of s l ight l y  less 
than one-qua rt e r  of the f i rm' s net earnings unaccounted for . 
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TABLE 1 8  
F INANC IAL H I STORY OF THE SCHWARZCH I LD & 
SULZBERGER CO . 1 
1 8 9 4 - 1 9 0 5  
( a l l  f igures in t housands ) 
YEAR P ROFIT DIVIDEND STOCK SURPLUS NET WORTH 
1 8 9 4  1 6 3 $ 1 7 5  $ 4 ,  4 3 4  2 6 0  $ 4 , 6 9 4  
1 8 9 5  3 6 3  1 7 5  4 , 375  2 4 8  4 , 623  
1 8 9 6  3 6 4 87 4 , 375 4 3 5  4 , 8 1 0  
1 8 97 4 0 1  1 3 1  4 , 3 7 3  7 1 1  5 , 0 8 4  
1 8 9 8  7 1 0  0 4 , 3 7 3  9 8 2  5 , 3 5 5  
1 8 9 9  927  0 4 , 3 7 3  1 , 6 9 2  6 , 0 6 5  
1 9 0 0  7 1 9  0 4 , 3 7 3  1 , 6 1 9  5 , 9 9 2  
1 9 0 1  1 , 0 5 9  0 4 , 3 7 3  1 , 3 3 8  5 ,  7 1 1  
1 9 02  9 0 2  0 4 , 3 7 3  2 , 3 97 7 , 1 7 0  
1 9 0 3  8 0 5  0 4 , 3 7 3  3 , 2 9 9  7 ,  672  
1 9 0 4  7 0 1  0 4 , 3 7 3  4 , 1 0 3  8 , 4 7 6  
1 9 0 5  5 1 1  1 6 4  4 , 3 7 3  4 , 6 4 5  9 , 0 1 8  
TOTAL 7 , 625  732  4 , 3 2 4 *  
NOTE : D I VIDEND = repo rted dividends . ,.. = the t o t a l  change in NET 
WORTH during 1 8 9 4 - 1 9 0 5 . These f igures a re exac t ly as  printed in the 
Repo rt c ited be low . I t  is not c lear why tot a l  net pro f i t s  minus 
dividends for the pe r iod a re grea ter than the t o t a l  ch�nge in the 
company ' s  net wort h . Dur ing a number o f  yea rs , 1 9 0 0 ,  for inst ance , 
ea rn ings were pos i t ive and no dividends were pa id, yet the company ' s  net 
worth was repo rted to have been less at the beginning of the subsequent 
yea r  ( 1 9 0 1 )  than at the beginning of  the previous yea r .  No explana t ion 
wa s offered a t  the time for this and other s imilar  anoma l ies . 
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SOURCE : FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Pack ing Indu s t ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 5 ,  p .  
272 
been distributed out s ide the company' s  narrow circle of  high corporate 
o f f icials . 89 
As wa s t rue o f  the other large dres sed bee f  shippers , t he 
Schwa rzchi ld & Sul zberge r Co . established a number of  subs idiary 
companies to pe rform func t ions which could more conven iently be car ried 
out by sepa rate,  nomina l l y  independent businesses . Due to prohibit ions 
aga inst New York corporat ions owning stock in other corpora t i ons , each 
company was owned in the interest of the pa rent company by Schwa r zchild 
& Sul zberge r ' s stockholders as  individua ls . The p ro f i c s  of  t he 
subs idi a r ie s ,  howeve r ,  we re t rans ferred in their  ent i rety to the 
Schwa r zchild & Sul zbe rge r Co . ,  upon whose annua l s t atement s  t hey 
regularly appea red . �' 
Four companies,  each with  capi t a l i zat ion ranging f rom $ 5 , 0 0 0  to 
$ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  we re sepa rately incorporated during 1 8 9 9 -1 9 0 4  t o  ope rate 
Sul zberger & Schwa rzchild' s branch dist ribut ion fac i l i t ies in Alabama , 
Missou r i ,  New Je rsey and Ohi o .  The stock o f  each subs idia ry company was 
appa rent ly pu rchased with funds t rans ferred to the individua l  pu rchaser 
by the Schwa rzchild & Sul zbe rge r Co . 91 The Cold Blast T ransportat ion 
Company, with an authori zed capitalizat ion o f  $ 7 5 0 , 0 0 0  of  which only 
$250 , 7 0 0  was is sued , operated the private re f r igeratol  cars of  the 
Schwa rzchild & Sul zbe rge r Co . The company' s f leet of ref r igerator cars,  
which numbered about 1 , 0 0 0 ,  was financed prima r i l y  through ea rnings 
rea l i zed by t he company th rough mi leage payments f rom t he rail roads for 
the use of  t he ca rs . � 
89Ga r f ield Repo rt , p .  38 . Of the ove r 4 3 , 7 0 0  sha res that the 
company had i s sued by 1 9 0 2 ,  approximately 3 5 , 7 0 0  we re he ld by corporate 
o f ficers and directors . 
9°FTC , Repo rt on t he Meat Packing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 5 ,  pp . 2 8 -2 9 . 
9 1Ga r f ield Repo rt , pp . 2 9 6-2 97 . 
92Ga rfield Report , p .  2 9 7 . The Cars we re va lued on t he company ' s  
books a t  $ 8 0 0  apiece . The repl acement cost pe r c a r  wc�ld p robably have 
been highe r . See above , this chapte r .  
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Schwa r zchild & Sul zbe rge r had only t wo other a f f i l i ates , one o f  
which w a s  o rgani zed earlier t o  t ransport cat t le f rom western ma rket s t o  
the New York sl aughte ring fac i l ity,  and the other to ma nufacture glue in 
Kansas City . Schwa rzchild & Sul zberger managed t he forme r th rough 
cont rol of its ent i re capital stock, and owned a cont roll ing int e rest in 
the latte r . 93 Schwa r zchi ld & Sul zberger had no reported stockyard 
investments prior t o  1 9 0 5 . 
Ve ry l i t t le informa t i on is avai lable regarding the company' s 
f inanc ial s t ructure prior to 1 9 0 5 . S imple balance sh��ts were released 
by Schwa rzchild & Sul zbe rge r for the years 1 9 0 3  and 1 9 0 4 ,  and a re 
presented in Table 1 9  below . The compa ra tive ba lance sheets for 1 9 0 3  
and 1 9 0 4  show quick assets t o  have surpas sed f ixed assets i n  total  
import ance in 1 9 0 3 ,  a l though this  had not proceeded t o  t he same extent 
as  for some of the other la rge dres sed bee f sh ippers . Wh i le it is not 
pos s ible to dist inguish between short term bor rowings and amount s due 
other f i rms on the ba sis  of the above informat ion , it would not be 
unreasonable to suppose t hat the "accoun t s  payable " entry cons ists  
prima r i l y  of  short term commercia l pape r and ba nk borrowings . I f  t he 
ent i re f igure could be so counted the company ' s  rel iance on short term 
borrowings re lat ive t o  total  labi lit ies wou ld have been a lmost identical 
to that o f  Cudahy & Co . ,  the other late ent rant to the re f rige rated beef 
indust ry ,  du ring 1 9 03-1 9 0 4 . La rge r ,  bet ter establi shed companies such 
as  Swift  & Co . ,  appear to have been less reliant on short term 
borrowings at  this t ime than their smalle r ,  less wel l  established 
counterpa r t s . • •  
93Ga r f ield Repo rt , p .  2 97 . 
94The proport ion of  short term bo rrowings to tot a l  l iabi l i t ies was 
approximately 4 0 %  in 1 9 0 3  for bot h Schwa rzchild & Sul zbe rger and Cudahy 
& Co . ,  and approxima tely 2 7 %  for Swift & Co . The f igu re for Schwa rzchild 
& Sul zbe rger overst ates t heir rel i ance on short term borrowings s ince it 
includes accounts payable ,  which, for the other packers for which 
f igures a re ava i lable, usua llv amounted to about 1 0 %  0f short term 
borrowings . 
· 
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ASSETS 
TABLE 1 9  
COMPARAT IVE BALANCE SHEETS FOR THE 
SCHWARZCH I LD & SULZBERGER CO . ,  
1 9 03-1 9 0 4  
1 9 0 3  1 9 0 4  
Rea l  Estate & Machinery $ 4 , 9 4 5 , 8 7 5  $ 5 , 1 3 9 , 3 8 0  
I nventories 3 , 8 8 7 , 9 62 3 , 8 1 7 , 0 62 
Cash and Debts Receivable 3 , 0 9 6 , 622 4 , 8 3 7 , 7 0 2  
Misce l laneous 65 4 , 3 7 4  
LIAB I L I T IES 1 9 0 3  ' 1 9 0 4  
Capit a l  Stock 4 , 3 7 3 , 3 95 4 , 3 7 3 , 4 0 0  
Account s Payable 4 , 9 1 2 , 8 67 5 , 4 7 7 , 5 0 9  
Surplus 3,  2 9 8 ,  572 3 , 9 4 3 , 1 9 8  
NOTE : "Miscel laneous " covers the value of  the f i rm' s p rivate 
re f rigerat or cars in 1 9 0 3 ;  it is not clear unde r which , if any, heading 
this item was carr ied in 1 9 0 4 . 
SOURCE : Ga r f ield Repo rt , p .  4 9  
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As would be expected given the company' s l imited c i rcle o f  
owne rship, Schwa rzch i ld & Sul zbe rger does not appea r t o  have been 
ove rcapi t a l i zed . The fixed as set ent ry was bac ked by �he compan y ' s 
s laught ering pl ant s i n  New Yor k ,  Chicago and Kansas City,  a l l  of which 
were quite la rge . 9; By 1 9 0 4  the company had a l so managed to accumulate 
cash and other l iquid as set s va lued in excess o f  i t s  ent i re is sued 
capita l  stoc k . In addit ion , alt hough it is not clear precisely how ( o r  
i f )  t h e  assets o f  t he subs idiary companies appea red on t h e  books o f  the 
Schwa rzchild & Sul zbe rge r Co . ,  thei r p roperty should prope rly be 
cons ide red to be behind t he capital izat ion of t he pa rent company as  
wel l .  96 
The Cudahy Packing Co . wa s organi zed in 1 8 8 8  as t he Armour -Cudahy 
Packing Co . ,  and cap i t a l i zed at $75 0 , 0 0 0 ,  a l l  common stock . 97 The 
company' s f i rst slaughtering faci l ity was located in South Omaha , 
Nebra ska ; bet ween 1 8 9 0- 1 9 0 5  the company ( renamed the Cudahy Pack ing Co . 
in 1 8 9 0 )  acqu i red addi t iona l sl aughtering fac i l i t ies in Kansas City,  Los 
Angeles and Sioux C i t y ,  Iowa . In addit i on ,  by 1 9 0 4  the company had 
establi shed approximately 1 0 0  branch dist ributo rships , mos t of which 
were located in the south and wes t ,  and an extens ive f leet of 
ref rigerator ca rs . 98 
')Garf ield Repo rt , pp . 4 9-50 . 
96The re frige rator cars of the Cold Blast Transportat i on Company 
appea red on the company ' s  books as  a "mi sce l laneous " asset i n  1 9 0 3 ,  but 
disappea red unde r that ent ry in 1 90 4 . I t  is not c lea r i f  they appea red 
under another heading du ring that yea r .  See t he Garfield Report , pp . 
4 9- 5 0 . 
9 1Ga rfield Report , p .  37 ; Yeage r,  p .  1 1 6 . Michael and Edwa rd A .  
Cudahy had been as sociated with Armour for about f i fteen yea rs prior to 
t he establi shment of the Armou r-Cudahy Packing Co . Michael Cudahy was 
made a full  pa rtner in t he f i rm of Armou r & Co . in 1 8 7 5 ,  several years 
a fter  having moved to Chicago f rom Milwaukee t o  become supe rintendent of 
Armou r ' s new Chicago s laughtering fac i l ity . Edward Cudahy j oined Armou r 
& Co . in 1 8 7 7 ,  f i rst as  a l ivestock buye r ,  then as  manage r o f  one o f  
Armou r ' s branch dist ributo rships , and f ina l l y  a s  a n  assistant manager of 
plant operat ions in Chicago . Armour and t he Cudahy ' s  remained on good 
t e rms even a f ter Armour had withdrawn f rom the Armou r-Cudahy Packing Co . 
98Garfield Report , p .  37 . 
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O f  the company' s original is sue o f  stock, P .  D .  Armour ' s holdings 
tot a l led 2 , 3 5 0  out of a total 7 , 5 0 0  shares , with the ba lance t a ken by 
Michael and Edwa rd Cudahy . In 1 8 90 ,  a fter a disagreement between Armour 
and the Cudahys , du ring which Armour complained that the f i rm wa s "do ing 
t oo l a rge a bus iness for the territory, " Armour sold his  interest in  the 
company to t he Cudahy brothers , whereupon the f i rm was renamed t he 
Cudahy Packing Co . 99 
The financ i a l  history of the company is summa ri zed in Table 2 0 . 
The capital  stock o f  the company rema ined at $ 7 5 0 , 0 0 0  th rough t he end o f  
1 8 9 3 ,  when $2 , 7 5 0 , 0 0 0  i n  addit iona l stock was is sued aga inst the 
company' s accumula ted surplus o f  $2 , 2 4 5 , 0 0 0 ,  increas ing the f i rm' s total 
capit a l  stock t o  $ 3 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . At the end o f  1 9 0 1  an addi t ional $ 1 . 5  
mi l l ion div idend, payable i n  stock, wa s decla red aga inst the company' s  
accumulated surplus , and $2 mi l l ion in cumulative s ix pe rcent pre ferred 
stock is sued to t he stockholders for cash . 100 
The informa t ion presented above suggests t ha t  the company was 
highly re l iant on ret a ined earnings for f inancing increases in i t s  net 
worth du r ing t he f i rst eighteen years of its l i fe . The annual average 
o f  ea rnings retu rned to the bus iness was approximately 57 % ;  these were 
more or less spread even ly over the e ighteen yea r  pe riod, as the 
proport ion of total  earnings reta ined in the bus iness over the per iod 
wa s an a lmos t  identical 5 8 % . : 01 Of the total increase in the company' s 
"Ga r f ield Report , p .  37 ; Yeage r,  pp . 1 1 5 - 1 1 6 . 
: ooFTC , Repo rt on the Meat Pack ing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 5, pp . 32-33 . 
It is  not c lear why t he company chose to is sue both pre ferred and common 
stock in 1 9 0 1 ,  s ince the c i rcle of owne rship wa s st rictly l imited to t he 
Cudahy fami ly . Perhaps the Cudahy' s we re concerned about protect ing 
their cash investment aga inst the claims of  ot her c redi tors , a lt hough i t  
i s  unl ikely that t he preferred stock t ook precedence over the company' s 
short t e rm debt s .  
1 0 1The annual ave rage represents the average proport ion of  total  
ea rnings that we re retu rned t o  the bus iness each yea r  and is  de rived by 
averaging t he annua l retu rned earnings percentages th roughout the 
pe r iod . The total  proport ion of  earnings ret a ined in the business 
equals the rat io o f  the sum of  total ret a ined ea rnings and total 
ea rnings t h Loughout the pe riod . I f  the proport ion o f  earnings ret a ined 
277 
TABLE 2 0  
F I NANC I AL H I STORY OF THE CUDAHY 
PACKING co . I 1 8 8 8-1 9 0 5  
( a l l  figures in thousands ) 
YEAR PROFI T  DIVIDEND STOCK SURPLUS NW 
1 8 8 8  $ 5 0  $ 0  $ 7 5 0  $ 0  $ 7 50 
1 8 8 9  150  0 7 5 0  s o  8 0 0  
1 8 9 0 500  0 7 5 0  2 0 0  9 5 0  
1 8 9 1  825  0 7 5 0  7 0 0  1 4 5 0  
1 8 92 7 2 0  0 7 5 0  1 , 5 2 5  2 , 2 7 5  
1 8 9 3  8 0 0  8 0 0  7 5 0  2 , 2 4 5  2 , 9 9 5  
1 8 9 4  1 1 4  1 1 4  3 , 5 0 0  0 3 , 5 0 0  
1 8 9 5  3 0 0  3 0 0  3 , 5 0 0  0 3 , 5 0 0  
1 8 9 6  4 4 0  4 4 0  3 , 5 0 0  0 3 , 5 0 0  
1 8 97 2 7 5  2 7 5  3 , 5 0 0  0 3 , 5 0 0  
1 8 9 8  4 1 4  4 1 4  3 , 5 0 0  0 3 , 5 0 0  
1 8 9 9 6 90 6 9 0  3 , 5 0 0  3 0 0  3 , 8 0 0  
1 9 0 0  4 8 3  222 3 , 5 0 0  3 0 0  3 , 8 0 0  
1 9 0 1  8 0 3  1 2 0  3 , 5 0 0  1 , 5 0 0  5 , 0 0 0  
1 9 02  1 , 4 0 0  720  7 , 0 0 0  7 4 3  7 , 7 4 3  
1 9 0 3  1 0 3  0 7 , 0 0 0  1 , 4 2 3  8 , 4 2 3  
1 9 0 4  928  2 4 0  7 , 0 0 0  1 , 52 6  8 , 52 6  
1 9 0 5  882  120  7 , 0 0 0  2 , 2 1 4  9 ,  2 1 4  
TOTAL 9 , 8 7 7  4 ,  1 5 5  8 , 4 6 4 *  
NOTE : • = the t o t a l  ch ange du ring 1 8 8 8 - 1 9 0 5 . NW = net wort h . 
Beginning in 1 902 , STOCK includes $2 mi l l ion i n  s ix percent cumulat ive 
preferred stock ; 1 8 8 8 - 1 9 0 1  all  st ock is common stock . 
SOURCE : FTC , Repo rt on the Mea t  Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 5 ,  p .  
32 . 
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net worth t hat occu rred ove r the pe riod, about 6 8 %  came f rom ea rn ings 
reta ined in t he bus iness and later capita l i zed th rough the dec l a rat ion 
of  dividends payable in s tock . Another 2 4 %  was der i ved f rom the 
pre ferred s t ock is sue of  1 9 0 2 ;  the remaining eight percent resulted f rom 
t he i ssue o f  stock aga inst accumulated surplus that had a greater book 
value than t he surplus against which it was being issued . Fully 7 6 % o f  
the tot a l  growth of  Cuda hy & Co . ' s  equity du r ing 1 8 8 8 - 1 9 0 5  thus resulted 
f rom the capit a l i zat ion of earnings that were ret urned to the bus iness 
and added to surplus account . The company was even more highly re liant 
on i t s  own earn ings for the funding of  its g rowt h than t hese f igures 
indicate . I f  the $2 mi ll ion figure paid in to t he f i rm by the Cudahy 
brothe rs for t he pre ferred stock is sue of 1 9 02  is deducted from total 
dividends pa id th roughout the pe riod, and the rema in ing total dividends 
pa id by the compa ny applied in ident ical annual inc rements to the 
company' s repo rted pa id in capitalizat ion for each yea r  du r ing 1 8 8 8 -
1 9 0 5 ,  t he ave rage rate of  return on capital inves ted du ring the per iod 
approaches 7 . 2 % . This represent s a " reasonable " annua l rate o f  return 
on invested capi t a l  given the f igures that a re avai lable for t he other 
dressed beef shippe rs du ring the per iod . 1 01 The $2 mi l l ion pa id in t o  
the f i rm b y  the Cudahy' s i n  exchange for the $ 2  mi l l ion i ssue of  
preferred stock is sued may thus be thought of  as "ext raordinary" 
dividend payments that we re retu rned to the bus ine s s ,  i n  which case the 
growt h in the company ' s  equity th roughout the pe riod cdn be cons ide red 
in the bus iness  would have consistent ly decrea sed as ea rnings grew 
la rge r,  the average annual f igu re , s ince it  i s  not weighted by annual 
ea rn ings , wou ld have been far greater than the total  proport ionate 
earn ings f igure . 
: J?Deduct i ng the $ 2  mi l l ion paid into the f i rm by t he s tockholders 
in 1 9 02 from total dividends pa id throughout 1 8 8 8 - 1 9 0 5  leaves $2 , 1 5 5 , 0 0 0  
i n  t o t a l  dividends pa id during the 1 8  yea r pe riod . This amount s t o  
$ 1 1 9 , 7 2 0  average yea rly dividends . I f  left undis counted , and applied to 
the d i f fe rent va lues o f  the company' s tot a l  capital  stock reported 
throughout the period ,  the annual average ret u rn would equal 7 . 2 % . Due 
to relat ive regula r it y  of dividend payments ( t hey were not "bunched" at 
either end of t he pe riod) it is not unreasonable to u se undiscounted 
annual dividend estimates in the above ca lculat ion . 
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to have been ent i rely financed by the reinvestment of  ea rnings in excess 
of a " reasonable"  re turn on the company' s pa id in capit a l i zat ion . 
The Cudahy Pack ing Co . ' s  stock rema ined ve ry c losely held through 
1 9 0 5 . 1 03  The f i rm' s initial $75 0 , 0 0 0  st ock is sue was dist ributed among 
only t h ree individua ls : P .  D .  Armour ,  Michael Cudahy and E .  A .  
Cudahy . 104 After 1 8  9 0 ,  when Armour ' s  inte rest in t he f i rm was purchased 
by t he Cudahy ' s ,  cont rol of  the f i rm pas sed ent i re ly into t he hands o f  
t he Cudahy family . Michae l and Edwa rd Cudahy, the f i rms chief 
s tockholde r s ,  had themse lves appointed annua lly to the pos it ions of 
pres ident and vice-pres ident through 1 9 0 5 ,  and a lso held t wo of the 
Company' s three di recto rships du ring the pe riod . 1 0 "  
The Cudahy Pack ing Co . did not ma ke extens ive u se of  subs idia ry 
companies to organ i ze the i r  t ransportat ion and dist ribut ion systems , nor 
did t hey attempt to gain control of  other companies in related 
indust r ies t h rough stock owne rship . The f i rm used on ly t wo a f f i l iated 
companies to operate branch di str ibut orsh ips in a reas whe re it was more 
"conven ient " to do so us ing sepa rate corporat ions . 1 0 6  The t o t a l  capit a l  
stoc k  of  each a f f i l iate was held by the stoc kho lders c f  the Cudahy 
Packing Co . a s  individua l s . The Cudahy Packing Co . ' s  private 
re f rigerator car l ines we re not ope rated as  a sepa rate corpo rat ion ; 
the i r  asset � ,  labi l i t ies and ea rnings a l l  appea red on t he same set of 
books as  t hose o f  the Cudahy Packing Co . itse l f . 1 07 The company had an 
interest in only one li vestock facility,  the S ioux City St ockya rds 
:03FTC , Report on the Meat Pack ino Indust rv, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 5,  pp . 32-3 3 . 
The Cudahy fami ly owned the ent ire company th rough 1 9 1 5 ,  when a new 
policy wa s adopted to encourage a wide r  dist ribut ion of the stock 
1 04FTC , Report on the Meat Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 5 ,  pp . 32-3 3 . 
mGa rfield Report , p .  2 9 6 . 
1 06Ga r f ield Reoo rt , p .  2 9 6 . The Cudahy Packing Co . ' s  two 
dist r ibut ion a f fi l iates we re incorporated in Lou is iana and Alabama , each 
capit a l i zed at $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 ,  and ope rated the company' s sell ing agenc ies in 
Alabama , Lou isia na and Vi rginia . 
1 0 'Ga rf ield Report , p .  2 6 6 . 
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Company . The Cudahy Packing Co . received 2 , 5 0 0  sha res of  t he pre f e r red 
stock of t hat company at the t ime that its  pa cking house was const ructed 
in S ioux City as a bonus for  locating there . ' 08 
The Cuda hy Pack ing Co . released no informat ion t o  the public 
rega rding the i r  f inancial st ructure unt i l  1 9 02 . A compa rison o f  t he i r  
balance shee t s  for  1 9 0 2 ,  1 9 0 3  and 1 9 0 4  appears in Table 2 1 ,  and con f i rms 
a numbe r o f  the t endenc ies noted above for the other dres sed beef 
shippe r s ,  pa rt icu la rly an increas ing re l i ance on wor k ing capi t a l  and 
qui c k  assets relat ive to  f ixed assets and a hea vier reliance on short 
term bo r rowings to finance wo rk ing capit a l  requi rement s  than longer 
estab l ished dressed bee f sh ippe rs such as Swift & Co . Throughout 1 9 02-
1 9 0 4 ,  the Cuda hy Pack ing Co ' s quick assets tota l led approximately twice 
as  much a s  f ixed asset s . As was t rue o f  the other dressed beef shippers 
for which informa t ion is ava i lable, this resulted prima r i ly f rom l arge 
share of total  assets that the f i rm held in the form of inventories . 109 
Although the Cuda hy Pac king Co . made extens ive use o f  reta ined 
ea rnings to fund the i r  working capital  needs ( t he i r  f ixed investment 
represented only approximately 6 0 %  of total capit a l i za t ion inc luding 
surplus ) ,  t hey cont inued t o  re ly heavi ly on short term borrowings . The 
sha re o f  t he company' s t ot a l  l iabi l i t ies accounted f o r  by bil l s  payable 
closely approx imated that of  Schwa rzchild & Sul zberge r ,  t he other late 
ent rant t o  the indus t ry,  and exceeded that o f  t he l a rg�r and more we l l  
1 08Ga r f  ield Repo rt , p .  2 9 6 . 
1 09Ga r f ield Report , p .  4 8 .  The Cudahy Packing Co . ' s  g ross sales 
varied f rom ove r $ 6 1 mi l l ion in 1 9 02 to a lmos t  $51 mil lion in 1 9 0 4 . The 
f i rm' s profits  on gross s a les va ried between 2 . 3% in 1 9 02  and 1 . 4 % in 
1 9 0 3 . These f igures a re compa rable to those reported by Swift & Co . 
over the same pe riod . The h igh rates of ret urn ea rned by the l a rge 
dressed bee f  sh ippe rs on the i r  capi t a l  stock (by which mos t  increases in 
capit a l i zat ion were funded)  we re dependent on a high volume o f  
throughput , which requ i red cont inuous la rge-scale l ives t oc k  pu rchases,  
the  ma intenance of  la rge inventories , and the rapid tu rnove r o f  h igh 
volumes of work ing capi t a l . 
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TABLE 2 1  
COMPARAT IVE BALANCE SHEETS FOR THE CUDAHY PACKI NG CO . ,  
1 9 02-1 9 0 4  
ASSETS 1 9 02  1 9 0 3  1 9 0 4  
Plant and Equipment $ 3 , 92 0 , 0 5 9  $ 4 , 3 0 8 , 5 0 8  $ 4 , 3 6 4 , 4 8 5  
I nvento ries 7 , 8 8 8 , 1 37 7 , 5 17 , 4 1 1  7 , 2 1 7 , 5 92 
Cash and Debt s Rece i vable 2 , 6 0 1 , 4 2 6  2 , 0 1 3 , 8 6 1 2 , 0 1 6 , 5 63 
Car Lines 62 8 , 9 1 3  6 1 9 , 3 5 8  8 4 3 , 3 9 9  
Stocks 1 0 8 , 7 5 0  1 0 8 , 7 5 0  1 0 8 , 7 5 0  
LIAB I L I TIES 1 902 1 9 0 3  1 9 0 4  
Stock $7 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  $7 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  $ 7 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
Account s  P ayable 6 9 0 , 1 6 0  3 0 9 , 5 0 9  4 3 6 , 3 3 9  
B i l l s  P ayable 5 , 3 1 4 , 4 8 4  5 , 7 32 , 8 0 0  4 , 6 6 0 , 9 0 0  
Surplus 2, 1 4 2 ,  6 4 1  1 , 5 2 5 , 5 8 1  2 , 4 5 3 , 5 5 0  
NOTE : The f igures given he re for surplus a re f rom end of  yea r 
report s ,  and thus include a l l  ret ained earnings f o r  t he relevant 
ca lenda r yea r .  They a re comparable to the surplus f igures presented in 
Table 17  for the subseouent ca lenda r yea r ,  wh ich show surplus rese rves 
at the beg inn ing ( a s  opposed to the end) of the ca lenda r yea r . There 
a re dif ferences be t ween figures presented here and in Table 1 7 ,  
pa rticula r ly conce rning t he surplus repo rted for 1 9 02  ( 1 9 0 3  i n  Table 1 7 )  
due t o  dif ferent account i ng methods employed by the agenc ies which 
tabulated them . 
SOURCE : Ga r field Reoort , p .  4 8  
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establi shed Swift & Co . during the yea rs for which compa rable f igures 
a re ava i lable , ranging between 32% in 1 9 0 4  and 4 0 %  in 1 9 0 3 . 1 1 0 
The Use of Credi t By the La rge Dressed Beef Shippers, 1 890-1 9 0 5  
While the increa sed volume of  t rade expe rienced by the large 
packers increased the i r  f ixed capit a l  requi rements in absolute t erms , a 
greate r  volume of  products moving more s lowly within increasingly l a rge , 
funct iona l l y  diverse f i rms inc reased t he impo rtance of  quick asset s ,  
pa rt icularly inventories,  re lative t o  f i xed assets within t he i r  
f inanc ial st ructu res . : 1 : As was also t rue du r ing 1 8 75- 1 8 9 0 ,  the 
propo rt ion o f  final receipt s that went for the cash purchase o f  
l ives toc k ,  and the la rge invent ories that the pa c kers we re forced to 
carry on thei r books for long pe riods , requi red t he use o f  high volumes 
of worki ng capita l .  Wh i le the pac kers were able t o  f inance a lmost a l l  
o f  their f i xed capital expendit ures through the use of  reta ined 
earn ings, the la rge l i vestock pu rchases and invent ories t hat their 
buas iness requ i red necessi tated hea vy re l iance on shor� t e rm bor rowings 
f rom commerc i a l  banks and in the commerc ial pape r ma rket . 1 1 2 But just  
as  the big f ive re l ied heavily on  retained earn ings t o  fund their long 
term capi tal requ i rement s ,  so too did they grow increasingly rel iant on 
ret a ined ea rn ings as  a s ource of working capit a l  during 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 0 5 . 
1 1 cSchwa rzchild & Sul zbe rge r ' s short term l i abi l i t ies ( inc luding 
accounts pa yable ) as  a propo rt ion of  tot a l  l iab ilit ies were 3 9 %  and 4 0 %  
during 1 9 0 3  and 1 9 0 4 ,  re spect ively . Swift & Co . ' s  short t e rm bor rowings 
as a proport ion of total l iabi lit ies were approximately 2 7 %  in 1 9 0 3 . 
1 1 1The s lowe r rate of  turnover o f  increas ingl y  la rge investment s  in 
working capit a l  among the big f i ve resulted f rom the increased 
impo rtance of items manu factured f rom by-products in  total  sa les , whi ch 
t oo k  l onge r t o  produce than edible beef . See FTC , Report on t he Meat 
Packing Indust ry, Summa ry and Pt . 1 ,  pp . 9 0 - 1 0 0 . 
' 1 2FTC , Report on the Meat Pack ing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Summa ry and Pt . 
1 ,  p .  9 5 ;  Palyi,  p .  6 4 . 
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Inf ormat ion is sca rce rega rding the ways in wh ich t he l i abi l i t ies 
of  t he la rge packers we re st ruc tured . 1 13 Seve ra l important 
gene r a l i z a t ions a re pos sible,  howeve r ,  us ing the info rma t ion presented 
above f o r  the Cudahy Packing Co . ,  t he Schwa rzchild & Sul zbe rger Co . and 
Swift & Co . 1 1 4 Inso f a r  as  it has been possible to determine , t he 
rel iance o f  The Cudahy Packing Co . and t he Schwa rzch i ld & Sulzbe rge r Co . 
on short term bo r rowings was qu ite s imi lar  during 1 9 0 2 - 1 9 0 4 ;  Swi ft & Co . 
appears to have re l ied less heavily  on short term c redit , a tendency 
that became increas ingly obvious throughout the pe riod . Table 2 2  shows 
short -t e rm bor rowings as a proportion of total l iabi l i t ies f o r  each o f  
t he t hree la rge dres sed beef shippers named above du r ing the yea rs f o r  
which f igu res a re available . 
The lowe r rel iance placed by Swift & Co . on short t e rm bo r rowings 
rel a t i ve to i t s  sma l le r  counte rpa rts wa s not a result of any ma r ked 
di f ference in their work ing capi tal  requi rements . Ra ther it  appea rs to 
have resu lted f rom Swift & Co . ' s , abi l i t y  t o  is sue long term debt in the 
form o f  bonds as  a substitu te for short term debt . I f  Swi ft & Co . ' s  
bonds out standing in each yea r a re added to t ot a l  b i l l s  payable , t he 
p roport ion of  t ot a l  liabilit ies accounted for by a l l  debt very c losel y  
approximates the f igures f o r  t he other two companie s ,  a l t hough it  
cont inues to display t he dec reas ing tendency noted above . m 
1 : 3The on l y  i n f o rma t i on that I was able t o  obtain on t he l iabi l it y  
st ructures of  the big f i ve has been presented above : 1 90 2 - 1 9 0 4  
compa rat ive balance sheets f o r  the Cudahy Packing Co . ,  1 9 0 3 - 1 9 0 4  
compa rat i ve ba lance sheets f o r  the Schwa rzchild & S u lzberge r Co . ,  and 
1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 5  compa rat i ve ba lance sheets for Swi f t  & Co . .  
1 14All informat ion upon wh ich the fol lowing obse rva t i ons has been 
based has been acknowledged above , un less otherwise noted, in t he 
sec t i ons des c r ibing the prof its and capita lizat ion o f  the t h ree f i rms 
being cons ide red here . The reade r should refe r to the relevant t ables 
in t he previ ous sect ions for citat ions . 
: : ;The proport ion o f  tota l debt to total  l iabi l i t ies f o r  Swift & Co . 
ranged f rom a high o f  4 2 i  in 1 8 9 8  to a l ow o f  2 8 %  in 1 9 0 4 . This 
resulted prima r i l y  f rom the $10 mi l l ion in stoc k  wh ich the company 
issued in 1 9 0 4 . 
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TABLE 22 
SHORT TERM BORROWINGS AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL 
LIAB I LIT IES FOR THE CUDAHY PACKING CO . ,  
SWIFT & CO . AND THE SCHWARZCHI LD & 
SULZBERGER CO . ,  1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 5  
F I RM  1 8 9 8 1 8 9 9  1 9 0 0  1 9 0 1  1 9 0 2  1 9 0 3  1 9 0 4  1 90 5  
Cudahy Packing Co . 3 5 %  
Schwarzch i ld & Sul zberge r 
Swift & Co . 3 3 %  2 0 %  2 5 %  2 5 %  2 5 %  
4 0 %  3 2 %  
3 9 %  4 0 %  
2 7 %  2 1 %  2 8 %  
NOTE : Short term bo r rowings for Schwa rzchild & Sul zbe rger include 
accounts payable . Percent age f igures represent b i l l s  payable /total  
l iabi l it ies for  each f i rm.  
SOURCE : Commercial and Financ ial Chronicle,  1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 5 ;  Ga rfield 
Repo rt ,  pp . 4 8 - 5 0 
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Just as t he total net worth (equity plus su rplu s i  of  the companies 
listed above e xpa nded by mo re , both proport iona l ly and abso lutely, than 
did their f ixed asse t s ,  so too did their short-term l iabi l i t ies grow 
less rapidly than t he i r  wo r king capit a l . In 1 9 0 4  t he quick assets 
appea ring on the books of  the Cudahy Pack ing Co . and t he Schwa rzchild & 
Sulzberge r Co . tota l led S 9 . 2  mi l l ion and $8 . 6  mi l l ion respect ive ly 
( including cash ) . At the same time, the i r  short t e rm bor rowings 
( inc luding accounts payable)  tota lled $ 4 . 6 6 mi l l ion ( for Cudahy) and 
$ 5 . 4 8 mi l l ion ( for Schwa rzchild & Sul zbe rge r ) . The rat io o f  cur rent 
assets to current l iabi l i t ies for each company during that yea r  was 1 . 5 6 
for Schwa rzchild & Sul zberger and 1 .  97 for  Cudahy & Co . .  1 1 6 Dur ing the 
same yea r ,  t he net worth of each company ( capi t a l  stock plus surplus ) 
was sufficient ly la rge to of fset 3 7 %  of  t he qu ick assets of  each a fter 
subt ract ing the va lue o f  f i xed assets . Du ring 1 8 9 8 -1 9 0 4  the wor king 
capital  employed by S w i f t  & Co . increa sed by over $20  mi l l ion wh i le 
current l iabi l i t ies grew by only about S 6  mi l l ion . Meanwhile,  ove r the 
same peri od, their net wo rth grew a lmost three t imes as  rapidly,  or by 
pract ica lly $20 mi l l ion more , than f ixed as set s . The rat io o f  current 
assets to current l iabi lit ies for Swift & Co . wa s a rat he r  high 2 . 17 in 
1 9 0 4 . 
These f i gures suggest that,  while the la rge packers found i t  
expedient t o  ma ke cont inued heavy use of short t e rm credi t ,  borrowings 
f rom ba nks and the iss uance of co��e rcia l pape r ma rket suppl ied a 
dec reas ing proport ion o f  the funds used by t he packer' s t o  finance the i r  
g rowing working capit a l  needs . As was doubly t rue o f  the f inancing of  
their f ixed capi t a l  requ i rement s ,  reta ined ea rnings ( by which mos t  
1 1 6Wh i le these rat ios appear ra ther low (a  va lue o f  " 2 "  i s  
cons idered s a f e  and prudent toda y) , it must be remembe red that t hese 
compa nies we re probably t oo sma l l  to issue long term debt and that a 
s ign i f icant proport ion o f  their bills payable probably cons isted of  
commercial pape r out standing ,  which was often renewed inde f initely . In  
any case,  both appear to have been considered f inanc i a l l y  hea lthy 
( Cudahy more so than Schwa rzchild & Sulzberge r )  a t  the end o f  1 9 0 4 . See 
Yeage r ,  pp . 1 1 6- 1 1 7 ,  pp . 122-125 . 
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increases in capi t a l  stock among the big five we re funded ) accounted for 
a s igni f icant and increas ing port ion o f  the financing of  t he la rge 
packers'  working capital requi rements . Th is t rend appears t o  have 
become most pronounced as the dressed bee f shippers ' f ixed capital 
requi rement s  dec l ined relat ive t o  working capit a l  requ i rement s ,  
releas ing internally gene rated funds that would othe rwise have been 
employed to f inance the extension or ma intenance of plant and equipment 
for other uses . 
The Formation and Financing of the National Packing Co . 
The Rol e of the Na t i onal Packing Co . 
By 1 9 0 5  t he interstate dressed bee f t rade had come to cons ist of 
six la rge f i rms : Armou r & Co . ,  the Cudahy Packing Co . ,  the Nat ional 
Packing Co . ,  Mor ris & Co . ,  the Schwa rzchi ld & Sul zbe rger Co . and Swift & 
Co . .  : : ,  The Nat iona l Packing Co . ,  incorpora t ed in New Jersey in 1 9 0 3  
and capi t a l i zed a t  $ 1 5  mi l l ion , wa s the last o f  the la rge interstate 
dressed beef shippers to commence ope rat ions . The f inanc ing and 
forma t ion of the Nat iona l Pack ing Co . ,  howeve r ,  occur red under an 
ent i rely diffe rent set of  ci rcumst ances than t hose which surrounded the 
format ion and f inancing of the f ive other la rge dressed beef sh ippers . 
Unl i ke the companies that compr ised the big f ive , t he Nat iona l Pack ing 
Co . wa s a holding-operat ing company wh ich owed its exi�t ence to a failed 
scheme of cons ol idat ion among the f ive large interstate dres sed bee f 
shipper s  dur ing 1 9 02-1 9 0 3 . When the movement t owa rd a gener a l  me rger by 
the big five was ha lted in 1 9 0 3  by the i r  f a i lure t o  secure adequate 
f inanc i a l  backing for the plan, a numbe r of  sma l le r ,  independent pa c king 
1 1 1Garfield Reoo rt , p .  xxi . Although t he six la rge packers named 
above we re respons ible for  only about fo rty-f ive pe rcent of t he total 
domestic beef s laught e r ,  approximately 98�  o f  a l l  the cattle k i l led in 
the eight leading western slaught ering centers pas sed th rough the i r  
pac k ing fac i l i t ies . 
2 8 7  
propert ies acqui red by the three largest packers in  anticipat ion o f  the 
planned consolidation we re o rganized as  the Nat i ona l Pack ing Co . 
The o rganizat ion o f  the Nat ional Pack ing Co . reoui red t he use of  
dif ferent f inancial techniques than those typic a l ly employed in the 
forma t ion o f  t he companies t hat comprised the indust ry in 1 9 0 3 . The 
met hods did, howeve r ,  bea r  a close resemblance t o t he met hods used by 
t he packers du ring t he 1 8 8 0 s  and 1 8 9 0 s  in coordina t ing the i r  
increas ingly di spe rsed and funct iona lly diverse subs idia r ies . Just as  
the c reat ion and exchange of  secur i t ies among businesses and individuals 
in the indust ry du ring its earlier period o f  development served to 
establ ish du rable f inanc ial and administ rat ive t ies among funct iona lly 
complement a ry f i rms , so too did the f inancial techniques employed by the 
packe rs in  the format ion of the Nat ional Packing Co . se rve to establish 
a commun ity o f  mutual f inanc ial interest within the indust ry as  a whole . 
The Nat iona l Pack ing Co . fell short of  establishing t he degree o f  
coordination and control ove r investment and product ion that would have 
been p rovided by a ful l-sca le conso l idat ion . I t  did, however,  provide 
t he la rge packe rs with both the means and incent i ve to coordinat e  t heir  
pric ing and produc t ion dec i s ions in  a more e f fect ive ,  durable manner 
than was po ss ible unde r the va r i ous pooling a r rangements that had been 
t ried earlier  and di sca rded . 
Early A t t empt s  a t  Coopera t i on :  The Al lerton and Veeder Pools 
The f i rs t  attempt at coopera t ion among the la rge dressed bee f 
shippers t ook the form o f  an informa l arrangement between G .  F .  Swift , 
P .  D .  Armour,  Nelson Mo r r i s ,  G .  H .  Hammond, and l ives tock shipper and 
hog packer S amuel Al lerton . Unde r this ag reement a poo l was o rgani zed 
to regulate mea t  shipment s into the northeast . The " Al le rton Poo l "  was 
to se rve as  a prot otype for the va rious pool ing a rrangements t ried by 
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the packers dur ing t he fol lowing decade . : : a  The " Al le rt on Poo l "  
co l lapsed unde r the weight of  heightened competit ion among t he 
establ ished dressed bee f shippe rs and the newcome r f i rm, t he Cudahy 
Packing Co . ,  du ring the onset of the dep ression of 1 8 9 3 . 1 1 9 
Fea ring the prospect of  a renewa l o f  unrest r icted compet i t ion 
during a pe r iod of gene ral bus iness depression ,  t he la rge dressed bee f  
sh ippe rs unde rtook a ma j o r  reorganizat ion o f  t he i r  f i rs t  pool dur ing 
May, 1 8 9 3 . Membe rship in t he new pool was enla rged to include t he 
Cudahy Packing Co . ,  t he Armou r Packing Co . of  Kansas City,  and the 
Mo rris cont rol led East St . Louis D res sed Bee f and P rovision Co . 1 20 The 
f i rst Veede r Pool was organ ized in 1 8 9 3  and consi sted of the f i rms named 
above . The poo l ing a rra ngement adopted by the members divided t he 
Un ited States into several dist rict s . 12 1  Each week representat ives o f  
t he member f i rms met , exchanged informat ion o n  sh ipments and prices 
rece ived du ring the preceding week, and decided how mu�h each could ship 
to va r ious ma rkets du r ing the fol lowing week . : n To enfo rce the 
agreement s ,  a series of f i nes and pena lt ies were enacted for fail ing to 
comply with shipment quotas set by the pool . : n  
Again,  t he establi shment of  a formidable new competitor  in 1 8 9 3 ,  
the Schwa r zchild & Sul zbe rge r Co . ,  threatened t he pools stability . By 
: 1 8FTC, Report on the Meat Pack ino Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 2 ,  p .  1 3 ;  
Yeage r ,  p .  1 1 3 .  
: : 9FTC , Reoo rt on the Meat Pack ino I ndust rv,  1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 2,  pp . 1 1 - 1 3 ;  
Yeage r ,  p .  1 1 7 . 
' 1°FTC , Report on the Meat Pack ing Indus t rv, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 2,  pp . 1 4 - 1 5 ;  
Yeage r ,  p .  1 1 7 . 
12 1The Na t iona l P rovisioner,  The S ignif icant S ixty, p .  7 9 ;  Yeage r ,  
pp . 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 .  The " Veede r Pool " was named a fter  a t t o rney Henry Veeder ,  
son o f  Albe rt Veede r of  Swift & Co . ,  and chief administrator  and 
o f f ic i a l  sec ret a ry of the pool ing associat ion . 
122The Na t iona l P rovis ione r,  The S ignif icant Sixty, p .  7 9 . 
1 73Yeage r,  p .  1 1 8 . For a det a i led account of  t he adminis t ra t ion of  
the "Veede r Poo l s " , see FTC , Reoo rt on the Meat Pack ing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  
Pt . 2 ,  pp . 1 4 - 1 9  and Yeage r ,  pp . 1 1 8 -128 . 
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1 8 9 5  that f i rm' s sha re of the ma rket had grown to such an extent t hat it 
dis rupted the wo rkings o f  the pool . u4 The second "Veede r Poo l "  was 
organi zed in 1 8 9 8 t o  a l low for the reasses sment of ma rket a l lotments as 
a result of  the admiss ion of  the Schwarzchild & Sul zbe rger Co . into t he 
pool . 12 � Whi le the earlie r  pool ing associations had proven di f ficult to 
en force and suscept ible to disrupt ion by new indust ry ent rant s ,  t he 
second "Veede r Poo l "  was weakened by forces f rom outs ide t he indust ry . 
The U .  S .  Supreme Court ' s  dec is ion in the Addyst on P ipe & Steel 
Case held that a l l  cartel devices , such as  the arrangement s used by t he 
la rge dressed beef shippe rs in o rgani zing the "Veeder Pool , " were 
i l lega l unde r the Sherman Ant it rust Act of 1 8 9 0 . 1 26 Furt:he rmore , du ring 
1 9 0 0 - 1 9 02 the rail roads began to acquire s ign i f icant numbers o f  
re f rigerat o r  cars , which faci lit ated the ent ry o f  new f i rms into the 
interstate dressed bee f t rade . Mo reove r ,  t he ra i l road reo rgan i zat ion 
movement of  t he late 1 8 90s had me rged a number of compet ing r a i l road 
l ines into a sma l l  number of  consol idated t ransport a t ion systems ,  thus 
increas ing the powe r of t he ra i l roads to ba rga in for h igher 
t ransport aion cha rges and lower mileage payment s  for t he use of t he 
packe rs ' ref r igerator cars . • n Finally, in Apri l ,  1 9 0 2 ,  t he second 
"Veede r Pool " wa s dissolved a f ter the U .  S .  Depa rtment o f  Just ice 
en j oined the packe rs to des i st f rom a l l  coll us ion in t he buying and 
sell ing of t he i r  products . · 1 ' 
1 24Yeage r ,  p .  1 2  4 .  
mYeage r ,  p .  1 2 5 . Schwa rzchild & Sul zbe rge r had repeatedly refused 
to coope rate wit h t he members of the f i rst "Veeder Pool . "  After two 
yea rs o f  uncont rol led competit ion du ring 1 8 9 6- 1 8 9 7 ,  howeve r ,  
representatives o f  the new f i rm expre ssed will ingne ss to come to te rms 
with the othe r  la rge dres sed bee f shippers . 
: 16U . S .  v .  Addys t on P ipe & Steel Co . ,  1 F . A . D . 6 4 1  ( 1 8 9 8 ) ; 1 7 5  
U . S . 2 1 1  ( 1 8 9 9 ) . See the discussion i n  Yeage r ,  pp . 1 6 0 - 1 6 1n . 
1 11Yeage r ,  p .  1 3 5 - 1 3 9 .  
' 28FTC, Reoort on t he Meat Pack ing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 2 ,  pp . 1 8 -1 9 ;  
Yeage r ,  p .  1 3 9 . 
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Prepara t i ons For the Forma t i on of the Na t i onal Packing Co . 
Wh ile the second "Veeder Pool"  wa s s t i l l  in operation, t he packers 
began planning for a fo rma l consol idat ion of  their re f r ige rated bee f 
interest s ,  undoubtedly given encou ragement by the la rge numbe r of  
indust rialist s who had aba ndoned informa l poo l ing associat ions s uch a s  
t he i rs f o r  fo rma l consol idat ion dur ing t he preceding decade . 1 2 9  F ive 
months a fter  t he death of P .  D .  Armour in Janua ry, 1 9 0 1 ,  G .  F .  Swift  
p resented a proposal t o  the pool membe rs that conta ined the foundations 
o f  a f o rma l conso lidat ion , which, according to the init i a l  agreement , 
was to be called the Na t i ona l Packing Co . . : 3c On May 3 1 ,  1 9 0 2 ,  J .  Ogden 
Armou r ,  G .  F .  Swift  and Edwa rd Mo rris signed a cont ract based on the 
init ial  ag reement proposed by Swift whe reby the i r  individual companies 
would be consol idated into a single enterprise . : 3 : The cont ract 
provided for t he c reat ion of  a new corporat ion to wh ich t he t h ree 
pa rt ies named above would t ransfer a l l  t he stock of the i r  packing f i rms , 
1 2�As noted in an earlier chapter,  the primary lega l impetus f o r  
f o rma l consolidat ion by way o f  the ho lding company device wa s p rovided 
by t he passage of the She rman Ant-T rust Act of 1 8 9 0 ,  which made the 
t rust f o rm of  consolidation " too risky to be of  much use , " and the 
revised New Je rsey Co rpo rat ion Law of  1 8 8 9 ,  which permit ted New Jersey 
corporat ions to own s tock in other f i rms . See , f o r  instance , El iot 
Jone s ,  The Trust P roblem in t he United States (New York : Macmi llan 
Company, 1 92 1 ) , pp . 395-3 9 8 . 
1 30A s ign i f icant part of  this account on the format ion and f inanc ing 
of the Na t iona l Pack ing Co . comes f rom t ranscripts of S t . of Mo . v .  
Hammond Packing Company and St  Lou is Dres sed Bee f  and P rovis ion Co . 
No . 1 6 0 9 0 ,  Joint Abs t ract of Record and T ransc ript o f  Evidence,  6 vols . 
( Swift  & Co . Archives ) ,  as  organi zed and cited by Mary Yeage r . Yeage r ,  
perhaps the leading his torian o f  the dres sed bee f indus t ry,  was g iven 
access to these reco rds by Swift & Co . ,  and c i tes them l ibera l ly in he r 
t reatment o f  t he f o rmat ion of  t he Nat ional Packing Co . in Ma ry Yeage r ,  
Competit ion and Regulat i on : The Development of  Ol igopo ly in t he Meat 
Pack ing Indus t ry (Greenwich, Connect icut : JAI P ress  I nc . ,  1 9 8 1 ) . 
Citat ions o f  t he work by Yeage r in this sect ion p rima r i l y  reflect her 
use of t hese t ranscripts . 
1 3 1 FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 2 ,  pp . 20-2 1 ;  
Yeage r ,  p .  1 3 9 . The cont ract which was signed on May 3 1 ,  1 9 0 2 ,  did not 
include Schwa rzchild & Sul zbe rge r or the Cudahy Pack ing Co . 
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including the stock and prope rt ies of subs idi a r ies t hat they owned and 
cont rol led as  individua ls . 1 32 
As compensat ion for the shares turned over to t he consolidat ion 
that were backed by tangible property, t he pac kers were t o  receive one­
half  payment in 4 1 / 2  pe rcent 20  yea r  gold bonds and one-half  in s ha res 
of  preferred stock in the new company ; this was to be distr ibuted in 
proport ion to the i r  cont ribut ion to the total tangible assets of the new 
company . l 33 In exchange for t he intangible assets of t he i r  companies , 
including expected fut ure ea rnings , the pa rt ies t o  t he agreement were to 
receive equal blocks of prefer red stock and common stoc k ,  the va l ue of 
which was to be equiva lent t o  2 5  t imes the ea rnings of  each company 
during some unspec if ied pe riod in the recent past . : 3r. The formula used 
to appo rt ion t he prefer red stoc k ,  common stoc k ,  and gold bonds was a lso 
appl ied to a prov is ion of  the agreement whe reby each of the t hree agreed 
to purchase '' for the use and benefit " of the new corporat ion t he shares 
of s tock o r  properties o f  other corporat ions engaged in the packing or 
the shipment of ref rigerated beef . 1 35 
In  accordance with the last provi sion of  the merge r cont ract , the 
compa nies that were to be acqu i red by the pa rt ies to t he consol idat ion 
' 32Yeage r ,  p .  1 3 9 .  f o r  a l ist o f  the prope rt ies t:1at we re to be 
turned ove r to the conso l i dat ion unde r the origina l agreement , see 
Yeage r,  p .  1 62n . 
mFTC , Reoort on the Meat Packing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 2 ,  p .  2 0 . As 
o f  August 2 ,  1 9 0 2 ,  t he tangible assets which were to be a cqui red by the 
consol idat ion were owned by the parties t o  the agreement in t he 
fol lowing proport ions : Swift , 4 6 . 7  pe rcent ; Armour ,  4 0 . 1 1 percent ; and 
Mor r i s ,  1 3 . 1 9 percent . 
1 3'-FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Pack ing Indu st ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 2 ,  p .  2 0 ;  
Yeage r ,  p .  1 3 9 . Swift was t o  rece ive about 4 6  percent of  the stock of 
the new company in exchange for his company' s appraised cont r ibut ion of  
$85  mi l l ion ,  Armour was t o  get about 40  pe rcent of the stock for his 
cont ribut ion of $ 7 3  mi l l ion,  and Mor ri s ,  whose assets we re valued at $ 2 4  
mi l l ion,  w a s  t o  receive t he rema in ing 1 4  percent . The proposed divis ion 
of  t he company' s stock a long these l ines reflects the apport ionment of 
t he common s t oc k  on the basis o f  past ea rnings , as  wel l  as  the division 
of the prefe r red sha res that we re to be exchanged for tangible asset s . 
135FTC, Repo rt on the Meat Packing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 2 ,  p .  2 0 ;  
Yeage r ,  p .  1 3 9 . 
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included those l isted in Table 23 . Each of  the t h ree original pa rties 
t o  t he consol idat ion agreement wa s to pay a port ion o f  the pu rchase 
p rice of t he companies that we re to be acqui red that was equal to the 
sha re of  the total  capital stock of  the consolida t ion that they we re t o  
receive upon i t s  f ormat ion . T o  ensure that Armour,  Mo rris and Swift 
would abide by the te rms o f  the consol idat ion agreement , including the 
f ina l provision descr ibed above , each was required t o  deposit $ 1  mi l l ion 
in cash or securit ies with t he I l linois Trust & Savings Bank . Fa i lure 
t o  comply with the terms of  the cont ract would requ i re t he forfeiture o f  
t he deposit to t h e  other two pa rt ies . 1 36 The fo rma l me rger cont ract was 
signed on May 3 1 ,  1 9 02 , and short ly therea fter t he pac kers began t o  
implement its  provi s i ons . : ; • 
The Forma t i on of the Na t i on a l  Packing Co . 
Shortly a fter the Ma y 3 1  signing of  the consol idat i on agreement ,  
Armour ,  Morris and Swift began acqui ring the sma l ler companies l isted in 
the cont ract . Each of the packe rs , operat ing a s  an individua l rather 
than through the agency of his packing firm, sepa rately negot iated the 
pu rchase of  the capital stock of a set of the sma l le r  f i rms which we re 
to be brought into the consolidation, with the appo rt ionment of  
responsibility for the total purchase pr ice o f  t he acqu i red f i rms in 
accordance with the me rger cont ract to be accomplished a t  a later 
dat e . 138 Meanwhile,  an  $8 mil lion loan was a rranged on �1eha l f  of 
1 36Yeage r ,  p .  1 4 0 . 
1 38The Comme rc i a l  and F i nancia l Chron icle repo rted that G .  F .  Swift 
wa s engaged in the acqu i s i t ion of the equity and bonded indebtedness of 
the Fowler Pack ing Co . and the Anglo-American P rovis ion Co du ri ng June , 
1 9 02 . J Ogden Armour was reported to have purchased a " s ign i ficant " 
interest in the G .  H .  Hammond and Hammond Packing Cos . during August , 
1 9 02 . The St . Louis Dressed Bee f and P rovis ion Co . ,  which was 
cont rol led by t he Morris int e rest s ,  was acqu i red by Edward Mo rris . I t  
is  not clear how t he other sma ll packing concerns were a cqui red by the 
o rigina l pa rt ies to the consolidat ion . See Commercial and Financ ial 
Chron icle 74 ( June, 2 6 ,  1 9 02 ) : 1 3 5 9 ;  75 ( August 9, 1 9 0 2 ) : 2 92 . 
2 9 3  
TABLE 2 3  
CAP ITAL I ZATION OF THE PACKING COMPANIES ACQUI RED BY 
ARMOUR, MORRIS  AND SWIFT IN P REPARAT ION 
FOR THE FORMAT ION OF THE 
NAT IONAL PACKING CO . 
F I RM  
G .  H .  Hammond Co . and Hammond Packing Co . 
Fowler Packing Co . 
Anglo-American P rovis ion Co . 
Omaha Packing Co . 
St Louis D ressed Bee f and P rovis ion Co . 
United Dres sed Beef Co . 
CAP I TALI ZATION 
$ 1 , 7 5 0 , 0 0 0  
7 0 0 , 0 0 0  
2 0 0 , 0 0 0  
5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0  
3 0 0 , 0 0 0  
NOTE : Does not inc lude a n  unknown numbe r o f  sma l l  f irms which were 
acquired by t he packers in prepa rat ion for  the consolida t ion . 
SOURCE : Yeage r ,  p .  1 4 0  
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Armour ,  Mo rris and Swi f t  th rough The First Nat ional Bank o f  New York t o  
pay for  the stock of  the companies being acqui red . P re l imina ry 
a r rangements a lso we re made with the investment banking f i rm of Kuhn , 
Loeb & Co . to  provide $ 6 0  mill ion in cash as underwriters of  the merger ,  
though n o  forma l cont ract had yet been signed . 1 3 9  
By the end o f  August , 1 9 0 2 ,  sepa rate agreement s  had been 
negot iated with Cudahy & Co . and the Schwa rzchild & Sul zbe rger Co . to  
secure t heir  part icipat ion in the planned consolidat ion . 1 40 Short ly 
therea f t e r ,  a tentat ive "working agreement " wa s formulated which 
combined t he t h ree separate cont racts described above bet ween the three 
o rigina l pa rt ies to the consolidat ion , the Cudahy Pack ing Co . ,  and 
Schwa rzch i ld & Sulzbe rge r . According to this " wo rk ing agreement " the 
company unde r wh ich the pa r t icipat ing fi rms we re to be consol idated was : 
to  acqu i re the prope rt ies and assets . . .  o f  Armour & Co . ,  
Swift & Co . ,  the Fa i rbank Cann ing Co . ,  and the Cudahy 
Packing Co . ,  toget her with those of a la rge number of other 
corpora t ions , and of  cert ain f i rms and individua l s ,  
cont rol led o r  held by the principle stockho lde rs o f  s a id 
four concerns respect ively; also of  a numbe r o f  companies 
which have been purchased, in whole o r  in pa rt , by some one 
o f  the vendor s ,  inc luding the Anglo-American P rovis ion 
Compa ny, the G .  H .  Hammond Company , Hammond Packing Company, 
United Dres sed Bee f Company , Omaha Pack ing Company, St . 
Louis  Dressed Bee f and P rovision Company and t he i r  several  
a l l ied and subs idiary  conce rns ( submi t ted in evidence , St . 
o f  Mo . v .  Hammond Pac king Co . ,  cited by Yeage r ,  p .  1 4 1 ) -.--
Table 2 4  shows the proposed plan o f  capi t a l i z a t ion and a sset 
st ructure of  the consol idat ion according t o  t he " working agreement "  
s igned a t  the end o f  August , 1 9 02 . Financ ing for  t he planned 
1 39FTC, Report on the Meat Packing Indus t ry,  1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 2 ,  p .  2 0 ;  
Yeager,  p .  1 4 0 . The $ 8  mi ll ion loan was granted by the F i rst Nat iona l 
Bank o f  New Yo r k  on July 1 0 ,  1 9 02 . The pa r va lue o f  t :1e stock in the 
sma l ler companies acqu i red by the packers in prepa rat ion for  the 
consolida t i on totalled $ 8 , 3 9 9 , 0 5 0 . 
1 � 0Yeage r ,  p .  1 4 0 .  The Cudahy Pac king Co . depos ited $ 1  mil l ion in 
cash and securit ies with the I l l inois Trust Company against the i r  
f a i lure t o  comply with t he terms of  the agreement negot iated with the 
other la rge packer s ,  but did not agree to pa rt icipa te with the o r iginal 
pa rt ies t o  the agreement in the acquisit ion o f  othe r  companies . The 
cont ract which wa s nego t iated with the Schwa rzch i ld & Sul zbe rger Co . did 
not requi re the deposit of a surety, nor we re they requi red to 
pa rt icipate in the acquisit ion o f  other companies . 
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TABLE 2 4  
PLANNED F I NANCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL 
PACKING CO . ,  AUGUST, 1 9 0 2  
ASSETS LIAB I LI T I ES 
Plant and Equ ipment . . . . . . .  $ 9 0 . 0  P referred Stock ( 6 % cum . ) .  
Quick Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $ 1 3 0 . 0  Common S tock . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
P u rchased Companies . . . . . .  $ 2 0 . 0  Bonds ( 2 0  yr . ,  5 %  gold) . . .  . 
Unass igned Ea rn ings . . . . . .  $ 2 4 . 5  
Int angible As sets . . . . . . . .  $ 2 8 5 . 5  
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $ 5 50 . 0  
S OURCE : Yeage r ,  p .  1 4 3 ,  p .  1 6 6n 
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$ 2 5 0 . 0  
$ 2 2 5 . 0  
$ 7 5 . 0  
$ 5 5 0 . 0  
conso l idat ion was t o  be secured through an investment syndicate headed 
by Jacob Schi f f ,  o f  Kuhn , Loeb & Co . ( the pr inc iple underwrite r ) , James 
S t i l lman ,  a New York banker ,  and ra i l road f i nancier E .  H .  Harriman . 1 4 :  
In return f o r  $ 6 0  mi ll ion cash, which wa s to be paid i n t o  the 
consol idat ion , the syndi ca�e wa s to rece i ve $35 mi l l ion in bonds , 
$ 3 6 , 8 7 5 , 0 0 0  in preferred st ock and $ 3 3  mi l l ion in the common stock of  
t he new corporat ion . 142  For the properties and securit ies t hat t hey 
cont ributed to the consol idat ion, Armour, Morris and Swift were to 
divide $ 1 65 mi l l ion in preferred stock and $ 1 8 2  mi l l ion in common stock 
in proport ion to their cont ribut ion to t he total  assets of  the 
combinat ion . ' / ,\ The rema inde r of the stock was to be distributed among 
the st ockho lde rs o f  the Cudahy Pack ing Co . and the Schwa r zchi ld & 
Sul zberge r Co . The init ial off icers of  the proposed consolidat ion,  as 
named in the " work ing agreement , "  cons isted prima ri l y  of  the packers and 
the i r  rep resenta t ives,  a l though the syndicate was guaranteed three out 
o f  f i fteen posit ions on the boa rd of di rectors,  and t h ree of f ive 
pos it ions on t he cons ol idat ion ' s  finance committee . 1 �4 
The full  scale consolidat ion wa s on the verge of  be ing consummated 
on Novembe r 1 8 ,  1 9 02 when the principle underwr ite r ,  Kuhn,  Loeb & Co . ,  
withdrew f rom the cont ract . Jacob Sch i f f ,  the head of  Kuhn . Loeb & Co . ,  
repo rtedly had " fo rebodings of the panic of  1 9 0 3 , " and dec ided not to 
negot iate the $ 6 0  mi l l ion loan earlie r  promi sed by Kuhn,  Loeb & Co . m 
1 � 1 FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Pack ing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 2 ,  p .  2 1 ;  
Yeage r ,  p .  1 4 2 . 
:uYeage r ,  p .  1 4 3 . According to the " working agreement " t he 
syndicate wa s requ ired to hold their Nat ional Packing Co . shares for 
seven yea rs , a f ter wh ich t ime the packers we re to have f i rst right of  
refusal in their purchase . 
1 43Yeage r ,  p .  1 4 3 . 
144Yeage r ,  p .  1 4 3 . 
14 5The $ 6 0  mi l l ion i n  cash promised t o  the packer s  by t he investment 
syndicate wa s partly to serve as wo rking capital for  the p roposed 
consolidation,  and pa rt ly to enable the former owne rs o f  the 
consol ida ted prope rt ies to l iquida te a po rt ion of their inves tment . The 
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Meanwhile,  t he packers had gone t hrough with their planned acquisit ion 
of the sma l le r  packing companies , a nd the $ 8  mil l ion do llar  loan which 
they had negotiated to f inance the purchase was due early in  Janua ry, 
1 9 0 3 . They insi sted that the bankers who had re fused t o  underwrite the 
l a rger conso lida t ion should assist in the f inancing of the pu rchase of 
the recently acquired compa nies since , acco rding t o  one of the ma jor  
dres sed bee f  sh ippe rs ,  " ( such companie s )  neve r would have been pu rchased 
i f  ( it wa s )  known that the organization of  the l arge compan ies wa s to 
fall t hrough . " 1 4 6  
Four weeks a fter  the col lapse of  the investment syndicate , Swi f t ,  
Armou r and Mor r i s ,  aga in act ing as individua ls rather t h a n  on beha l f  of  
the i r  companies , ente red into ag reement with Kuhn,  Loeb & Co . a nd three 
other gua rantors for a $ 1 5  mi l l ion loan,  bac ked by the secur i t ies of the 
sma l ler packing compa nies acqui red in anticipa t ion of the consol idat ion , 
t o  ret i re t he $ 8  mi l l ion loan that wa s earlier granted by The F i rst 
Nat iona l Bank of  New York . '< ' In  addition to the l oa n ,  a n  agreement was 
reached between the packe rs and the f inancie rs , stat ing that the latter 
would not stand in the way o f  the eventua l consol ida t i on of  t he acquired 
conso l ida t ion could st i l l  have been completed wit hout the f inancial 
backing of  t he investment syndica te,  since mos t  of  those invo lved in the 
agreement we re t o  cont inue in close associat ion with their consolidated 
propert ies ; none o f  the l a rge packers we re planning on "cashing out " of  
t he bus iness . Neve rtheles s ,  prot racted negot iat ions undert aken 
immediately fol lowing t he withdrawal of t he syndicate f rom the proposed 
consolidat ion were unsucces s ful . See FTC, Repo rt on t he Meat Packing 
Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 2 ,  p .  2 3 . 
1 46Hea rings Be fore the Commit tee on Agriculture on Meat Packer 
Legi s lat ion . 6 6 th Cong . ,  2nd Sess . ,  1 9 2 0 ,  p .  1 2 9 3 ,  test imony of  Henry 
Veede r ,  c i ted in Yeage r ,  p .  1 4 4 . 
14 1FTC Repo rt on the Me at Pack ing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 2 ,  p .  2 2 ;  
Yeager,  p .  1 4 4 . A po rtion o f  t he loan wa s t o  ret i re t he packe rs ' $ 8  
mi l l ion debt t o  t he Fi rst Na t iona l Bank of  New York . I n  exchange for 
the loan , the packers deposited the i r  pe rsona l notes with t he investment 
banking f i rm .  The debt , which was due i n  June , 1 9 0 3  wa s t o  be 
ref inanced by the packers is suing f i rst mortgage bonds on beh a l f  o f  
t he i r  companies in  excha nge for the i r  individua l  notes . The mo rtgage 
bonds , howeve r ,  were never issued, and the manne r i n  which the packers ' 
debt t o  Kuhn Loeb & Co . was event ua lly ret i red is not clea r .  See the 
Commercial and Financial  Ch ronicle 7 6  (April 4 ,  1 9 0 3 ) : 7 5 5 . 
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companies or of any companies owned by the packers , provided that t he 
lega l it y  o f  such a consol idation should be approved by t he counsel o f  
bot h  the bo r rowe rs and lenders . w 
As Ma ry Yeager has noted, the proviso a t tached t o  t he loan 
negot iated by t he packers was " an express ion of  intent " on t he pa rt o f  
t he packe rs,  as  we l l  as a sa feguard f o r  t he bankers who g ranted the 
loan . : � 9  The l a rge dressed beef sh ippe rs had no intent ion of completely 
abandon ing the i r  scheme to solve the problems of overproduct ion and 
exces sive compe t i t ion th rough consolidat ion . 1 50 Even be fore t he 
inves tment syndicate had withdrawn f rom the merge r agreement ,  t he 
packers had cons ide red certain a lte rna tives t o  t he p lanned gene ra l 
consolida t ion . These we re : The divis ion o f  the acqu i red compan ies 
among their  purcha sers ; dives t iture of  t he acqu i red compan ies ;  operat ion 
of  the acqu i red companies as a partnership; and, forma t ion of  a 
corpo ra t i on th rough wh ich t he acqu i red companies could be operated . '5 1 
The f i rst t wo st rategi es , i f  adopted, wou ld have done nothing t o  solve 
t he problems wh ich the gene ral consol idat ion was intended t o  address , 
and were thus re j ected out of hand . The fourth a lterna t i ve invo lved the 
same scheme as the gene ra l consolidat ion , a lbe i t  on a sma ller scale, and 
was cons ide red mo re feas ible t han the t h i rd a lternat ive . I t  was thus 
the course which was eventua l ly adopted by the packers . 
The Nat i ona l Packing Co . ,  capitaliz�d at $ 1 5  mi l l ion , was 
incorporated in New Je rsey on March 1 8 ,  1 9 0 3  as a holding-ope rat ing 
company t o  acqu i re and operate those companies which had earlier been 
a cqu i red by Armour,  Mo rris and Swift in ant icipat ion o f  the f a i led 
1 4 8Yeage r ,  p .  1 4 4 . 
1 4 9Yeage r ,  p .  1 4 4 . 
1 50Yeage r ,  p .  1 4 4 .  
1 5 1FTC, Report on t he Meat Pack ing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 2 ,  p .  22 . 
2 9 9  
gene ral consolidat ion . 1 � 7  The stock of t he acqui red compa n ies , which 
was re lea sed f rom t rust by the guarantors of  t he $ 1 5  mi ll ion loan that 
was earlier negotia ted by the packe rs once det a i ls relat ing to t he 
sma l le r  consolida t i on had been final i zed, was exchanged for  t he $ 1 5  
mi l lion pa r value sha res o f  the Nat ional Pack ing Co . m S ince Armour ,  
Swift and Morris  had become t he only stockho lde rs o f  record in t he 
acquired compan ies fol lowing their acquisit ion ,  they subsequently became 
t he sole st ockholders in the Nat ional Pack ing Co . ,  following t he 
exchange of  the consol ida t ion ' s stock for the shares o f  t he sma ller 
packing compa n ies . 
The divis ion o f  t he Nat iona l Pack ing Co . occurred a long s imi lar 
l ines to t hose earlier ag reed upon in ant icipat ion of  the aborted 
gene ral conso l idat ion ; Armour was to recei ve 4 0 % ,  Swift 4 6 % ,  and Morris 
1 4 %  . 1 �4 The companies a cqu i red by the National Packing Co . were soon 
: �2Ga r f i e ld Report , pp . 3 5 -3 6 ;  Yeage r ,  p .  1 4 4 . 
� �Jcomme r c i a l  and F i n a nc i a l  Chronicle 7 6  (Ma rch 2 8 ,  1 9 0 3 ) : 7 0 6 .  The 
Nat iona l Pack ing Comp a n y  acqu ired the properties and bus i nesses of the 
fol lowing : 
Omaha Packing Co . ,  
G .  H .  Hammond Co . ,  
Hammond Packing Co . ,  
Anglo-American P rovis ion Co . ,  
Fowler Pack ing Co . ,  
Stoc kya rds Wa rehouse Co . ,  
along with the pledged sha res of  a number of  sma ller companies . For a 
complete l i st , see FTC , Report on t he Meat Packing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 
2 ,  pp . 2 0-2 3 . 
� ��The apport ionment of  cont ro l in the new corporat ion wa s s l ight ly 
dif ferent than that which had been ag reed upon in relat ion to t he 
gene ra l consolidat ion . The Cudahy Pack ing Co . and t he Schwa rzchild & 
Sul zbe rge r Co . ,  while included in the earlier ag reement , had not t a ken 
pa rt in the acqu i s i t ion of the sma ller compa nies,  a nd t he re fore we re not 
entit led to share in the ownership of t he Nat ional Packing Company 
( Yeager,  p .  1 4 4 ) . Interes tingly, even after the format ion o f  t he 
Nat ional Packing Co . and t he acquis it ion of  the stock o f  i t s  
subs idiaries , s uch stock cont inued to stand o n  t he books o f  the 
subs idia ry companies i n  the names of the stockholde rs of  t he Nat ional 
Packing Co . in t he same proport ion as t hey we re stockholders in the 
latter company, rather than in the name of t he holding company itse l f . 
For a l l  pract ical purposes , the Nat ional Packi ng Co . could h a ve been 
di ssolved a nd proport ionate owne rship in the subsidiaries would have 
gone on undi sturbed . This techn ica l i ty was late r c i ted in an  
unsuccesful  a t t empt t o  abso lve the Na t iona l Pack ing Company f rom cha rges 
of ant i-competit ive beha vior (U . S .  v .  L .  F Swift et . a l . ,  1 9 1 1 - 1 9 1 2 )  on 
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integrated into a unif ied corporate st ructure . St rategic cont rol over 
the holding company wa s pl aced in the hands of a boa rri o f  di rectors 
dominated by Armour,  Mo rr i s ,  Swift and membe rs of the i r  f i rms and 
famil ies . 1 � ; Other pos it ions were held by top ranking execut ives and 
former directors of the acqu ired companies . The boa rd of directors 
formulated the long run , st rategic pol icy of the ho lding company, 
a llocated rea l and f inanc i a l  resources among the subs idia ry 
corpo rat i ons , and determined the f inancia l and operat ing pol i c ies of the 
subs idia ries . Day-to-day operat ions of the subs idia ry companies were 
managed in much the same way as before -- by individua l s  who we re 
c lose ly involved with the a f f a i r s of the subs idia ries on an individua l 
compa ny level . 1 ' � 
Ve ry l i t t le informa t ion is avai lable concerning �he f inancial  
pract ices o f  the Na tional Packing Company fol lowing its  forma t ion . Once 
the rather complica ted f inancial machinat ions that we re used in its 
forma t ion had accompl ished the i r  pu rpose , it  appears that the company 
adopted a pa ttern of f inanc i a l  beha vior which c losely para l l e l led the 
pract ices of pa ckers such as  Armour and Mo rr i s ,  who rel ied prima rily on 
t he i r  f i rm' s own resources and short term bo rrowings to finance 
ope rat ions and expans i on . The holding company itse l f  is sued no more 
stock during 1 9 0 3 - 1 9 0 5 ,  nor did it incur any bonded indebtednes s ;  the 
same was t rue of the s ubs idia ry companies . 1 �' It appears that t he 
subs idia ry companies borrowed in their own name , wh i le the directors of 
the ho lding company set general  borrowing guide l ines and determined t he 
the grounds that t he corpora tion wa s not the lega l " owne r "  of  the 
companies wh ich i t  had abso rbed . See FTC , Repo rt on t he Meat Packing 
Indus t ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  P t . 2 ,  pp . 22-2 3 . 
nhieager ,  p .  1 4 7 . 
1 �6For a thorough desc ript ion of the o rganizat ional st ructure and 
administ rat i ve pract ices of the Nat ional Packing Company, see Yeage r ,  p .  
1 4 5-1 5 5 . 
: ; 7Ga rfield Report , pp . 2 9 3-2 9 5 . 
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p roport ion of ea rnings that would be retu rned t o  the individua l  
bus ines ses . 1 � 8 
The rea l  s ign i f ica nce o f  the Nat iona l Packing Company de rives not 
so much f rom t he way in wh ich it f inanced the expans ion of product ive 
capac ity or t he ope rat ions of its subs idiaries , but rather f rom the ends 
which the packers were able to attain t hrough use of the holding company 
device and the sophist icated f inancial  techniques that we re employed in 
t he c reat ion of the company . P rior to the format ion o f  the Nat iona l 
P acking Compa ny there had been a general absence of interowne rship among 
the five la rge dressed bee f shippe rs . 1 � 9 Joint owne rship among any of 
t he la rge dressed bee f  sh ippe rs would have created a community o f  mutual 
f inanc ial inte rest among the f i rms that we re thus re lated, and would 
have enabled a unity of pol icy and pu rpose which otherwise would have 
been impossible . Whi le this s ituation was lega lly unchanged by t he 
forma t ion of the Na t iona l Packi ng co . ,  that company, as  a j ointly owned 
subs idi a ry holding compa ny of the three la rgest dressed beef shippers , 
provided a mechanism to enable cooperat ion that did not di f fer 
substant ia l l y f rom that which wou ld have obt a i ned within a gene ra l  
consolidat ion . 
The pecu liar  form of  consolidat ion that actua lly occu red within 
the dressed beef indu s t ry possessed features of both ext reme cases o f  
int ra-indus t ry f inanc i a l  re lat ions : complete absence of inte rowner ship 
and general  combina t ion . The use o f  a jointly owned subs idia ry holding 
: '8Al l earnings we re reta ined within the holding company prior t o  
1 9 0 8 . The company dec la red i t s  f i rst qua rterly dividend i n  Apr i l ,  1 9 0 8 ,  
and ma inta ined a 7 'i, a nnua l div idend rate unt il the company was disso lved 
by court order i n  1 9 1 2 . Note that wh ile the holding company withheld 
t he net p ro f i t s  o f  the subs idiaries , it is ent i rely poss ible t hat such 
profits  were redist r ibuted among t he subs idi a r ies as  deemed des irable by 
the directors of t he holding company . See FTC , Report on t he Mea t  
Packing I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 2 ,  pp . 2 0- 2 5 ,  and Yeager ,  pp . 1 5 3- 1 5 5 . 
1 "I n  t he wa ke of t he format ion o f  t he conso l idat ion it  wa s 
speculated that Swift & Co had i ndirec t ly acqu i red an intere s t  i n  
Schwa rzch i ld & Sul zbe rge r Co . through a broke rage house with whom 
f requently did bus ines s ,  but this wa s neve r conc lus ively proven . 





company as  a means of  c reat ing financ ial interdependence among 
ostensibly compet ing firms a l lowed the packers to ma intain a signi ficant 
degree of independence, wh ile achieving a unity of  policy a nd pu rpose 
that wa s impossible unde r the earlier pooling a rrangement s . 1 60 The 
Nat iona l Pac k i ng Compa ny provided a means,  incentive ,  and forum for 
coope rat ion th rough t he c reation of  a commun ity o f  mut ua l financ ial 
interes t among t he large packers . Ma ry Yeager summa r ized the industry­
wide impo rtance of the Na t ional Packing Company as fol lows : 
Al l of  the [ administrat ive and f inancial  reorganizat ion 
which accompanied t he format ion of the Nat iona l Packing 
Company ) wou ld not have rea l ly made much difference in the 
indust ry if  it had been simply the means of putt ing together 
the pieces f rom t he abort ive giant me rge r .  Nat iona l was ,  
howeve r ,  much mo re t han that . I t  came t o  se rve as  a kind of  
fo rum in which the old goals of cartelizat ion might be 
pu rsued lega l ly . I n  a sense , Nat ional became a sort o f  
corporate haven i n  which the packers could ma intain their 
independence yet col lude ,  and . . .  collude more e f fect ive ly 
than in  t he days o f  the pools . The Na t iona l also improved 
upon t he poo ling a rra ngement by providing the Big Three 
[Armour,  Morris and Swift ) with a common interest ,  namely 
[ t he preserva t ion of the va lue of t he i r  mutual investment ) 
in  t he Na t ional ( Yeage r ,  p .  1 5 3 ) . 
The ope ra t i ons of the subsidiary compa nies of t he Na t iona l Packing 
Company we re tai lored t o  conform to the impe rat ives of the l a rge d ressed 
bee f sh ippers ; the compa ny va ried its sales and pu rchases ult imately t o  
s u i t  Armou r ,  Mo rris a nd Swi ft . : 6: Operat iona lly,  the Nat ional Packing 
Company funct ioned i n  a manner not unl ike the " evene rs " of the rail road 
l ivestock pools of  t he 1 8 7 0 s ,  buying or sell ing wheneve r one of t he 
la rge packers found t hemselves more " long" o r  " sho rt " in  t he ma rket than 
was to be de sired . The packe rs a l so used the Nat ional Packing Company 
to a cqu i re compet ing slaugh te ring facilities as a subst itute for t he old 
1 60Yeage r ,  p .  1 4 2 . 
1 6 1 FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Packing I ndus t rv ,  1 9 1 9 ,  Pt . 2 ,  p .  2 4 ;  
Yeage r ,  p .  1 52 . 
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pract ices of  compet it ive bu ilding in a reas in which new l ivestock 
ma rkets we re emerging . a7 
Although it is beyond t he scope o f  t his work t o  est imate t he 
impact o f  the Nat ional Pac king Company on the prices o f  dressed bee f ,  
the output o f  t he la rge dressed beef shippers , o r  other fo rms of  
indust ry-wide behavior,  several facts suggest t hat the pract ices of  the 
l arge packers changed fol lowing the forma t ion of  t he holding company . 
The const ruct ion o f  new branch fac i l i t ies s lowed percept ibl y . Armour 
had bui l t  107 b ranch dist ribut ion facilit ies bet ween 1 8 9 1 - 1 8 97 and 95 
f rom 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 3 ,  wherea s between 1 9 0 4 - 1 9 1 0  he bui l t  only 65 . Swift built 
120 branch fac i l i t ies bet ween 1 8 98- 1 9 0 4 ,  but only 75 bet ween 1 9 0 4 - 1 9 1 0 . 
Mo rris , who bu i l t  4 1  branch houses between 1 8 9 1 - 1 8 97 and 3 8  bet ween 
1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 3  bu ilt  only 13 bet ween 1 9 0 4 - 1 9 1 9 . ' " '  The rate o f  
slaughterhouse const ruct ion and acquisition of interest s  in  stoc kya rds 
a ls o  s lowed : whereas Mo rris , Swift and Armour had bui l t  or acqu i red 
stock in 13 bet ween 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 0 3 ,  they bu i l t  or acqui red stock in only 2 
du ring 1 9 0 4 - 1 9 0 9 . 1� Whether t he changes in t he behavior o f  the 
packe rs , enabled by the c reat ion of  the Nat iona l Pack ing Company we re 
successful in inc rea sing their profitabi lity is not clear,  s ince many 
factors beyond t he cont rol of even the la rge st membe rs of t he indust ry 
could have a f fected their  earnings . Their ea rnings f igures cons ide red 
on their own a re inconclusive ;  between 1 9 0 3  and 1 90 7  the e a rnings of the 
big f ive , t hough inc rea s ing in absolute amount , rema ined s imil a r  a s  a 
1 62Yeage r ,  p .  1 5 3 . 
1 63FTC , Report on the Meat Pack ing Indust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  Summa ry and P t . 
1 ,  p .  1 53 ;  Yeage r ,  p .  1 5 3 . 
1 6�FTC , Repo rt on the Meat Packinq I ndust ry, 1 9 1 9 ,  S umma ry and Pt . 
1 ,  pp . 2 3 9-2 5 9 ;  Yeage r,  p .  1 5 3 . 
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percentage of tot al net worth . 1 �� Alt hough t he pro f itability  of t he 
three la rge st packi ng f i rms does not appea r to have inc reased to any 
s igni f icant degree , the returns to their owne rs ( insofar as they were 
also represented among the stockholders of t he Nat ional Packing Co . )  
did . Whereas bef o re t he crea t ion of  the Nat iona l Packing Company the 
t hree largest packers ' sha re of total domest i c  beef sales ave raged 
approximately 29 percent , their sha re ( i ncluding t he companies 
cont rol led by the Na t i ona l )  increased to 36 percent a f t e r  t he 
consol idat ion . : LL The i r  sha re in the indust ry' s total earnings l ikely 
increased as  we l l . 
: 6�Yeager cites the increas ing ave rage net pro f i t s  of t he la rge 
packers du ring the 8 years fol lowing t he creat ion of t he Nat iona l 
Packing Company, as  opposed to t hose of t he preceding 8 yea r  period,  as 
suggestive of  t he bene ficent (to t he packers ) e f fects of t he 
cons o l idat ion ( Yeage r ,  p .  1 5 5 ) . However ,  as  t he companies grew l a rger ,  
their p ro f i t s  wou ld a l s o  tend t o  increase proport iona l l y . I have 
calculated t he a ve rage prof its for Armou r & Co . and Swift & Co . as  a 
percentage of  total net worth (wh ich takes int o conside rat ion t he 
effects o f  f i rm growth on total profit s )  and have found t hem t o  be 
vi rtua lly identical for both pe riods . 
1 "Yeage r ,  p .  1 6 9n . The pa cke rs would actua l ly have begun 
bene fitt ing f i nanc i a l ly f rom the sales of t he Nat iona l Packing Company 
immediate ly,  even though a l l  ea rnings we re ret u rned to t he subs idiary 
companies be fore Apri l ,  1 9 0 8 ,  as the value of their shares in t he 
consol idat ion would have inc reased as  the surplus accounts of t he 
holding company o r  its  subsidi aries grew . 
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CHAPTER V I  
CONCLUS ION 
Summary of the S t ra tegi c vs . Ta c t i cal Finance Hypothesis 
This study has focused on the use of  sophist icated financial 
techniques and t he innovat ion of new bus iness devices among the ma j o r  
manufact u re rs in  two ma ss product ion indust ries : meat pac king a n d  suga r 
re fining . Despite the increased prevalence of incorpo rat ion and the use 
of corpo rate stoc k  among the dominant firms within the suga r refining 
and meat packing indus t r ies , however ,  pract ically a l l  such f i rms 
displayed an ext raordinary degree of self-rel iance in funding t he i r  day­
t o-da y operat ion s ,  and the expans ion a nd ma intenance vf p roduct i ve 
capacity . Wh i le most cont inued to be highly dependent on short-term 
borrowings from a va riety of sou rces du ring the t h i rty years which 
comprise this  st udy, their dependence on out s ide infus ions of  long term 
capi t a l  was minima l . The new financial techniques and business devices 
that these f i rms increas ingly employed appa rent ly were not , therefore , 
dev ised i n  orde r to finance the incorporat ion o f  new, capi t a l  intensi ve 
technologies into the i r  production processes . 
The most s t r i king feature of this st udy is t he extent to which the 
s imple financ ial pract ices that we re typically empl oyed by early meat 
packing and suga r re f in ing firms continued to exi s� s ide-by-s ide with 
t he more sophist icated financial techniques that came into gene r a l  use 
during the later pe riod . The ma jor fi rms within each indust ry con t inued 
t o  rel y  a lmost exc lusively on the capi t a l i za t ion of ret ained ea rnings 
and short t e rm borrowings to f inance t he ma intenance and expans ion of 
product ive capacity and other aspects of their  day-to day operat ions , 
even wh i le they made inc rea sed use of the sophist icated financial 
techniques that came into widespread use du ring the corporate 
revolut ion . 
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These financial h i stories sugge st tha t ,  as the problems o f  excess 
capacity and t he need to manage increa sed volumes of th roughput became 
increas ingly appa ren t ,  the f inancial devel opment o f  each indus t ry came 
t o  be s haped by two di f fe rent sets of  impe rat i ves . The f i rst con s isted 
o f  the need t o  dev i se solut ions to t he problems c reated by excess 
capac ity in increas ingly volume- and inves tment -intensive indust r ies 
such a s  suga r re f in ing, to  provide fo r the coordination o f  
geographica l ly dispersed ,  mult i- funct ion enterpri ses � ·1ch as  t hose which 
dominated the dres sed bee f indust ry, and to dec rease t he vola t i l ity of 
returns on investment in indust ries that were weakened by " cutthroat 
competit ion "  du ring the late nineteenth cent ury . The new f inanc i a l  
techn iques t hat f i rms devi sed to solve these problems cons isted o f  t he 
use o f  new bus iness devices ( the operat ing corporation , t he subs idia ry 
company , and the ho lding company ) ,  and the c reat ion and apport ionment of 
securit ies such as corporate st ock , in orde r to establ ish and ma intain 
coordinat ion bet ween functiona lly comp lement a ry un its within ve rt ica lly 
integrated f i rms , o r  between funct iona l l y  ident ical f i rms in 
horizontally integrated industries . Such techniques may be cons idered 
as part of the process of " st rategic f inance . "  " St rategic f inance" had 
l i t t le ,  i f  anything, to  do with the establishment of  new p roduct ive 
capacity,  the f unding of the inco rporat ion of new technologies into a 
pa rticula r product ion proces s ,  or t he financing o f  any other aspect of  
t he actual manu facture of physica l ob j ects . 
The second set of  impe ratives consis ted of  t he need t o  fund 
working capita l requirement s ,  the ma intenance and expans ion o f  
p roduct ive capacity,  a n d  other aspect s of  day-t o-day operat ions . 
Throughout the per iod examined here, s imple r ,  more t raditiona l f inanc ial 
pract ices were typica l l y  employed for these pu rposes by f i rms within the 
suga r re fi ning and meat packing indust ry, and coexisted s ide-by-s ide 
with t he newe r ,  mo re s ophist icated f inanc ial techn ique s of " s t rategic 
f inance . "  The f o rme r ,  more t radit iona l f inanc ia l  techn iques consisted 
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of the u se of  various type s of  short term credit t o  fund working capital  
needs , t hus freeing the bulk of  the  owners ' pa id in  capital and 
accumulated cash surplus for investment in fixed capit a l . The h igher 
e a rn ings on equity made poss ible by the use of borrowed capit a l ,  coupled 
with the higher rate of turnover of wo rking capital  facilitated by new 
mass product ion technologies,  generated a suf ficient volume of ea rnings 
to fund t he ma intena nce a nd expans ion of  product ive capacity and a 
commensurate expansion (th rough the use of equity and accumulated 
surplus as  collatera l )  of short term credits to fund propo rt ionate 
increases in working capit al . These financial techniques may be 
cons idered pa rt of the process of " tact ical f inance , " and appe a r  to have 
suff iced for the funding of  most aspects of  day-to-day operat ions within 
each indust ry with l i t t le change t hrough 1 9 0 5 . 
The development and perfection of the techniques of  " st rategic 
f inance , " as  det a i led in the financial hist ories of  the mea t  packing and 
suga r re fining i ndust ries above , and the inst itut ions and inst ruments 
which made such techn iques pos sible , may be cons ide red the financial 
counterpa rt of  the organi zational  revolut ion in  American business f i rst 
described by A l f red Chandle r .  Modern , mu lt i-unit and/ o r  mul t i-funct ion 
incorporated bus iness enterprises , with their securities a nd 
sophist icated financial pract ices , came into bei ng when the use of  
f inance t o  facilitate coo rdinat ion pe rmi t ted higher earnings , greater 
p roduct ivity,  a nd lowe r cost s ,  than the use of f inance to expand and 
improve capac ity . The expans i on and ma intenance of product i ve capacity 
could have been ( and wa s )  financed using the t radi t ional methods of 
" tactical f inance . "  
The o rganizationa l revolut ion described by Chandler cons isted of 
t he emergence o f  diffe rent layers of management , with some respons ible 
for the coo rd ination of resou rce flows and long range planning within a 
pa rticular bu siness ( s t rategic ma nagement ) ,  and others respons ible for 
t he day-t o-da y operat ions of pa rticular depa rtment s within t he business 
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( tactical management ) . The bifurcat ion of financi a l  pract ices descr ibed 
above was ana logous to the sepa rat ion of the funct ions of management , 
with " s t rategic f inance" di rected towa rds the forma l i zat ion of the 
mechanisms of plann ing and coordinat ion within a nd bet ween f i rms , and 
tactical finance directed t owards f inancing the i r  day-t o-day opera t ions . 
Impl i ca t i ons for the "Textbook Explana t i on " 
The "textbook explanat ion "  of the relat ionship between financial 
and economic development as described in  Chapte r  1 i s  ba sed on the 
implicit proposit ion that the prima ry feature of finar:c i a l  development 
is  the emergence of  institutions and ma rkets that a re capable of  more 
e f f ic ient ly smoothing the flow of rea l savings between surplus and 
deficit  spending units . The prima ry impetus for the development o f  
t hese new financial inst itut ions is hypothesi zed t o  have derived f rom 
changing de ficit fi nancing requ irement s ,  which a re presumed t o  be t he 
prima ry fact or behind all  bor rowing and security is sues . The re fore, 
drama t ic inc reases in the numbe r of incorpo rated manufacturing f i rms 
during the late nineteenth century, inc reased corpo rate secu rity issues, 
t he eme rgence of o rgani zed markets for indust rial  secu rities , and t he 
p ro l i feration of  other s ophist icated financ i a l  and bus iness dev ices 
du r ing the same period, has been assumed to provide ev idence for the 
hypothesis t hat def icit  f inanc ing requ i rements we re expanding t oo 
rapidly for t radit ional financial methods and institut ions t o  
accommodate . 
No di rect evidence is  ma rsha l led to suppo rt t he " textbook 
explanat ion . "  Us ing t he logic of  the " textbook explanat ion , "  t he e f fect 
be ing observed is s imply assumed to result f rom t he cause that is 
theoret ically p redicted to p recede it , thereby "proving" the existence 
of the cause itsel f .  The refo re , the observat ion o f  a ser ies o f  events 
that theory predicts shou ld result f rom an excess demand for pu rchas i ng 
power among de ficit  spending units is  presumed to p rovide evidence of 
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j us t  such a phenomena . 
The evidence I have brought t o  bea r  on the examina t ion o f  the 
f inancial  deve lopment of the meat packing and suga r re fin ing industries 
du ring the late n ineteenth cent u ry fails to support the " textbook 
explanation . "  During their early development , most f i rms in both 
indust r ies we re highly reliant on short term advances f rom s uppl iers,  
commercial bank s ,  o r  f rom t he sale of  commercial pape r ,  f rom which 
p ract ica lly a l l  of the exte rna l funds t hey used were obta ined . The use 
of short term c redit s  is assumed to aid pr ima r i ly in funding t he 
accumulat ion of  working capital ; its  cont ribut ion t o  t he forma t ion of 
fixed capi t a l  in indust ry is therefore commonly presumed t o  be 
ins ignif icant . As had been suggested above , however, in industries with 
h igh rates of  prof it a nd reinvestment , this contribut ion can be 
cons iderable . These condit ions certainly apply to bot h the mea t  packing 
and suga r ref in ing indust ries during the early stages of their 
deve lopment . 
The financ ial histories presented above suggest f i rms within t he 
early meat pack ing and suga r re f ining indust ries re lied on the personal 
resou rces of  a l imited c i rcle of  owne rs to finance their early f ixed 
capital  expenditure s ,  supplemented by va rious short t e rm c redits  for the 
funding o f  the i r  work ing capital needs . The earnings t ha t  we re 
generated by t he increased rate of t u rnover of working capital  enabled 
by the new mas s  product ion and dist ribut ion techniques we re ret urned to 
t he va rious bus ines ses in suff ic ient quant ity to aid i� the f unding of  a 
hign rate of expansion of  produc t ive capac ity,  and t o  supplement bank 
borrowings and other fo rms of credit in the funding of a s imilarly 
expanding base of working capit a l . None of t he f i rms which comprise 
these case s tudie s ,  with the except ion of Swift & Co . ,  relied to any 
extent on t he is sue or s a le of stock or bonds to fund any a spect of 
their ope rat ions prior to 1 8 9 0 . Prior to 1 9 0 5 ,  only Swift & Co . and t he 
Ame rican Sugar Re fining Company had increased their capi t a l i zat ion by 
3 1 0  
issui ng stock for cash . As has been suggested above , howeve r ,  most 
is sues o f  stock by the fo rme r during this pe riod s imply invol ved t he 
equiva lent of  the dec larat ion of dividends payable in  stock,  whi le the 
proceeds f rom the American Suga r Re f ining Company ' s  s ingle cash is sue of 
1 9 0 1  were used i n  their enti rety to enable that company to extend its 
inf luence throughout the beet sugar indust ry . 
The financial pract ices of the firms that comprise these case 
studie s ,  insofar as  t hey re late to the financing o f  invent o ries , items 
in  t he p roce ss o f  product ion, payroll s ,  the ma intenance o f  p roduct ive 
capacity,  or the const ruct ion of new productive capacity did not change 
apprec iably du ring 1 8 9 0-1 9 0 5 . Furthermo re, by 1 9 02  nea rly a l l  had 
i ncorporated, is sued s t ock and/or unde rwent consolidat ion into l a rge 
vert ica l l y  or ho ri zontally integrated f i rms . S ince pract ica l ly a l l  such 
f i rms were ma king extens ive use of the new f inanc i a l  techniques enabled 
by the adopt ion of t he corporate form of bus iness o rganization and the 
developing inves tment ma rket , yet had not undergone any s igni f icant 
change i n  the wa y in  wh ich they financed their day-t o-day ope ra t ions , 
then such new financial techn iques cannot co r rectly be presumed to have 
resulted f rom a n  unsatisf ied demand for purchasing powe r to f und a ny 
s igni f icant aspect of their working or f ixed capital  requi rement s . The 
p roces s  of hor i zont a l  consolidat ion pursued within both indust ries 
during this pe riod i s  further suggest ive of  a sufficiency o f  finance to 
fund the expan s ion of  product ive capacity using t radit ional f inanc ial  
techn iques . I f  fi rms in ei ther indust ry had been faced with a scarcity 
o f  capi t a l  to finance the incorporat ion of expens ive ,  new technologies 
into t he i r  processes of  production, then the financ ing of t he ho r i zont a l  
conso l idat ions that occur red would have rapidly come t o  involve t he 
is sue o f  s tock for cash in orde r to meet this unsat i s f ied demand . Such, 
as  has been suggested above , was clearly not t he case . 
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The Al t e rna t i ve Expl ana t i on 
The dat a  contained i n  these case st udies suggest that the 
interpretat ion of the deve lopment of  corporate financ i a l  prac t i ces 
advanced by Be rle and Mea ns , and developed further by Navin a nd Sea rs , 
Mich ie , Pol la rd,  and othe rs , embodies a more accurate approach t o  
explain ing t h e  re lationship between financial and indus t r i a l  development 
among Ame rican manufacturers during the late n ineteenth century . At 
leas t  two ideas dominant in the interpret ation o f  U . S .  economic history 
have prevented the f u l l  art i culation of  this more accurate account of  
the ro le played by f i nance i n  industrial deve lopment .  The f i rst is the 
emphasis on imperfect ion in capital ma rkets wh ich has domi nated t he work 
of  Lance Da vis ,  a nd which has given rise to the forma t ive ques t ions that 
have fol lowed in  the wake of his work . I n  this view, the use o f  more 
and more varied securities simply served to make more pe r fect an a l ready 
exist ing process : the t ransfer of  money f rom savers t o  borrowers . 
The second ba rrier t o  the accept ance of  the supe rior,  a lt e rnat i ve 
explanation has been the dominance of  the popu l i s t  pe rspect ive i n  
interpretat ions o f  U . S .  business hist ory . This perspec t i ve , a long with 
wide use of the s t ructu re-conduct -pe rformance pa radigm i n  the study of 
indust ria l orga n i zat ion , has caused the f inanc ial pract ices o f  f i rms at 
the t u rn of the century t o  be viewed as  machinat ions against the public 
interest . The f i nancial histo ry o f  the t ime has been told as subs idiary 
to t he e f fort t o  a chieve ma rket power . 
A l f red Chandle r ' s revision of  bus i ness history,  with its focus on 
a de sc ript ion of  what f i rms did,  how they reo rga n i zed,  and why , led to 
this dissertat ion . This empha sis should also lead to a more complete 
a rt iculat ion o f  t he a l ternat ive explanat ion of  turn-o f -the-cent ury 
corporate f inance . There is a l ready cons iderable evidence for this 
explanat ion in t he works c ited . Wha t  this dissertat ion con t ributes a re 
deta iled accounts of  f inance in two i ndus t ries and a "Chandle rian"  
i nterpretat ion of  t hose account s  in which t he new f inancial  p ractices 
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a re correlates of t he organizat ional innova t ions described by Chandler .  
My interpret a t ion of the financial histor ies o f  t he suga r re fining 
and meat packing industries s uggests that a s ignificant pa rt of t he 
deve lopment of  the indust ri al secu rit ies ma rket , and t he innovat ion o f  
new o rgani zat iona l fo rms a nd financia l pract ices can be a t t ributed to 
t he eme rgence and pe r fect ion of  the techniques o f  " st rategic finance . "  
" St rategic f inance" was di rected t owa rds the reorganizat ion and 
combinat ion of independently o rganized, a l ready exist ing p roduct ive 
capacity;  t he reconf igu rat ion of independent , though funct iona l ly 
related, product ive uni t s ;  and t he eliminat ion o f  the difficu l t ies 
c reated by the cha ract erist ics of  " s unkenes s "  and indivi s ibility of  
inves ted capit a l  in manufact ur ing enterpri ses organi zed a long 
pa rtne rship, propriet o rship , or primit ive corporate l ines . The mos t  
impor t ant feat u re of  the development of Amer ic a ' s f inanc ial  ma rkets 
during t he late n ineteenth cent u ry wa s not movement t owa rd a more 
"perfect " ma rket mechanism, or more e f fic ient f inanc ial  inst itut ions 
that were bet ter able to smoot h the flow of  capi t a l  between savers and 
invest ors . A mo re impo rtant innovat ion for Ame rican manufacturers was 
t he emergence of  a di f fe rent kind of ma rke t ,  in  which new t ypes of  
funct iona ries engaged in the excha nge of new t ypes of  f inancial  
inst rument s ,  the latter  of which we re created by bus inesses with 
dif ferent ends in view t han the financing of ongo ing operat ions o r  t he 
establ ishment of  new product i ve capacity . 
Whet he r  o r  not this interpreta tion will f i t  other indust ries , and 
whe ther or not t he re a re other indus t r ies whe re high f ixed-capital  
requi rement s ma ke the " te,.:tbook account " the mo re accu rat e ,  is yet t o  be 
det e rmined . I t  does not , howeve r ,  seem reasonable s imply to assume that 
this i s  s o . 
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SOURCES USED IN THE COMP I LATION OF THE FINANC IAL H I STORIES 
OF THE MEAT PACKING AND SUGAR REFINING INDUSTRIES 
Seconda ry sources used in compil ing the f inancial h i s to ry o f  the 
suga r re fining indust ry during 1 8 7 5 - 1 9 0 5  include A l f red Eichne r ,  � 
Emergence of Ol igopoly : Suga r Re fining as a Case Study ( Ba l t imore : The 
Johns Hopkins P ress , 1 9 6 9 ) , Jack S .  Mu llins ,  "The Suga r T rust : Henry 0 .  
Havemeyer and The American Suga r Refin ing Compa ny" ( Ph . D .  dis sertation,  
Unive rs ity o f  South Carolina,  1 9 6 4 ) , and Paul L .  Vogt , The Suga r 
Ref in ing Industry in the United States ( Publ icat ions o f  t he Univers ity 
o f  Pennsylvania Series in Political Economy and Public Law, no . 2 1 ,  
P h i ladelphia : Published for the Univers ity,  1 9 0 8 ) . Eichne r ' s wo rk,  
though rich in hist orical det a i l ,  has as its  prima ry focus the 
applicat ion of indust rial organization theory t o  t he suga r re f ining 
indus t ry bet ween 1 8 4 0 - 1 9 1 0 . Eichner includes extensive analysis o f  
changes i n  the st ruct ure and pe rformance of the indust ry t hat resulted 
f rom, a nd he lped produce changes in Ame rica ' s  lega l and pol i t ical 
envi ronment ; his  study wa s pa rticularly va luable in  enabl ing me to 
unde rstand the consequences of  lega l and legislat ive changes for t he 
f inanc i a l  deve lopment of the industry . Mu l l ins ' s tudy dea l s  prima r i ly 
with the role o f  individua l ent repreneurs , such as  Hen ry 0 .  Havemeye r 
and John E .  Sea rles,  i n  the hist ory of the suga r refin ing indus t ry . It 
contains much on t he role of such individua ls in t he financial 
development o f  the sugar t rust and the Ame rican Suga r Re f in ing Company . 
Vogt ' s  work consists  of  a contempora ry study of  t he suga r ref i ning 
indust ry,  and focuses on is sues t hat we re of  interest during t he t wenty 
years  fol lowing the format ion of the American Sugar Re f i ning Company, 
including the pos s ibi lity o f  exces sive capita l i zat ion and its e f fects on 
the behavior of the conso l ida t ion,  and the re lationship bet ween t he 
indus t ry ' s deve lopment and the suga r t a r i f f . These t h ree works contain 
valuable information on the f inanc ing o f  the suga r re f i ning indust ry, 
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but most o f  such informat i on is presented in order to facilitate 
analysis o f  problems that are only indi rectly re lated to f inanc i a l  
development . 
In compil ing the f inancial histo ry of t he meat packing industry,  I 
have rel ied heavily upon Mary Yeager ,  Competit ion and Regu l a t ion : The 
Development of Oligopoly in the Meat Pack ing I ndus t ry ( Greenwich : JAI 
P ress I nc . ,  1 9 8 1 ) . Like Eichner' s work,  Yeage r ' s book is both r ich in 
historical deta i l ,  and uses such det a i l  prima r i ly to ana lyze the 
development of the meat pa ck ing indust ry from an indus t ria l  o rganizat ion 
perspect i ve . In part icu la r ,  Yeage r i s  concerned with the nat u re o f  
intra-indust ry competit ive behavior among the la rge dressed beef 
shippers du ring t he late n ineteenth and early twent ieth centu ries , and 
t he behavior of o ligopolists  in gene ra l . Other seconda ry sou rces that 
a re cit ed ext ensively above include Lou is F .  Swi f t ,  The Yankee o f  the 
Ya rds : The Biographv of Gu stavus Franklin Swift ( New York : A .  w. Shaw 
Company, 1 92 7 ) and Rudolph A .  Clemen , The Amer ican Livestock and Meat 
I ndust ry ( New York : The Ronald Press Compa ny, 1 9 2 3 ) . Swift ' s biography 
of his  father has been useful insofar as it cont ains a f i rst-hand 
a ccount of many important aspects o f  the f inanc ia l  deve lopment of the 
indust ry, and of Swift & Co . in pa rticula r .  It does appea r ,  howeve r ,  to 
be t a inted hy the a f fect ion that Lou is Swift obviou s ly felt for his  
fathe r ,  and thus tends to focus on t hose features o f  Swi ft & Co . ' s 
development that pa int G .  F .  Swi ft in a favorable l ight . Clemen s ,  
perhaps t he most noteworthy historian of  the Ame rican l ivestock a n d  mea t  
indust ry, presents an account of the dressed beef indust ry that focuses 
on t he role of individual ent repreneu rs,  such as  P .  D .  Armo u r ,  Nel son 
Mor r i s ,  G .  H .  Hammond and G .  F .  Swif t ,  in t he indust ry' s development ; 
and t he technological changes that facilitated t he indust ry' s rapid 
expans ion . Clemen only dea ls briefly with the f inanc i a l  pract ices o f  
the early dressed bee f shippe rs . 
Wh i le these works fac i l i tate a det a i led underst anding o f  a number 
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o f  important aspects o f  the deve lopment o f  the meat packing and suga r 
refining indust r ies du ring the late nineteenth cent ury . they lack a 
det ai led and systematic account o f  the f inancia l deve lopments t hat we re 
an important concomitant o f  more obvious st ruct u ra l ,  o rganizat iona l ,  and 
technologica l changes . The task o f  gain ing an unde rst anding of  t he 
f inanc i a l  development o f  t he meat packing and s uga r refin ing indus t ries , 
as  i s  a l so t rue of  most othe r  nineteenth century manu facturers , is made 
di f ficult by the fact that few o f  the closely he ld f i rms which dominated 
most indust r ies du ring t h i s  t ime kept det a i led account s or re leased 
f inancial  informa t ion to the publ ic . As a result , the i n fo rmat ion that 
i s  commonly used t o  compile f inanc ial histories , such as  corporate 
reports and prospectuses , a re unavai lable for most nineteenth centu ry 
Ame rican manu factu rers . 
Fortunately,  the re a re a number of contempora ry accounts of the 
f inanc i a l  development of the meat pack ing and suga r re f in ing indust r ies 
that , when ta ken toget he r ,  enable one to desc r ibe in s ome det a i l  the 
f inanc ial histories of a numbe r of ma jor f i rms within each indust ry, and 
of the indust ries in gene ra l . A numbe r o f  the nineteenth century 
commercial c redit report s o f  R .  G .  Dun & Co . were used t o  out l ine the 
f inancial  development of several New York sugar refineries prior t o  the 
f o rma t i on of the suga r t rust in 1 8 8 7 ,  and of seve ra l  of t he l a rge 
dressed beef sh ippe rs prior t o  1 8 8 5 . Informat ion on the f inanc i a l  
a ff a i rs o f  t he pa rtnerships and closely held corpo rat ions that 
eventually  came t o  dominate each indust ry th rough horizont a l  and 
vert ical integrat i on is othe rwise pract ica l ly non-exis tent . 
Unfortunately,  t he reco rds of R .  G .  Dun & Co . that I was able to examine 
cease a round 1 8 90 . 
Nume rous is sues o f  t he Comme rcial and Financia l Chron i c le were 
used to det a i l  pa rt icu l a r  aspects of the later f inancial  histo ries of 
ma j o r  meat pack ing and suga r re f ining f i rms a fter  t hey became an item of 
general interest among investors . For the suga r re fining indust ry, 
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widespread coverage begins in 1 8 9 0 ,  with events leading up t o  t he 
format ion of  the American Suga r Refin ing Company . Cove rage was f a r  more 
sca rce f o r  t he meat pac k i ng industry, p�imarily due t o  t he fact that 
most of  t he ma j o r  dressed bee f sh ippe rs rema ined c losely held t hrough 
1 9 0 5 ,  the one exception being Swift & Co . The " Inve s t o rs S upplement , "  
published qua rterly by the Commercial and Financial Chronicle,  was 
pa rticularly use f u l ,  insofar  as  it  often conta i ned the ba lance shee t s  
f i led b y  corporat ions with the st ates i n  which they were cha rte red, and 
a det a i led index o f  a rt i cles fo r the preceding qua rter . 
Gove rnment documen t s  and reco rds of lega l proceedings used 
extens ively in compil ing the financia l history of  the suga r ref ining 
indu s t ry include t he Lexow Repo rt , the Ha �dwick Commit tee Hearings , the 
U . S  House Commit tee on Manu factures,  Repo rt on Trus t s ,  the U . S  
Indust rial  Commis s ion Report s ,  and t ranscripts f rom hea rings held in the 
U . S .  Dis t rict Court for the Southern District o f  New York in t he case of  
United States v .  t he American Suga r Re fin ing Co . et a l . ( a l l  o f  which 
a re cited above ) . These agencies we re able t o  obt a in vo lumes o f  
informat ion that otherwise would have been unava i lable due t o  the 
notorious reluctance of  t he suga r refiners to release any informat ion to 
t he public regarding even the most innocuous aspects  o i  the i r  
ope ra t ions . 
In compiling the f inanc ial histories o f  the l arge dressed beef 
sh ippers , I made extensive use of a repo �t compi led by t he U . S .  
Commis s ione r o f  Co rpo rat ions ( t he Ga r f ield Report ) and t he vo luminous , 
s ix pa rt Federal T rade Commi ss ion , Report on the Mea t  Pack ing Indust ry 
( a l l  cited above ) . Each cont a ins informa t ion t ha t  was given t o  t he 
government in confident ia l ity,  and would thus otherwise l i kely have been 
unavai l able . Informat ion presented in the Ga r f ield Report , f o r  
instance , was obt ai ned f rom t he la rge dres sed bee f shippers under a 
g rant o f  immunity extended by the U . S .  Depa rtment o f  Just ice,  which 
s tated that t he packers would be exempt f rom subsequer :: prosecu t i on on 
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the basis of s uch information as was surrendered to the Commissioner of 
Corporat i ons . 
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